The continuing evolution of policing: community oriented policing in the civilian sector and its applicability in the military environment

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THE CONTINUING EVOLUTION OF POLICING:
COMMUNITY ORIENTED POLICING IN THE CIVILIAN SECTOR
AND ITS APPLICABILITY IN THE MILITARY ENVIRONMENT

A Thesis
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Ralph George Schindler
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The history of urban policing paints an evolutionary picture describing the various forces that impinged on society's earliest efforts at public policing and led to numerous reforms culminating in what has been termed the professional model of policing. The dynamics of an ever-changing urban society continued to present new challenges to policing and have driven police administrators and politicians to seek new methods of responding to society's criminal element. The evolution continues today with our latest response to the problem of crime; namely, Community Oriented Policing. By far the most popular movement in policing today, COP attempts to change the very culture of the modern urban police department through a structural as well as functional reorganization of that department. The goal is to tighten the bonds between police officer and citizen thereby involving community residents in solving their particular neighborhood problems. Initial results depict a broad mix of successes with intermittent failures; yet, the movement continues to gain popularity in nearly all quarters including many of the nation's Air Force communities. While numerous installations begin implementing components of COP, there is some concern they are doing so without questioning the applicability of COP in the military community. Several unique characteristics of the Air Force community diminish the need for COP while at the same time making those communities ideal for implementation of COP tactics. In particular, the strong informal social controls existing at most AF installations strongly reduce the need for formal police controls. An exploratory survey
suggests that while many Air Force Security Police units are committed to COP, the individuals working the programs may not fully understand all that COP entails or that Air Force SP units actually began performing many community oriented services years before the COP movement took hold. Further research into which areas of COP would benefit the military community the most and which programs are not necessary is recommended. Additionally, close monitoring of civilian programs and efforts at community policing, especially those in rural America is encouraged.
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It was once noted that “crime should have been added to death and taxes as inevitable facts of life (Stephens, 1992, p. 19).” Indeed, the problem of crime seems to be as enduring as humankind itself. While one need not search very far before uncovering ample evidence of the perpetual nature of criminal activity, historically speaking, our responses to crime have varied widely over time, and as Sherman (1995) points out, the phenomenon we know as police patrolling was relatively unknown during the past thousand years and before the substantial police reforms of early British police history, citizens, in one form or another, generally policed themselves. In spite of historical facts such as these, it is easy to understand how Americans today, who have known no other system of criminal justice, assume that the modern image of policing, perpetuated and stereotyped in the media, is as abiding as crime itself. In the quest for crime control, responses have been varied and often hastily concocted in response to some pressing critical issue—only to be repudiated just as quickly when results were not speedily forthcoming. One analogy offered compares society’s responses to the crime problem to that of crash dieting. Every now and then, someone touts a new “miracle cure” which turns out to be anything but a cure, and in many cases only serves to exacerbate the problem (Walker, 1994; p. 12). Whether the solution is selective incapacitation, determinate sentencing, a war on crime, a war on drugs, or any one of a number of contemporary solutions to the crime problem, our responses seem more like
crisis management than thoughtfully proposed and researched programs of crime fighting (Byrne, Lurigio, & Petersilia, 1992).

Politicians and police practitioners themselves are partly to blame for this frenzied search for a solution to the crime problem. As pointed out by Cochran (1992), a staple of most politician’s running platforms is to “get tough on crime” which, of course, implies that we are not yet tough enough. In addition, getting tough usually implies attempting new law enforcement techniques, reducing the number of “technicalities” which may be used by criminal defense lawyers, adding more police to the streets, or otherwise “unleashing the cops,” none of which, research has shown, will do much to reduce the crime problem (Walker, 1994). Others have pointed out that police administrators have become quite adept at burning the candle at both ends; that is, both rising as well as falling crime rates have long been successfully used by police administrators as justification for more police funding in spite of the fact that available research has shown that police, in and of themselves, cannot do much about the crime problem (Williams, F. P. III, & Wagoner, C. P., 1992). While one would suspect that people would eventually realize that most crime repression programs have had little effect on the crime problem, Cochran (1992) points out that the symbolic nature of each new program overshadows the lack of substance with the previous programs. It is suggested that, as long as politicians and practitioners keep churning out new laws and programs faster than the failings of past programs can be comprehended, the end to the furious search for an effective response will remain out of sight.
When it comes to law enforcement, the response to crime drawing the most attention over the past several years is Community Oriented Policing (COP). It has been “touted as the only form of policing available for anyone who seeks to improve police operations, management, or relations with the public” (Rosenbaum & Lurigio, 1994). In addition, as Rosenbaum, Yeh, and Wilkinson (1994) have pointed out, it would seem those critical of the change to community policing are becoming somewhat of an endangered species as “police chiefs and public officials have stopped asking questions and have started jumping on the bandwagon” (p. 331). Citing President Clinton’s Fiscal 1994 budget, which includes $50 million for state and local government implementation of COP programs, Roberg (1994) points out that even though there is little, if any, hard, empirical evidence that COP reduces crime, it “appears to be a done deal” (p. 254). Results from a National Center For Community Policing 1993 survey support these conclusions by demonstrating that 42 percent of all large departments (those serving jurisdictions of 50,000 or more) and 98 percent of small departments surveyed (those serving jurisdictions of less than 50,000) reported having some kind of COP program (Trojanowicz, 1994). More recent statistics show that the movement’s popularity is growing unabated: Department of Justice, NIJ, figures show that at the end of 1994, out of 15,000 departments which serve jurisdictions of 50,000 or more, a full 9,000 applied for federal funding in support of their ongoing or planned community policing programs. Certainly, Kelling’s (1988) comments about COP being a “... quiet revolution [which] is reshaping American policing” seem right on target (p. 1).
This “quiet revolution” has not gone unnoticed by the nation’s military leaders either. Ever vigilant in detecting evolving police technologies or procedures which may benefit military communities. US Air Force (USAF) Security Police commanders have already implemented components of COP at various military installations throughout the country. More are planned for the future, and while this interest in COP is certainly laudable, assuming it has merit as an effective response to the crime problem, there is some risk involved in jumping on the COP bandwagon without prior assessment of its need or applicability within the USAF community. For one, as more and more USAF Security Police (SP) units feel the need to get in line with the growing movement, some of these units will undoubtedly attempt to do so even though they may be less-than-adequately equipped to successfully manage the necessary changes. Because the existing research on community policing’s effectiveness already constitutes a mixed bag, continued program failures, outside of or within the military community, could prove problematic for the movement’s life expectancy. The result may be program abortions even though failures may stem from poor implementation strategies rather than from the use of faulty concepts.

**Problem Statement and Overview**

Before any USAF SP commander embarks on a quest to implement community policing it would seem wise to assess the logical fit of community policing with the military community and its unique culture. Is the military already doing community policing but under a different name? What aspects of community policing are
applicable to military communities? Does the philosophy underlying community policing mesh with that of traditional military police work? To the extent that community policing would require structural changes within departments, is the military ready or able to implement the necessary changes? How much change is required by community policing in USAF SP departmental culture and philosophy in order to be successful in the military? What community policing programs could be effectively used by military commanders? Finally, are there any lessons to be learned from military policing programs and philosophy which would benefit civilian departments as they endeavor to implement community policing? These constitute just some of the questions which need to be addressed in order to afford any community policing effort the best possible chance for success.

In an attempt to answer the foregoing questions, three areas of concern for USAF Security Police (SP) commanders and leaders will be explored in an effort to determine the potential value of COP for military communities as well as identify any possible risks or other areas of particular concern. First, the question of a need for a complete philosophical shift to COP within the USAF military community environment will be addressed. Next, the overall fit of the COP model of policing and the military policing model will be examined to see if some restructuring and reculturalization of the military police organization is necessary before COP has any chance of successful implementation. Finally, the possibility of a segmented implementation of COP in the military community will be explored; that is, an attempt will be made to determine
which components, if any, of COP have the greatest applicability (and, hence the

greatest chance for success) in the military environment.

Chapter Two will provide an overview of our traditional model of policing including an analysis of the driving forces which forged (and are continuing to forge) this model. Chapter Three will focus on the COP model beginning with a description of some of the major motivating forces and following with a definition of COP as well as a brief review of several contemporary efforts. It is hoped that this portrait of COP will clearly illustrate the magnitude of the effort level required for a true shift in departmental culture prerequisite to full implementation of COP. In Chapter Four, a sketch of the tradition of military policing will be presented, focusing on its roots, mission, and similarities (as well as dissimilarities) with the traditional model of policing. In addition, the question of a need for COP in the Air Force will be addressed focusing on the unique environment of the military community. The major reasons why COP may have some implementation problems will be discussed along with some considerations which might be addressed in pursuing COP implementation in the Air Force. Finally, an outline of the results of some exploratory research into what is currently being done at several USAF bases with respect to COP will be presented. The examples presented will further demonstrate how a selective application of COP in the military community may be the method most likely to meet with success. Chapter Five will summarize the research and include some discussion about, and recommendations for, future inquiry and research.
Methodology and Limitations

A literature review will provide historical and contemporary information concerning the development and current status of the various philosophies of policing. A number of writers have elaborated on the roots of contemporary policing, beginning with the British foundations and continuing with the American adaptations. These writers discuss the political, economical, and social forces of the times which served as catalysts for change (Crank, 1994; Critchley, 1967; Moore & Kelling, 1983; Sherman 1995; Silver, 1967; Sparrow, Moore, & Kennedy, 1990; Trojanowicz & Bucqueroux, 1990). Similarly, the literature is replete with explanations of the forces which have, in part, helped to shape the current trend toward community policing (Crank, 1994; Eck & Rosenbaum, 1994; Roberg, 1994; Rosenbaum & Lurigio, 1994; Turner & Wiatrowski, 1995).

While Trojanowicz & Bucqueroux (1990) stand out as leaders in defining community oriented policing, there are numerous others who address the issues of philosophy and definitions (Brown, 1989; Capowich & Roehl, 1994; Greene & Decker, 1989; Kratcoski & Dukes, 1995; Rosenbaum & Lurigio, 1994; Sparrow, 1988; Sparrow, Moore, & Kennedy, 1990; Walker, 1994;). In addition to describing or attempting to explain what community policing entails, others, meanwhile, have also focused on evaluation of existing programs as well as the myriad of implementation issues associated with changing a well-ingrained police culture (Brown, 1989; Capowich & Roehl, 1994; Greene & Decker, 1989; Greene, Bergman, & McLaughlin, 1994; Kratcoski & Dukes, 1995; McLaughlin & Donahue, 1995; Moore, 1994;
Murphy, 1988; Rosenbaum & Lurigio, 1994; Sadd & Grinc, 1994; Skolnick &
Bayley, 1988; Thurman & Bogen, 1993; Walker, 1994; Weisel & Eck, 1994;
Wilkinson & Rosenbaum, 1994; Wycoff & Skogan, 1994). Finally, the concept of
community and its inherent limitations with regard to an organized response to crime is
addressed by Buerger (1994).

Because there remains some ambiguity surrounding community policing and its
precise definition, any material presented and conclusions drawn from that material will
necessarily be based on the definition presented by the author for this work. With
regard to the history and tradition of military policing, the literature is scant; therefore,
many of the observations made concerning USAF SP traditions and practices are drawn
from the author’s own personal experience as a USAF SP officer covering a period of
approximately nine years.

An exploratory survey will draw information from USAF SP personnel to
formulate a picture of what is being done today regarding community policing, in an
try to measure the extent of the movement’s popularity at the unit level. This
survey will be conducted by telephone and will consist of a sample drawn from the
population composed of all USAF SP units within the continental United States. The
results of this survey should provide some useful examples of what is currently being
done in various military police units or what is projected for short-term implementation.
The survey results which will be used in the thesis are not intended to be a
representative example of all SP units. Differences in laws, customs, and jurisdictional
authority makes generalization beyond the United States impossible, while differences
between units' missions, locations, and headquarters-generated operational guidelines makes comparison across units within the United States difficult as well. Therefore, the nature and intent of the survey is to discover which (if any) COP activities are being performed by a variety of units, with the results used strictly for descriptive purposes.

In this work, no attempt is made to gauge the ability of military personnel (from an aptitude or attitude perspective) to make the change to community oriented policing or to unnecessarily compare the military with their civilian counterparts in terms of success probabilities. The differences between military and civilian police units, in terms of composition, mission, and environment, are judged as being too great to make any realistically meaningful comparisons.
Chapter 2
Traditional Policing

The traditional model of policing (or professional model as it has been also termed), has evolved over a number of years in response to a variety of factors. Because the community policing model is somewhat of a natural outgrowth or progression of the traditional model, we begin with a review of the traditional model and briefly describe how it came into being, including some of the most significant historical social, economic, technological, and political factors which influenced its evolution.

From Public Servant To Professional Crime Fighter:
The Evolution of the Traditional Model of Policing

The professional, or traditional model of policing is characterized by a quasi-military command and control structure which seeks to maximize the strengths of police officers as professional crime fighters. The typical modern police department is a highly centralized organization where decision making is mostly vertical and unidirectional (top-down); bureaucratic in nature, it employs multiple levels of supervision and management, detailed rules and prescriptive regulations, and seeks to package jobs into neat, simple sets of specific responsibilities. This structure and form of management has as its primary purpose the unification of effort toward the commonly defined goal of crime control. It also affords a strong mechanism for maintaining strict accountability of its officers, and is designed to promote the type of productivity on
which the relative success of the organization is measured: numbers of arrests, calls handled, and containment of Part I Index Crime rates. The evolution of this structure and the management style which accompanies it solved a myriad of problems faced by early American urban police departments. A brief review of some of the major developments which helped forge this traditional model of policing will provide a better understanding of its underlying philosophy.

Public Policing: A New Response To An Old Problem

To the British of the time, the establishment of the Metropolitan Police District in 1829 represented a profound divergence from the status quo. Previously, the responsibility for policing rested primarily with the people themselves, who, relying on a system in which non-paid volunteers served as watchmen, would respond to the hue and cry and band together in apprehending violators of the law. Citizens were grouped together into tithes, hundreds, shires, and parishes and then held responsible for the capture of criminals who came from their various groups (Critchley, 1967). As the country became more industrialized and the populations of the largest cities grew, crime and disorder also increased and posed a greater set of problems to citizens and industries alike. In an effort to contain the criminal element and minimize its impact on business, various private police organizations formed, the earliest of these being Henry Fielding’s Bow Street Runners; however, being mostly reactionary in nature, the Runners’ success in investigating and solving crimes still hinged on public involvement (Moore & Kelling, 1983). Increasing urbanization and industrialization continued to
exacerbate the crime problem as the population of the poor and seemingly lawless, known as the “dangerous classes,” began to swell in the most highly populated cities.

After nearly a century of attempted reform, society became increasingly alarmed with, and aware of, the encroaching disorder and the ineffectiveness of the traditional parish system. Thus the stage was set for change and a more radical response to the crime problem. Silver (1967) points out that complaints of the day regarding rising crime and disorder in London were strikingly similar to the contemporary lamenting we hear as people anguish over how best to handle our own urban crime problems. The perception was that crime and disorder had simply taken on new dimensions and the “traditional” methods of the time appeared inadequate to deal with them. Public recourse in handling the problem left much to be desired: either rely on an ineffective and fragmented system of watchmen and private police or turn to the militia which had proven itself all too “bloodily effectual” in its past encounters with disorder (Sparrow, Moore, & Kennedy, 1990).

Against this setting of disorder and the sense of desperation for a solution to the crisis, Sir Robert Peel brought into being the London Municipal Police Act of 1829 which for the first time drew together the efforts of policing under one head in an attempt to organize and professionalize the fight against crime. Critchley (1967) points out that Peel’s task was not a simple one. The general citizenry and parliament had vociferously resisted previous attempts at organizing police forces on the grounds that the concept ran counter to everything then believed about a citizen’s right to liberty. The fact that the Act passed without any dissent (Trojanowicz & Bucqueroux, 1990)
suggests that a pervasive belief existed that *something* had to be done, some other response was needed, with regard to the growing crime problem. Critchley (1967) continues, citing the convergence of a variety of factors, over an extended period of time, as leading up to the opportune moment for passage of the Metropolitan Police Act. These factors included the work of the Fielding brothers nearly a century earlier, which raised the level of awareness about crime and its implications; the works of Colquhoun and Bentham and the influence they had on public opinion; the lost confidence in the existing parish system with its wholly incompetent watchmen; a Prime Minister (Wellington) who favored using police forces rather than conventional army troops; and the political opposition being “bought off” (p. 49). Silver (1967) notes that the change was seen as necessary and, in fact, was welcomed by most of the upper, or “propertied,” class as it largely relieved them of the day-to-day responsibility for policing while still allowing them control over who was to be policed and how the policing was to be done. In addition, whatever fears the upper class may have had of losing liberty at the hands of a public police force was more than offset by the increasing lack of civility on the part of the “dangerous classes.”

The newly founded response to crime was not without its problems and growing pains; a fact not surprising in light of the many obstacles and problems faced by the fledgling “Met.” The citizenry’s general opposition to any formal organization of a police force was compounded by the fact that, as Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux (1990) point out, many of the newly appointed constables came from the ranks of the old watchmen and brought their corrupt practices with them. In addition to the disrespect
shown the police by the citizens, low pay tended to magnify the temptations to give in to corruption and also resulted in a high rate of turnover. Finally, the sheer demands of the job (keeping order in an environment full of disorder) further exacerbated the problem of maintaining good workers. In the end, however, it was the Met’s persistence and demonstrated restraint (in contrast to the military mentality of “shoot first, ask questions later”), and the eventual control of the “riotous element” which caused public support to eventually swing in favor of the Bobbies and allow this new response to crime to continue developing.

America’s Response: Following England’s Lead

If the British reformers had little in the way of precedent upon which to build their police organizations, the colonists in America had even less, so it was only natural that America’s urban response to a growing crime problem was largely patterned after the British response. Earlier efforts favored the watchman system and, as in England, this system soon became ineffective as urban Americans became afflicted with the same problems endemic to urban London. The formal effort to professionalize the police force, then, generally followed London’s lead, with one notable exception: The British system was set up under a central office which reported to a member of the Prime Minister’s Cabinet, while the American police departments were set up under individual municipalities and therefore were less insulated from the corrupting influences of local party politics. Not surprisingly, this vulnerability was exploited by politicians who
brazenly used the police as political tools in furthering their own ambitions and agendas:

“Police chiefs came and went with mayors, precincts were laid out to be contiguous with political wards, and precinct captains worked hand in hand with ward leaders. Power within departments was extremely decentralized, with precinct captains directing, hiring, and firing their men, often at the behest of local party captains (whose frequent close connection with crime bosses often meant that convicted felons ended up as police officers). When the mayoralty changed parties, it was not unusual for the entire police department to be fired and replaced by supporters of the new victors.” (Sparrow et al., 1990, p. 33)

The opportunities for corruption were magnified by the fact that police officers routinely carried out numerous functions, such as issuing licenses for a wide variety of businesses, all of which created a system where it was nearly impossible to avoid corruption: “Even honest cops who where not tempted by monetary bribes could do little to defy a system where such licenses were dispensed as political favors” (Trojanowicz & Bucqueroux, 1990, p. 48). Early American police thus found themselves wearing a variety of hats depending on the needs of the situation; with few other public agencies around, the police became the ones to turn to when faced with nearly any problem, crime related or not. Whatever benefits may have been derived from the service orientation of the early American police were soon overshadowed by a growing sense of uneasiness; that is, owing to the seemingly haphazard organizational structure of most mid-1800s police departments and the instability of their political supporters, people naturally questioned the authority of the police and eyed them with a measure of suspicion (Moore & Kelling, 1983). Sparrow et al. (1990) likewise point out that in spite of the positive aspects of the police system in the middle to latter half of
the 19th century, the demand for police reform continued to grow as corruption and abuses of power became increasingly widespread. Three of the more significant social issues which spurred the early reform movement were a perceived lack of crime control, the view that the police were major obstacles in the way of political reform, and the perception of many that the “moral pollution” within the cities was a direct result of police refusal to enforce vice laws (Sparrow et al. 1990, p. 34; Moore & Kelling, 1983). Indeed, it seemed that police corruption became as significant a concern as the crime problem itself, thus setting the stage for continuing reform with regard to the way cities were policed.

While the reformers’ developments gave the police more power in defining their role and function in society as well as clarifying the response to crime, it did not give them complete autonomy from political influence. Subsequent efforts at reform often came in the form of blue ribbon panels which focused more on other aspects of police corruption. The Lexow commission in 1894 exposed some of the well-ingrained police corruption in New York City, and these findings served as a catalyst for numerous other commission investigations throughout the United States. Years later, the Wickersham Commission further solidified reform efforts and, pointing to the lack of competence and training of most police officers, gave renewed motivation to the concept of police professionalization. The dynamic efforts of leaders like J. Edgar Hoover and August Volmer helped formulate the framework for what would come to be accepted as the role and function of police in society. Hoover, especially, taught reform-era administrators the benefit of defining one’s role and selling that to the public rather than allowing
others determine what one’s role should be (Trojanowicz & Bucqueroux, 1990).

Technology (most significantly the advent of the patrol car and mobile radios), the 911 system, and expanding use of the Uniform Crime Reports all continued to solidify the image and role of police as society’s professional crime fighters and our first line of defense (and offense) against the omnipresent problem of crime.

In short, industrialization and urbanization during the 19th and 20th centuries created crime and disorder problems of a magnitude and type never before encountered. Traditional law enforcement responses of the time simply were not effective and, once the problems encountered grew sufficiently large enough to create a feeling that something had to be changed, reforms were initiated. Later changes and modifications to policing were similarly driven by the perception of problems which the existing system did not seem to handle. Once the principle role of crime control was formed, and the image of the professional crime fighter created, the police became less and less involved with services and duties not directly related to law enforcement, and any changes (including those technologically driven) were pursued largely in order to enhance the police’s ability to fit that image and enhance the organizational structure and management style which had been espoused. The overarching factor involved throughout the various stages of police reform has been the “need factor.” Without a strong impetus for change which this need factor provided, the reform efforts would most likely have stalled, lacking the necessary momentum required to overcome the considerable inertia presented by the reigning status quo.
Turning Back To The Community

Some may argue that community policing is taking us back to policing’s roots; however, when viewing the history of policing from an evolutionary perspective, one senses that current trends appear to represent a continuation of that evolution rather than a swinging of the pendulum back to another era. While the changes that led to the professional model of policing were necessary and fitting for the time in which they occurred, some of the professional model’s inherent weaknesses became more apparent over time when faced with a perpetually changing environment. In particular, the rift between the police and the public whom they served (which began to grow as patrol officers moved from the foot beat to the car) grew wider as the police and citizens became increasingly distant and distrustful of each other (Moore & Kelling, 1983). As problems with police-community relations increased to crisis proportions, the search for a response to this new problem began to gain momentum.

As such, the ongoing search for alternatives to the professional model of policing generally has followed the same pattern of change witnessed during the early reform years; that is, the current attempts at community policing are in response to a new set of challenges resulting from some ineffectiveness of traditional policing. Thus, in a sense, perhaps the community policing movement is multi-directional: In part, the pendulum is swinging back to a day when patrol officers were more involved, one-on-one, with the citizens whom they serve; however, in another sense, policing is simply proceeding with its evolution as society continues to grapple with the ever-growing and
changing problem of crime control. A brief examination of the more important factors leading up to the current shift toward community policing will help further clarify just how public and political pressures combine to create an environment conducive to change.

The Beginning of The End

Even as the professionalization of policing seemed to reach its zenith in terms of rapid response and the crime fighter image reformers had worked so hard to create, the public began to question the effectiveness of its police forces (Moore & Kelling, 1989). Aside from the perception that crime was growing rampant during the 1960s, Crank (1994) cites several concrete events which brought the legitimacy of the primary police mission (protecting the public and fighting crime) under question. Crank includes (1) increasing urban unrest and widespread protests of the Vietnam War, which tended to show a police force unprepared to handle these situations; (2) assassinations of the Kennedy brothers and Martin Luther King, Jr.; (3) Chicago Police Department shootings of Black Panther leaders; (4) the 1964 and 1968 presidential elections, which spotlighted the street crime issue for the first time on a national level; (5) the American Bar Foundation’s study of the criminal justice system, which was published in the 1960s and exposed a police force that did not apply the law in an equal manner; (6) Miranda and other Supreme Court rulings, which bolstered the growing distrust of a police force perceived as abusive of its discretionary power; (7) and, finally, the highly publicized Kerner Commission and President’s Crime Commission reports that
summarized and formally stated many problems endemic to policing of the time while at the same time making an official call for drastic reform. The combination of these factors created a crisis sufficiently strong that people began to "... question the fundamental purpose of the [police] organization itself" (Crank, 1994, p. 327).

Similar to the call for change which preceded police reform around the turn of the century, the 1960s movement was also based on a perception of problems within policing and a perceived ineffectiveness of current police strategies. No single event triggered these changes, rather it was the culmination of numerous incidents which finally resulted in a sense of crisis and the perception of a social problem significant enough to demand change. The President’s Crime Commission findings and recommendations for a shift in police strategy were based on data gleaned from previous studies on policing and the impetus provided by the political and public climate which were clamoring for change. This official call for change was important if for no other reason than it served as the catalyst for police introspection and further research.

The President’s Crime Commissions’ call to turn the police back to the communities by improving police-community relations spurred some practitioners to seek alternative approaches in dealing with the joint problems of crime and social unrest. Some of the earliest efforts involved Team Policing—a program designed to get officers back on the beat and foster greater communication between officers and community residents. However, by and large, these efforts failed because of mid-level management resistance and a general preoccupation on the part of the police with what
has been called a “means over ends syndrome”; that is, the police were more concerned with appearing to be doing something in the way of community relations rather than trying to actually solve some community problems (Roberg, 1994; Rosenbaum & Lurigio, 1994; p. 303). Most other early attempts at improving community-police relations similarly failed because of internal resistance with departments only going through the motions, or faulty implementation tied to a poor fit between organizational structure and program implementation. Rather than investigate the reasons for poor results, the tendency was to discredit the entire idea; thus, early attempts at alternative models for policing became collateral casualties of failed demonstration projects (Rosenbaum & Lurigio, 1994). Whatever the causes of these failures, the tide of change continued to move along, occasionally injected with new life from anecdotal success stories or, more significantly, some highly publicized events which again focused on the negative aspect of traditional policing and re-invigorated the cry for change.

Continuing Changes

Of the more consequential events which kept the ball rolling in the quest for crime control alternatives were the Kansas City Preventive Patrol and Rapid Response experiments of the early 1970s. While previous efforts at reform may have been hampered by a less-than-enthusiastic cadre of police administrators who dabbled with change (at least, cosmetic change) as a result of political and media pressure, the results of the Kansas City experiments virtually destroyed some of the more basic assumptions
of the professional model and gave administrators even less reason to hang on to the status quo (Turner & Wiatrowski, 1995). The fact that the police operated for so long assuming preventive patrol and rapid response to be the cornerstones of policing (and, hence, crime control) is not surprising when one considers the underlying raison d' être for traditional patrol procedures. The prevailing style and procedures were adopted primarily because they dovetailed so nicely with the accepted management style, organizational structure, and adopted role of the police departments and not because they had been empirically tested and found to be effective. The impact of the Kansas City experiments was that they narrowed down the general complaints of police ineffectiveness and for the first time objectively pointed to areas where police could make changes. Their collective strength lay not in exposing a new alternative, but rather in demonstrating to practitioners and researchers alike what didn’t work.

Whereas public opinion and commission findings generalized problems with policing and indicated change was necessary, focused research provided greater insight and produced more internal motivation for police departments to make substantive changes.

Some other events which continued to fuel the fire of change include the continued politicization of crime brought to center stage with catchy slogans such as the “War on Drugs” and the highlighting of cases such as Willie Horton; media exposure about corruption or other problems in some prominent police departments (Philadelphia, Los Angeles); and controversial police tactics such as the “bombing” of the MOVE headquarters in Philadelphia and the Rodney King beating in Los Angeles. In addition, while recent commissions charged with investigating urban police
departments (Philadelphia in 1987 and Los Angeles in 1991) cite the ineffectiveness of traditional policing in dealing with the crime problem, the *events* which triggered the investigations revolved around the use of force (incidentally, against a minority) and the endless complaints about police *inequity* in dealing with minorities (Eck & Rosenbaum, 1994).

Again, similar forces are seen as precipitating the change cycle: shifts in police policy with regard to the appropriate function for police have been largely fueled by significant events which capture the heart and imagination of the public. Where research has been applied to changes in police strategy, it has followed the cry for change and has filled a more indirect, albeit an important, role by demonstrating what doesn’t work. But moving from what doesn’t work to what does work is much more difficult—both in the realm of theory as well as in practice. Efforts in community policing throughout the 1980s and into the ‘90s were grounded more in ideas and anecdotal evidence than in any solid, theory-based research. Nevertheless, the momentum grows unabated as federal funding for police initiatives is increasingly being tied to community policing (U.S. Dept Of Justice Fact Sheet, 1994) and COP continues to wind its way down the road to becoming a veritable institution (Crank, 1994).

**A Working Definition**

Since the time of the President’s Crime Commission reports, there have been numerous forays into aspects of community policing, some of which have met with success while others have failed. There has also been considerable confusion over just
what constitutes COP. At the center of the confusion is the predominate failure to differentiate between strategy and tactics. While COP in its purest form encompasses a complete philosophy and therefore transcends tactical programs, these programs nevertheless have captured most of the attention. Of the more enduring experiments which have somehow survived the years of trial and error and remain the most prevalent in the literature, mini-stations, foot/bike patrol, Neighborhood Watch and other crime prevention programs, civilianization, and permanent beat assignment of officers are the most well known and used.

Tactical Programs

Mini-stations are perhaps the most direct effort at structural decentralization of the police department. By bringing the police department directly to the affected neighborhoods, the mini or sub-stations provide community residents with greater access to the police. The underlying hope is to foster rapport, encourage citizen involvement, and afford the police officers that have been assigned to the mini-station greater familiarity with their assigned beats (Trojanowicz & Bucqueroux, 1990). While most mini-stations are set up to operate in fixed structures, some cities have experimented using converted vans that have the added advantage of being able to move throughout the community on a set rotation (Sadd & Girn, 1994). In both cases, departments have solicited successfully for citizen volunteers who fulfill various administrative tasks in the mini-stations.
Similar to mini-stations, foot/bike patrols are used in an effort to bridge the gap between patrol officers and community residents. The patrol officer on foot or bicycle becomes more accessible to the average citizen than the officer operating his/her patrol vehicle. Likewise, once patrol officers are out of their vehicles, they are more likely to solicit help from and engage in conversation with community residents.

Neighborhood Watch and similar crime prevention programs, civilianization of certain police responsibilities, and permanent beat assignment of officers are all used to maximize the effectiveness of the primary community policing initiatives discussed above. Neighborhood Watch extends the eyes and ears of the police department by increasing the number of people who report crime or potential problem areas. The key again is citizen involvement which is further facilitated through the permanent assignment of officers to a specific beat. With time, the familiarity of the officers reassures community residents and increases citizen involvement (Sadd & Grinc, 1994). Civilianization of certain administrative functions within police departments frees up sworn officers who are then assigned to the community where they can have a more direct impact on community policing efforts. Each of these programs has the overarching goal of citizen involvement based on the premise that only through community organization and citizen support can crime be effectively curtailed. While the evidence to support this notion is still somewhat scant, some have reasoned that this may be due to insufficient research (Eck & Rosenbaum, 1994), and that there seem to be at least five solid ways that community residents can positively effect efforts at crime control. First, citizens can watch and report more actively. Second, they can actively
patrol and identify problem areas for police officers. Third, they can alter their own behavior and thereby make the community more crime resistant. Fourth, the united voice of citizens can provide the necessary pressure on politicians and others in power in order to affect necessary changes. Fifth, citizens can authorize officers to act in their behalf rather than making the task of the police officer more difficult by second-guessing and criticizing police actions.

COP Strategy

However varied and expansive the definitions of community policing may be, Moore (1994) points out that it is important to keep a proper perspective on what community policing is and what it is not. He suggests it is more than operational programs, reforms in administration, or situational tactics; rather, community policing is all of the above and then some; in short, it is nothing less than “strategic innovation” (p. 290). Community policing then, is better seen as “a collection of strategies that share a common philosophy or set of principles about the desired role of police in society” (Rosenbaum & Lurigio, 1994, p. 302). That shared philosophy emphasizes police accountability and responsiveness to the communities which they serve, a commitment to helping communities help themselves, and seeing the police-citizen relationship in a more interactive light (Skogan, 1990, as cited in Rosenbaum & Lurigio, 1994).

While increased citizen involvement is one primary goal of community policing efforts, and the programs that have been described are some of the most prevalent
means used to solicit that involvement, none of them, *individually*, constitutes community policing. Some have even suggested that existing research demonstrates that if community policing is implemented as an “isolated change within the police department it will not work” (Sadd & Grinc, 1994, p. 41). Others have attempted to show how some of the more popular tactics which are often defined as community policing are nothing more than an attempt to use a different tool in the context of a traditional policing strategy (Cordner, 1994). Yet true community policing, at a minimum, is supported by, even designed in concert with, residents of the affected communities. Indeed, community policing radically alters the status quo by changing the role of police officer from “crime fighter” to “problem solver” and the relationship between citizens and officers to one of “partnership” (Sadd & Grinc, 1994). By casting the police officer in a more generalist role, COP reduces the specialization of the police officer that was generated in the reform years and perfected throughout the professionalization era. This generalist role goes beyond targeting only those problems that are perceived as directly related to crime control and illuminates other factors that impact a community’s quality of life. The COP philosophy attempts to insert the police officer into the community and make him or her a part of the community in hopes of creating the type of environment found in many rural towns:

Rural and small town police are closer to their community than are urban police. Rural and small town police are a part of the local culture and community, whereas urban police tend to form a subculture and move apart from the community. . . Urban police tend to be efficient; rural police tend to be effective. (Weisheit et al., 1994. p. 554)
In this type of environment, the police officers, as well as all citizens and any other public service agents who interact in the community, are among those who make up the fabric of the community. Thus COP attempts to create and foster a sense of community that transcends geographic boundaries. This aspect of community policing has led some to propose that the best way to distinguish the real thing from programs merely masquerading as such, is to examine whether implementation efforts have raised the level of community participation and, ultimately, increased citizen satisfaction with police services. (Skolnick & Bayley, 1988).

COP is also not the same as Problem Oriented Policing (POP). Capowich & Roehl (1994), point out POP and COP both came into being at about the same time and are just as often seen working together as not. While both COP and POP involve problem solving (that is, they both shift the locus of police activity from a means to an ends orientation), COP first and foremost focuses on the community and any problems endemic to that community, whereas POP identifies problems first and then includes the relevant community in its solution. In this light, it may be argued that POP becomes another of the many tactical programs that fall under the umbrella of COP. Finally, a parade of scholars and practitioners have enumerated the identifying details of community policing and the distinction between it and other programs which commonly are seen as community policing (Brown, 1989; Greene & Decker, 1989; Kratcoski & Dukes, 1995; Rosenbaum & Lurigio, 1994; Sparrow et al., 1990; Trojanowicz & Bucqueroux, 1990).
Distinguishing between strategy and tactics when discussing COP is one of the primary problems associated with implementation of community policing. More than merely a new program or tactic for police officers to use in their role as crime fighters, it involves an almost paradigmatic shift in that role. It encourages proactivity instead of reactivity, problem solving instead of symptom managing, line officer innovation instead of dogmatic rule following. Whereas tactics merely change the way police respond to crime, strategy seeks to change the entire relationship between police and citizens by making them partners in identifying and solving community problems. The more effectively police officers can be integrated as members of the community, the better this new partnership with community residents is expected to function.

But in order to effectively activate this new role in police officers and the citizen-police partnership, there are concomitant changes which must occur in both the organizational structure and the very culture of any department seeking to implement COP. Before examining these management implications, however, a brief review of several studies will highlight some of the ambiguity surrounding the effectiveness of community policing while at the same time more clearly substantiating the notion that COP is more than just a passing fad—that it is, a concept with considerable staying power.

**Effectiveness Review**

As the brief description of community policing above demonstrates, the concept covers a broad realm of activities, strategies, and fundamental changes in the perception
of crime. As such, it is no surprise that there has been some degree of difficulty in its successful implementation. Regardless, practitioners and researchers alike continue to work at bringing the reality of community policing a bit closer. As a result of the growing popularity of community policing, reports of successful (and failed) implementation efforts from a variety of perspectives abound. While the attempt to synthesize these efforts is not the main purpose of this paper, there are some valuable lessons to be learned from even a cursory glance at some of the existing reports.

Sadd & Grinc (1994), in a report on community policing efforts across eight cities including, among others New York, Houston, and Portland, OR, found widely diverging results from the various projects with respect to drug trafficking, drug-related crimes, fear of crime, community-police relations, and community involvement. While some cities reported marked differences in drug problems and fear of crime, others did not, and all cities showed relatively little impact of the programs on community involvement. The only area of considerable agreement was that of police-community relations, which all cities noted as being at least somewhat better. The evaluators attributed the differences to varying levels of education (both on the part of the police and the community residents) concerning community policing’s goals and blamed the lack of community involvement as stemming in part from the programs all being viewed as “police initiatives” and not involving other city agencies (p. 50).

In Spokane, WA, a special project which was evaluated under the rubric of community policing, was found to have been generally successful, both in the eyes of officers and community residents, in providing alternative programs and outlooks for
some of the city’s most socio-economically disadvantaged youths. The findings, however, were very present-oriented and would require long-term follow up to substantiate any lasting benefits (Thurman & Bogen, 1993). Seattle, WA, was able to gain voter approval for increased funding and resources to support city-wide implementation of community policing based on the success of their program, a major part of which was attributed to strong community involvement from the point of program inception (National Institute of Justice, 1992). On the other hand, Skogan (1994) cited an implementation effort which resulted in the transfer of the district commander and the replacement of the Chief of Police largely because of over-zealousness with community policing to the point of letting basic services slip. A study in Toronto (Murphy, 1988) found that community policing may be overrated and traditional policing overly maligned. It included a suggestion that community policing may be more effectively viewed as a modification, rather than a replacement, of traditional policing.

Other studies have focused on the personnel aspect of community policing to include factors such as job satisfaction, skill perceptions, acceptance of the community policing philosophy, and perceptions of community residents, with findings varying considerably both across sites and categories (Greene, 1989; Lurigio & Skogan, 1994; Rosenbaum et al., 1994; Wilson & Bennet, 1994; Wycoff & Skogan, 1994; Weisel & Eck, 1994). One of these studies, in Madison, Wisconsin, produced some interesting results. The implementation of community policing was approached rather indirectly with the emphasis during the first two years exclusively on incorporating “quality
policing” (based on Edwards Demming’s management principles), throughout the organization (Wycoff & Skogan, 1994). The hypothesis presented was that community policing, which involves a fundamental shift in management philosophy, could not be successfully implemented without the quality management approach fully ingrained throughout the department first. Interestingly, after the second year, survey findings revealed some positive changes regarding citizens’ perceptions of the police department—all without any overt emphasis on community policing projects. These findings suggest that attitudes involved with professional policing, and not just tactics, may be the biggest problem of the traditional approach. The findings also generally support the results of the Toronto study.

Even a brief review, such as presented here, is enough to paint a kaleidoscopic picture of the community policing movement with its myriad approaches and results. It points out that the empirical evidence that might support the viability of community policing is, at best, inconsistent. Nevertheless, the community policing movement continues to grow. One of the reasons for this sustained commitment to community policing may lie in its relationship to contemporary management philosophies. Just as the move toward police professionalization, with all that it entailed, was forged in part by the prevailing management philosophy of the time and solved the most pressing policing issues of the day, the move toward community policing is shaped by the larger movement toward quality, or participatory, management. As such, it solves one of the most troublesome issues concerning policing in the days since the President’s Crime Commission; namely, that of police-community relations (Eck & Rosenbaum, 1994).
In addition, as Crank (1994) points out, the nature of community policing allows it to be used by both liberals and conservatives alike to further their polar agendas. While conservatives focus on community policing’s order maintenance approach, liberals favor the community organizing aspects of the movement thereby affording substantial support for COP from all corners. Eck & Rosenbaum’s “plastic concept,” community policing seems to have the necessary flexibility to weather assaults from all fronts and still survive (1994, p. 3).

Buerger (1994) cites three reasons why many continue, Quixotic-like, to strive after community policing. He suggests the movement continues to be fueled by what Goldstein (1979, 1990) dubbed the “means over ends syndrome” and that police are guilty of celebrating the many small successes (means) while ignoring the ultimate impact (ends). Second, Buerger calls attention to the fact that the movement enjoys the benefit of a large deposit of pre-packaged solutions and terminology that have accumulated over the years as a result of the many community relations and anti-crime programs of the past that have been lauded for their successes (even those successes were based on short-term results). The final reason for community policing’s continuing popularity provided by Buerger is simply the lack of any feasible alternative solutions. The result is a concept robustness which implies that community policing will be with us for a considerable time to come in spite of the fact that a concrete solution, or blueprint for implementation, may yet be well in the future.

Implied as well is the warning to forward-looking administrators to prepare to change. If evidence indicating favorable trends as a result of community policing
efforts continue to mount, there will surely be more and more pressure from citizens’ groups, politicians, and eventually peers to get on board and accept the new policies. Additionally, the “plastic” nature of the COP philosophy may well allow it to be used by other public service agencies. The underlying theme of helping communities to help themselves, coupled with the goal of bridging the police-community rift, is equally applicable to all services. Across the spectrum of public service agencies, the ideas embodied in the COP philosophy can be effectively used to enhance community relations and thereby improve the quality of life. From this perspective, Community Oriented Policing may well be a misnomer; while the orientation is certainly toward community, the applicability reaches far beyond the realm of policing. For practitioners, anticipating these eventualities and preparing now for the future will increase the likelihood of successfully leading organizations through the changes which lie ahead—especially in light of the magnitude of the changes required for full implementation of COP. These necessary preparations and organizational changes require discussion in order to illustrate the enormity of the challenges facing contemporary police (as well as other) administrators who are committed to implementing community oriented programs.

Keys to Successful Change

As previously mentioned, the reformers who followed the classical style of management in restructuring early American urban police departments were able to solve numerous problems which had beset those departments. However, as Kelling,
Wasserman, & Williams (1988) point out, the classical management approach did not come without its drawbacks. Specifically, they cite the diverse nature of the patrol officer’s job, which defies detailed proscription and simplification, and the fact that when on patrol officers are rarely under any direct supervision. The classical approach to management would serve to limit discretion in an arena where discretion is a fundamental necessity for success. This “[discontinuity] between organizational prescriptions and work realities” is seen not only as creating problems for administrators, but for the officers as well, who are subjected to “considerable role strain” by being “portrayed as professionals on the one hand but treated as recalcitrant semi-skilled workers on the other” (p. 2). The impact of these administrative consistencies has been to create, along with the centralized command and control structure so typical today, a strong line officer subculture in most police departments which relies on informal rules, emphasizes watching out for other line officers, discourages formal innovation, and pulls line officers away from both supervisors and the citizens whom they are called to serve into a tightly knit circle of solidarity (p. 3).

The concept of community policing attempts to rectify the strains created by the classical management approach by moving the police organization toward a more participative management style. Scholars and practitioners have stressed the need for several fundamental organizational shifts under this participatory management style, including: (1) a power shift, which hinges on decentralization and the displacement of discretion out to the line officer; (2) a training shift emphasizing two-way teaching methodologies with a focus on, among other things, problem identification and problem
solving; and (3) an evaluation shift turning toward innovative thinking and problem solving as the basis for reward and promotion (Roberg, 1994; Moore & Stephens, 1991, as cited in Wilkinson & Rosenbaum, 1994). These three areas deserve further discussion to clarify both their interdependent nature as well as the level of effort involved in making the change to COP.

Decentralization

One of the most commonly referred to necessities for community policing is the notion of decentralization, including its implications for participatory management and empowerment of line officers. The focus of community policing (identifying and solving problems at the community level through greater interaction between officers and citizens) implicitly suggests a need to move operations out to the community in order to strengthen community ties. For this reason, perhaps, nearly all community policing attempts involve some level of decentralization; at a minimum, the majority seem to encompass some type of mini-station system in the effort to bridge the physical and emotional gap between officers and citizens. In a cross-site analysis presented by Weisel & Eck (1994), it was found that while none of the six programs evaluated involved any “formal decentralization” (in the sense of flattening out the entire departmental structure), they all emphasized more responsibility and increased decision-making authority for officers along geographic lines; that is, out to the point where the demonstration projects were being run (p. 65). Similarly, an overall implementation survey conducted in Florida in 1989 found that mini-stations and permanent beat
assignment for officers were two prominent components which all COP efforts had in common (Greene, 1993). Wycoff & Skogan (1994), reporting on one of the most successful examples of community policing implementation to date, cited the actual geographic and functional decentralization of the department as being particularly difficult. Bonds between departments and personnel that had been forged over the years were suddenly disrupted as work centers and responsibilities were shifted. Strained, as well, was the mutual trust that had formed through frequent face-to-face communication. In spite of these challenges, the researchers noted that the geographic and functional decentralization was generally supported and seen as necessary by departmental personnel.

So, while the need for decentralization appears to be an implicit assumption for those moving toward COP, it does not come without its costs. Complaints about a “split force” and a mid-level management perception of a loss of power associated with decentralization are noted as significant obstacles by some (Pate & Shtull, 1994; Roberg, 1994; Wilkinson & Rosenbaum, 1994).

Training

As suggested earlier in this work, ignorance concerning what constitutes community policing has engendered confusion surrounding its implementation. This confusion has often become a source of resistance both within police departments as well as within the communities where implementation has been attempted. Where there has not been active resistance, there has been at least apathy, which might be
interpreted as passive resistance. In either situation, departmental and community resident training is crucial to overcoming the resistance factor (Sadd & Grinc, 1994).

While police training has been increasingly emphasized during the past century, modern training programs focus almost exclusively on “adherence to law and discipline and very little on situational problem solving” (Kelling et al., 1988, p. 5). In contrast, COP requires a very different set of tools, and thus must be approached from a different training perspective. Roberg (1994) stresses the importance of moving to a more interactive teaching style, which incorporates both instructors and students in an exchange of analytical reasoning, problem identification, and problem solving. In support of this notion, Wilkinson & Rosenbaum (1994) suggest that much of this training is more suited for the field than the classroom. Lee Brown, former Chief of the Houston Police Department, emphasized the need to attack training at all levels—recruiting, cadet, officer, supervisor, and management—with a focus on specific information needs and skills required at each level (Brown, 1989). McLaughlin & Donahue (1995) report on one department’s successful training approach, which confronted the training issue in seven phases covering areas from COP, POP, and neighborhood organizing, to tactical crime analysis, crime prevention surveying, and city ordinances. The scope of these training areas further highlights the complexity and nature of the skills needed for successful COP. In short, there must be both substantive and style changes in training at all levels within the department and the affected communities before any meaningful increase in knowledge, skills, and results can occur.
Evaluation and Reward

No organization can ever hope to sustain changes in its structure or operational philosophy without incorporating supporting mechanisms which reward personnel for work toward desired goals. Sparrow (1988) points out that in most traditional police departments, officers are required to follow rules, not to exercise judgment and discretion. Citing the voluminous departmental regulation manuals which attempt to attempt to address every conceivable situation in which officers may find themselves, Sparrow describes this regulation-rich environment as one where “there is little incentive and little time to think, or to have ideas. There is little creativity and very little problem solving. Most of the day is taken up just trying not to make mistakes” (p. 4). This type of mentality and reward system runs counter to everything COP hopes to achieve.

There is some evidence that departments have been able to successfully implement new evaluation systems which emphasize officer discretion, innovation, problem solving, and proactivity, and thereby become value-rather than rule-driven (Roberg, 1994; Sparrow, 1988; Trojanowicz & Bucqueroux, 1990). However, there are some who argue that the police cannot disregard such standard measures of effectiveness as response time or arrest rates without bringing unbearable public dissatisfaction and pressure to bear. While there are cases to support this contention (Skogan, 1994), there is also evidence suggesting that the 911 issue and the demands it places on officers may be exaggerated and that it is a wholly manageable problem (Kessler, 1993). Furthermore, it is argued that police departments have misled
themselves into believing that their official measures of police effectiveness are
synonymous with citizens’ measures of police effectiveness (Eck & Rosenbaum, 1994).

To the extent that the public and police perception of the problem differ, the police will
continue to be ineffective where it perhaps counts the most—in the eyes of the citizens
whom they serve and upon whom they are dependent for the majority of their support.
Therefore, in order to allow officers to focus on citizen-perceived problems, a system of
officer performance evaluation rewarding this approach becomes imperative.

In conclusion, for COP to be effectively implemented, three components of
management structure must be instituted simultaneously. Moving toward
decentralization and pushing decision making authority out to the district and line levels
cannot work without providing the proper tools (information and training) to those who
will now be expected to function in ways to which they are not accustomed. Similarly,
even if provided with the necessary tools and authority to use them, unless officers are
first liberated from the constraints of countless rules, regulations, and a “mistake-
avoidance” mentality, they will be reluctant to exercise their new authority.

Even though there may general agreement about these necessary changes, there
has been little consensus on just how to go about implementing them (Wilkinson &
Rosenbaum, 1994). Police organizations and culture have proven quite resistant to
change and continue to befuddle many administrators who have tried to innovate and
lead their organizations in new directions (Greene, Bergman, & McLaughlin, 1994). In
spite of the daunting odds, many continue to press ahead and some have met with
measured success. It is from the trials and errors of others to which we turn for an understanding of what strategies have offered the most promise thus far.

**Implementation Strategies**

Trojanowicz & Bucqueroux (1990) suggest that implementation attempts at community policing must be department-wide endeavors in order to insure success. They reason that successful implementation must be preceded by education and awareness; that without everyone in the department understanding how community policing can benefit them personally, the effort remains vulnerable to failure stemming from internal resistance and lack of support. If history can serve as a guide, then these claims are well founded as it has been suggested by some that internal resistance to decentralization from mid-level management was the primary cause of the downfall of the Team Policing efforts of the 1970's, often noted as the precursor to COP (Roberg, 1994; Rosenbaum & Lurigio, 1994). As mentioned, others have even expanded the notion of department-wide implementation by incorporating the community in the education process. Pointing to a citizenry which has been conditioned over many years to perceive the police as the crime fighters, some researchers make the claim that any divergence from this stereotypical role tends to foster confusion and mistrust (Eck & Spellman, 1994; Sadd & Grinc, 1994). And while the ideal community policing program would involve a complete shift in philosophy, both for the department and the community, getting to that point does not happen all at once. In fact, researchers and practitioners alike advocate a piecemeal approach to managing the necessary changes.
Sparrow (1988) draws a particularly helpful analogy comparing the typical police department to a heavily laden tractor-trailer which cannot be handled like a sports car when negotiating changes in direction. His point is well summarized in the following statement:

Implementing community policing is not a simple policy change that can be effected by issuing a directive through normal channels. For the police it is an entirely different way of life. The task facing the police chief is nothing less than to change the fundamental culture of the organization. (p. 2)

Roberg (1994) stresses the importance of a solid foundation for change before making the move to community policing. He argues that the operational philosophy of community policing is such a radical departure from traditional policing that it requires skills and knowledge many police department personnel are simply lacking. The key, then, is a clear understanding of departmental strengths and limitations first, followed up by action which will bring the department to the point where it will be able to make the change. Rosenbaum et al. (1994), as well, talk about “organizational readiness” and the need for having the necessary structure, policies, procedures, knowledge, and skills in place before making the move to a community policing philosophy. Others seem to agree with these views in positing that it may well take a generation or longer before a department can really make the switch to community policing (Moore, 1994).

**Choices for Change**

Underlying all of these cautions for change is an implicit assumption that there must be *a perceived need for change* on the part of all involved before they will
actively support, or at least not resist, the change. In order to create this perception that change is necessary, many have followed a two-phase approach recommended by Brown (1989). The first phase involves small program changes or demonstration projects which serve the purpose of showing what is possible, not only to those within the department, but to those outside as well, thereby making evident the possibility of different approaches to the same problems. This phase also indirectly incorporates Sparrow’s (1988) recommendations of exposing the defects of the current system and bringing outside sources of pressure to bear on the department. The second phase involves a fuller implementation of the new philosophy by expanding the test programs to include the infrastructure of the entire department suggesting the need to build a strong foundation first and integrate new programs one step at a time.

A review of the current literature reveals that most attempts to implement community policing have generally followed some rough form of Brown’s two-phase approach. In Joliette, Illinois, a two-year demonstration program first restricted the implementation effort to one specific group or unit, and then expanded to include other units in the second year. Using the Evanston, Illinois, police department as a control group, a pre-posttest analysis of the program showed some (more the exception than the rule) positive changes in officer job satisfaction, perceptions of community policing, and perceptions of problem-solving skills. Rather than finding any fault with methodology or theory, the analysts concluded that the less than optimal results could be largely attributed to the relative newness of the program and the need to yet attain the “critical mass” necessary for sustained institutionalization (Rosenbaum et al., 1994).
In Seattle, Washington, a similar approach was followed and resulted in such great success that the citizens subsequently passed an initiative which provided the necessary funding and resources for city-wide implementation. As previously mentioned, at least part of the greater measure of success in the Seattle program could be attributed to the very high level of community involvement in program development. One other lesson from the Seattle experience was the identification of a four-stage process of relationship building between citizens and police officers/administrators. The first stage was largely defined by citizen’s venting their frustrations with and challenging the traditional police approaches to the crime problem. The second stage settled into an exchange of information and ideas which facilitated organization, planning, and relationship building. The third stage was coined the “success” stage in that it consisted of implementation of planned actions. The successes of the third stage seemed to cement the police citizen relationship as well as commitment to the community policing approach. The final stage involved creating mechanisms and otherwise planning for long term stability (National Institute of Justice, 1992). While this four stage developmental process involved the citizens and police of Seattle, this method may also apply to the process of internal change within police departments. In particular, the challenging in stage one seems to be a necessary step in overcoming the resistance of personnel to any proposed changes.

From another perspective, there has been at least one department to date which has successfully implemented community policing from the approach suggested by Roberg (1994); that is, laying the organizational foundation before attempting to
implement community policing in any measure. The Madison, Wisconsin, police department’s focus on establishing quality management principles before community policing, as previously mentioned, produced favorable results in the community without emphasizing any community projects. Their philosophy, captured in the department’s motto, “Closer to the People: Quality From the Inside, Out” and the results obtained just through creating a new management culture support the logical fit between quality management principles and the philosophy of community policing with its emphasis on customer service (Wycoff & Skogan, 1994, p. 373). Furthermore, while the Madison approach did not result in a perfectly smooth transition; it was regarded by the evaluators as “one of the least tumultuous [changes] we have witnessed” (p. 382). The Madison approach of developing a new management style first also makes sense because departments which choose to implement community policing and are intent on sticking with it will, at some point, be forced to adopt the quality management philosophies simply because the goals and processes of successful community policing demand it.

In spite of the gargantuan task of successfully changing organizational culture and structure, it seems evident that COP is the wave of the future. Even those who question its usefulness admit that the evidence is not all negative and recognize the successes achieved in certain quarters (Buerger, 1994). However, a review of the existing literature does not support the notion that COP is the panacea which many seem to believe it is while the difficulty encountered by those attempting to implement COP should warn others that it is certainly no quick-fix either. In addition, nothing in
the literature suggests that COP can (or should) be implemented in every type of setting or all departments. Particularly in the military community, the question of COP’s applicability or tenability remains unanswered.
Chapter 4
Community Policing in The Military Environment:
Square Pegs for Round Holes?

The assumption that community policing is an equally appropriate solution for all types of crime is as naive as the presumption that it can be (or should be) implemented with equal success in all communities. Particularly in the military community we find a situation where not only are the crime problems of a different magnitude, but the community dynamics are unique as well. In order to explore the issue of COP’s applicability in the military community, it will be helpful to understand some of the unique characteristics of military policing, its mission, and the environment in which it operates. We begin with a brief sketch of military policing’s roots.

**Military Policing: A Brief History**

Dating back to the 11th century, the tradition of the military police has been to protect the government’s (or Sovereign’s) riches and maintain order among the ranks of the soldiers as suggested by the following charter issued to the Provost Marshall in 1629 by King Charles I:

> The Provost must have a horse allowed him and some soldiers to attend him and all the rest commanded to obey and assist or else the Service will suffer; for he is but one man and must correct many and therefore he cannot be beloved. And he must be riding from one Garrison to another to see the soldiers do no outrage nor scathe the country. (Air Force Regulation [AFR] 125-3, 1977, p. 1-1)

On the American continent, the first military police unit dates back to the time of the Revolutionary War and was organized along the lines of a regular Continental
Army company. Although soldiers from time to time were assigned duties normally assumed by military police, and the military was often the only recourse pertaining to matters of law enforcement for settlers of the western US, the next official formation of a military police unit would not occur again until the time of the Civil War (Wright, 1992). Those who served as military police during the Civil War were granted broad authority in discharging their law enforcement functions and could call on any soldier, citizen, constable, sheriff, or police officer to assist them (AFR 125-3, 1977).

The emerging pattern of formally organizing military police units during times of national or international conflict in order to fulfill a specific need or mission, continued with most units “hastily activated...with no special supervision or technical training” through the end of WWI (AFR 125-3, 1977). It was not until WWII that a centrally directed Provost Marshall was once again formally established, and not until 1948, following the creation of the United States Air Force (as distinguished from the US Army Air Corps which had existed until 1947), that the Air Police were formed and professionalization of the force began in earnest.

At the time of its creation, the mission of the Air Police was specified as (1) the protection of all Air Force installations, equipment, and military information; (2) the operation of all confinement facilities; and, (3) the enforcement of discipline, conduct, and military courtesies (AFR 125-3, 1977). Following the Korean War, the need for a strong Air Base defense plan was identified and the Air Police were charged with the primary responsibility for its development and implementation, thus further expanding the role and mission of the Air Police. Coupled with the urgency of protecting the
nation’s combat-ready weapon systems and nuclear arsenal during the ensuing Cold War years, the Air Police mission was rechanneled with security for these important resources taking the top priority. In 1960, the title of Air Provost Marshall was changed to Director of Security and Law Enforcement and in 1966, the Air Police became the Security Police—both title changes more reflective of the redefined mission of the force.

During the Vietnam War the need for a whole-base defense concept was realized and the necessary changes were made to build security plans around installations rather than around weapon systems. In 1971, a division of responsibilities occurred when the Security Police career field was separated into two distinct categories—security and law enforcement. This separation of functions allowed for greater professionalization through specialization and allowed commanders to provide a higher level of traditional law enforcement services as well as security by formally identifying the dual roles and missions of the AF Security Police.

**Today’s Security Police Organization**

The typical Security Police squadron today is similar to its civilian police counterpart in both structure and function. Strongly centralized in administration, the chain of command is clear and its use is strongly encouraged and enforced. Standards of conduct as well as regulations governing procedures, authority, and responsibilities are routinely controlled using a rigorous system of recurring practical evaluations and testing. Communication within squadrons is mostly top-down, although formal
programs to facilitate bottom-up communication have been part and parcel of most organizations for a number of years. Efforts at more bottom-up and lateral communication have greatly increased since implementation of a Quality Air Force program in the early 1990s that includes training for all personnel and formal evaluation for all units and is based on Total Quality Management philosophies (The Quality Approach, 1993). While the mission of any given SP squadron has been formally divided between security and law enforcement since 1971, the two areas have never been completely divergent because of the symbiotic relationship between security and law enforcement in providing for the overall safety and quality of life of all military personnel. Over the past several years, however, some economies of scale have been realized through the consolidation of security control centers and law enforcement control centers into one security police control center with dispatchers certified in both security and law enforcement functions and the dual certification of security specialists who now regularly augment their law enforcement counterparts. The primary differences between the typical SP squadron and its civilian counterpart can be found in this multi-faceted mission or role of the SP unit. While the civilian department focuses largely on law enforcement, SP units are responsible for security and Air Base Defense with traditional law enforcement being one subcomponent of this greater goal.

The Military Community

Similar to the traditional police model, the SP philosophy has embraced the notion of the police as crime fighters, but perhaps not to the extent of civilian
departments because of four unique characteristics of the environment within which the
SP units operate. First, the typical Air Force installation is a closed environment
inhabited by a large contingent of "citizens" who are also military personnel specially
trained to operate in stressful and unusual contingency situations, often in direct support
of law enforcement and security operations. As such, the SP have not only the
authority to order other military personnel to assist them under certain conditions, they
also use this authority on a regular basis. Even during normal operations, security
awareness exercises and other law enforcement related scenarios, such as anti-robbery
exercises, are carried out with all participating players—whether a jet engine technician
or a bank teller—evaluated on their responses.

Second, the closed environment of the military community also allows for
tighter control over who is allowed access to the community. Consequently, both the
volume and assortment of crimes committed are reduced by precluding those with a
higher propensity toward criminal conduct from transiting the installation. This "border
control" mechanism actually works in both directions; that is, in addition to preventing
unauthorized individuals from entering the installation, military commanders also have
the authority to expel troublemakers or personnel who are found guilty of any number
of crimes or other violations. While civilian communities exercise a form of "border
control" as well through incarceration of serious offenders, the military community
regularly prevents individuals from transiting the base confines for much less serious
offenses. Thus, by intervening earlier, the military community is somewhat shielded
from more serious criminal activity than neighboring civilian communities. In the case
of military personnel, the offender may simply be discharged and his/her privileges to access the base revoked. In a situation where dependents of military personnel residing in base housing are found to be the source of problems, the family may lose their right to government housing and be asked to find domicile outside the installation confines. And while the family may be allowed to enter the base as they desire, the individual dependent(s) identified as the problem source(s) may have their base access privileges permanently revoked, thereby ensuring a low rate of on-base recidivism.

Taken together, this ability to control access to military communities significantly reduces installation crime rates when compared to neighboring civilian communities (Table One provides illustrative data comparing March AFB with neighboring Riverside, CA). The considerably lower crime rates consequently diminish the need for extraordinary crime fighting measures and greatly increases the flexibility of the SP squadrons to initiate crime prevention or other non-traditional law enforcement programs.

**1992 PART ONE INDEX CRIMES PER 100,000 POPULATION**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>MURDER</th>
<th>RAPE</th>
<th>ROBBERY</th>
<th>ASSAULT</th>
<th>BURGLARY</th>
<th>LARCENY</th>
<th>GTA</th>
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<td>55</td>
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<td>1491</td>
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<td>MARCH AFB, CA</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1903</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE ONE**
A third unique characteristic of the military community is the difference between the young adult population when compared to its civilian counterpart. Specifically, the group is made up of individuals who have voluntarily chosen to join the military and therefore have a personal interest in making the best of their opportunities. For many young officers and enlisted personnel, the military is a chosen career; for others, it is a stepping stone. In both situations, however, there exists considerable motivation to make the best of the present circumstances in order to further one’s career, whether that be in the military or not. In addition, the military young adult is more limited in his/her individual freedoms. While the military does not completely control an individual’s life, it does exert substantial influence over both on-duty as well as off-duty conduct through the attachment of very clear consequences to conformity or nonconformity with military values and culture. The strong military culture, supervisor involvement in one's life, and the personal investment individuals have in their careers provide powerful encouragement for adherence to the principles and values espoused by the military community. The encouragement or motivation to conform with community norms serves as a strong informal control that diminishes the need for formal control mechanisms such as the police. The stronger these informal controls, the less the need for formal policing.

The fourth peculiarity of the normal AF installation is found in a structure where all public service agencies (police, fire, civil engineering, community services) are grouped to function in concert under one commander (Support Group Commander) and work toward a joint goal of improving the quality of life for all base residents and
personnel. Even outside of the Support Group, the installation as a whole emphasizes a team effort in all undertakings recognizing the fact that everyone on the installation plays an important role in overall mission accomplishment. This teamwork approach serves as a shield against the parochialism that is endemic in most highly specialized, professional organizations. Thus, the COP goal of casting the police officer as problem solver and facilitator is superseded in the Air Force environment by investing an individual of higher rank with the necessary authority and express responsibility of community problem solver. While in the civilian community this responsibility typically rests with the Mayor, the ability to influence other agencies to work together in order to achieve a common goal is stronger for the military commander because of a more direct and clearly defined chain of command. Not only are there significant economies of scale achieved through grouping under one individual all of those agencies responsible for the military community citizens' quality of life, the power this individual wields over those under his/her command facilitates a level of teamwork that few cities have been able to achieve in their efforts at community policing.

While some may be wary of vesting one individual with such a high level of power and authority, the overarching mission of each installation, which is not directly tied to any one service group or agency, serves as an effective check and balance on the authority and power of the Support Group Commander. In reality, the more the Support Group Commander can facilitate agency interaction and teamwork toward improving the quality of life, the closer that commander comes to realizing the COP goal of increasing community problem solving skills within all public service agencies.
Implementing COP: Weak Incentives

While on the one hand it would seem that the unique environment and functional structure of the typical AF installation provide for a community highly amenable to Community Oriented Policing, it is nevertheless unlikely that COP as it is defined in the current literature will successfully replace traditional policing as a new philosophy primarily because what COP hopes to achieve with respect to community organizing and crime prevention, the AF community has already realized. To a large extent, as pointed out by Skogan (Buerger, 1994), COP assumes a broken down community; a community that has become disorganized following the disintegration of traditional informal social controls. To the extent that this breakdown has not occurred in AF communities, those communities already resemble the ideal COP community and as a result of this, there is no pressing need for significant changes to occur with regard to COP.

In Search of a Need

As other civilian departments have come to realize, before being able to alter the culture of a highly centralized bureaucratic organization such as a police department there must first exist a strongly perceived need for change. In the military environment depicted here, the mission and role of the SP is not derived solely from the image of the crime fighter, but rather from the overall mission of the Air Force and each individual installation. Therefore, the need for change would most likely have to be driven by events or circumstances that prove themselves detrimental to mission accomplishment.
While severe crime problems certainly could have a negative impact on the overall mission by having a detrimental effect on the quality of life of those who reside and work at the military installation, the unique characteristics of the military community combine to produce relatively benign crime rates. One may argue that crime problems could grow to the point that changes would be demanded; however, this scenario is unlikely in light of the military community's strong informal social control mechanisms that effectively reduce the levels of crime on AF installations. With a strong discipline ethic, a philosophy that encourages—even requires—supervisors to become very involved in subordinates' personal lives and problems, the "border control" capability of Air Force installations, and the ability of commanders to punish and/or even expel serious offenders from the installation, the need for formal police action is significantly reduced. The combination of these factors creates a community that is not only well suited for COP, but in reality is already exercising the COP philosophy. As one scholar pointed out, "Anticrime organizations are often most successful in communities that need them least...[and] least common where they appear to be most needed—in low-income, heterogeneous, deteriorated, renting, high-turnover, high-crime areas" (Skogan 1988, p. 42, 45). Air Force communities are no exception to this observation.

Implementing Tactical Change in The SP Unit

Although there are many existing similarities in structure and methodology between civilian and military police units, this does not necessarily mean that there are
parallels in managing change in both types of departments. Some of the more salient issues and problems with which many civilian police agencies are currently grappling do not equally apply to Air Force SP units wishing to engage in COP programs. Of particular significance are the issues of decentralization, training, and evaluation and their applicability to the SP unit.

The geography of typical Air Force installations diminishes the need for physical decentralization of the police department. The relatively small size of most bases enables easy access to the police for base residents and employees. Air Force communities also offer citizens direct access to the highest levels of leadership through a variety of mechanisms, the most common being a Commander’s Hot Line which allows people to lodge any variety of complaints or simply ask questions. Accessibility is also increased by virtue of the fact that Chief’s of Police, as well as many police officers, routinely live within the base community. This phenomenon, rare in urban police departments, opens up the police rank and file to the informal accountability (accountability to the community) that is cited as an important ingredient in police-community relations in rural communities by Weisheit, Wells, and Falcone (1994). In addition, this informal accountability serves to curb line officer discretion somewhat as police officers are held not only accountable to their supervisors, but to the community residents with whom they live and work daily. The resulting environment closely resembles a small, rural town where citizens play a larger role in community affairs and differs markedly from the sprawling, urban city with its imposing levels of bureaucracy.
that somewhat shield police officers from direct public access and scrutiny. As noted by Eisenstein (Weisheit et al. 1994, p. 553):

A major explanation for the high degree of police discretion found in urban areas is the low visibility of police actions. In smaller communities the actions of police officers are known to most of the population thanks to the effectiveness and extensiveness of informal communication networks; there they are more highly visible. As a result, small town police enjoy less latitude in deviating from dominant community values.

While the nature of the AF community lessens the need for physical decentralization of the SP unit, functional decentralization is also less likely to occur unless it is fully supported by the highest levels of installation leadership. The military culture places high levels of responsibility and accountability on its senior officers and senior non-commissioned officers. Mistakes made by junior enlisted personnel, or junior officers, are routinely answered for by supervisors. This situation creates an environment where individual discretion is sharply curtailed at the patrol officer level so that commanders and mid-level managers are able to maintain stricter control over line officer behavior. While this scenario is similar to that found in most civilian police departments, it is perhaps more acutely felt in the military environment because of the direct chain between police commanders and senior base leadership. Leadership lapses on the part of those vested with command authority are not tolerated well and can quickly lead to career ending performance evaluations.

Unlike decentralization, training and evaluation issues relevant to the civilian police department apply to the SP squadron as well. Air Force training occurs on at least two levels beginning with initial Air Force-level training at Technical Training.
schools following completion of the initial Air Force Basic Training. While this training covers the basics of police work, it does not include the various skills or methods dictated by the variety of missions found across Air Force installations. New recruits, then, must undergo further training once they arrive at their newly assigned destinations in order to be successfully integrated into their respective units. Moreover, because of the fluid nature of military life, which results in reassignment to other installations every few years for most personnel, continued training—even for seasoned police officers—is a constant necessity. This multi-tiered and continuing training becomes a concern in that inconsistencies between training levels or locations could breed confusion and/or cynicism on the part of police officers and make implementation of any desired changes more difficult. Thus, Air Force level coordination of training in both operating philosophies and tactics becomes important regardless of the chosen direction.

Equitable implementation of evaluation systems, as well, is benefited by Air Force level control. Because SP officers and enlisted personnel compete against all other Air Force SP officers and enlisted personnel for promotion and career advancement opportunities, similar criteria must be rewarded equally across the board. Unless implementation of COP tactics is approached from an Air Force level, the reward system necessary to motivate SP personnel to change to a new operating philosophy will not exist. Without the necessary reward-based motivation, successful implementation of any program(s) becomes an insurmountable task. Finally, efforts at revising existing training and evaluation systems should be attacked simultaneously and
in a complementary fashion. Implementation of a new evaluation and reward system cannot be effective without the necessary training to support the desired roles and behaviors. Conversely, even with proper training, an evaluation and reward system that is not reflective of newly desired behaviors/actions will not provide the necessary motivation for people to implement the desired changes or use the training they have been given.

In short, although the typical SP organization resembles the traditional police department, both in structure and culture, it also operates in a significantly different environment that strongly curtails the need for any radical changes in departmental culture or operating philosophy. The unique characteristics of the Air Force installation provide for a sense of community rarely found outside of rural America. Geographic boundaries, which are controlled effectively by the Security Police, coupled with a population which is made more homogenous by the commonality of the military culture and installation mission, create an environment in stark contrast to the inner city, ghettoized neighborhoods described by Wilson & Kelling (1982); neighborhoods that have been blamed for many of the more severe crime problems faced by contemporary urban police departments. Absent any pressing social or political need for change, the probability that true reform at the strategic level could be (or need be) successfully achieved within the average SP unit is remote. However, just because there may be no pressing crime-related or social issues across AF communities which would drive a massive reform effort toward Community Oriented Policing, there is a need for continued community oriented actions or activities that will preserve the strong sense of
community that does exist. In fact, the Air Force Security Police already performs many functions which arguably fall under the rubric of Community Oriented Policing and may fill some of this need for continued community oriented activities. Additionally, recent Air Force-level changes in management philosophies bode well for continued development of some of the more important components of the COP philosophy.

Air Force Community Oriented Policing

Meagher (1985) found that community size impacts the type of service provided by police departments. Following a continuum of sorts, smaller town police departments were found to focus more on crime prevention while larger departments emphasized law enforcement and arrest rates. Flanagan (1985) cited similar results in another study showing that whereas large cities tended to expect police to concentrate on being crime fighters, small towns expected a wider variety of services and functions from their police departments. In light of the evidence that AF communities most closely parallel rural towns, it is not surprising to find that AF SP units have traditionally provided a range of services which are responsive to the desires and needs of the communities they serve. A brief exploratory survey of nine AF SP units produced some telling results with regard to COP in the Air Force. The survey was conducted telephonically with the senior Law Enforcement Non-Commissioned Officer (or most knowledgeable NCO with regard to COP) at each of the nine selected units. Of the nine units, two were pending base closure within the following nine months, a
fact which somewhat limited their ability to perform any more than the absolute minimum law enforcement support. Two other units were facing significant—albeit temporary—personnel shortages which also affected their capability to perform other than essential services; yet each of these units was planning to resume COP programs and/or otherwise expand existing efforts. The following discussion does not presume to cover all programs or efforts which may be ongoing at the selected installations. It does however provide an overview of the kinds of programs which are typical at most AF installations as well as some insight into the current perception of what actually constitutes COP.

Findings

Without first differentiating between COP as a philosophy or as a tactical program, six of the nine units queried indicated they had formally adopted Community Oriented Policing. The three units which had not done so cited personnel shortfalls as the primary reason for not making more of an effort to implement COP. When questioned what component(s) they had implemented, bike patrol was the answer 100 percent of the time suggesting that there existed a perception in the minds of those questioned that bike patrolling was tantamount to Community Oriented Policing. When pressed for other programs which might be considered as COP, the respondents listed several, all of which are discussed below.

In the realm of formal programs, AF SP units have aggressively pursued activities in resource protection and crime prevention for many years. Resource
Protection is a formally evaluated program covering the “business” or operational side of an AF installation. Typical activities include insuring compliance with AF directives governing funds and other non-priority resources (such as weapons) through training of personnel who have been delegated responsibility over these resources and periodic inspection of their facilities and agency programs.

Crime Prevention programs (also formally evaluated), on the other hand, are directed more toward the base residents although they also encompass elements of the base business community. Typical duties for those assigned to Crime Prevention office include the publishing of timely newspaper articles identifying current crime trends and suggesting ways individuals can protect themselves against becoming victims; training the various unit managers in proper crime prevention techniques for their respective units; conducting home crime prevention surveys in an effort to identify vulnerabilities and help citizens recognize ways in which they can better “crime-proof” their residences; organizing and monitoring Neighborhood Watch programs; administering the installation D.A.R.E program; briefing all newly assigned personnel in local crime problems and crime prevention techniques; and managing the installation Product Identification program that allows individuals to have valuable belongings engraved and registered in case of theft. The individuals selected as Crime Prevention officers also have the opportunity to undergo formal training.

Many proponents of COP have stressed that department-wide implementation is necessary to insure a successful shift in departmental culture. While the Resource Protection and Crime Prevention programs do not involve all SP personnel in the unit,
they are nevertheless indicative of a philosophy of catering to the needs of the
community—whether that be the business or residential community. In addition, they
certainly involve services and activities that are not considered as normal law
enforcement and surely do not fit the stereotypical “Joe Friday” image of crime fighter.

All of the nine surveyed bases had active Crime Prevention and Resource Protection
programs. Furthermore, because the programs are formally evaluated (Air Force wide),
it can be safely assumed that all AF SP units have similar programs.

Other non-traditional police activities in which all nine bases engaged included
after-hours building checks (rattling door knobs; checking windows), stray animal
control, bike patrols, and foot patrols. Building checks and stray animal control are
activities, like Crime Prevention and Resource Protection, that began independently of
the current COP fervor and have been pursued over the years because they continue to
serve a useful purpose in the community. Bike patrols are an attempt to move the
police officer in certain areas to a bicycle, thereby increasing community accessibility to
the police officer. A variation of the foot beat of an earlier era, bike patrols offer greater
mobility for the police officer while maintaining the ability to build the rapport with
citizens that disappeared with the advent of the patrol vehicle and rapid response goals.
While once attempted at some AF installations in years past, bike patrols have become
enormously popular and owe their resurrection to the COP movement. Initiated at
Major Command level, bike patrols are now 100 percent supported in at least two of the
Air Force’s eight Major Commands. Survey respondents indicated that feedback from
both police officers and supervisors as well as community residents, installation
leadership, and other installation personnel has been virtually unanimous in its support of the bike patrol program. The few negative comments concerning the program came from line supervisors who complained under conditions of meager staffing that it was difficult to post bike patrols in addition to other required patrols, or that bike patrols "robbed" them of their ability to perform "real" police work—a comment not uncommon in civilian departments which have tried to implement components of COP.

Six of the nine installations surveyed indicated their bike patrol officers received formal training from local civilian police agencies that provided the service for their own officers as well. Of the three units that did not currently have a formal training program, two cited personnel shortfalls and one was closing within the next two months; the two with personnel shortfalls indicated they had a plan to begin formal training when they could afford to do so. All six of the nine units surveyed that indicated they had bike patrols indicated that bike patrol officers were permanently assigned to specified beats, while four of those six units attested to having a dedicated bike patrol section whose members worked as a separate unit from the remainder of the force. While this type of structural arrangement has proven problematic for some civilian police departments, none of those surveyed cited any problems stemming from the splitting of the force. In fact, all units noted an average of volunteers to work bike patrol duties indicating that line officers had a favorable impression of that particular program.

Foot patrols at all nine installations were used mostly to apply more police presence in areas identified through crime analysis as problem zones. Several indicated
foot patrols were used to augment bike patrols on a random basis and that foot patrols would increase in quantity over bike patrols during the winter months because of inclement weather. As with bike patrols, all respondents mentioned similarly positive feedback concerning foot patrols while those who noted some dissatisfaction cited the same reasons line supervisors gave concerning bike patrols.

Discussion

The findings of this brief exploratory survey highlight some interesting points. First, it seems that personnel viewed bike patrols and COP as synonymous. When asked if their unit had formally adopted COP, those responding affirmatively cited bike patrols as the program related to COP. Even those units that did not claim any formal adoption of COP noted they were conducting bike patrols. Next, the virtual institutionalization of Crime Prevention and Resource Protection programs supports the notion that those programs that are evaluated and rewarded from higher Headquarters are those which receive attention at the unit level. This would also explain the popularity of the bike patrol program which has been similarly initiated at the Major Command level. Finally, similar resistance can be expected from some within the SP organization to changes of any kind. The comments about “real” police work are indicative of officers holding a professional policing philosophy. Although there are programs conducted that would justifiably be termed as COP programs, the philosophies of professional policing may still be well-ingrained in the minds of many SP personnel and this factor should be considered when formulating plans for further
integration of COP programs. On the other hand, all nine units said they had no lack of volunteers for their bike patrol program. This popularity might indicate a willingness on the part of the line officer (who are traditionally among the youngest in an AF SP unit as opposed to the line supervisors who are more seasoned) to try different methods of policing. The program’s popularity may also, however, be due to the novelty of the program, which would mean that in the long run its popularity would likely decline.

In summary, while AF installations do not exhibit the same driving needs that have spawned the growth of COP in the civilian world, they nonetheless remain a fertile environment for COP tactics. The similarities between rural towns and AF communities mean that many police activities that do not fall under the contemporary COP vocabulary are nevertheless actively pursued because they provide services desired by the community and, in some cases, are demanded by higher authority. In this sense, much like the rural towns which have performed COP for years—although they may have not been recognized as doing so (Weisheit et al., 1994)—AF SP units have performed components of COP for many years as well. As such, full implementation of COP as a new operating philosophy may not be necessary in AF communities because of the different nature of the community, the unique demands of the SP mission, and the services which are already provided. In reality, COP in the military community is not a case of fitting square pegs into round holes—the proper fit has already existed for some time.
Chapter Five
Discussion and Recommendations

Summary

Tracing the history of urban policing, we find that changes in law enforcement were preceded by events or changes in society that first created an atmosphere conducive to change. The migration of farm laborers to the urban areas of 19th Century England and the subsequent concentration of crime and disorder in those areas triggered a growing sense of uneasiness among those with power to initiate changes. Absent that sensation of growing disorder, one could argue that Peel’s Bobbies may have yet been well into the future. Similarly, void of the rampant corruption of local politicians in early urban America and the havoc they created among America’s first urban police departments, one can legitimately argue that the professionalization of policing may not have matured quite as soon as it did. Even once initiated, the professionalization of police work did not follow a steady, straight-line evolution either; rather, it was jolted and pushed along an unpredictable and ever-changing course. Improved technology, tenacious leadership by a few key individuals, evolving management principles in the business world, and the omnipresent need for law enforcement in urban areas kept the movement progressing.

In a like manner, Community Oriented Policing found its genesis in issues relevant to society at large in the 1960s. The Civil Rights movement, urban unrest, overly aggressive police tactics, and the distancing of police officers from the public they served combined to create a new impetus for change, slowly nudging away from
the professional model of policing. Similar to the road followed by the professional model of policing, COP encountered its share of stops and starts, sputters and surges. Empirical research demonstrated some of the things that were wrong with the professional model and its fundamental assumptions, new management techniques offered options to the status quo of police administration, and the changing face of inner-city America provided the necessary set of problems which kept the quest for alternative responses to the crime problem alive.

Underlying the changes which have occurred over the past 250 years of the history of policing is the factor of need. Largely creatures of habit, people are generally loathe to make changes unless the first perceive that change is necessary and/or desirable. Once the need for change makes itself manifest (even when that manifestation may be an illusion) Americans have a demonstrated propensity for reform. Consequently, when deliberating the change to COP, one must also give the potency of the desire for change its due consideration in order to successfully predict an outcome. Especially in attempting to change something as ingrained as organizational or institutional culture, the impetus driving the change cannot be found impotent if it is expected to generate enough momentum to overcome the considerable inertia it faces. Successful change must be dealt with systematically; all aspects of form and function must be carefully thought through lest the momentum fractures itself on unanticipated obstacles. While the jury is still out with respect to the future of COP in America’s urban police departments, there have been some significant strides made in directing
change and achieving results and preliminary findings suggest that COP has a fighting chance of successfully altering the status quo.

Whether or not these same reforms can (or should) be successfully applied to the Air Force Security Police is an entirely different question and requires examination of the same, as well as some other, significant factors. Primarily, the question of need for change is up for debate. Air Force communities, with the ability to control access through effective border control mechanisms, the high degree of investment which its members have in maintaining community norms and upholding AF values, the homogeneity of community, the small town atmosphere, and some of the other similarities it shares with rural America result in significantly lower crime rates than those found in America's urban areas. Consequently, the AF community environment is at once ideal for COP programs and largely devoid of the need for COP as a new philosophy. Certain aspects of the COP philosophy, however, should be applicable in any community; even in the AF community which already embodies many characteristics that the COP philosophy attempts to create, further enhancements are nearly always desirable. Specifically, since successful law enforcement has been dependent on public support since the days before urban policing, aspects of community policing designed to bring police officers and citizens closer together can only improve a police department's ability to maintain order and solve crimes. Even in communities where that police officer-citizen gap is not as great (or even nonexistent), closer relations between police and citizens can only enhance crime control efforts and
improve customer satisfaction, which in turn should raise the level of support given the police department.

While SP units have made great progress over the years in providing non-traditional law enforcement services, existing programs sometimes suffer by being categorized as not being “real” police work. The police work orientation could be enhanced by making clear to line officers and supervisors the significance of providing these kinds of services. Recent attempts to integrate COP through the initiation of bike patrols, as well, will take on more meaning as those implementing and managing the changes come to understand the worth and positive side effects of community oriented programs. For it is not the fact that police officers move from the confines of their patrol cars to the freedom of the sidewalks that gives worth and value to bike or foot patrols, rather it is the underlying message that interaction between police and community residents is desirable if it raises the quality of community life. In reality, with COP there is more at stake than higher arrest rates and lower crime rates; quality of life is the relevant issue, whether that be addressed through order maintenance, increased citizen involvement in crime control, greater involvement by all public service agencies functioning in the community, enhanced police-community relations, or higher arrest and lower crime rates.

The strides made in the Air Force in recent years toward Total Quality Management dovetail well into the COP philosophy and quality of life issues. The principles learned through TQM training will automatically amplify the effort police officers make in reaching out to their communities; and this without any specific focus
on COP, as evidenced by the success enjoyed in the Madison, Wisconsin police department (Wycoff & Skogan, 1994). So, while the need for a change to COP may not be as evident in AF communities as in many of the urban areas of America, the desirability of a greater emphasis on certain aspects of the COP philosophy still exists. In order for SP units to successfully enhance their current law enforcement services, there are several areas of concern which warrant continued research and evaluation.

**Recommendations**

There seems to be an assumption on the part of many SP officers and enlisted personnel that because SP units are similar in structure to urban police departments, that they must also function like their civilian counterparts. While the professionalization of police work generated by the early reforms has also benefited Air Force police efforts, a clear understanding of the dissimilarities between SP units and the typical urban department is also important. Through careful analysis of the dissimilarities between the two types of agencies, Commanders will then be better able to identify areas that could (or should) not be realistically integrated or changed. Similarly, the study of rural police departments and the various services provided by them is one area which could strengthen the Air Force’s ability to tailor future law enforcement training and plan for any desired changes. Particularly, the notion of more citizen involvement/control over some aspects of police work as is found in many rural departments should be further investigated in order to identify desirable ways of enhancing the police-community partnership. The idea of bringing community
Residents and police officers closer together and reorienting the crime fighting focus toward problem solving in unison with community residents and other public service organizations will tend to enhance any police tactics or strategies implemented. In the end, understanding the nature of the AF SP unit, its mission, the contributions it already makes, the unique characteristics of the AF community, and what activities are needed in order to perpetuate the sense of community thus far experienced will help define the appropriate course to follow.

Continued research of the COP philosophy and monitoring of ongoing advancements will also aid those charged with developing training and other programs at the Major Command or Air Force level in order to identify and maximize implementation of those components of COP which would be most beneficial to the AF community. Specifically, integrating COP with TQM principles would create the ideal platform for continued education and training of SP personnel. In a like manner, careful evaluation of ongoing COP programs in the civilian community and close working relationships with civilian departments will enable AF SP units to avoid reinventing the wheel, especially in those situations where the wheel proves to be defective. Additionally, critical evaluation of newly introduced programs, such as bike patrols, is needed in order to establish the usefulness of these programs and thereby clearly illustrate just why these new programs are being pursued. Both the SP units and their civilian counterparts, particularly those in rural areas, may benefit from joint training and education and may achieve some economies of scale through mutual interaction as well.
Just as COP is not equally applicable to all civilian communities, it may not be equivalently useful at all AF installations or even in all areas of any given installation. Especially in environments with a highly transient population, such as training bases where some of the unique characteristics of the traditional AF community do not exist, there will be areas of the installation where COP programs may not be as useful. Further research into what factors make an environment particularly well suited to COP will help avoid wasting scarce resources and maximizing use of those resources where they are needed the most.

In conclusion, better understanding the dynamics which have shaped and continue to shape the role of police in society will enable us to adapt those changes most desirable while avoiding those which ultimately serve no useful purpose. Not only will customer satisfaction rise (along with the attendant increases in support for the police), but job satisfaction should grow as well as officers better understand the purposes behind the actions and changes they are asked to make. Similarly, a clear recognition of the uniqueness of the AF community and an understanding that police work is just one small slice of the pie which determines a community’s quality of life will overcome resistance to changes which move away from the traditional model of policing. Ignoring these realities, on the other hand, and not taking time to carefully analyze what changes are necessary and achievable will inevitably lead to program frustration and cynicism among the rank and file of the organization as administrators attempt to implement ill-fitting or unobtainable programs.
As policing continues along its evolutionary path, Community Oriented Policing philosophies and programs seem destined to be with us—both in the civilian as well as the AF community. As such, caution should be exercised by those in positions of leadership to ensure that the strategies or tactics pursued are appropriate for the situation in which they are meant to operate. While it has been suggested that COP philosophies and programs have been part and parcel of AF SP operations for quite some time, the degree to which this is true surely varies across AF installations and fluctuates with changes in base and unit leadership. Because of the inherent variations among AF Commands and installations, issues dealing with COP should be dealt with at the highest levels of AF SP leadership in order to receive adequate and unit-level attention.

The findings presented here should be viewed as a launch pad for further, more in depth analysis and study, and not as the ultimate solution to unanswered questions concerning COP and the military environment. Particularly, more detailed research into line personnel knowledge regarding COP and the prevailing perception of the proper role for the police in the AF community is encouraged as a starting point that will afford a clearer understanding of precisely where the AF SP community stands in its continuing evolution. Without a proper understanding of where one is, it become difficult to navigate the way to where one desires to be. Ultimately, correct understanding, garnered through careful research and analysis, should result in thoughtful implementation of additional COP strategies or tactics and will enable AF commanders to successfully lead their organizations through the gauntlet of change and challenges that lay before them.
## APPENDIX A

### Survey results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Questions</th>
<th>Unit 1</th>
<th>Unit 2</th>
<th>Unit 3</th>
<th>Unit 4</th>
<th>Unit 5</th>
<th>Unit 6</th>
<th>Unit 7</th>
<th>Unit 8</th>
<th>Unit 9</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adopted COP?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td>Written Definition of COP?</td>
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<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bike Patrol</td>
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<td>Not Yet</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Not Yet</td>
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<td>Foot Patrol</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
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<td>Town Meetings</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
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<td>D.A.R.E.</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td>Building Checks (After hours; rattling doorknobs)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td>Stray Animal Control</td>
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<td>Are Bike Patrol Officers assigned to special section?</td>
<td>No</td>
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<td>No</td>
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<td>N/A</td>
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<tr>
<td>Do Bike Patrol Officers assigned permanent beats?</td>
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<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Do Bike Patrol Officers receive special training?</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Support of supervisors for Bike Patrol Program</td>
<td>Mix</td>
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<td>Pos</td>
<td>Pos</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Pos</td>
<td>Pos</td>
<td>Mix</td>
<td>Pos</td>
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<td>Enthusiasm for Bike Patrol from Line Personnel</td>
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<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
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<td>Support Received From Installation Commanders</td>
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<td>Pos</td>
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<td>Type of Feedback received from community residents</td>
<td>Pos</td>
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<td>Pos</td>
<td>Pos</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Pos</td>
<td>Pos</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Pos</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Plans to implement COP programs when current personnel shortages are overcome.
3. Plans to implement COP programs when current personnel shortages are overcome.
4. Cited biggest obstacle coming from mid-level supervisors who were forced to fill bike patrol positions over normal patrols even though current staffing levels did not support the additional program.
5. See Footnote 4.
6. Hospital Commander investigating the possibility of placing one Emergency Medical Technician on bicycle within the base housing area during certain hours to allow for swifter response in case of injury.
References


Eck, J. E., & Spelman, (1994). Who ya gonna call? The police as problem-busters. In S. Stojkovic, J. Klofas, & D. Kalinich (Eds.), The administration and


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