1995

Demystifying "On the Jewish question": A rhetorical and linguistic analysis of Karl Marx's essay

Bret Logan Scaliter

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DEMYSTIFYING "ON THE JEWISH QUESTION":
A RHETORICAL AND LINGUISTIC ANALYSIS
OF KARL MARX'S ESSAY

A Thesis
Presented to the
Faculty of
California State University,
San Bernardino

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts
in
English Composition

by
Bret Logan Scaliter
December 1995
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ABSTRACT

In the anti-semitic tract "On the Jewish Question," Karl Marx constructs valid arguments and decries man's alienation from society. But he also uses stereotypes and innuendo to distort readers' perceptions. This study analyzes how both rhetorically and linguistically Marx constructs his essay in an attempt to persuade his audience to accept unquestioningly his argument. After an examination of the historical and psychological background that produced Marx, this paper investigates his use of figures of speech, the enthymeme, informal fallacies, and hypothetical syllogisms to arouse prejudice, pity and anger. This thesis (borrowing from the techniques of discourse analysis) also demonstrates Marx's use of the end-focus principle, segmentation, salience and sequence to further his argument. And finally, by probing the pragmatics of implicature, presupposition, and deliberate ambiguity, this investigation uncovers Marx's implicit call for genocide.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Collaboration is the watchword not only of the English Department at California State University, San Bernardino but also for all writers whether conceded by them or not. I cannot take credit for this thesis without acknowledging the synergetic efforts of others. I am indebted to Bruce Golden, my primary reader for English Composition, for always being available, whether in person or on-line, for pointing me in the right direction when I frequently was led astray and for constantly supplying me with subtle support—and threats—when needed. Rong Chen, my linguistic reader, has garnered my utmost respect by provoking both laughter and fury in me—sometimes simultaneously—while always demonstrating the pragmatic approach to resolving all. Mike Persell has my heartfelt appreciation for his time and effort and for agreeing, as my historical reader, to subject himself to this uncomfortable topic. Also, I must acknowledge Ed Erler for providing the initial impetus (though unbeknownst to him) for this work. Katherine Barber, I thank for offering the hypothetical setting of the Marx family seated around the
dinner table discussing religious issues from which sprang my intrigue with the psychology of the Jewish anti-Semite. Thanks, too, to Kandy Lockard for her suggestions and assistance in proofreading the final format. Both credit and praise go to my fellow English Composition students for poking and prodding me while lavishing me with positive strokes when my energy and enthusiasm were flagging. Through the funding of the Travel and Research Committee of the Instructionally Related Programs (IRP) I was able to present my then in-progress paper at the Conference on College Composition and Communication (CCCC) in Washington, D.C. this spring and further my research. Many thanks go to the faculty and staff at CSUSB, especially in and around the English Department, for having provided me with a superior education. I cannot conclude without acknowledging my supportive—"we’re-so-proud-of-you-Mom" and inquisitive—"but-why-are-you-writing-this?" children, Yarden and Ami. And finally, yet primarily, I want to thank my husband, Daniel "The Master" Scaliter, for being steadfast and providing the B.B.M.B., which I so frequently need, though never want.
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But when a man's religion becomes really frantic; when it is a positive torment to him; and, in fine, makes this earth of ours and uncomfortable inn to lodge in; then I think it high time to take that individual aside and argue the point with him.

Herman Melville
INTRODUCTION

Do I hate my brother because he reminds me of myself, or do I hate my brother because he reminds me of someone who is "not" myself? Whom do I hate, the one who is me, or the one who is anything but me?

Elie Wiesel

Born in 1952, I thought I'd been liberally educated by my parents. Raised agnostic during the McCarthy era, I often had to counter charges of being a Communist for not attending any house of worship. At eighteen, I found out that I was of Jewish descent. When I asked why this had been kept from me, my father countered with, "Your grandfather's parentage didn't matter to him, so why should it matter to you?" Why was it suddenly such a big deal to me? My question to him was: if it wasn't a "big deal" why had no one ever mentioned it?

Similarly, I had friends who were Mexican-American yet raised not to be. And, if they could speak Spanish, they were cautioned not to use it outside of the family and they were never, never to speak English with an accent.

In 1971 at UCLA, during the height of the Black Panther
movement and the establishment of the Black Students' Union (BSU), my three black roommates were discriminated against—not by the whites in the dormitory but by the blacks. As they refused to exchange me for an acceptable "sister" roommate, they were labeled Uncle Toms and the four of us spent our freshman year entering by the basement elevator rather than confront the taunts of the "brothers" who occupied the lobby in the main entrance.

Assimilation was everything then and if assimilation wasn't possible, strident segregation was equally valid. The shadow of slavery, the Holocaust and McCarthyism still clouded minds and spirits. Perhaps in reaction to all this, I decided to leave the U.S. and make a new life in the communal society of kibbutz in Israel. Ten years later, upon my return to America to complete my neglected formal education, it was with some shock and embarrassment that I discovered Karl Marx, the father of communism, had written an anti-Jewish tract—"On the Jewish Question." The irony was overwhelming. While I was well aware he had said, "Religion...is the opium of the people," I had never considered that he, a Jew, might regard the Jews as anathema and an obstacle to communism because of their being Jews.

Amazingly, Marx's essay hasn't received much critical attention. One of the few who doesn't circumvent the issue
is Stephen Greenblatt who says, in Learning to Curse, "[Marx] seize[d] upon the Jew as a kind of powerful rhetorical device, a way of marshalling deep popular hatred and clarifying its object" (41). Instead many, while referring to some individuals' racist anti-Semitic interpretations, sidestep these connotations and, like Shlomo Avineri, conclude that though it presents "a rather unflattering image of Judaism [this] somehow overshadows the question about [Marx's] actual attitude which caused the essay to be written, i.e., the position of the Jews in Prussia" (448).

My study attempts to unite an historical overview of the time and place in which Marx was writing with philosophical and psychological understandings of hate and anti-Semitism—as they specifically relate to Marx—and examine how both rhetorically and linguistically Marx constructs his essay in an attempt to persuade his audience to accept unquestioningly his argument.

Marx's essay includes numerous, blatantly anti-Jewish remarks but the basis for them is hard to pin down; his anti-Semitism is puzzling. Hopefully, this study will illuminate the enigma.

As I have worked from an English translation of Marx's original German, a note with regard to this choice is in
order. Robert Tucker, the editor and translator of the particular text ("On the Jewish Question") I have used says in his "Notes on Texts and Terminology," "Translators of Marx from German into other languages have had to resolve some special problems, arising in part from Marx's use of Hegelian philosophical terminology." This, while a problem for the translator trying to determine whether "alienation" or "estrangement" is the best English equivalent for Marx's use of entfremdung, did not present difficulties in my particular rhetorical-linguistic analysis. There are those who have asked how I can apply the end-focus principle, the principle of climax, etc. when dealing with the work in translation. To this I reply, the analysis was performed on the translation, and its merit, as such, must be left to the reader to determine.
CHAPTER ONE
MARX’S MILIEU

A philosopher of imposing stature doesn’t think in a vacuum. Even his most abstract ideas are, to some extent, conditioned by what is or is not known in the time when he lives.

Alfred North Whitehead

Karl Marx promulgated human emancipation, most notably in his well-known works, the Communist Manifesto (1848) and the much later Capital (1867-95). But years earlier, in “On the Jewish Question” (1844), he laid the groundwork for his vision for the future of mankind. In doing so he needed a culprit responsible for the way things were at the time. He seize[d] upon the Jew as a kind of powerful rhetorical device, a way of marshalling deep popular hatred and clarifying its object. The Jew is charged not with racial deviance or religious impiety but with economic and social crime, crime that is committed not only against the dominant Christian society but, in less ‘pure’ form, by that society. (Greenblatt 41)

In the first part of “On the Jewish Question,” written in response to two essays by Bruno Bauer—“The Jewish Question” (1842) and “The Capacity of the Present-day Jews
and Christians to Become Free,"(1842)\(^1\)--Marx criticizes politics to make the case that political man is divided, torn between two constraints of his own making: his adherence to his civil society and to his state. Civil society was further complicated by man's religion. In a religious state, Marx believed mankind to be the furthest from realizing his emancipation. However, in those countries, like the United States, which had succeeded in abolishing a state religion, he saw man as "politically emancipated from religion [which] is not to be finally and completely emancipated from religion, because political emancipation is not the final and absolute form of human emancipation" ("Question" 32). The reason for his non-acceptance of political emancipation as true human emancipation was simple; the state could consider itself free without the individual being free, in that religion would be relegated to the realm of the civil society and worship by the individual. It was still a form of separation and egoism. He concluded that the "question of the relation between political emancipation and religion becomes for us a question of the relation between political emancipation and human emancipation" ("Question" 31).

Marx disputes Bauer's contention that the state can be emancipated while the individual is free to practice religion privately. As one of the so-called "rights of man," that
contention, Marx says, serves only to promote self-interest, further separating man and state—putting the state at the disposal of man. He concludes that "human emancipation requires the ending of the division between man as an egoistic being in 'civil society' and man as abstract citizen in the state." ("Question" 26). In the second part of the essay he criticizes economics/commerce which he equates with Judaism, thereby making the case that society must be emancipated from Judaism.

Stephen Greenblatt points out that Karl Marx wisely sidesteps the issue of race in his essay, but it is worth our time to consider why Marx should choose to overlook this commonly preferred basis for promoting prejudice.

Race is something that mankind has used as a measurement of quality. There are those who contend that certain races are superior to others. They base this opinion on certain distinctions and characteristics such as relative intelligence, cranial capacity, eye color and shape, skin pigmentation, brow ridges, zygomatic arch placement, jaw structure, stature, etc. A belief that certain bloodlines are "purer" or better than others has allowed people to relegate others to distinct classes. Yet wars, such as the French Revolution—a "class struggle," have never settled the race issue nor the theories surrounding them.
But race as a biological construct did not emerge until the 1860s and 1870s, quite some time after Marx wrote "On the Jewish Question." So, because he knew very little about race he did not avoid the issue, but rather did not address it at all.

Religion is another issue that we humans use to qualify individuals. If we use Webster's secular definition we can say that religion is a "cause, principle, or system of beliefs held to with ardor and faith." The Jews have the dubious distinction of having the word, "Jew" used to define both their religion and race.

In The Oxford English Dictionary, the word "Jew" is defined as "A person of Hebrew descent; one whose religion is Judaism; an Israelite." It goes on to say that originally the Jew was considered to be:

a Hebrew of the kingdom of Judah, as opposed to those of the ten tribes of Israel; later, an Israelite who adhered to the worship of Jehovah as conducted at Jerusalem. Applied comparatively rarely to the ancient nation before the exile but the commonest name for contemporary or modern representatives of this group, now spread throughout the world. The word "Jew" is also applied to groups, e.g. the Falashas in Ethiopia, not ethnically related to persons of the main European groups, the Ashkenazim and the Sephardim. ("Jew," OED 228)

Though Marx deals with religion in this essay it is with a jaundiced eye. In the introduction to the "Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's 'Philosophy of Right'," published a
year later, he writes "Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the sentiment of a heartless world, and the soul of soulless conditions. It is the opium of the people" (54). Marx holds no religion in high regard. Instead he writes in "On the Jewish Question" of the nature of things. "The Christian state, by its very nature, is incapable of emancipating the Jew" ("Question" 27). In paraphrasing Bruno Bauer, Marx says, "the Jew, by his very nature cannot be emancipated" (27). Again, citing Bauer, he writes, "...he is and remains a Jew, even though he is a citizen and as such lives in a universal human condition; his restricted Jewish nature always finally triumphs over his human and political obligations’" (28). And still relying on Bauer to help construct his own argument, Marx quotes him saying, "'[The Jew] declares, by this separation, that the particular nature which makes him Jewish is his true and supreme nature, before which human nature has to efface itself’" (40).

Like race, an exact definition of human nature is problematic. "The Greeks--most notably Plato and Aristotle--introduced the notion of form, nature or essence as an explanatory, metaphysical concept" ("Philos. Anthro.,” Brit. 559). This kind of thinking was used to explain how animal and plant species gave rise to like kind and could not be interbred. Man, setting himself apart from the flora and
fauna by virtue of his intelligence, reason, use of tools, and language, saw his nature as immutable—determined by his place in the universe and destiny—until the 15th century. Certain Renaissance humanists declared, on the other hand however, that man could take responsibility for his own actions; in addition to his own nature, he had free will. Further, during the 17th and 18th century Enlightenment, some argued that man could develop morally and materially by using reason. In the 19th century, with an emphasis on science, other new disciplines arose; religion's influence began to decline. An organic perception of man and nature was now emphasized; man was no longer viewed outside nature but within it. A fixed human nature was rejected while "[t]here was a continued commitment to the perspective for the individual, and his creative relation with the world" ("Philos. Anthro.," Brit. 566). Marx, a Romantic humanist, held to this tenet coupled with the scientific application of reason.

In "On the Jewish Question," where Marx first decries religion's negative impact on society, he uses the Jew as the focal point for blame, epitomizing capitalism and the culprit for man's alienation from himself as a species-being. As we have seen, he says the Jew elevates his nature above that of
humanity, "... his restricted Jewish nature always finally triumphs over his human and political obligations," thus setting himself apart. Judaism is equated with capitalism where "[m]oney is the jealous god of Israel" ("Question" 50). The Jew is the "huckster," worshipper of Mammon, the egoist whose "profane basis" is "practical need" and "self-interest." "The chimerical nationality of the Jew is the nationality of the trader, and above all of the financier" (51). For Marx, Judaism is not merely a religion; Jews are, by nature, capitalists, the bourgeoisie. Therefore, it will never be enough for the Jew to renounce his religion--he cannot. The Jew is his religion--the religion the Jew. According to Marx the inherent nature of the Jew is Judaism. This will forever ban him from the final Marxian nation where there is no need for rule of man over man, no private property, no class relations. Property relations will be abolished; there will be no exclusive relationships, no jealousy, greed or crime as these are all products of class relations. The only barrier to realizing this utopia is the Jew. How is this to be actualized? Marx says, "In the final analysis, the emancipation of the Jews is the emancipation of mankind from Judaism" (49). "The social emancipation of the Jew is the emancipation of society from Judaism" (52).

How do we explain this virulent attack? We can ascribe
Gordon Allport, a leading contributor to the analysis of prejudice, cites a wit as defining prejudice as “being down on something you’re not up on” (8), which is another way of saying, “prejudice is: thinking ill of others without sufficient warrant.”4 [Allport’s emphases] While recognizing that prejudice can also carry positive connotations, Allport points out that with regard to ethnicity,5 prejudice is generally conceived of as negative. He breaks down the definition further by saying:

The phrase “thinking ill of others” is obviously an elliptical expression that must be understood to include feelings of scorn or dislike, of fear and aversion, as well as various forms of antipathetic conduct: such as talking against people, discriminating against them, or attacking them with violence. (7)

This helps to define the term, but what of its source?

It is a serious error to ascribe prejudice and discrimination to any single taproot, reaching into economic exploitation, social structure, the mores, fear, aggression, sex conflict, or any other favored soil. Prejudice and discrimination... may draw nourishment from all these conditions and many others. (Allport, Preface xii)

Since some people have no definable reason for their bigotry, reason will never persuade them that it is unjustified. They are also just as likely to dislike a group of people that they have never encountered as one they have. As Leonard Dinnerstein, author of Antisemitism in America, said in an
online Voice of America interview:

I think certain things have been drilled into children from childhood, such as the Jews killed Christ, there are some stereotypes that are so deeply embedded in the culture that I don't know when they will go away. I hope eventually but I can't predict absolutely.

Karl Marx's prejudice took the form of anti-Semitism which "simply means hostility towards Jews," as defined by Dinnerstein,

> [h]ostility in thought or deed. Thoughts are impossible to measure so it has to be hostility in expressions or activities. We find that anti-Semitism is just another example of hostility towards the outgroup. (VOA Interview)

Which brings us to the paradox: if you hate them, and the "them" is like you, whom do you hate?

It is doubtful that we can wholly explain why Marx thought the way he did. That his argument springs from deepseated, numerous elements that he, himself, could not verbalize is likely. Race and religion are issues that spawn prejudice and have served as catalysts for segregation, warfare and annihilation. To understand the venom of Karl Marx's rhetoric, it is necessary to acquaint oneself with the psychologic ramifications of having been born Jewish in 19th century Germany and the Jewish self-hatred this could have engendered. What is more, his philosophic and historic legacies cannot be overlooked. All are intricately interwoven to create that entity that was Karl Marx.
Jewish history is filled with pogroms and anti-Semitic purges. Here and there it is also dotted with periods of relative calm and at times Jews were even accepted by their non-Jewish neighbors in the Diaspora.

On September 28, 1791, two years after the French revolution and two years after legislators drew up the preface to the French Constitution proclaiming the equality of men, the General Assembly delegates, pressured by the members of the Paris Commune, granted Jews full rights of French citizenship.

In 1799 Napoleon rose to power. In a series of political moves that proved expedient to his burgeoning empire, he courted and wooed the Jews. On September 3, 1806 he asked them to create and convene a Sanhedrin—the Supreme Court of the Jews—defunct since the destruction of the Second Temple in 70 C.E. Playing upon his beneficent mien, as perceived by the French Jews, Napoleon courted their influence with their eastern brethren in Poland to provision his troops there. In 1808, he declared Judaism an "official" religion of France; the rabbis' salaries were set by the state and they were regulated by "consistories," departmental associations of Jewish laymen (Sachar 64). So while the Jews were accorded a modicum of recognition and freedom, they were now state regulated.
Following his takeover of the continent, Napoleon set about instituting formal constitutions after the French model in each of the states. This boded well for the Jews of the former Holy Roman Empire who, since 1792, had petitioned their monarchs for equal rights. In the German states, however, each Jewish petition was countered by a petition by German citizens, "urging authorities to keep the Jews in their ghettos" (Sachar 66).

Nonetheless, ghettos in the the German states were destroyed and their inhabitants freed. In unoccupied Prussia, Jewish emancipation did not occur until 1812, and then it was only partial as they could not hold state offices. Prussian Jews were still viewed with suspicion despite their having taken part in military action against the French, many distinguishing themselves in action—even receiving the Iron Cross (Sachar 68).

Following Napoleon's Waterloo, conservatism seized Europe with the populace embracing a return to the pre-Napoleonic period. In Italy, Austria, Hungary and Galicia Jews were once again relegated to ghettos. They were harassed, had special taxes imposed upon them, and were forced to take humiliating oaths in law courts. In Germany—both in Prussia and the former Confederation of the Rhine—
Jews were even more greatly oppressed.

Immanuel Fichte and Georg Hegel, preaching what became known as romantic conservatism, "deduced from the past that the welfare of the State-Leviathan took precedence over the happiness of individuals" (Sachar 102). To put oneself and one's needs before the state's was tantamount to treason. Between 1815 and 1840 there was a radical return to nationalism in the German states and with it came renewed hatred of the Jews.

Frederich Rühs of the University of Berlin and Wilhelm Ries of the University of Heidelberg offered anti-Semitism an intellectual rationale. They viewed the Jewish minority as a "'state within a state," as a "menace to the welfare and character of the Germans'" (qtd.in Sachar 103).

Further complicating the period was the public's growing fascination with science. Scientists "chose to assume that matter was the source of everything in the universe, including life and consciousness. Everything else was either an illusion or else a subjective impression which could be 'reduced' to material fact" (Barzun, DMW 9). Scholars hastened to ground everything in fact.

Arising within this historical milieu was Karl Herschel Marx. His father, Herschel ha-Levi Marx, was a successful Jewish lawyer who "came from a long line of distinguished
rabbis" (Kamenka xiii). After studying jurisprudence and becoming an "enlightened Deist and liberal Kantian" (Kamenka xiii), though formally remaining a Jew, Herschel returned to Trier where his father and elder brother were rabbis. In a Jewish ceremony, Herschel Marx married Henriette Pressborck, the "daughter of a rabbi from Nijmegen in Holland, whose ancestors had been rabbis in Hungary" (Kamenka xiii). Of the nine children born to them only Karl and five sisters survived.

Karl was born on May 5, 1818 in Trier, located in a province of the Rhine "liberated" by the Prussians from France. Sometime between 1816 and 1817, Karl's father was baptized into the Evangelical established church of the kingdom of Prussia...seven years later, on 24 August 1824, Karl Marx [age 6] (with his five sisters) stood at the baptismal font. In 1825, after both her parents had died, Marx's mother finally went through the ceremony of baptism. (Kamenka xiii-xiv)

While some biographers have suggested that this conversion was due to the elder Marx's Deist/Enlightenment convictions, more recent study has shown that Prussian legislation forced Herschel to choose between his law practice as State Legal Counsellor in Trier, and remaining a Jew (Kamenka xiv). In 1815, Herschel Marx wrote to the Governor-General requesting that the laws applying solely to Jews be annulled, identifying himself as a believer and member of the Jewish community.
In 1816 the President of the provincial Supreme Court interviewed Heinrich [Herschel] Marx and recommended that he and two other Jewish officials be retained in their posts and that the King grant them the special exception....The Prussian Minister of Justice failed to recommend such an exception. (Kamenka xiv)

No evidence exists indicating the extent of Jewishness in Herschel Marx's household and many researchers refute those who suggest that the elder Marx was anti-Semitic. Much writing and correspondence exists though, showing Karl Marx's vehement and hostile attitude toward Jews and Judaism. Marx viewed Ferdinand Lassalle (a fervent anti-Semite, though Jewish himself, and a socialist who became Marx's opponent within the revolutionary movement) as the "'most unGreek of all the water-pollack Jews,' He is 'Itzig.' His books stink of garlic. But mainly he is that 'Jewish Nigger, Lassalle'" (206). In a letter to Friedrich Engels, Marx continues his "impression of the external nature of the Jew as typified by Lassalle":

Always this constant babble with the falsely excited voice, the unaesthetic, demonstrative gestures, the didactic tone...And also the uncultivated eating and the horny lust of this "idealist." It is now completely clear to me that, as his skull shape and hair prove, he is a descendant of those Blacks who accompanied Moses on the exodus from Egypt. (If his mother or grandmother on his father's side did cross with a nigger.) Now this combination of Jewishness and Germanness upon the Black basic substance must bring forth a strange product. (Gilman 206)

That Marx, who was dark complected and nicknamed "Moor,"
(Kamenka 345) should disparage Lassalle on the basis of his heritage and color is ironic and yet in keeping with Marx’s penchant for denigrating in others what was inherent in himself.

This form of diatribe is also reflected in “On the Jewish Question” where Marx poses rhetorical questions regarding Judaism and Jews and then supplies the answers, “What is the profane basis of Judaism? Practical need, self-interest. What is the worldly cult of the Jew? Huckstering. What is his worldly god? Money” (48).

At the same time there appears a strong ambivalence in Marx when we compare his actions to his words. In 1871 Mikhail Bakunin⁷ writes of Marx, praising his intelligence and work as a scholar, especially in economics, and his love for the cause of the proletariat. He lauds Marx for being the “chief inspirer” of the founding of the International.⁸ But then he points out what he views as Marx’s faults:

Marx is extremely vain, a vanity which causes him to descend to filth and madness. This is strange in so intelligent and honestly devoted a man and can only be explained by his education as a German scholar and a man of letters and particularly by his nervous Jewish character,...Himself a Jew, he has surrounded himself in London and France but above all in Germany, with crowds of minor, more or less clever, scheming, glib, speculating Jews. Like Jews everywhere else, they are banking or commercial agents, literary people, political people, correspondents for newspapers of all shades....(Bakunin 117-19)

Bakunin’s own prejudices notwithstanding, we see Marx as a
man who, on the one hand, vilifies Jews while, on the other, surrounds himself with them. The man was an enigma, and it would not be too far fetched to assume he was tormented. As David McLellan puts it in his introduction to *Karl Marx: Interviews and Recollections*:

The whole framework of Marx's existence was penetrated by profound structural contradictions. He was a Jew living in a Christian culture. He was a German living in London. He was a socialist living in a bourgeois society. (xii)

Eugene Kamenka confirms McLellan's conclusions and moves into the realm of psychology when he states in his introduction to *The Portable Karl Marx*:

[I]n Marx's childhood character, in his sharp tongue, strong ambition, and frequent aloofness—characteristics that stayed with him for much of his life—we do find some evidence of an underlying insecurity and distress, so frequently linked with equivocal status. (xiv-xv)

We can readily see this "equivocal status" made manifest by the conversions to Christianity in Marx's household. By Jewish rabbinic law, if one is born to a Jewish mother, one is Jewish, regardless of later conversions by either the mother or her offspring. The Evangelical Church, however, would view the Marx family as Christian. Jews in Prussia had the option declaring allegiance to their religion or they could adapt to their surroundings. Herschel Marx's forlorn attempt to remain faithful to his religion and heritage
illustrates that the alternative to adaptation was not promising. The Marx family was not unique. Many Jews, with the advent of the Enlightenment and emancipation, moved to the cities where they did not have to bear close scrutiny by Orthodox Jews. Also, by this time, central-European Judaism had become rigid. The new, secular Western culture was seductive. The Jews "were willing to go to almost any length to prove themselves worthy of citizenship, even, in the case of some, if it meant sacrificing their religious identification" (Sachar 140).

What arose from this "psychic insecurity" was Jewish self-hatred. In an attempt to move into the Prussian drawing rooms of the aristocrats and intelligentsia and have them, in turn, as guests, Jews began to struggle against that which they saw as an obstacle to full acceptance by Prussian society--their Jewishness. As Moritz Goldstein wrote in 1912 in the journal Der Kunstwart "We Jews administer the intellectual property of a people which denies us the right and the ability to do so" (qtd. in Arendt 30).

Howard Morley Sachar relates the dilemma of Rahel Levin a "brilliant salon Jewess." She entertained the most original minds in Germany at the time in her home. She had a unique ability to discern new talent, being the first "to introduce Goethe and Ranke to the literary world." She was called,
"the most gifted woman of the universe, a seeress with the influence of a Pythia, the first modern woman of German culture" (141). She was, however, desperately unhappy due to, as she viewed it, the misfortune of having been born Jewish. In writing to a friend she says:

How loathsome degradation, how offensive, insane and low are my surroundings, which I cannot avoid. One single defilement, a mere contact, sullies me and disturbs my nobility. I imagine that just as I was being thrust into this world a supernatural being plunged a dagger into my heart with these words: "Now, have feeling, see the world as only a few can see it, be great and noble... But with one reservation: be a Jewess!" (qtd. in Sachar 141).

In 1814, after marrying a thirty-year-old Christian writer and diplomat (thirteen years her junior), she was baptized a Lutheran the same day (Sachar 141).

While some Jews fled their heritage by conversions, others did not seek salvation in such maneuvers. They, like Moritz Goldstein, Franz Kafka and Walter Benjamin born more than two generations later, preferred instead to forge ahead, "to discover new ways of dealing with the past" (Arendt 38)

not because they believed in "progress" and an automatic disappearance of anti-Semitism or because they were too "assimilated" and too alienated from their Jewish heritage, but because all traditions and cultures as well as all "belonging" had become equally questionable to them. (Arendt 36).

We can see vestiges of this dilemma and Rahel Levin's self-loathing in Marx, himself, in his 1841 poem (written two
years before "On the Jewish Question") in a Berlin literary magazine, Athenaeum.

The Player
The player strikes up on his violin,
His blond hair falling down.
He wears a sword at his side,
And a wide, wrinkled gown.

"O Player, why playest thou so wild?
Why the savage look in thine eyes?
Why the leaping blood, the soaring waves?
Why tearest thou thy bow to shreds?"

"I play for the sake of the thundering sea
Crashing against the walls of the cliffs,
That my eyes be blinded and my heart burst
And my soul resound in the depths of Hell."

"O player, why tearest thou thy heart to shreds
In mockery? This art was given thee
By shining God to elevate the mind
Into the swelling music of the starry dance."

"Look now, my blood-dark sword shall stab
Unerringly within thy soul.
God neither knows nor honors art.
The hellish vapors rise and fill the brain,
Till I go mad and my heart is utterly changed.
See this sword--the Prince of Darkness sold it to me.
For he beats the time and gives the signs.
Ever more boldly I play the dance of death.

I must play darkly, I must play lightly,
Until my heart and my violin burst."

The player strikes up on his violin,
His blond hair falling down.
He wears a sword at his side,
And a wide, wrinkled gown. (Payne 59-60)

The title itself can be interpreted as an equivocation.
It can mean the player of a musical instrument, in this case, the violin; it can be construed also as one who is acting or playing a role; a player can also be someone involved in a game. Which of these players is Marx? The God-given art that the speaker refers to “to elevate the mind” but which the player uses instead “to tear [his own] heart to shreds in mockery” may be Marx’s own writing and his venomous, caustic ability with words, which he then uses to “stab unerringly with [the] soul” of his interlocutor, while at the same time, he destroys himself.

Goethe was one of Marx’s favorite poets (see Appendix ‘A’), so it is not difficult to connect the allusion to the player’s purchase of the sword from the Prince of Darkness to the pact in Faust.

In the poem, we can only guess as to the roots of the protagonist’s tortured self-hatred. As for Marx, himself, it seems that his race, his religion, his Jewish origins may explain much in his writing and his conflicted personality. Gerhart Saenger writes in his 1953 book The Social Psychology of Prejudice that many Jews, having resisted suppression for generations, resign themselves to accepting prejudice. Those Jews who still resist are viewed by the resigned, as troublemakers. It is better, in the resigned’s view, to
avoid bringing anti-Semitism to public awareness. Furthermore, they believe that anti-Semitism is brought on by the behavior of those troublesome Jews; if all Jews behaved as they, themselves, did, anti-Semitism would cease to exist. The "bad" Jews are responsible for the "good" Jews not being accepted by the majority. The "good" Jews now feel that they have more in common with the majority by sharing the majority prejudice. The "good" Jew now feels superior to the other Jews. From a psychological standpoint, this allows him an outlet for his aggression "resulting from discrimination as well as from his inability to escape the situation due to his resignation but also additional support for his self-esteem" (Saenger 30). Saenger goes on to point out the devastating consequences of this self-hating pattern:

From here it is only one step toward releasing the accumulated hostility toward members of one's own group or other minorities. Jews become anti-Semites...The price, however, which the minority member pays for such neurotic outlet is the inability to identify with his own group. Rejected by the majority and by the minority such individuals are often quite isolated. (30-31)

Saenger recommends that instead of becoming resigned to the discrimination that the individual take overt action against the prejudice—even to the point of militant action. This produces a better adjusted individual (31).

In Jewish Self-Hatred, Sander Gilman explains why this strategy is not only the best of two options but probably the
only practical solution. He contends that as the minority member attempts to adapt to the majority, the majority views his actions as "The more you are like me, the more I know the true value of my power, which you wish to share, and the more I am aware that your are but a shoddy counterfeit, and outsider" (2). It is an ever moving target, an unachievable goal.

The power rests with the determining majority. "One cannot escape these labels [ethnic, religious or class identity] because of the privileged group's myth that these categories are immutable" (Gilman 4). If one is to circumvent the "power," one must change the rules. Myths cannot be eradicated; they must be supplanted. One must create a new myth. Marx tried. By attacking religion--"the opium of the masses"--he attempted to change the myth. Unfortunately, to do so, he had to demonize his origins.

I must play darkly, I must play lightly, 
Until my heart and my violin burst.
CHAPTER TWO

RHETORICAL ANALYSIS: FORMS, FALLACIES AND FIGURES

What's in a name? That which we call a rose
By any other name would smell as sweet.

William Shakespeare

In the classical tradition rhetoric meant "the art of persuasive speaking." Rhetoric originated 2,400 years ago in the courts of Syracuse in arguments over property, and it is ironically fitting that Karl Marx should use rhetoric to propound his doctrine advocating the freeing of humans from their dependence upon property. Later, rhetoric came to encompass written discourse as well and has since undergone changes along with a deepening understanding of human nature and language. Developments in history, culture, psychology, literature, and philosophy have also served to shape modern rhetorical strategies and study. However, three types of appeals, first identified by Aristotle, have remained indispensable to modern rhetoricians: logos, ethos and pathos. Of these respective appeals Aristotle said,

The man who is to be in command of them must, it is clear, be able (1) to reason logically, (2) to

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understand human character and goodness in their various forms, and (3) to understand the emotions—that is, to name and describe them, to know their causes and the way in which they are excited. (Aristotle, Rhetoric, Book 1, 154)

While the classical rhetoricians may have disapproved of the emphasis upon pathos, and many, like Plato, despised rhetoric, preferring the dialectic with its emphasis on logos, pathos' power to sway people cannot be denied.

Kenneth Burke says, in "Rhetoric--Old and New," that modern rhetoric hinges upon the principle of "identification," which, though a deliberate device like the persuasion of "old" rhetoric, "can include a partially 'unconscious' factor in appeal" (63). He elaborates further on this concept by saying,

identification can also be an end, as when people earnestly yearn to identify themselves with some group or other. Here they are not necessarily being acted upon by a conscious external agent, but may be acting upon themselves to this end. In such identification there is a partially dreamlike, idealistic motive, somewhat compensatory to real differences or divisions which the rhetoric of identification would transcend. ("Rhetoric--Old and New" 63)

Identification, therefore, is the process by which speakers get themselves accepted by an audience. That audience, in turn, suspends its logic (in the Aristotelean sense) to follow along. The new rhetoric exploits this.

Roland Barthes, another modern rhetorician, includes "ludic" as one of his six practices in rhetoric.9 He defines
it as a mockery of rhetoric that developed naturally in response to the repressiveness of rhetoric's institutional system. It is, he continues,

a "black" rhetoric (suspicions, contempt, ironies): games, parodies, erotic or obscene allusions, classroom jokes, a whole schoolboy practice (which remains to be explored moreover, and to be constituted as a cultural code). (Barthes 14)

Ludic is a cognate for "play," and play's derivation is readily apparent in that both it and ludic are defined as opposition to work, irony, parody.

This multi-faceted concept of "ludic/play," as noted in Marx's poem "The Player" in the last chapter, and Burke's "identification" and the psychological ramifications of both for Marx, personally, carry forward into our rhetorical examination of Marx's non-fiction prose, specifically "On the Jewish Question," adding other dimensions to our comprehension of the essay and its motivation.

The darker side of "play" can be found in anti-Semitic literature. In "The Passion of the Anti-Semite" (1948), Jean-Paul Sartre discusses just this point.

Anti-Semites have the right to play. They even like to play with discourse for by giving ridiculous reasons, they discredit the seriousness of their interlocutors. They delight in acting in bad faith, since they seek not to persuade by sound argument but to intimidate and disconcert. (148)

Sartre, philosopher, political essayist and activist, argues that anti-Semitism is not an idea but a passion, one
which he equates with hysteria. He says that historically the hatred of Jews has not been based upon "an 'historical fact' but the idea that the agents of history formed for themselves of the Jew" (146). In refuting the view that "social facts" indicate that, for example, there are too many Jewish lawyers, Sartre says that one doesn't hear a like complaint that there are "too many Norman lawyers" or that there are too many Breton doctors. His point is that "Normans are [considered] Normans and Jews as Jews" (147). It is, he continues, "the idea of the Jew which seems to be the essential thing" [Sartre's emphases](147). Lest we confuse the passion of anti-Semitism with the passions of hatred and anger, Sartre cautions that hate and anger must have a provocation; someone must instigate the anger/hatred. Anti-Semitism, on the other hand, "precedes the facts that are supposed to call it forth" (147). He reasons that it is not unusual for people to prefer passion to reason; usually they love the objects of passion but as the anti-Semite chooses hate it must be the state of passion that he loves.

Marx is certainly a man of passion. We have seen it demonstrated in his poem "The Player" (see above, page 23). Anti-Semitism is prevalent throughout "On the Jewish Question," and we see his violent hatred directed at Lassalle
We also learned of the historical circumstances that shaped his world, McLellan’s and Kamenka’s assessments attest to Marx’s equivocal status in society (see above, page 20) and Saenger an Gilman confirm his deep Jewish self-hatred (see above, pages 24-26). Yet Marx’s writings also reveal a man of reason. Like the man, they are greater than the sum of the parts.

Classically educated from the local gymnasium through five years at the University of Berlin, he had developed his ability to use language to manipulate audiences in both the classical and modern sense. Marx’s doctoral dissertation, entitled “The Difference Between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophies of Nature” (1839-41), voiced his “Promethean revolt.” “By liberating the world from the unphilosophical condition, men at the same time liberate themselves from philosophy, which in the form of a definite system has held them in fetters” (qtd. in Lewis 33). This passage demonstrates Marx’s use of the classical figure, polyptoton, the use of a repeated word or root in different grammatical functions, i.e. liberating, liberate. Arthur Quinn points out in Figures of Speech, it is a technique used frequently in aphorisms as in Epicurus’, “Nothing is enough to the man for whom enough is too little.” Quinn suggests that it is successful because it is not readily recognizable
as a figure and therefore makes the adage seem "strikingly original" (74). (It is not surprising that Marx uses polyptoton, a technique favored by Epicurus--whose philosophy was the focus of Marx's dissertation.) Such rhetoric would serve Marx well.

While Marx relied heavily upon rhetorical strategies, he touted the dialectic--with, of course, his own modifications. The word "dialectic" has accrued many meanings over the centuries so it is worthwhile, here, to slow our argument to discuss the different conceptions. Originally, the Aristotelean dialectic and that of the classical Greek scholars, "us[ed] rigorous syllogistic logic to approach probable truths in questions about human affairs and philosophy that do not lend themselves to absolute certainty" (Bizzell and Herzberg 4). In modern usage, the dialectic has become a "philosophical concept of evolution applied to diverse fields including thought, nature, and history" ("Dialectic," Brit. 63). When applied philosophically by Kant, the dialectic shows "the mutually contradictory character of the principles of science, when they are employed to determine objects beyond the limits of experience (i.e. the soul, the world, God)" (OED, "Dialectic" 599). Between these two definitions rests the Hegelian dialectic: "The tendency of a notion to pass over into its own negation
as the result of conflict between its inherent contradictory aspects" ("Dialectic," Brit. 63). Hegel denied Kant's position that the contradictions of science were irreconcilable. Instead he maintained that the term "dialectic" applies:

(a) to the process of thought by which such contradictions are seen to merge themselves in a higher truth that comprehends them; and (b) to the world-process on its objective side, develops similarly by a continuous unification of opposites. (OED "Dialectic" 599)

Marx adopted Hegel's definition but revised it through the application of Ludwig Feuerbach's "transformational criticism...inverting its principle propositions" (Tucker xxii). Instead of the Hegelian belief that the course of events could be deduced from any "principle of dialectics," Marx said that the principles must be inferred from the events, matter over mind. This gave rise to the Marxian theory of dialectical materialism, according to which political events or social phenomena are to be interpreted as a conflict of social forces (the "class struggle") produced by the operation of economic causes, and history is to be interpreted as a series of contradictions and their solutions (the thesis, antithesis, and synthesis of Hegelian philosophy). (OED, "Dialectical," 600)

Marx's collaborator, Friedrich Engels, described this dialectical process as the being like the planting of a cereal seed (thesis), which is annihilated as the plant grows (antithesis) and, in developing, a causes its own extinction
in the production of new seeds (synthesis). Marx considered this to be the universal law of nature, history and thought.

The fundamental change between Hegel's and Marx's view of the dialectical process is one from "spirit" (Hegel) to "material" (Marx).

Marx relished "turning Hegel on his head." In "A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy" Marx takes Hegel's view, that civil society was an outgrowth of the state, and says instead that the state was an outgrowth of civil society. In referring to the Hegelian dialectic in the Afterword of the second German edition of Capital, Marx says, "With him it is standing on its head. It must be turned right side up again, if you would discover the rational kernel within the mystical shell." (Tucker, Intro. The Marx-Engels Reader, xx-xxi).

In Stanley Fish's highly specialized view, he describes the dialectic presentation as disturbing, for it requires of its readers a searching and rigorous scrutiny of everything they believe in and live by. It is didactic in a special sense; it does not preach the truth, but asks that its readers discover the truth for themselves, and this discovery is often made at the expense not only of a reader's opinions and values, but of his self-esteem. (Fish 1-2)

The intent is to force the audience into reevaluation and change. The end product of this dialectical experience "is (or should be) nothing less than a conversion" (Fish 2).
The antithesis, according to Fish, is rhetoric, making "lies and impieties attractive...induc[ing] forgetfulness and complacency" (15). So what are we to make of Marx, who mixes his rhetorical and dialectical presentations?

Marx attempts Fish's "conversion" by vehemently trying to dissuade his audience from embracing religion altogether. And while Marx is guilty of "pander[ing] to his audience's immediate desires" (Fish 15-16), he utilizes the definitive dialectic form to:

transform []the soul-mind into an instrument capable of seeing things in the phenomenal world for what they really are (turning things upside down), imperfect and inferior reflections of a higher reality whose claim on our thoughts and desires is validated as earthly claims are discredited. (Fish 7)

Certainly, in its final extreme, the socialist/communist world Marx envisioned was other-worldly, manifesting a "higher reality," a utopia that is not credible given man's generally self-serving attitude. Yet, Marx did not stop with Hegel in "turning things upside down" to attempt to achieve his world view. In his eleventh thesis on Feuerbach, Marx says, "The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it" (145). This could be considered Marx's raison d'être. Calling for "a ruthless criticism of everything existing" in a letter to Arnold Ruge in 1843, his writings reflect his critical and revolutionary
attitudes directed toward social reality. It is not too far-fetched then to postulate that in defying tradition by inverting Hegel and blending the rhetorical approach with the dialectic, Marx was mirroring his ideology.

Not limiting himself to the larger components of written expression, Marx also uses inversion at the level of sentences.

Marx poses the question "What specific social element is it necessary to overcome in order to abolish Judaism?" [Marx's emphasis] ("Jewish Question" 48). He then suggests, "Let us not seek the secret of the Jew in his religion, but let us seek the secret of the religion in the real Jew" ("Question" 48). Using antimetabole, a form of antithesis repeated in opposite order (Quinn 93), and clearly aligning himself with his audience against the Jews, Marx presents us with an idea and then its inverse--an antithesis. Antithesis and antimetabole are more than interesting uses of language; they allow for repetition and accumulation--two fine didactic techniques--by denying the contrary and asserting it (Quinn 93). Marx uses this technique extensively in his essay to press home his point.

Thus man was not liberated from religion; he received religious liberty. He was not liberated from property; he received the liberty to own property. He was not liberated from the egoism of business; he received the liberty to engage in business. ("Question" 45)
Besides using antimetabole, Marx also alters the passive voice to the active as he moves from the first clause to the second in each sentence. But instead of implying that man is the doer, Marx conditions the action by saying "he received..." and through the repetition of the same phrase, "he received..." emphasizes man's subjugation.

In the first section of the essay, Marx makes his case against religion, specifically against Judaism, paraphrasing Bruno Bauer, whose essays "The Jewish Question" and "The Capacity of Present-Day Jews and Christians to Become Free," are the proximate cause for Marx's essay. Marx begins by condemning Jews as egoists. "You Jews are egoists if you demand for yourselves, as Jews, a special emancipation" ("Question" 26). Again, Marx's antimetabole sets the Jews up as adversaries of the German people. "Why should the German be interested in the liberation of the Jew, if the Jew is not interested in the liberation of the German" (27). Then he stresses that the Jews set themselves apart, not only from the German people, but Christians as well. "The Jew himself in this state, has the privilege of being a Jew. As a Jew he possesses rights which the Christians do not have" (27). Marx is very clever in weaving his own interpretations through Bauer's words. He haphazardly uses quotation marks, sometimes attributing quotes, sometimes paraphrasing.13 This
makes it difficult, at this juncture, to ascertain whose words are whose. Later in the essay, however, Marx allows his own no-longer-camouflaged voice to surface. He uses Bauer as a whipping boy for not having taken his argument far enough. Bauer stopped short of defaming all religion, and did not require that society be purged of all Jews.

Marx's tone comes through in his style. He makes ample use of italics, even in quoting from Bauer's essays, and his choice of nouns, adjectives and modifiers all emphasize his defamatory agenda.

When we move our rhetorical investigation from the level of sentences to that of words, we see Marx uses words to great effect. Some examples are: "right of property," "right of self-interest," "private interest," "private caprice," "monad," "nature," and any and all forms of the word "ego." These words are used to imply oppositions between the individual and society as a whole, distinguishing between the general rights of man and the specific rights of the citizen. Marx says that man's individual rights keep him from being at one with the community of man.

But it is the word "Jew," its variations, and Marx's repeated use of it as an epithet that is striking. Jews are "egoists," there is "the privilege of being a Jew." "[T]he
Jew by his very nature, cannot be emancipate.' and ‘...his restricted Jewish nature always finally triumphs over his human and political obligations.’”15

“He regards himself as a member of the Jewish people, and the Jewish people as the chosen people.” “[A] Jewish attitude, i.e., that of a foreigner, towards the state” keeps him forever apart.

Gordon W. Allport points out in The Nature of Prejudice that “a noun abstracts from a concrete reality some one feature and assembles different concrete realities only with respect to this one feature” [Allport’s emphasis] (174-75). He uses Irving Lee’s example of a blind man who may be many other things—a good student, careful listener, conscientious worker—but because he is also a blind man he is stigmatized by that noun [Allport’s emphasis]. He calls this a symbol of “primary potency”—a label that “distracts our attention from concrete reality. The living, breathing, complex individual...is lost to sight” (175-76). Allport goes on to say that the force of the noun’s primary potency may be mitigated if used as an adjective, e.g. Jewish artist, Negro soldier, Catholic teacher, whereby other group classifications are just as legitimate as the racial or religious (176) and the more attributes used to describe an individual the better, suggesting that “we designate ethnic
and religious membership where possible with *adjectives* rather than *nouns*" (177).

Marx rigorously avoids the use of the word Jew/Jewish as an adjective; he has no desire to mitigate the connotations. One exception is "the practical Jewish spirit" (50), but he uses another adjective, "practical," not to conciliate but to heighten the negative impact as he has already argued that practicality is synonymous with self-interest and huckstering. These are all Jewish traits and all are anti-social.

But while in the first section of his essay, there appears to be a less specific attack on Jews and a more general one on the condition of mankind as a whole, in the second portion he equates Jews and Judaism with the monad, the egoist, and the financier to demonstrate they are one and the same and consequently anathema to society and true human emancipation.

Marx finally disassociates himself from Bauer’s Jewish question criticism by stating that is only a theological criticism as in Germany “there is no political state, no state as such...The Jew finds himself in *religious* opposition to the state, which proclaims Christianity as its foundation” (30). When no state religion exists and when it “ceases to maintain a *theological* attitude toward religion,” the Jewish
Question becomes one of politics and not theology (29-31). Marx then poses the question, "What is the relation between complete political emancipation and religion?" and sets up the hypothetical syllogism that if a country has full political emancipation and religion continues to exist, then the "existence of religion is not at all opposed to the perfection of the state, but since the existence of religion is the existence of a defect, the source of the defect must be sought in the nature of the state itself" ("Question" 31). He thus makes the point that theological questions must be addressed as secular ones and not the reverse. This reflects the Hegelian inversion discussed earlier (page 34) and also is a technique of accumulation and an antithesis (Quinn 67). Marx goes on to state that man, by still adhering to a religion in the private and civil sector in a secular state, is a "profane being" ("Question" 34). "The democratic state, the real state, does not need religion for its political consummation" ("Question" 37).

Marx felt that Bauer erred in relegating religion to individual worship; the state must abolish religion not only from its political life but it must be abolished from the civil or private life, as well. Worth noting is the implicit totalitarian position Marx takes on the subject of all religion. And it can be argued that his position on Jews was
hardly different than that on Christians. Marx says that "Christianity issued from Judaism. It has now been re-absorbed into Judaism" (52). But he blames Jews for their corrupting influence. He argues that,

It was only in appearance that Christianity overcame real Judaism. It was too refined, too spiritual to eliminate the crueness of practical need except by raising it into the ethereal realm.

Christianity is the sublime thought of Judaism; Judaism is the vulgar practical application of Christianity. ("Question 52)

Marx, nevertheless, singles out Jews and Judaism:

We do not say to the Jews, therefore, as does Bauer: you cannot be emancipated politically without emancipating yourselves completely from Judaism. We say rather: it is because you can be emancipated politically, without renouncing Judaism completely and absolutely, that political emancipation itself is not human emancipation. ("Question" 40)

What is the reason for this exclusivity?

In the second part of his essay, Marx quotes Bauer as saying that it is simply a matter of the Christian "ris[ing] above his religion to abolish religion in general...[the Jew] has to break not only with his Jewish nature, but also with the process towards the consummation of his religion"(47).

Marx contests this view by again saying that Bauer’s theological take simply relegates the question of Jewish emancipation a matter of religion. He chastises Bauer saying this "demand does not follow, as he himself admits, from the
development of the Jewish nature" (47).

After shattering Bauer's premises (or at least manipulating them to serve his rhetorical purposes), and supplanting them, in the first half of the argument, with his own, Marx now builds towards his conclusion. He contends that Jewishness, being at the crux of Bauer's examination of the Jews' request for political emancipation in Germany, is not solely a religion. He says that Bauer is mistaken in attempting to address the issue theologically. But Marx uses Bauer as support for his claim when he says:

Bauer regards the ideal and abstract essence of the Jew--his religion--as the whole of his nature. He, therefore, concludes rightly that 'The Jew contributes nothing to mankind when he disregards his own limited law,' when he renounces all his Judaism. (47)

Marx claims that Bauer's error lies in believing that the Jews' essence is their religion rather than their inherent nature. Yet here, he has used Bauer's own words as both support and refutation.

For Marx, the roots of Judaism are more than cultural, more than a product of materials, they are nature.

But this runs counter to Marx's conventional argument--dialectical materialism--whereby conditions produce the man.

If we formulated Marx's argument in "On the Jewish Question" as a syllogism it would look something like this:

Major Premise: All anti-social elements must be removed from society for it to succeed.
Minor Premise
(implied): [The Jew's, by nature, are set apart, anti-social.]

Conclusion: Jews must be removed from society for it to succeed.

While this is a startling argument in its bare-bones formulation, Marx is careful to cloak it in layers of clever rhetoric and convoluted phrasing. Using the enthymeme and its implied premise to distort perceptions, he sets up the Jew's nature as the less defensible straw man and then destroys it and uses genetic fallacy to attack the cause of the Jew's belief rather than its justification. Marx does not offer a logical opposition but rather a rhetorical one.

Marx defies his own philosophical dictates. He uses faulty logic. He relies on fallacies and rhetorical figures. These are not the tools of a logical or prudent individual. Yet we know Marx to be one. Why does he deviate?

If we recall Sartre's appraisal (see above, pages 29-30), "they seek not to persuade by sound argument but to intimidate and disconcert," a plausible answer emerges. Marx is in the thrall of passion. But this only explains his vehemence; it does not excuse it.

In an effort to dehumanize the Jew, Marx uses as his
premises the most hackneyed stereotypes: Jews are "hucksters," money and Mammon are the "gods of the Jew." He states the "nationality of the Jew" to be that of the trader and the financier. He invites his audience to draw comparisons, albeit implied, between money (property) and Jews. Building on this false analogy, he demonstrates that they are inseparable; both are responsible for man's alienation from his natural and emancipated being. Marx demonstrates that the Jewish religion and the Jewish nature are indivisible and that their nature is capitalistic.

Marx begins a telling passage with:

Let us consider the real Jew: not the sabbath Jew, whom Bauer considers, but the everyday Jew. [Marx's emphases] ("Question" 48)

Omitting the dependent, practically parenthetical clause "whom Bauer considers," he employs the figure of repetitive ends, epistrophe, concluding each clause with "Jew."

Why does Marx resort to stereotypes? Because they work. They work because people believe in them. Stereotypes lead to prejudice. Aristotle calls this "indignant language" and says that when we paint a highly colored picture of the situation without having proved the facts of it:...if the prosecutor goes into a passion, he produces an impression of the defendant's guilt...the hearer infers guilt or innocence, but no proof is given, and the inference is fallacious accordingly. (Rhetoric 192)

Marx's passage continues with the previously examined
paragraph with its antimetabole (see above, page 36):

Let us not seek the secret of the Jew in his religion, but let us seek the secret of the religion in the real Jew. ("Question" 48)

which is then followed by:

What is the profane basis of Judaism? Practical need, self-interest. What is the worldly cult of the Jew? Huckstering. What is his worldly god? Money. ("Question" 48)

The repeated use of identical clause beginnings, anaphora, used here: "What is..." in this question-answer format is deceptively childlike in its simplicity but effective in its repetition. These three paragraphs offer a different rhetorical figure, yet all are a form of repetition and it is this repetition, drumming the litany into the reader that helps Marx make his point. The Jew is the consummate Capitalist and thus the quintessential egoist. His solution and the attainment of human emancipation, therefore, can only be achieved by mankind's emancipation from Judaism ("Question" 49-52). Capitalism creates religions, but according to Marx, only the Jews worship (or make a religion of) capitalism. This behavior is the problem with Jewish liberation. He further states that:

Judaism could not create a new world. It could only bring the new creations and conditions of the world within its own sphere of activity, because practical need, the spirit of which is self-interest, is always passive, cannot expand at will, but finds itself extended as a result of the continues development of society. ("Question" 51)
Marx makes an obvious, though implied comparison between Judaism and parasitism, emphasizing greed and selfishness. These were commonly held beliefs in 19th century Europe and it was not beneath Marx to use ad populum fallacy to sidetrack his audience, appealing to favored ideas, values, or symbols as a means of winning assent to a claim without confronting substantive issues. But, in this case, as he had already supplied the premise—that the Jew's belief was caused by greed—it makes the argument doubly specious.

Marx's heavy reliance upon informal fallacies would be considered illogical and unethical. Rhetorically, however, these means work to justify his ends. As Socrates tells Phaedrus, "he who is to be an artist in speech must fix his attention upon probability. A speaker must always aim at probability, paying no attention to truth" (qtd. in Bizzell 139). Additionally, Marx uses what Aristotle called enthymemes and "non-essentials," personal appeals arousing prejudice, pity and anger (Bizzell 151).

Moving to the language of modern rhetoric, Marx also utilizes Burke's identification (see above, page 28): "anything that anyone does--verbally or non-verbally, consciously or unconsciously, for persuasion (the old rhetoric) or for identification (the new rhetoric)...[as] a rhetorical strategy" (Burke 59).
Marx exploits this principle by placing himself clearly on the side of the "non-Jews" while encouraging his audience likewise to join him. Yet, who was Marx's audience?

A member of the Young Hegelians, and the Doktor Klub, Marx was one of a group of "critical young thinkers, who poured contempt on the church, on the bourgeoisie and even on the state" (Lewis 23). Chosen to edit the Rhenish Gazette (1842) by its founders, Cologne merchants and bankers, Marx moved to Cologne. When the journal was censored and suppressed in early 1843, Marx "retired" briefly, and in November moved to Paris. It was about this time he wrote "On the Jewish Question." Also, with the financial backing of Arnold Ruge he became co-editor of The German-French Yearbook (November, 1843). This was yet another in a series of "journalistic enterprises undertaken by German radicals in the 1830s and 1840s" (Gilman 192). The the backers, writers and readership were Jewish. As they had difficulty publishing their work in Germany, and were denied access to the politics there, they wrote and published in France. As radical idealists striving for identification the primarily Jewish, Young Hegelians wrote for their non-Jewish countrymen only to be denied acceptance. Their work was restricted to those who shared their views and perceived by the rest of the world as "Jewish and foreign"(Gilman 193).
Adhering to revolutionary demagoguery while appealing in part to a hoped-for Christian constituency, Marx writes in "On the Jewish Question" (as discussed above, see page 42), "Christianity issued from Judaism. It has now been re-absorbed into Judaism....Judaism is the sublime thought of Judaism; Judaism is the vulgar practical application of Christianity" (52). Marx's implication is clear: Judaism's parasitic nature could not exist, flourish, without Christianity—the host—yet remains fully culpable as Christianity is only an extension of Judaism. Furthermore, Christianity allows Judaism to taint it with "practical need and egoism." As such, society has been corrupted and, in such a state, man cannot realize his true emancipation. The inevitable conclusion, if we accept Marx's premises, is that for man to become a true socialist—a species-being at one with his fellow man—the Jew must be removed from society. "The social emancipation of the Jew is the emancipation of society from Judaism" (Marx, "Question" 52).

This final argument is the final line of Marx's essay. Instead of the syllogism, with its supposed-to-be-true general premise followed by a substantiating minor premise leading to a rigidly deduced conclusion, Marx uses the enthymeme with a probable premise and missing minor premise
to create a tentative conclusion. This allows him to expertly declare his own view to his audience rather than guide them to "right thinking." Marx has used a variation of this passage four pages earlier. (We can again see evidence of his use of repetition to emphasize his point.)

In the final analysis, the emancipation of the Jews is the emancipation of mankind from Judaism. (49) The implied premise, in both cases, is that there exists an anti-social element in the Jews that must be expunged before mankind’s emancipation can take place. Marx also equivocates with the word "emancipation": in the one sense it means liberation; sui juris, having full legal rights and capacity, and in the other deliverance, which carries the added connotation of riddance. It is the preposition "from" that promotes the latter interpretation.

Similarly, Marx employs what Burke calls "spiritualization ... a grand device, central to polemic, which is forever translating back and forth between materialist and idealist terms for motives" (Burke 76), used most effectively here to persuade his readers that the Jews’ materialistic nature is what keeps them and, by their influence, the rest of society from attaining the ideal emancipation.

Marx declares that the Jews are "by nature" Capitalists. Yet if we look at his original premise in "The German Ideology," we see that he, applying "scientific socialism,"
states that humans originally were conscious producers only
in the sense that they produced their means of subsistence,
which at the dawn of time did not include money. "What they
are...coincides with their production, both what they produce
and with how they produce. The nature of individuals thus
depends on the material conditions determining their
production" (150). This assertion supplies support for the
contradictory claim that the Jew cannot "by nature" be
"hucksters," for their nature, like the rest of humanity’s,
was determined prior to any need for finance. Also, human
history when examined shows that the Jews, who antedated many
of the non-Jewish populations in Europe and whose communities
had existed long before the rise of Christianity, were,
however, isolated and relegated to ghettos in Christian
Europe because they were feared as "Christ-killers." This
was an imposed autonomy, forced upon them, certainly not a
natural or self-elected separation. As they were cut off
from property ownership, agriculture and "respectable"
commerce they turned to other means of support (Sachar 25-
35). Frequently, the only acceptable "profession" was
banking and lending, something considered "unclean" by
surrounding Christian societies. The restrictive lifestyles
and heavy taxes imposed upon them in and out of the ghetto
casted Jews to become prudent and thrifty. They limited
their possessions to goods they could carry due to the frequent arrogation of their homes and furnishings by various regimes. Again, this forced adaptation is not elemental human nature but the means of survival in a prejudiced state.

It can be argued that relying on "The German Ideology" for support is questionable as Marx and Engels wrote it in 1845-46, several years after Marx wrote "On the Jewish Question" (1843). Marx may have mellowed, his rhetoric in the earlier essay was perhaps misconstrued or, as Shlomo Avineri suggests in "Marx and Jewish Emancipation," his primary argument was the philosophical argument with Bauer. Though Avineri admits Marx loathed Judaism, he suggests that in Marx's return to the subject of Jewish emancipation in the The Holy Family, he modified his harangue to focus on the political aspect of Jewish emancipation (while still adhering to the firm conviction that it is at core a question of human emancipation). Avineri points to Marx's support for those Jewish writers who took issue with Bauer's contentions that the Jewish question was a religious rather than a political one as support for his claim that Marx had a bigger picture in mind. In interpreting The Holy Family and backing Marx, Avineri says:

It seems that Marx makes it quite explicit, that he is concerned here not only with the inner contradictions of an attitude which would like to deny the Jews equal
rights in a modern society, but is out to claim those very rights for the Jews himself. (450)

He reminds us that Marx's goal, given his "Feuerbachian, anthropological attitude to religion"(447) and his recognition of the limits of political emancipation, in the essay (and by implication, that in "On the Jewish Question") are not ultimate. He concludes by saying that "One has to divorce Marx's acrimonious attack on the role Jews played" (450). Why? To better serve Marxism?

Marx may have backed off in his vehemence, as Avineri suggests; what cannot be denied is the attack itself and Marx's obvious anti-Semitic stance in "On the Jewish Question." Perhaps, having written it, Marx determined his argument was too strident (at Engels' urging?) for his audience and refocused it in The Holy Family. That investigation is beyond the scope of this paper. However, at the risk of being accused of using the genetic fallacy, I have to believe that Mr. Avineri's contentions may be colored with a certain self-serving bias, given what I presume to be his socialist philosophical and political agenda.

If one still chooses to overlook the obvious anti-Semitism in Marx's "On the Jewish Question" and replace "Jew" and "Judaism" with "Capitalist" and "Capitalism," it becomes obvious that his scapegoating is directed at the materialism
and egoism of the present society and how it is embodied not only in Judaism but in all religion. To ultimately rid man of the propensity for egoism, man must be rid of all religion; a point he expresses. But then why single out Judaism? We have already ruled out racism (see above, pages 7-8); Marx knew little if anything of the biology of race. Robert Tucker points out in a footnote to his translation of "On the Jewish Question" that "the German word Judentum [Judaism] had, in the language of the time, the secondary meaning of 'commerce,'" (50) and that Marx exploited the two senses of the word. The Jew served Marx's purposes rhetorically and historically as the proverbial scapegoat. As previous investigation of the psychology of Jewish self-hatred has shown, Marx and many others chose to deny their heritage as an act of self-preservation; this may explain, in part, his use of fallacious ad-hominum arguments directed against Jews.

Another explanation for Marx's less-than-well-reasoned argument may be supplied by Sartre who sees the rational man as one who "gropes for the truth" ("Passion" 148). This type of individual realizes the provisional nature of his own reasoning. But there are also those who "are attracted to the durability of stone" (148), those who despise change. Such persons have a fear of themselves and truth, subordinating
reason and research, seeking only what has already been
found, becoming only what already was. "This is nothing but
passion" (148). Anti-Semites have chosen hate as a faith,
Sartre contends, thereby devaluing words and reasons. They
know the absurdity of their words and attacks but leave it to
their adversaries, who, through their belief in words, are
compelled to use them responsibly.
CHAPTER THREE

DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

Proper words in proper places, make the true definition of a style.

Jonathan Swift

Without knowing the force of words, it is impossible to know men.

Confucius

To understand more fully Marx's essay, we must unite our understanding of the circumstances of his life and culture to the words he uses and the way he chooses to use them. To accomplish this I have chosen to employ two divisions of discourse analysis: stylistics and pragmatics.

Discourse analysis is, as Teun van Dijk states, "both an old and new discipline" (1). Whereas linguistics arose from the grammatica and its "normative rules of correct language use" (1), discourse analysis stemmed from rhetorica, sharing rhetoric's concern for persuasive effectiveness. In today's world, however, it is:

used to describe activities at the intersection of disciplines as diverse as sociolinguistics, psycholinguistics, philosophical linguistics and computational linguistics." (Preface, Brown and Yule viii)
Some see this overlap as an aid to rhetorical analysis in that these disciplines utilize examinations that are generally viewed, relative to the analyses practiced by the humanities, as more "scientific." Its real strength lies in allowing microanalysis of areas of textual use heretofore interpreted solely by rhetorical modes and by the figures of speech.

Stylistics

In the past, rhetorical analysis of literature has dealt with authorial intent and examination of works utilizing figures of speech such as anaphora, ellipsis, metonymy, synecdoche, and, as we have already seen, Marx's favorite, antimetabole. These figures are all well and good and analysis of their use helps literary critics to wade through texts interpreting and extrapolating. But there is something missing from their analysis. While critics could rely upon their "good instincts" and cite similar and/or prior use of forms to explain rhetorical style and its power to persuade, what lay behind or within the persuasive tools? Arthur Quinn, in Figures of Speech, states that "Writing is a matter of making linguistic choices, and reading depends upon understanding the linguistic choices made by someone else" (5).

An overlap exists between rhetoric and linguistics which
plays out in our discussion of "figures" and discourse analysis. As has been demonstrated, Marx's rhetorical skill is formidable; his power to persuade, compelling. What I wanted to analyze and hopefully understand was how he achieves this impact stylistically.

Much of the early part of Marx's essay is taken up by direct quotes from Bruno Bauer's essays, "The Jewish Question" and "The Capacity of Present-Day Jews and Christians to Become Free," as well as paraphrases of Bauer's writings and others', notably Hegel and Alexander Hamilton. I have chosen not to analyze these portions. While they, too, are indicative of, from both a rhetorical and linguistic standpoint, Marx's stylistics, I choose instead to examine the writing which was strictly his.

There is a climactic build in many of his passages, frequently prefaced by seemingly rhetorical questions as well as a liberal use of italics supplied by Marx. For instance:

Or do the Jews want to be placed on a footing of equality with the Christian subjects? If they recognize the Christian state as legally established they also recognize the regime of general enslavement. Why should their particular yoke be irksome when they accept the general yoke? Why should the German be interested in the liberation of the Jew, if the Jew is not interested in the liberation of the German? ("Question" 26-27)

Echoing the technique of classical rhetoric known as erotema in Greek, the two concluding rhetorical questions are used as
no answers are expected and only one answer can reasonably be made for either. "Writers who use a rhetorical question save themselves the trouble of offering further evidence to support their claims" (Barnet and Bedau 78). In the first, the obvious answer is that Jews should not find a "particular" yoke irksome. And the second, relying on a forced hypothesis—that the Jew is not interested in the liberation of the German—pushes the reader to conclude that on this basis, the German should not be concerned with the Jew's liberation.

As we saw in the rhetorical analysis chapter, Marx relies on antimetabole here, reversing the structural order of the sentence and negating the Jew's interest in the final question. Both the principles of end-focus and climax are used to present the new information Marx wanted to convey as well as create a dramatic effect, while disenfranchising Jews from Germans. The italicized "Christian" set up an opposition with the non-italicized "Jew." Finally, his questions following the antecedent, "If they recognize the Christian state as legally established..." are more like the "then" consequences of a conditional hypothetical syllogism than pure rhetorical questions, further forcing the hypothesis.

Marx's use of cohesive devices such as juxtaposition,
expressive repetition, and various forms of cross-reference abound. In arguing the rights of the citizen as distinct from the rights of man as put forth in the "Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen," he employs them to act as synonyms and add emotive heightening.

Feudal society was dissolved into its basic element, man; but into egoistic man who was its real foundation. ("Question" 45)

Man, here, becomes synonymous with egoistic man, a cross-reference. He italicizes man and egoistic, the technique of segmentation, to further emphasize his point. In the next sentence he repeats the word man, carrying with it this new connotation:

*Man in this aspect, the member of civil society, is not the foundation and presupposition of the political state. He is recognized as such in the rights of man. ("Question" 45)*

Two pages previously in his essay, Marx has alleged that "...the political liberators reduce citizenship, the political community, to a mere means for preserving these so-called rights of man" (43). He is employing the principle of climax--building toward something. The words man and political are again repeated, but we recognize them now with their negative connotations intact. Furthermore, the repeated italics not only heighten emotion but act pedagogically, as seen in the rhetorical analysis, to inculcate the reader with his, Marx's, position.
In the next paragraph Marx supplies a new definition of man’s liberty.

But liberty of egoistic man, and the recognition of this liberty, is rather the recognition of the frenzied movement of the cultural and material elements which form the content of his life. ("Question" 45)

He violates the principle of end-focus in the following paragraph, below, by placing the new information first, stating, “Thus man was not liberated from religion...” and, having redefined liberty, he can now equivocate. And as we saw in the rhetorical examination, where he exploits the repetitive figures antimetabole and antithesis (see above, page 36), we see here that he ignores the linguistic principle of reduction, repeating the words “he received” and “liberty” with variations thereof. The repetition serves to persuade and convince rather than dull the senses through redundancy.

Thus man was not liberated from religion; he received religious liberty. He was not liberated from property; he received the liberty to own property. He was not liberated from the egoism of business; he received the liberty to engage in business. ("Question" 45)

Though abandoning end-focus with respect to the sentence embedded in the paragraph, he uses the paragraph itself as the end-focus of his argument, demonstrating that man is a passive recipient, “a bourgeois,” rather than an active agent.
or citizen of the state.

Despite apparent divergences, we should not lose sight of the fact that the crux of Marx’s argument is still supported by anti-Jewish premises.

Marx begins “On the Jewish Question”:

The German Jews seek emancipation. What kind of emancipation do they want? Civic, political emancipation. (26)

The first sentence ends with the word “emancipation.” It is repeated in the second graphic unit—a question, and again in the third graphic unit (a graphological sentence but not a syntactic one; devoid of both subject and verb), where it again receives end-focus. The information Marx presents in the first sentence is a given: that German Jews seek emancipation. In the second sentence he poses a question only to be answered with the ostensibly new information that they want civic and political emancipation. But he does not even bother with the coordinating conjunction “and” between “civic, political,”—also a rhetorical figure called asyndeton, which Arthur Quinn suggests promotes brevity and organic unity (7-8)—making it all the more emphatic syntactically. Furthermore, beginning the essay with these short simple sentences, he sets up his entire argument in this half of the essay while delivering a combination punch with an italicized climactic ending. Italics, as Geoffrey
Leech and Michael Short note, are a "special device used expressively to give the flavour of spoken emphasis" (213). The use of simple sentences, coming at the beginning of the essay coupled with the end-focus and climax principles within the first paragraph, imparts a forceful manner. The pronoun substitution—"they" for "German Jews"—and abrupt punctuation in the example above both convey an emphatic style that would not be prevalent if the sequencing and segmentation had been rearranged.

Marx uses a variation of the same style seen above in the following passage:

The most stubborn form of the opposition between Jew and Christian is the religious opposition. How is an opposition resolved? By making it impossible. And how is religious opposition made impossible? By abolishing religion. ("Question" 29)

Again he uses the question/answer format, and with the use of iconicity—the imitation principle—he not only implies that the cause, religion, precedes the effect, opposition, he also presents a hypothetical syllogism which is apparently "valid" and thus an ostensibly irrefutable argument. Nonetheless, the premises Marx uses are not only questionable but force the hypothesis; hence the argument is not sound.

Other cohesive devices frequently employed by Marx in his essay are cross-references and linkages. Moreover, his blatant use of juxtaposition, deictics, substitution, formal
repetition, 'elegant' variation, coordinating conjunctions and linking adverbials all point to a not-to-well-hidden agenda:

Judaism has been preserved, not in spite of history, but by history.

It is from its own entrails that civil society ceaselessly engenders the Jew.

What was, in itself, the basis of the Jewish religion? Practical need, egoism.

The monotheism of the Jews is, therefore, in reality, a polytheism of the numerous needs of man, a polytheism which makes even the lavatory an object of divine regulation. Practical need, egoism, is the principle of civil society, and is revealed as such in its pure form as soon as civil society has fully engendered the political state. The god of practical need and self-interest is money.

Money is the god of Israel, beside which no other god may exist. Money abases all the gods of mankind and changes them into commodities. Money is the universal and self-sufficient value of all things. It has, therefore, deprived the whole world, both the human world and nature, of their own proper value. Money is the alienated essence of man's work and existence; this essence dominates him and he worships it.

The god of the Jews has been secularized and has become the god of this world. The bill of exchange is the real god of the Jew. His god is only an illusory bill of exchange. ("Question" 50)

In these examples, Marx again combines the simple sentences with the complex, presenting seemingly rhetorical questions which he then answers. He breaks the sentences into paragraphs lending further emphasis to them. Besides the
italicized words, which Marx has endeavored to represent as similar if not synonymous in the reader's mind, it is his juxtaposition of ideas and words, evoking connections between two otherwise unconnected elements, however, which is striking in this passage. In the sentence, "It is from its own entrails that civil society ceaselessly engenders the Jew," he is saying that civil society gives birth to Jews through its bowels, thereby implying that the Jew is not only spawned in an unclean manner but is also synonymous with excrement. In the fifth paragraph beginning "Money is the god..." Marx equates "money" with the "god of Israel," (which is already an elegant variation for the god of the Jews). He then defines money's negative connotations, eschewing the use of "it" for the time being. Instead, he begins each of the next three sentences with "Money," then uses the definite cross-reference "It" to link Jewishness to the now scorned "money." Then, with the linking adverbial "therefore," he implies that money/Jews are responsible for "depriving the whole world...of their own proper value." In the final sentence, again reverting to the use of "Money" as the initial word, he concludes with a powerful, climactic ending.

Earlier in this series of examples Marx says, "...a polytheism which makes even the lavatory an object of divine regulation." Marx is knowledgeable of the Talmud and the
Bible. He refers here to an orthodox Jewish injunction that one should give thanks for all God's graces, including the ability to continue in good health and disposition through natural elimination. He uses what can only be construed as insider knowledge to ridicule and demean Jews and Jewish practices. He employs the device again when he says,

That which is contained in an abstract form in the Jewish religion—contempt for theory, for art, for history, and for man as an end in himself—is the real, conscious standpoint and the virtue of the man of money. Even the species-relation itself, the relation between man and woman, becomes an object of commerce. Woman is bartered away. ("Question" 51)

The reference this time, "an object of commerce," is to the ketubba, or marriage contract, in which men agree to pay a settlement of a specified amount of money to their wife or her family in the event the marriage results in divorce.

Combining end-focus in each of the sentences: "man of money," "object of commerce," "bartered away" with the hypothetical syllogism; where if A then B, if B then C, therefore, if A then C, Marx uses the principle of climax to coerce the reader into concluding that the Jew, who has no real redeeming social value as he is contemptuous of everything artistic and creative in mankind except money, is—in the name of money—even willing to sell his wife.

Besides divulging his intimate knowledge of Jewish tradition, Marx's use of "Even" at the beginning of the
second sentence as an adverbial link that signals something of even greater contrast will be forthcoming, persuades the reader to believe that what follows is not only negative but reprehensible. His deictic use of "that" to begin the sentence is used in a reductive sense to refer first, to the "contempt for theory, etc." and second, and perhaps more importantly, to reduce through a condescending tone that which is abhorrent, e.g., "That one—the one who did all the damage."

Throughout the essay, Marx weaves into his argument ad hominem attacks upon the Jews. As was pointed out earlier in the examinations of rhetorical figures, these occurrences become more frequent and virulent in the second half of the paper:

Let us consider the real Jew: not the sabbath Jew, whom Bauer considers, but the everyday Jew.

Let us not seek the secret of the Jew in his religion, but let us seek the secret of the religion in the real Jew.

What is the profane basis of Judaism? Practical need, self-interest. What is the worldly cult of the Jew? Huckstering. What is his worldly god? Money.

Very well: then in emancipating itself from huckstering and money, and thus from real and practical Judaism, our age would emancipate itself.

An organization of society which would abolish the preconditions and thus the very possibility of huckstering, would make the Jew impossible. ("Question" 48)
Relying on anaphora (repetition of beginnings: "Let us..."), antimetabole (repetition in opposite order which is also a negation: "Let us not seek the secret of the Jew in his religion, but let us seek the secret of the religion in the real Jew") and epistrophe (repetition of endings: "Let us consider the real Jew: not the sabbath Jew, whom Bauer considers, but the everyday Jew") in their respective paragraphs, Marx is able to shift the focus to the end of the passage while repeating "Jew" again and again.

Marx does not want the reader to focus on the "sabbath Jew;" implying the religiously correct individual; he wants the attention focused on the "everyday Jew," one devoid of religion and God. He knows his audience; if not primarily Christian, they at least share his predisposition to dislike and distrust Jews. He underscores all this by placing "everyday Jew" at the end of the sentence and paragraph so it receives end-focus.

In the third paragraph he asks three questions and then supplies the answers as a single graphic unit minus the subject and verb; "Practical need, self-interest"; "Huckstering"; "Money." This is the figure ellipsis—a stylistic device whereby certain parts of a sentence are omitted. In the first assertion: the basis of Judaism is "practical need, self-interest," the conjunction is omitted,
another example of asyndeton (as on page 62). These
omissions serve to move the reader along, speed things up.
They don’t allow one to dwell or reflect. And once again the
end-focus principle makes his point emphatic. By italicizing
the words practical need, self-interest, huckstering and
money, a device called segmentation, Marx suggests emphasis
and intonation. The Jews’ cult is “huckstering”; an
outgrowth of practical need. Their worldly god is “[m]oney”;
the product of the huckstering. Here, Marx uses a crescendo-
like technique, the principle of climax, to substantiate the
claim.

Having achieved metonymic substitutions--the reader now
reads “money” and/or “huckster” for Jew/Judaism and vice
versa--Marx builds upon this groundwork to state in the
fourth and fifth paragraphs that to emancipate itself the
“age” must emancipate itself from money and consequently,
Jews. Venturing further, he says that the society freed from
the conditions which make huckstering possible would make
Jews impossible. But Marx’s inductive argument implies that
“practical need and huckstering” are synonymous with Judaism.

This then raises the question, does Marx propose to get
rid of the hucksters/Jew. And, if so, is it possible to get
rid of Jews without physical annihilation? This is the
Though is a cleverly constructed, linked argument, it is unsound. Were his premises truthful, which again, as was the case in the previous argument (see above, page 63), they are not, it would not only be valid but sound.

Marx commits at least six fallacies:

(1) Ad hominem: arguing against a claim by attacking the holder in irrelevant ways—*the cult of the Jews is huckstering*;
(2) The genetic fallacy: attacking the cause of someone's belief rather than its justification—*Judaism's basis is practical need/self-interest*;
(3) Equivocation: a fallacy that turns on the semantics of words—*Jews/Judaism are equivalent to self-interest, huckstering, money*;
(4) Hasty generalizations: a conclusion drawn about an entire population based on too small a sample—*all Jews are this way*;
(5) The straw man: in attacking an opponent's position one attacks a less defensible similar but different position—*because some Jews are creditors, they are self-serving usurers*;
(6) The fallacy of the negative proof: whereby someone argues that because we don't know if a certain statement is true, then it is false or because we have no proof that it is false, then it is true—the abolition of money and moneylending would make Judaism/Jews disappear.

These same techniques are apparent again in the example below. Here, Marx casts aspersions on Christianity, as a perfected off-shoot of Judaism, for alienating man from himself and nature. The difference is that he uses more
complex sentences that serve to mitigate the strength of his chastisement:

Christianity is the sublime thought of Judaism; Judaism is the vulgar practical application of Christianity. But this practical application could only become universal when Christianity as perfected religion had accomplished, in a theoretical fashion, the alienation of man from himself and from nature.

It was only then that Judaism could attain universal domination and could turn alienated man and alienated nature into alienable, saleable objects, in thrall to egoistic need and huckstering. ("Question" 52)

Despite the appearance of his taking Christianity to task in the first paragraph, he reverts to form once again, using the backgrounding technique to highlight his climactic foregrounding of Judaism as responsible for man's being held in thrall to egoistic need and huckstering. J.E. Grimes calls this climatic foregrounding, staging or thematization.

It occurs where
dever clause, sentence, paragraph, episode, and discourse is organised around a particular element that is taken as its point of departure. It is as though the speaker presents what he wants to say from a particular perspective. (qtd. in Brown and Yule 134)

This foreground is played against a background of what Teun A. van Dijk calls the "ASSUMED NORMALITY of the world" (qtd. in Brown and Yule 62). We, as readers or hearers, "recognize types of communicative events which take place against a background of a mass of below-conscious expectations...based on past experience" (Brown and Yule 62).
All this allows the reader, in the case of Marx’s essay, to recognize the regularities inherent in this type of writing, generalize from past exposure and predict the outcome or the direction the argument will take. Readers, then, do not need to pay attention to all that is written; it is enough to gloss the material to get a general idea of how it relates to past experience and “construct...the probable detail” (F.C. Bartlett, qtd in Brown and Yule 63). This is also known as presupposition, something we will investigate further in the pragmatics analysis.

Cultural stereotypes provide a source of corroboration or embarrassment depending upon past experience. If, for instance, a certain genre of joke is told, the hearer may or may not know how to respond based upon whether he has heard the same kind of joke before (Brown and Yule 63), or may not “get” the joke at all. By the same token, if a reader’s background knowledge allows him to make presuppositions about what is being read without a thorough reading, he may simply miss certain references whether implicit or direct.

For Marx’s audience, already predisposed to anti-Semitic sentiment, the anti-Christian allusion may be overlooked or be simply mildly troubling. To persuade the more discerning reader, Marx uses words and phrasing that belie the new information he presents: Christianity is the
sublime thought of Judaism; Christianity as perfected religion; in a theoretical fashion.

In the following paragraphs, Marx reiterates much of what he has said before throughout the essay. It is this expressive repetition which Leech and Short have said is "expressive in that it gives emphasis or emotive heightening to the repeated meaning" (Leech and Short 247). Repetition, as we saw when we analyzed Marx's use of the rhetorical figures antithesis and antimetabole (see above, page 36) is also a frequently used didactic device to get readers to pay attention.

In the final analysis, the emancipation of the Jews is the emancipation of mankind from Judaism. ("Question" 49)

The chimerical nationality of the Jew is the nationality of the trader, and above all of the financier. ("Question" 51)

In its perfected practice the spiritual egoism of Christianity necessarily becomes the material egoism of the Jew, celestial need is transmuted into terrestrial need, subjectivism into self-interest. The tenacity of the Jew is to be explained, not by his religion, but rather by the human basis of his religion—practical need and egoism. ("Question" 52)

As soon as society succeeds in abolishing the empirical essence of Judaism—huckstering and its conditions—the Jew becomes impossible, because his consciousness no longer has an object. The subjective basis of Judaism—practical need—assumes a human
form, and the conflict between the individual, sensuous existence of man and his species-existence, is abolished.

The social emancipation of the Jew is the emancipation of society from Judaism. ("Question" 52)

Of special interest is the fact that the first paragraph and the last are almost verbatim. The final paragraph is also the last line of the essay. If the principal of end-focus, the principal of climax, and repetition mean anything, then this is not only Marx's conclusion but also his focus.

If we read the first and last paragraphs alone, could Marx be advocating genocide, albeit implicitly? He has already constructed a powerful, though fallacious, argument which could be construed as arguing for this interpretation. But if we look at the fourth paragraph, where he states that if society rids itself of the "empirical" or observable "essence of Judaism," which he has already defined and does so again as "huckstering," the Jew will become "impossible"—cease to exist. Does Marx mean cease to exist as a Jew, or as a living being? It may be inferred that it is simply enough to no longer sustain an economic nexus, which will in turn cause Jews to fade away, having removed the object of their consciousness. But then Marx says that the "subjective basis of Judaism--practical need--assumes a human form." The segmenting dashes place emphasis on the preceding words, "Judaism" and "need," as they did in the foregoing sentence.
accentuating "Judaism" and "the Jews." But the phrase is ambiguous. How does this transmutation take place? Is he implying that heretofore Jews were/are not human? And when he says "assumes a human form," he has not said whether this form is still living. The implication is that the barrier between man as an individual and man as a species being will be dissolved, but the circumstances by which this will be achieved are unclear.

It can be argued that Marx is making a materialist argument: Jews/Judaism are products of objective conditions. Remove those conditions and you remove the product of those conditions---the Jew. As we saw above, in Chapter Two (page 43), this is the conventional Marxist argument: "conditions produce the man." But it is obvious that Marx chooses to depart from his own conventional wisdom with respect to the Jews. It is enough that we recall Marx's clash with Bauer over Bauer's contention that the emancipation of the Jews is simply a theological question rather than, as Marx would have it, a question of Jewish "nature," or review his rhetoric:

Money is the jealous god of Israel; huckster; worshipper of Mammon; the egoist whose 'profane basis' is 'practical need' and 'self-interest'; The chimerical nationality of the Jew is the nationality of the trader, and above all of the financier; Jews are 'egoists'; There is 'the privilege of being a Jew'; '[T]he Jew by his very nature, cannot be emancipate' and '...his restricted Jewish nature
always finally triumphs over his human and political obligations'; He regards himself as a member of the Jewish people, and the Jewish people as the chosen people; [A] Jewish attitude, i.e., that of a foreigner, towards the state keeps him forever apart to see that Jews and Judaism elicit something less than logical argumentative strategies from Marx.

In light of the principle of charity, Marx may have been using an inductive argument. He is presenting "evidence" hoping that his audience will make an inferential leap to the conclusion: in order for the world to exist as a better place it must be emancipated from Jews; Jews must simply cease to be. But it is an easy leap from "cease to be" to "be eliminated" though one is passive and the other active.

Finally, focusing on the fifth and sixth paragraphs of the example, above, it could be and has been argued that Marx's main argumentative thrust was not truly anti-Semitic. If we view the bigoted remarks as merely emotional appeals, a means to an end, convenient scapegoating, then the argument might be considered a vilification of material wealth and religion as a whole. In this case, Marx has made strong arguments throughout the essay, but he equivocates at the end. He leaves the reader to decide whether he is calling merely for mankind to disavow religion and money, or whether he believes wholeheartedly that the Jews are the root of all evil and should be eradicated.
Through our investigative use of the end-focus principle, principle of climax, segmentation, salience, sequence, coordination and subordination and the cohesive devices of cross-reference and linkage found in iconicity, along with figures of speech and the rules of logic and argument, Marx's anti-Semitism has been shown to be more than implicit. Not only can it be demonstrated, but his use of it to further a new philosophy is quite evident.

Marx ignores the general endophoric cohesive devices whereby the reader looks either forward (cataphoric relation) or backward (anaphoric relation) in the text for interpretation of a deictic reference. He prefers to repeat time and again what and who he is railing against—Judaism and Jews. However, he does rely on exophoric relations. This is "where the interpretation lies outside the text, in the context of the situation...which plays no part in textual cohesion" (Brown and Yule 192).

This is where the historical record and Marx's psychological profile come into play. If we are to proceed to a pragmatic analysis in an attempt to prove the implicit call for genocide, we must understand not simply the words but the behavior, beliefs and time. As we have seen, rhetorical analysis is helpful, stylistics is illuminating
but alone does not serve our purpose, and the two together
do not provide sufficient evidence. We must understand the
discourse-as-process:

how a recipient might come to comprehend the
producer's intended message on a particular occasion,
and how the requirements of the particular
recipient(s), in definable circumstances, influence
the organisation of the producer's discourse. (Brown
and Yule 24)

Pragmatics

In his essay, "Foundation of Philosophical Pragmatics,"
Asa Kasher argues that a thorough grasp of language must not
separate the study of syntactical structures and semantical
relations from linguistic pragmatical theory. Syntax and
semantics, as we have seen from our investigation of rhetoric
and stylistics, combined with pragmatics constitute the warp
and woof of language. To study one without the other would
leave little on the loom. To continue the analogy, while the
underlying structure of the warp might exist, there could be
no visible pattern without the woof. And, conversely,
without the interwoven motif, what purpose does the
structure serve?

In any study of language, social factors come into play.
Pragmatics is specifically concerned with these social
factors. "The ultimate goal of any pragmatical theory--is to
specify and explain the constitutive rules of the human competence to use linguistic means for effecting basic purposes" (Kasher 226, author's emphases).

More specifically, pragmatics studies the factors that govern our choice of language in social interaction and the effects of our choice on others. In theory, we can say anything we like. In practice we follow a large number of social rules (most of them unconsciously) that constrain the way we speak. (Chen, "Pragmatics" 120)

The factors we will consider with respect to these social rules are Speech Acts, Politeness, Presupposition, Conversational Implicature and Deliberate Ambiguity.

While not breaking new ground, the application of pragmatic analysis to Marx's essay, as was the case with stylistics earlier in the chapter, requires some adjustment of the principles governing oral discourse and/or fiction. In most cases, I have not edited the theorists' statements regarding conversational discourse, judging them amendable to written discourse; and I have made every attempt to be true to the intent of these theorists in applying my analysis to Marx's non-fiction prose.

Speech Acts

Speech acts are a central sub-domain of pragmatics. Speech Act Theory originated with J. L. Austin's 1962 observations in How to Do Things with Words that while
sentences can often be used to report states of affairs, the utterance of some sentences, such as:

I bet you two dollars it will snow today.
I christen this ship the Enterprise.

must, in some specified circumstances, be treated as the performance of an act.

Austin described such utterances as performatives and the specified circumstances required for their success he outlined as a set of felicity conditions:

1. There must exist an accepted conventional procedure, having a certain conventional effect, which includes the uttering of certain words.
2. The particular persons and circumstances in a given case must be appropriate for the invocation of the particular procedure involved.
3. The procedure must be executed by the participants correctly.
4. The procedure must be executed completely.

Austin's point is that in saying something, a speaker is DOING something, i.e. performing a speech act. For example when you say:

I promise to behave

you are not merely saying it; you are also promising at the same time. "I promise" is the performative.

Marx, opting for the conventional third person point of view, uses the inclusive "we" and "us" when he does adopt the use of a pronoun. In every instance of the use of "we" there
is also the use of an explicit performative:

We ask the converse question...(30)

We do not claim that they must transcend their religious narrowness in order to get rid of their secular limitations. We claim that they will transcend their religious narrowness once they have overcome their secular limitations. We do not turn secular questions into theological questions; we turn theological questions into secular ones.(31)

We criticize the religious failings of the political state by criticizing the political state in its secular form, disregarding its religious failings. We express in human terms the contradiction between the state and a particular religion, for example Judaism, by showing the contradictions....(31-32)

The use of "we" and the concomitant performatives are used almost exclusively in the first section of the essay and concentrated in the area where Marx refutes Bauer. By using the explicit performatives, Marx emphasizes the action of the verb. Coupled with the third person singular pronoun, though it could also be read as an implicit "I," he forces the readers into an acceptance of his view. If readers are not to offend the writer's "face", a breech of the Politeness Principle, which will be addressed later, then they must accede to Marx's claims.

It is in Marx's repetitive use of "we" plus the performatives that a link to rhetoric can be detected. If we recall Kenneth Burke's definition of rhetoric as both persuasion and identification (see above, page 28), the use
of "we" functions as a persuasive strategy to encourage the readers to identify with the writer. By the same token, it demonstrates to the readers that he, Marx, shares their view. It should be remembered that performatives are not, in and of themselves, factual. They produce a response. This response is what rhetors, like Marx, count on.

Any speech act, according to Austin, includes the following:

1. **Locutionary Act** - The act of saying. It includes making linguistic sounds, arranging these sounds according to grammar of a given language, referring, and predicating.
2. **Illocutionary Act** - The act of doing. By saying "I promise..." one promises.
3. **Perlocutionary Act** - The act that brings consequences, i.e. effects the illocutionary act has on the hearer. If I convince you and you are convinced, then my utterance of convincing is said to have a perlocutionary act.

Though the illocutionary force of an utterance and its perlocutionary effect may not coincide, as someone can be warned against a particular course of action and may or may not heed the warning, these three distinctions allow for the study of the effect utterances have on the behaviour of speaker and hearer ("Pragmatics," CEL 121).

Marx wants to ensure that the illocutionary force and the perlocutionary effect coincide. From the example above we extract:

We ask...(30)
Marx hedges his bets. By using the performatives he reinforces the perlocutionary effect; and by relying on antimetabole, he further emphasizes his point by negation and repetition.

J. R. Searle introduces a distinction between direct and indirect speech acts, which depends on a recognition of the intended perlocutionary effect of an utterance on a particular occasion. (That is to say, the hearer infers from the speaker not only what is said but also what is implied). Searle claims that we can discover the necessary and sufficient conditions of each speech act. By using these conditions, one can explain why a particular act is defective and why a speech act is "indirect." An indirect speech act applies or can apply to only one of the felicity conditions while a direct speech act, applies to all the felicity conditions for that speech act.

A subset of indirect speech acts are implicit performatives. In "On the Jewish Question," the explicit performatives found in the earlier portion of the essay are
dropped in favor of implicit ones. Marx asks:

What is the profane basis of Judaism? Practical need, self-interest. What is the worldly cult of the Jew? Huckstering. What is his worldly god? Money. ("Question" 48)

The chimerical nationality of the Jew is the nationality of the trader and above all of the financier. ("Question" 51)

The social emancipation of the Jew is the emancipation of society from Judaism. ("Question" 52)

Here, instead, he employs implicit performatives: "We ask...," in the questions, and "We assert," in the answers. Marx is now confident of audience approval, and the quotations above reflect this. They are written as indirect speech acts adhering only to the second felicity condition—appropriateness to the persons and circumstances. He has switched to a polemic form and there are distinct negative associations to be inferred from the words "practical need," "self-interest," "huckstering," "money," "chimerical nationality," "trader" and "financier."

But Speech Act Theory does not offer the discourse analyst a way of determining how a particular set of linguistic elements—such as those above—in a particular context, comes to receive a particular interpreted meaning.
Conversational Implicature

Conversational Implicature (CI) is an area of discourse analysis that can best be expressed as "implications based on our expectation of normal conversational conduct" (Keenan 256). It is culture/situation dependent in contrast to standard logical implication. Logical implication holds that certain utterances (given the agreed on conventional meaning of the logical words and the utterances truth) guarantee the truth of others. Conversational "implicature depends on how the utterer is expected to behave with respect to conversational maxims, and these may vary situationally and cross-culturally" (Keenan 256).

If there is an overlap between Conversational Implicature and Speech Acts Theory (SA) it may be found in Austin’s Perlocutionary Act: the effect the illocutionary act has on the hearer.

If we recall Austin’s example of a Perlocutionary Act, "If I try to convince you and you are convinced, the act of convincing is said to have a perlocutionary act," what happens in the case where the convincing is implicit? In the enthymeme: "Gabriel is an angel, therefore Gabriel is immortal" the missing premise, "All angels are immortal" is implied. It is into this void, so to speak, that CI thrusts itself, explaining the reader’s or hearer’s acceptance of
what may not be apparent or even tangible. If we look again
at the syllogism we constructed for "On the Jewish Question":

**Major Premise:** All anti-social elements must be
removed from society for it to succeed.

**Minor Premise**
(implied): [The Jew's, by nature, are set apart, anti-social.]

**Conclusion:** Jews must be removed from society for
it to succeed.

we see that Marx has allowed CI to instill the minor premise
in the reader's mind. Whether readers accept or not the
validity of the argument is based upon their acceptance of
the implicit minor premise and this is based on
historical/social/psychological factors.

As with indirect speech acts, implicature can get people
to do something without asking them to do it specifically.
Whereas, the direct speech act takes a performative verb or
not, as the case might be:

I order you to sit down
Sit down!

the indirect:

Won't you please sit down?

offers both a literal and an implied meaning. Indirect
speech acts try to get someone to do something indirectly,
and both implicature and indirect speech acts try to explain
cases in which we don't say what we mean explicitly.
H. P. Grice's Cooperative Principle states that conversation is a cooperative venture governed by maxims of truthfulness, relevance, informativeness, and manner, which may be exploited for particular conversational effects. And, according to Grice, CI occurs when a speaker flouts a maxim by blatantly failing to fulfill it. If the speaker is able to fulfill the maxim and do so without violating another maxim; is not opting out; and is not trying to mislead, yet flouts or exploits a maxim, giving rise to a veritable contradiction between what is stated and what is taken by the hearer to be relevant to the conversation, conversational implicature results.

According to Grice:

The presence of a conversational implicature must be capable of being worked out; for even if it can in fact be intuitively grasped, unless the intuition is replaceable by an argument, the implicature (if present at all) will not count as conversational implicature; it will be conventional implicature. (Grice 154)

Thus when Marx writes:

What is the profane basis of Judaism? Practical need, self-interest. What is the worldly cult of the Jew? Huckstering. What is his worldly god? Money. (“Question” 48)

he is flouting the maxim of manner. The italicized words are, at face value, innocuous—with the possible exception of
huckstering. Yet contextualized by the preceding question, "What is the profane basis of Judaism?" and the negative connotations attached to the adjective "profane," the words take on additional significance and become less than perspicuous. This lack of clarity results in CI.

The rational approach, as in the case (or purportedly so) with academic writing, is to be succinct, saying precisely what you mean with the intent to argue or inform. But this is not always interesting. For the most part, it lacks implicature. Creative writing tends to use more. And persuasive writing, such as political speech writing, and advertising, is loaded with implicature.

Why do we use it?

As humans, we generally appreciate hard work; and implicature involves the hearer to the extent that he or she must work it out. This leads to camaraderie—as we must share the enterprise and in doing so establish a relationship. Implicature is unconventional and we like unconventionality. And it appeals to our desires to be both secretive and not give offense. We can use implicature to get messages across without actually saying something explicitly—especially in a negative case.

This is not to say that there are not problems inherent in the use of implicature. Indeterminacy can result in
listener/reader confusion.

Harvey: Do you want coffee?
Jeanette: Coffee keeps me awake.

Harvey may well ask, "Well does she want coffee or not?"
Jeanette's reply also might be construed by Harvey, in one instance, as a way for Jeanette to distance herself from him. Jeanette has flouted Grice's maxim of quantity; she has not supplied sufficient information.

Suzanne: Where's John? I saw his bike on the lawn.

Again, what is Suzanne implying? The relevance of her comment is questionable (an exploitation of the Cooperative Principle's relation maxim). Without supplying a context, Suzanne may frustrate the very relationship that she and the hearer hope to consolidate.

Lack of context or relevance can also be an advantage. A writer/speaker may choose to be ambiguous deliberately. If an abusive husband is looking for his wife and asks her best friend where she is and that friend replies:

There was a lot of rain downtown last night

the friend may be: (1) simply avoiding the question, (2) implying that the husband (who works downtown) is all wet/a real drip, or (3) giving the husband a hint that his wife
went downtown the night before. The implicature can only understood, or not, in light of the circumstances. The friend's deliberate ambiguity in answering may allow her: (1) to save face by not directly revealing a confidence, (2) to not directly accuse the husband, or (3) indicate she is opting out by offering a seeming non sequitur.

The personality of a writer/speaker may be determined by his or her use of implicature or lack of it. If overused, as with irony or metaphor, implicature can become tedious to audiences. The user runs the risk of losing the audience's respect or may be considered insincere. If used too little or not at all, she may be boring. While there is always the chance of being misunderstood, for the most part proper usage will result in the speaker being considered a "good communicator."

Another example of how the flouting of the felicity conditions and Grice's cooperative maxims results in conversational implicature can be seen in a "figurative utterance" from Marx's essay. Grice held that a figurative utterance "implicates an open-ended disjunction of propositions." Deirdre Wilson and Dan Sperber, in "On Grice's Theory of Conversations," suggest instead that "a figurative utterance evokes a range of propositions, possibly
interspersed with images" (163). Though running counter to Grice, Wilson and Sperber's interpretation is most evident in a passage in the second half of "On The Jewish Question." Here Marx paraphrases Captain Hamilton as support for his contention that the Jews, through their acquisition of the power of money, have corrupted Christians, instilling in them a "practical spirit":

Thus, for example, Captain Hamilton reports that the devout and politically free inhabitant of New England is a kind of Laocoon who makes not the least effort to escape from the serpents which are crushing him. Mammon is his idol which he adores not only with his lips but with the whole force of his body and mind. (49)

The images Marx evokes are striking. We see the beleaguered Trojan priest, Laocoon, as a stand-in for the New England inhabitants (presumably Christian), beset by snakes—the Jews and their greed. The snakes also bring to mind the Garden of Eden and the serpents introduction of original sin. Mammon can be interpreted as material wealth, which invokes Matthew 6:24. "No man can serve two masters: for either he will hate the one, and love the other; or else he will hold to the one, and despise the other. Ye cannot serve God and mammon." Or "mammon" can understood as a reference to the demon avarice one of the seven deadly sins. In either case, Marx implies that this "idol" is worshipped not only in prayer but
also in thought and deed.

Though Marx mixes metaphors, the effects of these "figurative utterances" are to portray the pure Christian populace as beset by the evils of Judaism yet unable or incapable of resisting its tyranny, and this has caused them to replace God with material wealth as an object of worship. His point is clear. Judaism is a corrupting influence.

Politeness

In much the same way as conversational implicature, politeness is dependent upon the culture and situation. Like Austin's Felicity Conditions, which depend on both the form of the words and that they be used under the right conditions to successfully perform of a speech act, and Grice's maxims for his Cooperative Principle, the rules of politeness are:

designed to get people through cooperative transactions with a minimal amount of wasted effort, or friction. Unlike the rules of conversation, they are to some extent mutually exclusive: different ones are applicable in different real-world situations, and applying the wrong one at the wrong time may cause as much friction as not applying any. (Lakoff 88)

Robin Lakoff, in "What You Can Do with Words: Politeness, Pragmatics, and Performatives," states the rules of politeness as follows:

(1) Formality: Don't impose/remain aloof
(2) Hesitancy: Allow the addressee his options
(3) Equality or camaraderie: Act as though you and the addressee were equal/make him feel good.
In (1), the hearer is accorded respect through the use of a title or last name or the use of technical language. Formality assumes distance and a certain amount of power; breeching it can lead to an assumption of rudeness.

(2) Hesitancy, can be suggested by the use of euphemisms: "I'm going to the bathroom" instead of, "I'm going to defecate;" hedges, cogitives and tag questions--"You like this, don't you?" "Would you pass the butter, please?" Hesitancy is used to ascertain the distance or closeness of the exchange between two parties. (3) Equality or camaraderie is used to establish solidarity; it is used primarily among equals. If someone uses camaraderie in a formal situation, it will give offense and the converse is true as well.

Abiding by the rules is considered a standard, though violations of Grice's maxims and the politeness rules occur just as frequently and, as Lakoff is quick to point out, those violations are not committed solely out of ignorance or in an attempt to be rude, but can signal something else implicit in the discourse.

Marx adheres to camaraderie in the first portion of the essay, using the inclusive "we," as discussed earlier (pages 80-83), and by frequently quoting renowned sources such as Gustave de Beaumont, Tocqueville, Thomas Hamilton and Rousseau, he establishes solidarity with his well-read,
literate audience. In the second section, Marx flagrantly breaches formality: he is not averse to using language that would normally be considered unacceptable in a formal paper:

It is from its own entrails that civil society ceaselessly engenders the Jew. ("Question" 48)

or crudity to make his point:

The monotheism of the Jews is, therefore, in reality, a polytheism of the numerous needs of man, a polytheism which makes even the lavatory an object of divine regulation. (48)

Marx moves from the sublime to the base. He uses Latin phrases such as, *bellum omnium contra omnes* (All-out war against all) (35), in the first portion of the essay only to slip into the most offensive, malediction later. Implicit in this idiomatic maneuver is the author's sense of security with his audience. Marx can comfortably make these claims without regard to affronting readers.

Breaching hesitancy, Marx asks seemingly rhetorical questions and then foists the answer on his reader.

What is the profane basis of Judaism? Practical need, self-interest. What is the worldly cult of the Jew? Huckstering. What is his worldly god? Money.

Very well: then in emancipating itself from huckstering and money, and thus from real and practical Judaism, our age would emancipate itself. ("Question" 48)

This should result in an assumption, by the audience, of bad breeding and inexcusable vulgarity, but because he uses camaraderie initially to establish a unity of interests with
his readers and utilizes the Jew as the "other" in contrast to that unity, his violations are generally overlooked or noted and accepted as part of his argument.

Why Marx chooses to observe the politeness strategies in the beginning of his essay only to ignore them later is an intriguing question. Keeping in mind the audience for which the essay was intended: the non-Jews of Europe and the primarily German, self-hating, Jewish radicals of the 1840s, it is possible to see that the camaraderie he fashions in the first section with readers of his own ilk, allows him to flagrantly flaunt the rules of formality later on. What is implicit in these violations of Lakoff's rules of politeness is the unstated idea that writer and audience share the views as stated.

In the same excerpt above, we see the use of interrogatives and declaratives:

What is the profane basis of Judaism? Practical need, self-interest. What is the worldly cult of the Jew? Huckstering. What is his worldly god? Money.

According to Lakoff, a question seeks information and requires a response and a declarative requires the addressee's belief (101). However, as Marx supplies the answers to the questions he poses, we can assume they are asked in a rhetorical vein. Rhetorical questions, when taken as true questions by the addressee, and not signaled, are
annoying. They violate Grice's quantity maxim because they are more than is needed (Lakoff 97). That Marx supplies the answers as well can also be construed as a violation of quantity. These violate Lakoff's second politeness rule, hesitancy, allowing the addressee his options. Furthermore, in Lakoff's hierarchy of indirect speech acts, the question may implicate a declarative or an imperative, a declarative may implicate an imperative or another declarative, but an imperative may implicate only another imperative, not a question or a declarative. In this sense the imperative is the 'strongest' of the three speech act types, a question the weakest. (100)

Marx couples his questions with his declaratives (as all polemicists do) in the examples above. Lakoff points out that by asking a question a "speaker acknowledges his subservience, countering the amount of work the addressee is expected to do" (101). Marx, however, supplies his own answers. These declaratives require the readers to believe what Marx is saying. This is to ask less of [them] in terms of measurable intellectual or physical labor, but it is asking something more demeaning. To impart information that is expected to be believed, the speaker puts himself in a superior position to the addressee and is presumably giving him something he needs.(101)

Is Marx intentionally insulting his readers? Not necessarily. One of the means to persuade is to appear authoritative. We saw earlier that he used many performatives early in the essay coupled with the inclusive
"we." And it was postulated that the readers, not wanting to offend, would believe Marx's declaratives. Lakoff suggests that performatives, while violating the rule of quantity, lend clarity. However, they still violate the rules of politeness by closing off the addressee's options, telling him how he is to think, what he is to do, and how he is to reply. By implication, then, he is being ordered around peremptorily, and not being treated as an equal (violation of Rule 3) and being pressured as well (violation of Rule 1).(103)

There is also a rhetorical component to his voice; he is using a form of catachresis, by which:

a writer seems to have come close to abusing the legitimate function of substitution. He has made a substitution of a word which, far from having an easily definable connection with the substitutee, seems to have been chosen precisely because of its inappropriateness.(Quinn 55)

By equating "practical need, self interest" with Judaism, using "huckstering" to define the Jew, and identifying "money" as the Jew's god, Marx slips into the colloquial of the street. He deliberately flaunts the conventions for, as rhetoricians might say, stylistic purposes—to catch the reader's eye.

Marx remains puzzling though. He uses "we" to preface his performatives, which the addressee does not perceive in the same way as the first person singular pronoun "I." "We" subscribes to Rule 3, building equality and camaraderie.
This in some way mitigates the previous politeness transgressions. Nevertheless, Marx seems to alternate between the inveigler and the bully. Part of the bullying is found in what can be termed rudeness.

In "Linguistic Politeness" Gabriele Kasper discusses three forms of rudeness: 1) that due to lack of affect control, 2) strategic rudeness, and 3) ironic rudeness. Strategic rudeness, which is Marx's leitmotif, Kasper defines as "purposefully utilized by an actor in order to achieve a certain goal" (210). He suggests that, as Lakoff demonstrated in her analysis of American Courtroom discourse:

the prosecutor is licensed to attack the defendant in a manner incompatible with the principles of politic conduct in ordinary conversation...[he] is endowed with the right to mobilize resources that would be illicit in other types of interaction, in particular rude attacks serving to break down the defendant's control. In addition to exerting psychological pressure, transgressing rules of politic conduct in the interaction with the defendant symbolically marks this person as having forfeited claims to public protection. The symbolic withdrawal of social rights does not only serve to adversely affect the defendant's self-esteem but at least as much the jury's assessment of the defendant's qualities as a social member. In this sense, the defendant is treated as guilty before the jury has decided on their verdict. (Kasper 210)

Kasper goes on to state that this "licensed enactment of rudeness" reverses the sequencing rules of ordinary conversation whereby "rudeness as display of aggressive affect is legitimate only as reactive behaviour" (210) in
response to another's preceding act of rudeness. He holds that strategic rudeness "is initiating and does not license its addressee to retaliate" (210). I argue that this is not accurate. The prosecutor, by already assuming the guilt of the defendant, attempts to force the jury to view the defendant as having already initiated the rudeness by virtue of his having committed a crime; therefore his (the prosecutor's) rudeness is merely retaliatory effect control.

Marx apparently uses the same strategy in his presentation of the "case" to the "jury" (the readers). He presumes the defendant (the Jew) is already guilty, therefore he must only convince the jury.

Marx's rudeness, his use of stereotypes, do "transgress the rules of politic conduct"; they "mark the person as having forfeited claims to public protection" and "adversely affect the defendant's self-esteem" as well as "the [reader's] assessment of the [Jews'] qualities as a social member."

Nonetheless, they are, in the same sense as courtroom drama, effective.

As we have seen, Marx vacillates between politeness, as defined by Lakoff, and rudeness. Based on the evidence of his formally classical education and his writing, which generally adheres to standard logical implications (pages 85-
87), we cannot assume that these transgressions are inadvertent or the mistakes of a novice. As a consummate rhetorician, Marx alternates between formality and camaraderie, only to disregard formality to indulge in foul invective. But rather than disenfranchising his readers, this strategy keeps them intrigued. His rudeness (going back to our argument with Kasper) is retaliatory, motivating the readers, by the rules of ordinary conversation, to view the Jew as the rudeness initiator. The readers, by Marx’s clever use of “we,” are transformed into something other than simply a passive audience. They identify with Marx; he and they are the “we.” The Jew, having ostensibly initiated the argument/fight, is now liable for the audience’s revenge. It can be argued that Marx, by virtue of writing the essay, has retaliated. But the readers have not had their opportunity to do so. Marx exploits this sense of unfinished business. Implicit in his incendiary remarks is the point that the Jews started all this. Now we have the opportunity to not only retaliate but change things permanently.

Marx’s employs the explicit coupled with the implicit. This methodology in some way reflects his anti-Semitism at times overt, at others covert. Like a man on unproven ice, he treads heavily when he’s sure the support is there. But
when uncertain, he steps gingerly, attempting to maintain one foot on solid ground.

**Presupposition**

In her essay, "Presupposition" in *Pragmatics and Natural Language Understanding*, Georgia Green defines presupposition as a term which refers to "propositions whose truth is taken for granted in the utterance of a linguistic expression, propositions without which the utterance cannot be evaluated" (71).

Geoffrey and Ross Winterowd concur; presupposition is knowledge taken as given. Like implicature, it is a form of "gap" in the semantics of textual coherence. Knowledge derived from the text, though not directly stated, is inference. Their example is:

The twenty-five-year-old-man will marry the octogenarian millionairess.

Part of understanding the sentence involves the presupposition that the man and woman are single and have consented to marriage. Also, one inference is that the man is marrying the woman for her money. However, based on this inference another is possible: that the speaker/writer of the sentence has passed an unfavorable moral judgement on the young man (Winterowd 2). One might also infer that the woman bribed him to do it, in which case it could be further
inferred that she is desperate.

Marx uses presupposition knowing that his audience is well aware of and, in many instances, shares his stereotypical vision of the Judaism/Jews. That Jews are presupposed to be beneath contempt, allows him to state with little risk:

What is the profane basis of Judaism? Practical need, self-interest. What is the worldly cult of the Jew? Huckstering. What is his worldly god? Money. ("Question" 48)

The italicized words may be understood simply by their denotations. But once again, as with many other words Marx uses that we have examined, the italics signal something more to the reader--the words' connotations, their inferences. In this case, as in past examples (page 60), they are negative inferences, emblematic of something despicable. Anyone who possesses these characteristics is to be reviled.

J. L. Morgan, in "Two Types of Convention in Indirect Speech Acts," identifies three properties of presupposition:

1) Presupposition is semantic material which is taken for granted, entailed or assumed and not asserted, questioned or ordered in the sentence. It is undeniable; once presupposed, you cannot deny it:

People wept in the streets when JFK was shot.
Denying the presupposition—JFK was shot—would not be successful:

But JFK was not shot.

(2) Nonnegatability shows that the presupposition associated with a word or construction are constant when the clause containing the word or construction is negated or questioned. That is, negating the main verb does not negate the presupposition:

People did not weep in the street when JFK was shot.

(3) Presuppositions cannot be denied without evident self-contradiction (as in property 1), but they can be suspended:

My students would be lazy, if I had students.

Presuppositions are relative to an "assumed" world. While it is generally taken for granted that the relevant world is the real world (as presumed to be mutually known) there are certain "world creating" verbs and constructions that can define other worlds as relevant for the evaluation of presupposition-involving constructions (Green 76).

If graduate school was a drug, we'd have all O.D.'d by now.

Suppose mail boxes could be bought; I'd buy one and charge people money to put their letters in it.
I dreamed that all men were tolerant of each other and we had achieved world peace.

*If, suppose and dream* do not establish a new world for the presuppositions all by themselves; it takes a world-creating word and its complement to establish the world defined by the propositional content of the complement.

The world-defining proposition does not have to be identical to the presupposition it warrants. It is sufficient if the world-defining proposition provides a necessary or sufficient condition for the presupposed proposition.

Green, too, argues that presupposition cannot be solely explained as a semantic phenomenon. She sees it (as does Morgan), not as "a semantic property inherent in lexical items, but a pragmatic property of utterances in context" (77).

While it is tempting to assume that presupposition is something that is taken for granted the questions arise: granted by whom? and taken for granted by whom? Some have said that it requires that it be mutual knowledge; both speaker and addressee must assume it is true, and that the speaker assumes that the addressee assumes it. Green points out that this is erroneous. A sentence like:

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Sorry I'm late—my children spilled milk on me, and I had to take the time to change my clothes.

does not require that the addressee take the presupposed proposition for granted (that the speaker has children) to consider a sentence with a presupposition to be evaluatable as true or false. The addressee only has to be willing to infer that the speaker does, and that the speaker expects that he, the addressee, can reasonably infer that the speaker does (Green 81).

The fact that an addressee would take a presupposition for granted and not evaluate it as true or false is the loophole that evangelists, politicians, advertisers, lawyers and any other form of propagandists can best exploit.

Lawyer: Have you stopped beating your wife?
Defendant: I don't beat my wife!
Lawyer: Answer the question! Yes or no?

If the defendant answers in the affirmative, he admits to having beaten his wife. If he says no, he implies that he is still beating her. In either case it is presupposed that he has or still is beating his wife.

Generally, we do not challenge presuppositions. Ann Weiser, in "Deliberate Ambiguity," proposes an addendum to Grice's Cooperative Principle—"maintain smooth flow" (726). If this appended maxim holds, then both in the interest of saving face and not interrupting the flow by challenging an
assumption, a speaker may introduce new information or an opinion as a presupposition.

If you imagine that a person using a sentence containing presupposed and non-presupposed material is in effect saying, "Assume that part and respond to this part," then it becomes clear that you are not cooperating if you respond instead to the presupposition. (Weiser 727)

Weiser supplies the following example:

X: Nixon’s dishonesty is a threat to our personal freedom.
Y: Yes, I feel threatened by it, too.
Y: Do you think it is? I’m not too worried.
Y: Wait—you’re assuming he’s dishonest. I don’t agree. (727)

The third reply, Y3, is the one that would break the flow by challenging the presupposition—that Nixon is dishonest. In both Y1 and Y2 the presupposition is accepted; only the threat to personal freedom is conceded or disputed, respectively.

In the following quotation from “On the Jewish Question”

In the final analysis, the emancipation of the Jews is the emancipation of mankind from Judaism. (“Question” 49)

Marx cleverly introduces the presupposition that Jews need emancipation. That Marx’s readers are willing to infer that he takes the stereotypical view of the Jews for granted, and Marx, himself, expects his readers to infer this allows him to proffer it without a world-creating word and its complement. By presenting the information as a presupposition, Marx does not need to argue this point.
If we assess the statement using J. L. Morgan's three properties of presupposition we see:

(1) But Jews don't need emancipation.
Denying the presupposition is not successful.

(2) The emancipation of the Jews is not the emancipation of mankind from Judaism.
Negating the main verb does not negate the presupposition.

(3) The emancipation of the Jews is the emancipation of mankind from Judaism. But Jews don't need emancipation.

This is a self-contradictory statement unless we use a world-creating word and its complement:
The emancipation of the Jews would be the emancipation of mankind from Judaism, if Jews needed emancipation.

In the final analysis it is clear that Marx's ability to use presupposition makes readers accept this statement, and the numerous variations on the same theme throughout the essay, without challenge.

Mutual Knowledge

A large part of presupposition is mutual knowledge.

Gordon P. Thomas defines "mutual knowledge" as "the knowledge, attitudes, and beliefs that a speaker or writer and the audience knowingly have in common" (582). He contrasts this to "shared knowledge" which is "the information and beliefs that are shared but may not be believed to be shared" (582). He points out that:
The distinction is important, for the fact that I know that you know something (a state of Mutual Knowledge) enables me to exploit that "something" in very complex ways. That complexity grows in part from the fact that I know you will know that I can exploit it. The implications of knowledge merely shared (but not known to be shared) do not resonate in this fashion. If I do not know you know some fact, I cannot use that knowledge in the same way I could if I were certain that you knew it. (Thomas 582)

The use of the Jew as a scapegoat for societal ills is a form of mutual knowledge. Exploitation of this mutual knowledge allows Marx to make his case in "On the Jewish Question" with need for little more than a reiteration of these notions.

Thomas breaks down mutual knowledge into three parts: 1) Knowledge of Conventions—the shared understandings of regularities of punctuation, spelling, words, grammar, idioms, genres of writing (in any given language community) on the part of writers and their audiences; 2) Knowledge of Language—the audience’s recognition of the writer’s intentions when a condition of relevant mutual knowledge holds, which involves a) the audience’s recognition of the writer’s intentions and b) the writer’s expectation of that recognition (a second-level expectation); and 3) World Knowledge—"before a writer even produces one word, her audience already knows a good deal about what she might say. An author uses her knowledge of what she believes that
A skilled writer will have a fairly accurate idea of what she can expect her audience to know about the world—facts, common opinions, and so forth. Included in the "World Knowledge" is a good understanding of what her audience already knows and believes about the world. A skilled writer will have as her primary task the goal of getting her audience to believe or feel closer to the way the writer does about a certain aspect of the world: the traditional expression of this feeling or belief is the familiar "thesis statement," but we also know that in much writing such a feeling is often implicit. (Thomas 587)

Marx, relying on the mutual knowledge he shares with the audience, that of the Jew as the scapegoat, and his audiences' World Knowledge, that society could always be changed for the better, allows him to persuade his audience of the validity of his argument:

Major Premise: All anti-social elements must be removed from society for it to succeed.

Minor Premise (implied): [The Jew’s, by nature, are set apart, anti-social.]

Conclusion: Jews must be removed from society for it to succeed.

The key to Marx’s, or any other writer’s use of World knowledge is Grice’s Cooperative Principle. As was discussed before:

in situations of informative communication both speakers and hearers act with reference to one overriding assumption: that the speaker attempts in all utterances to be cooperative. (Thomas 587)
To get to the reason why Marx chooses to imply genocide rather than overtly state it, we can begin by looking at a similar question that Rong Chen asks of Grice's theory of conversational implicature and its resolution. In "Conversational Implicature and Poetic Metaphor," Chen states:

Although Grice successfully accounts for how conversational implicature come about through the violation of the maxims, he does not explain, at least explicitly, why the hearer prefers to violate a particular maxim rather than to say what he means directly. (61)

Chen proposes three motivations for the violation of conversational maxims: the Politeness Principle, whereby one conveys negative opinions by the use of conversational implicature for fear of appearing impolite; the Self-Interest Principle, which motivates a speaker to be cautious in what she says or how she says it to avoid undesirable consequences to herself; and the Expressiveness Principle, which a speaker uses because she wants to be expressive. Expressiveness is comprised of two aspects, according to Chen:

First, it indicates that the speaker has strong emotions about what she is conveying. Second, the speaker wants to pass on her emotion and meaning to the hearer forcefully and effectively, leaving as much impact, psychological, aesthetic, or otherwise, as possible on the hearer. As a result, the speaker uses language elaborate in structure and deviant from the norm, which might sacrifice clarity and easy understanding as specified by Grice's Cooperative Principle. (62-63)
Marx is alternately polite, using conversational implicature to convey negative opinions; self-interested, demonstrating cautiousness in building a strong but slow argument so as not to immediately alienate his audience; and expressive (per Chen's definition), using deliberately elaborate, sometimes opaque, language to pass on his passionate agenda. It is his use of clarity: active voice and declaratives, coupled with his retreats to ambiguity: passive voice and implicit premises that seduce and provoke the readers, leaving them with, as Chen suggests, the psychological and aesthetic (or in this case unaesthetic) impact of an inferred Jewish genocide.

Deliberate Ambiguity

At this juncture, it is worthwhile reviewing some of the aspects of conversational implicature as they relate to ambiguity in general and "On the Jewish Question," specifically.

Implicature is linked to politeness, according to Robin Lakoff, when the speaker/writer is fearful of having to pay the consequences for something he says he may resort to circumlocution.

Conversational implicature is a special case of Politeness Rule 2 [Hesitancy: Allow the addressee his options]; at least conventionally it gives the addressee leeway in interpreting what is said to him.
He need not automatically realize that he has just been told THAT, whatever undesirable thing THAT may be. (100)

If we recall Marx’s audience, his ambiguity and implicature may be more understandable. Marx’s target audience is made up of non-Jews, or at the least, self-hating ones. But among his readers there may be those Jews who are not yet fully convinced of his argument. So he is careful; he cannot risk disenfranchising them at this juncture.

Politeness is often defined by its violation of Grice’s principle of clarity, “Be clear, unless there is some reason not to be” in addition to the maxims of quality, quantity, relation, manner.

Then, if clarity is not achieved, the participants in the conversation will, by this metarule and their concept of implicature, both be able to figure out why the contribution was unclear, and what its translation is. (Lakoff 99)

Lakoff states that there are “various overriding reasons [for violations of clarity] that we can identify.”

First, literature is notorious for lack of clarity, poetry in particular, and often it seems that the more highly regarded the work, the harder the reader has to mediate between the printed word and its intention. The result is that each reader, since he has to some extent an individual grammar by which he interprets implicatures, receives his own message; a work of art is not the same work to all people. It is this process of mediation that makes reading good works of literature an exciting intellectual exercise, and also one of the things that distinguishes “creative” writing from scientific, technical, or academic prose, which attempts above all to be clear and unambiguous.
—and thereby sacrifices, perhaps necessarily, any esthetic pleasure it might possibly impart to its readers. (Lakoff 99)

Her description of “scientific, technical or academic prose,” troubles me though, because some “non-creative” writers write ambiguously, sometimes deliberately. Marx is intentionally ambiguous at times and quotes out of context purposely to deceive and serve his own agenda.

In concluding his argument in part one of his essay, Marx excerpts from J. J. Rousseau’s "The Legislator," Book II, Chapter VII of The Social Contract:

> Whoever dares undertake to establish a people's institutions must feel himself capable of changing, as it were, human nature itself, of transforming each individual who, in isolation, is a complete but solitary whole, into a part of something greater than himself, from which in a sense, he derives his life and his being; [of changing man's nature in order to strengthen it;] of substituting a limited and moral existence for the physical and independent life [with which all of us are endowed by nature]. His task, in short, is to take from a man his own powers, and to give him in exchange alien powers which he can only employ with the help of other men. (qtd. in “Question” 46)

Marx is quite careful to set off the quotation, using quotation marks (something he is not always so scrupulous about in his quotations from Bauer). The emphases are not Rousseau's and the bracketed portions were deleted in Marx's work. With the bracketed portions intact, it is clear that Rousseau believed there was "a human nature." Marx did not share this opinion. He held that there was only human
history; hence, no permanent conditions confront human beings—there is no permanent human nature.

However, also in "On the Jewish Question," Marx refers continuously to the Jewish nature. He says that Bauer asks "the Jews to break with the essence of the Christian religion, but this demand does not follow, as [Bauer] himself admits, from the development of the Jewish nature" ("Question" 47). Marx continues:

Bauer regards the ideal and abstract essence of the Jew—his religion—as the whole of his nature. He therefore, concludes rightly that 'The Jew contributes nothing to mankind when he disregards his own limited law,' when he renounces all his Judaism." ("Question" 47)

The implication is that the Jew's nature is his religion and his religion is his nature. The two are inseparable. And there is nothing worthwhile to be found in Jews devoid of Judaism. From this apparently valid, although circularly reasoned, argument, Marx proceeds to attack the "Jewish nature" and its impact upon society. In doing so, Marx argues against his own argument regarding human nature—not the hallmark of a skilled rhetor. So why does he do so? He is signaling something else—an implicit strategy.

We cannot considered Marx a racist as the biology of race was not considered until several decades after Marx wrote "On the Jewish Question" (see above, pages 7-8). And it
is an oversimplification, based on Marx's own history and psychology, to excuse Marx's discourse as an attempt to use Judaism as a sign for all that is vile in capitalism. For his argument regarding Jews to make any sense, the implicit premise is that the "Jewish nature" must be the exception to mankind's lack of a human nature. Marx's focus is on "Jewish nature." The word "nature" is used instead of biology or religion with the result being an equivocation—a hedge, based upon inference and ambiguous language.

In Marx's declarative statements:

In the final analysis, the emancipation of the Jews is the emancipation of mankind from Judaism. ("Question" 49)

The social emancipation of the Jew is the emancipation of society from Judaism. ("Question" 52)

A presupposition is forced on the readers, as was previously demonstrated (pages 106-07), and by doing so it also fosters belief. However, Marx's meaning of "emancipation," as was discussed earlier in the chapter on rhetoric (page 50), is euphemistic and unclear. Emancipation can mean freedom, salvation, liberation, deliverance, riddance or eradication. The latter two definitions carry more negative associations, though depending upon whether one uses the preposition "of" or "from" in conjunction with the term, the same could be said of the former four. Keeping in mind the fact that Marx has never missed an opportunity to supply or play upon the
negative connotations of words, it is difficult to imagine he has changed modus operandi here.

Nevertheless, offering Marx the benefit of the doubt, he is still hedging. As Lakoff points out:

Euphemism, then, seeks to give the addressee a way out of having to face the facts as facts. It gives him (at least conventionally, again) a different way of looking at a potentially unviewable notion. (90)

Consequently, clarity is not served.

Looking back to Lakoff’s earlier claim where she states, if either the politeness rules or Grice’s are violated something else must be going on, we cannot help but perceive that Marx’s implicature, his avoidance of clarity, his euphemisms, his ambiguity—demand closer scrutiny.

We have seen that when speakers/writers flout the respective maxims, principles, or rules, the result is conversational implicature/rudeness. It has been demonstrated that Marx’s writing is, at times, ambiguous. The questions remain. Why? What purpose is served?

In her essay “Deliberate Ambiguity,” Ann Weiser addresses how “a speaker might utter a sentence with two acts in mind, willing that either one of them be taken as his or her intent in uttering the sentence, willing that either of two different acts of presuppositions and felicity conditions
be taken as operative" (723-24). She calls this "deliberate
ambiguity and says that it

is used in situations where the speaker is uncertain
as to which of two states of affairs holds for the
addressee, does not want to speak so as to presume one
or the other true, but does want the situation to
'carry forward;'\textsuperscript{23} therefore, he/she uses a sentence
that would fit either of the possible states of the
addressee and would 'carry forward' the situation in
either case. (724)

She says that the difference between the presupposition
strategy and that used in deliberate ambiguity rests on the
speaker's intent. Though both rely on maintaining smooth
flow, presupposition is used to "sneak in" new information,
while steering the conversation away from that particular
point. Deliberate ambiguity, by contrast, steers the
conversation toward that new information (728). For example:

Two school friends, Ryan and Dave are talking about a mutual
friend, Susan. Ryan is interested in taking Susan to a
dance, but knows that she and Dave have had an on-again/off-
again relationship. He doesn't want to risk offending Ryan
in the event that (a) they are either still dating or (b) she
dumped him. He does however want to know if she is
available. Ryan says, "Susan's sure popular. Do you think
she's going to the dance?" If Dave answers that she's going
with him or someone else, Ryan has not offended him and he's
found out the new information he sought. If Dave answers he
doesn't care or doesn't know, Ryan then can decide whether or
not to ask her out, and he has still gained new knowledge without annoying Dave.

In our examples from Marx:

In the final analysis, the emancipation of the Jews is the emancipation of mankind from Judaism. ("Question" 49)

The social emancipation of the Jew is the emancipation of society from Judaism. ("Question" 52)

we can see in both quotations, he steers the reader toward the new information by use of the end-focus principle and the preceding presuppositions.

Weiser assures us that though these strategies sound calculating and devious (and may be so) they are not necessarily perpetrated with complete conscious awareness (728). This lack of full conscious awareness fits in with our profile of Marx’s Jewish self-hatred, also a less than completely conscious act.

Weiser goes on to stipulate that deliberate ambiguity cannot be defined by either form or situation alone as it deals with the use of “certain types of sentences in certain situations” (724). The use of deliberate ambiguity is most likely to occur in

'socially tricky' situations...those in which the speaker has something to lose if he/she acts on the assumption that a certain state of affairs is true and it turns out not to be, but something to gain if that certain state of affairs is actually true. (724)

It is hard to imagine a more potentially "socially tricky"
situation than advancing the idea of Jewish genocide to a largely Jewish audience proffered by, of all people, a Jew.

There still exist disturbing facts that demand explanation. Marx strategically avoids clarity; With respect to Jews/Judaism, he relies heavily on the negative connotations of words instead of the positive ones, or their denotations; he foists presuppositions onto the reader; there are equivocations in his euphemistic use of "emancipation," (which Lakoff suggests is a way of viewing the unviewable) in conjunction with his dubious use of the prepositions "of" and "from"; his audience and the social situation he finds himself in require the utmost delicacy of word and deed.

All this predisposes us to conclude that Marx is being not just ambiguous but intentionally ambiguous.

Weiser says that "speakers can produce sentences with two meanings in mind, intending that only one will be conveyed but not knowing which one it will be" (729). In light of this statement and by applying her definition of deliberate ambiguity,

[it] is used in situations where the speaker is uncertain as to which of two states of affairs holds for the addressee, does not want to speak so as to presume one or the other true, but does want the situation to 'carry forward;' therefore, he/she uses a sentence that would fit either of the possible states of the addressee and would 'carry forward' the situation in either case, (724)

we cannot discount a second option to the popularly held
opinion that Marx was using Judaism as a surrogate for all that he found repugnant in Capitalism, Marx’s use of deliberate ambiguity cloaks another more sinister agenda—

In the final analysis, the eradication of the Jews is the deliverance of mankind from Judaism.
CHAPTER FOUR
CONCLUSION

In certain situations, reason exercises little or no persuasive force when vying against the combined powers of rage, fear, and prejudice, which together forge innumerable hateful ways of knowing the world that have their own internalized systems, self-sustaining logics, and justifications.

Richard E. Miller

Two contemporaries of Marx, Ludwig Börne and Heinrich Heine, both converts to Christianity, reviled the Jews only to retreat from their positions later. Heine blamed Christianity for leading him into "faithlessness, disloyalty and hypocrisy," while Börne claimed he had become baptized so that:

he could abuse Germans, as a German, for their medievalism, lack of liberty and vicious treatment of the Jews until he had created the society in which there were neither Jews nor Christians, but only free men. (Kamenka, "Baptism" 344)

Even Engels was to recant seven years after Marx's death proclaiming, "Anti-Semitism is the characteristic sign of a backward civilization..." (qtd. in Kamenka, "Baptism" 348).

Marx never retreated from his position.
Like his essay, Karl Marx was composed of many parts. His anti-Semitism cannot be condoned but given the circumstances of his birth and the world he found himself in, neither should he be condemned for it. If one can find something laudatory in his behavior perhaps it is his intractability.

Sartre tells us in his essay "The Passion of the Anti-Semite" that the anti-Semite does not deny that the Jew is hardworking and intelligent. He will readily admit that he is inferior in these regards to the Jew. The anti-Semite does this to demonstrate that the more virtues the Jew possesses the more dangerous he can be. The anti-Semite considers himself average, mediocre and takes pleasure in this; "he is the man of the crowd" (149). He cannot be an anti-Semite alone:

...a man is not necessarily humble or even modest because he has consented to mediocrity. On the contrary, there is a passionate pride among the mediocre, and anti-Semitism is an attempt to give value to mediocrity as such, to create an elite of the ordinary. (149)

Marx strives "to create an elite of the ordinary" in his writing, specifically in "On the Jewish Question." It is through his use of rhetorical persuasiveness, style and its implicature that it is made manifest. After all, isn't the "common man" at the core of Marxism--the rise of the proletariat?
Today, 150 years later, Louise Harnby, writing about the passage of California's Proposition 187 and its denial of social services to "illegal aliens," makes the point that Californians who voted for the proposition:

should feel proud to be in excellent historical company. Some 60 years ago, Hitler and his Nazis also came to power in 'democratic' elections and enacted similar restrictions to another 'alien' group: The Jews. And in U.S. history there are many other, more or less gruesome, precedents, such as the segregation of African Americans, putting Japanese Americans in concentration camps during the war, or the earlier laws against Chinese Americans and other immigrants who were seen as an economic or cultural threat to the dominating Euro-majority. ("On Propositions, Racism and Democracy")

She goes on to say that human rights abuses are now being cloaked in respectability by these propositions, these official policies and "formulated in terms of arguments, rhetoric and definitions of the social and political situation, typically blam[e] the victims for all social evil."

The point in combining the historical, philosophical, psychological, rhetorical and linguistic disciplines in this study, besides their obvious overlaps and interrelatedness, was to suggest different approaches to analyzing and assessing not only Marx's essay but other works, such as those precedent-setting ones Hornby alludes to, as well.

There is a symbiosis among language, history, philosophy
and psychology. Linguistics and its extensions, discourse analysis, stylistics and pragmatics, reflect these associations. It may be that one field is sufficient to extract meaning from a text; we may find that rhetorical analysis or stylistics is sufficient for our purposes. But when, as is sometimes the case, there are limitations to the discipline, or the critic, or the text is dense and the underlying meaning still suspect, it may be advisable to consult another discipline either for corroboration or for new insight. I found this to be the case when I was confounded by my inability to prove Marx's apparent demand for Jewish eradication in his essay solely through the use of stylistics and rhetorical analysis. Finally, after having woven the rhetorical, historical, and psychological investigations together, I ventured to examine the product through the lens of pragmatics, in order to reveal the inherent presupposition, implicature and inference that called for genocide.

If there is something more to be gained from the insight obtained in using the tools of analysis demonstrated in this study, it is the avoidance of giving value to the mediocrity that Sartre cautions against and, as Harnby suggests, the ability to astutely interpret political commentary so that we do not irresponsibly foment social evil and human rights abuses.
Ad hominum: Arguing against a claim by attacking the holder in irrelevant ways.

Ad ignorantiam: Whereby someone fallaciously argues that because we don’t know if a certain statement is true then it is false or because we have no proof that it is false, then it is true.

Anaphora: Repetition of beginnings (Rhetorical Figures). an endophoric relationship whereby the meaning of expressions is recovered from previous mention (Stylistics).

Antimetabole: An inverse repetition at the level of words coupled with a negation.

Antithesis: Repetition by negation.

Asyndeton: The omission of an expected conjunction.

Catachresis: “Apparently inappropriate substitution of one word for another, inappropriate because there is not an obviously definable relationship between the two” (Quinn 102).

Cataphoric: An endophoric relationship whereby the meaning of expressions is recovered from subsequent mention.

Chronological sequencing: “textual time imitates real time: that if A comes before B in the model of reality, then A comes before B in the text” (Leech and Short 234).

Climax: The principle of climax dictates that “in a sequence of interrelated tone units, the final position tends to be the major focus of information” (Leech and Short 222-
23), and "in a classically well-behaved sentence, we shall expect the parts of the sentence to be presented in the general order of increasing semantic weight, in obedience with the principle of climax" (Leech and Short 224).

Cohesion: The way in which units of language are bound together, relying on cross-reference and linkage.

Co-operative principle: H.P. Grice's four maxims: be true, be brief, be relevant be clear, which people assume to be in operation when interpreting discourse.

Coordination: "If A is subordinate to B, then A is the circumstantial background against which B is highlighted" (Leech and Short 221).

Co-referential forms: Forms which make reference to something else for their interpretation and direct the reader to look elsewhere than their semantic meaning for interpretation.

Cross-reference: "The various means which language uses to indicate 'the same thing' is being referred to or mentioned in different parts of the text" (Leech and Short 244). Cross-reference allows for cohesion (utilizing the principle of reduction) by substituting third-person pronouns for proper nouns.

Deictic: Showing or pointing out directly by using demonstrative pronouns like: this, that, those, here, now.

Elegant variation: The use of a synonymous or almost synonymous expression to avert repetition.

Ellipsis: The general term for the figure of omission; omission of clauses, phrases or words that can be recovered from the context or from elsewhere in the discourse.

End-focus principle: The syntactic ordering of information in a sentence so that old precedes new.
Endophoric: A relationship whereby co-referential forms' interpretation lies within the text. There are two kinds: anaphoric and cataphoric.

Epistrophe: Repetition of ends.

Equivocation: A fallacy that turns on the semantics of words.

Ethos. An appeal to the moral sense (Sophist) and the speaker's authority (Aristotelian).

Exophoric: A relationship whereby co-referential forms' interpretation lies outside the text.

Expressive repetition: Used to emphasize or heighten emotion.

Felicity Conditions: Specified circumstances required for the success of performatives.

Genetic fallacy: Attacking the cause of someone's belief rather than its justification.

Hasty generalizations: A conclusion drawn about an entire population based on too small a sample.

Iconicity: The imitation principle whereby a syntactic relationship exists between words and the objects and events that the words signify.

Juxtaposition: A form of cohesive linkage in which units of language are placed side-by-side so that they are presumed interrelated.

Linkage: The use of overt connectors such as coordinating conjunctions, subordinating conjunctions and linking adverbials.

Logos. Refers to the preferred Aristotelian appeal to reason and logic in dialectal forms of argument.
Ludic: One of Roland Barthes six principles in rhetoric. A cognate for "play," demonstrated in ironies and/or parodies; an opposition to work.

Pathos: A persuasive appeal to emotion.

Performatives: Sentences that express the performance of an act, e.g. I bet you it will rain today.

Pragmatics: The study of sign/intent of the speaker

Principle of climax: "In a sequence of interrelated tone units, the final position tends to be the major focus of information...[with]parts of the sentence...presented in the general order of increasing semantic weight" (Leech and Short 224).

Principle of reduction: Substitution of third-person pronouns for proper nouns.

Salience: The promotion of one clause above another in syntactic hierarchy.

Segmentation: The use of punctuation and devices such as dashes, italics, breaking up of lines to indicate the rhythm of prose, suggesting emphasis and intonation.

Semantics – an analysis of expressions and their meaning; the meaning of words.

Semiotics: The general science of signs and languages

Sequence: The placement of one clause before or after another.

Speech acts: a central sub-domain of pragmatics. A speech act is an utterance defined in terms of intention and/or effect.

Straw man: Attacking an opponent's position by attacking a less defensible, similar but different position.

Subordination: See Coordination.

Syntax: Sentence structure; the study of relations between expressions.
Following is an excerpt from Laura Lafargue's, Marx's daughter, Confessions Book with Marx's version of a Victorian parlor game called Confessions. It was written in English in the mid 1860s.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Answer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Your favourite virtue</td>
<td>Simplicity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Your favourite virtue in a man</td>
<td>Strength</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Your favourite virtue in a woman</td>
<td>Weakness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Your chief characteristic</td>
<td>Singleness of purpose</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Your idea of happiness</td>
<td>To fight</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Your idea of misery</td>
<td>Submission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The vice you excuse most</td>
<td>Gullibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The vice you detest most</td>
<td>Servility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Your aversion</td>
<td>Martin Tupper*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Favourite occupation</td>
<td>Book-worming</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Favourite poet</td>
<td>Shakespeare, Aeschylus, Goethe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Favourite prose-writer</td>
<td>Diderot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Favourite hero</td>
<td>Spartacus, Kepler</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Favourite heroine</td>
<td>Gretchen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Favourite flower</td>
<td>Daphne</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Favourite colour</td>
<td>Red</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Favourite name</td>
<td>Laura, Jenny</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Favourite dish</td>
<td>Fish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Favourite Maxim</td>
<td>Nihil humani a me alienum puto**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>De omnibus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>dubitandum***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Victorian popular writer

** "I consider that nothing human is alien to me."

*** "You must have doubts about everything."
ENDNOTES

1 Entitled "Die Judenfrage" and "Die Fahigkeit der heutigen Juden und Christen fuet zu werden," respectively, these essays were published in 1843. Marx's review of and response to them, "On the Jewish Question," was written in 1843 but not published until the following year.

2 The emphases here and in all Marx's quotations are supplied by Marx.

3 Marx derives his definition of species-being from Ludwig Feuerbach who says in The Essence of Christianity (Das Wesen des Christentums) (1841) that man differs in nature from animals by his consciousness of self as an individual and as a member of the human species. A fully realized species-being is one who no longer views himself as an individual but rather as an intrinsic part of the whole community.

4 Gordon Allport derived this definition from the Thomistic moralists (as discussed by the Rev. John LaFarge, S.J. in The Race Question and the Negro, New York: Longmans, Green, 1945, 174ff)(The Nature of Prejudice 7)

5 Allport prefers "ethnicity" to race as this term does not imply biologic unity. Instead, it refers to characteristics of groups that may be, in different proportions, physical, national, cultural linguistic, religious, or ideological in character(Preface, The Nature of Prejudice xii).

6 Lassalle, as a socialist, first established contact with Marx and Engels during the German revolution 1848-49. He finally met Marx in 1861 and they continued corresponding, though later became estranged due to differences in opinion over the revolutionary versus evolutionary path of Socialism. Lassalle died in a duel in 1864.
Mikhail Aleksandrovich Bakunin was the chief propagator of 19th-century anarchism, a prominent Russian revolutionary agitator, and a prolific political writer. His quarrel with Karl Marx split the European revolutionary movement for many years.

The First International, formally International Working Men’s Association, was founded in London on September 28, 1864. It was a federation of workers’ groups that had a considerable influence as a unifying force for labor in Europe during the latter part of the 19th century. Karl Marx, though he had no part in organizing the meeting, was elected one of the 32 members of the provisional General Council and assumed its leadership. The First International split at its Hague Congress in 1872 over the clash between Marx’s centralized socialism and Bakunin’s anarchism. In order to prevent the Bakunists from gaining control of the association, the General Council, prompted by Marx, moved its headquarters to New York City, where it lingered until it was formally disbanded at the Philadelphia Conference in July 1876.

Roland Barthes definition of rhetoric was that of a metalanguage—a discourse on discourse—that involved the following: 1) technique; 2) teaching; 3) science; 4) ethic; 5) social practice; and 6) ludic. For a full treatment see Roland Barthes, “The Old Rhetoric: an aide-memoire,” The Semiotic Challenge. Trans. Richard Howard. New York: Hill and Wang, 1988, 13-14.

In addition, Jean-Paul Sartre (1905-1980) was a man for whom writing was action. He is known as a proponent of popular existentialism, a playwright, novelist, critic and biographer. His political activism centered around a renewal of Marxism, incorporating a flexibility to allow it to adapt to particular situations and where the individual freedom of man was respected.

Feuerbach’s inversion of Hegel’s philosophy that “man is spirit (or God) in the process of self-alienation and self-realization...yields the theme that religion is a phenomenon of human self-estrangement” (Tucker xxii-xxiii).
12 Though Fish's dialectic is highly specialized and relies in large measure upon the classical definition, his descriptions of its use hold in this instance for Marx.


14 Marx uses his own italics when citing another's material, which may or may not signify the author's original emphases.

15 Quoted from Bauer's "The Jewish Question."

16 The monad, usually referred to as a circumscribed monad, is degenerate and has a special connotation for Marx, antithetical to his concept of the species being, who is one who cooperates with his fellow man, and who "has recognized and organized his own powers (forces propres) as social powers so that he no longer separates this social power from himself as political power" (Marx, "Question" 46). The monad is an egoist who sets himself apart by being the owner of the means of production and who retains the surplus value provided by those who labor. This concept and the idea that the only things that exist are relations, "all being is contingent," the only being is the relation of one thing to another thing, are elaborated upon in the "Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844" and "The German Ideology" (1845-46).

17 These are the same rhetorical devices found in most fanatical tracts. Mein Kampf contains the same stratagem and one sees it in the speeches of Louis Farrakhan.

18 Marx became a member in the same year the Doktor Klub was founded, 1837. The Club was made up of representatives of the radical wing of the Hegelian school in Berlin. Bruno Bauer, a lecturer in theology at the Berlin University, was also an active member.

19 Written in 1844-45 in collaboration with Engels.

20 Preface to the French Constitution
21 The Cooperative Principle states: Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged. It's maxims are: Quantity: Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of the exchange). Do not make your contribution more informative than is required. Quality: Do not say what you believe to be false. Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence. Relation: Be relevant. Manner: Be perspicuous, avoid obscurity of expression, avoid ambiguity, be brief, be orderly. (qtd. in Brown & Yule 31-32).

22 In order for hearers to ascertain whether conversational implicature is present, they rely on the following data:
1. the conventional meaning of the words used, together with the identity of any references that may be involved;
2. the Cooperative Principle and its maxims;
3. the context, linguistic or otherwise;
4. other items of background knowledge; and
5. the fact (or supposed fact) that all relevant items falling under the previous headings are available to both participants and both participants know or assume this to be the case. (Grice 154-55)

23 Ann Weiser explains the phrase "carry forward" by saying, "Often conversational participants have purposes that can be accomplished indirectly, in conversations that are 'about' something else. But sometimes one of the purposes may be to have the conversation be about a particular topic, perhaps only if that topic is 'safe,' or if some other precondition is met" (727).

24 Excerpted from David McLellan's Karl Marx: Interviews and Recollections, p. 167 (whose source was the Moscow Reminiscences of Marx and Engels p.266).
BIBLIOGRAPHY


