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Thomas George Hagen

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FRAMING RESISTANCE: HOW HAMAS USES COLLECTIVE ACTION FRAMES TO ATTRACT AND MAINTAIN HUMAN RESOURCES

A Thesis
Presented to the Faculty of California State University, San Bernardino

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Master of Arts in Social Sciences

by Thomas George Hagen

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ABSTRACT

The Islamic Resistance Movement, also known as Hamas, has been in existence for a quarter of a century. In that time, it has grown from a seemingly insignificant resistance movement against Israeli occupation of the Palestinian Territories to a major political party that challenges the socio-political legitimacy of the Palestine Liberation Organization. This research attempts to discover how Hamas has changed its strategic messaging during its 25-year existence, in order to gain a greater understanding of what motivates the movement, as well as those who support it. Employing qualified and quantified content and frame analysis, this research examines a collection of translated Hamas documents, ranging from its creation during the First Intifada of 1988 to the 2006 Palestinian Legislative elections. This analysis shows that the movement has pragmatically altered its messaging to meet its changing needs and changing audiences. By understanding the nature of these changes, and how they influence Hamas and its supporters, we gain a greater understanding of the complexities that make up the greater Palestinian-Israeli Conflict.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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I would also like to thank communications' professor, Ahlam Muhtaseb, for providing me with initial guidance in a discipline in which I had no prior experience. Her direction at the beginning of this research was crucial to my greater understanding of the theories utilized therein.

A special thanks to the Pfau Library is also well deserved. Their stacks of books and online journal databases offered many hours of research over the course of this project.

Finally, I would like to thank my good friends, Areej Qasqas and Arika Khajetoorians. Their experience and insight provided me with a model of what a thesis should be, and they were more helpful than they can ever know
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

Socio-political movements have a variety of tools with which to acquire and maintain their human resources. Some may take advantage of the coalescing qualities brought by a charismatic figurehead. Others may opt to encourage membership and support by developing extensive socio-political programs and institutions. Whatever tactics or strategies a movement employs to gain popularity with the masses, it must get its message out to the people it is trying to attract to its cause. If a movement fails to attract and maintain human resources, it fails to exist. A very effective vehicle used to deliver messages is collective action frames. Collective action frames carry information and ideas from social movements to their potential and existing human resources; they align themes in ways that resonates with likeminded individuals, making them a human resource through their direct membership, support or ideological sympathy; they tell people how to think about an issue, as well as what to do about it. Some of the most proficient uses of collective action frames come from the Islamic Resistance Movement, better known as Hamas. Throughout its twenty-five-year history, Hamas has successfully employed the various mechanisms and processes of collective action framing, enabling the group to grow from a small, unknown resistance movement in the late 1980s to a major political party in 2006. But what exactly are those mechanisms and processes,
and how exactly has Hamas used them in specific documents to acquire and maintain its human resources? The answer to these questions is the focus of this study.

Organization of the Study

This research is divided into seven chapters intended to expose readers to a variety of relevant social science concepts and historical perspectives so that they can better understand the conclusions upon which those concepts and perspectives are based. The INTRODUCTION outlines the layout of the study, and explains its purpose, limitations and definitions of key terms. CHAPTER TWO offers an assessment of literature on collective action frames and Hamas, in order to expose the distinct academic holes in research that this study helps to fill. CHAPTER THREE describes case study research and the particular case used in this study, the qualitative and quantitative research methods used in this research, and the ways content and frame analysis have been scientifically used to examine data and form conclusions in this research. CHAPTER FOUR explains, in detail, the concept of collective action framing, including its theoretical foundation, components, alignment, and resonance. CHAPTER FIVE describes the ideologies and history of Hamas, in order for readers to gain an understanding of this complex movement and to give context to the documents and conclusions that follow. CHAPTER SIX features a detailed analysis of several documents by Hamas, including its 1988 charter, various leaflets from
the *First* Intifada, and its 2006 election manifesto. Finally, CHAPTER SEVEN sums up the findings of this research and draws several conclusions regarding how and why Hamas employs the types of framing it uses and how those frames have changed over time.

**Purpose of the Study**

The decision whether or not to take part in a social movement or collective action is not made in a vacuum. Many factors, certainly, both conscious and subconscious, go into such a choice. The purpose of this study is to help researchers and scholars of contentious politics and social movement theory to gain a greater understanding of the role frames play in that decision by showing the ways social movement entrepreneurs use them to acquire, maintain, and motivate human resources for the purpose of collective action. The case study of Hamas and a comparison of the framing mechanisms and processes used in its 1988 charter, its *First Intifada* leaflets, and its 2006 electoral platform furthers the discussion on collective action framing and adds to the evidence that frames can resonate with target audiences and help to motivate collective action. Such research also gives a greater academic understanding of the complexities of the Hamas movement and those who—for whatever reason—identify with it. When considering the size, influence, and longevity of Hamas, the need for such an understanding is absolutely warranted and could be vital to attempts at peace in the region of Israel and Palestine.
Limitations of the Study

There are a number of limitations regarding the theories, case study, and documents used in this study. One such limitation is that of offering significant and verifiable proof of the concept of frame resonance. While there is certainly a great deal of evidence to suggest that frame resonance operates exactly how it is articulated in Chapter Four of this research, the fact is that we do not know that it does with any amount of certainty. Until more research is done that finds a way to accurately measure what a person or a target audience thinks about what they read and hear, and, perhaps more importantly, measures how people act upon what they read and hear, the process of frame resonance, and the mechanisms that drive it will remain an unverified theory.

Another such limitation of this study is the lack of verifiable data on the movement Hamas. While Hamas is certainly a socio-political movement, it is also a resistance movement—one that has been violent and regarded by many as terrorist in nature. As such, there is a lot that is not known about the members of the group or about its inner workings, and what we do know is often presented with a biased slant. These factors are important for a couple of important reasons. First, reliable information on the membership numbers of Hamas over time could help with quantifiable evidence that Hamas’s framing tactics resonate with the target population. Second, unbiased academic research on Hamas could help with qualifiable evidence regarding the motivations for its actions and
positions, which, ultimately affects what we know about its public image and, in turn, its degree of frame resonance.

A third set of limitations rest in the documents being analyzed in this study. First, access to the Hamas documents analyzed in this study, especially its First Intifada leaflets is largely limited to what has been translated and published by other authors. This presents multiple potential problems that include context and meaning of words and phrases being lost in translation and potential bias by the translator affecting their translations. Another limitation and potential problem is that of presupposition in analyzing the documents. This author has made a great attempt to exclude personal feelings about the case study from the content and frame analysis, but must recognize that it is possible that some bias still exists. Those attempting to recreate this study will also need to be on guard against their own presuppositions and biases regarding the case study and document analyses, while also recognizing that those qualities may still find their way into the researcher’s work.

Definitions

Socio-Political Movement or Terrorists?

Socio-political movements provide people with a way for their grievances to be heard and to take collective action in attempt to resolve those grievances. For the purposes of this study, a socio-political movement is regarded as a movement that attempts to bring both social and political change through various
means that may or may not include violence. This definition is in line with seminal and current academic literature. In *Power in Movement*, sociologist Sidney Tarrow describes a social movement as a group whose "actions are based on dense social networks and effective connective structures and draw on legitimate, action-oriented cultural frames," with the ability to "sustain these actions even in contact with powerful opponents" (Tarrow, 2011, p. 16).

Contentious politics is often an important facet of a social movement. In his dissertation, entitled "Guerrillas today, what tomorrow: transformation of guerrilla movements," political violence scholar, Kevin Grisham, describes contentious politics as forms of collective political behavior by political contenders against a particular government (Grisham, 2009). Sociologist Charles Tilly defines collective action as "people's [sic] acting together in pursuit of common interests" (Tilly, 1978, p. 7).

When collective action includes physical force, it becomes collective violence. Tilly opines that collective violence displays the proof that at least some of the people involved in a collective action are taking the action seriously, and that it brings the collective action, and in turn, the movement behind that action, to the attention of others (Tilly, 1978). However, once attention to the movement and its violent action is drawn, people begin to form opinions about both based on their own individual needs and value systems. Some may see the violent actions as acceptable means by a legitimate movement in an effort to bring about an eventual end, while others may see them as intolerable acts of
force by illegal and immoral terrorists. This subjective gray area makes the term "terrorist" problematic to objective academia, and, as such, will be used sparingly when describing the case study of Hamas.

**Mechanisms and Processes**

This study employs the mechanism-and-process approach in regards to the concept of collective action framing. The mechanism-and-process approach is the method utilized by McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly (2001) in their groundbreaking *Dynamics of Contention*, in which they analyze small-scale causal mechanisms that combine to produce and affect larger processes (p. 24; Tarrow, 2011, p. 185). As George and Bennet (as cited in Tarrow, 2011, pp. 185-186) explain, "students of mechanisms and processes are less interested in the 'why' of contentious politics than in its 'how,'" putting them "closer to the strong advocates of 'process tracing'... than to traditional variable-based analysis." With that stated, however, this study focuses on both how and why Hamas uses and alters its collective action framing mechanisms and processes.

**Mechanisms.** McAdam, et al. (2001, p. 24) define mechanisms as "a delimited class of events that alter relations among specified sets of elements in identical or similar ways over a variety of situations." In simpler terms, mechanisms are specifically defined events that combine with each other to change other specified variables that lead to relatively predictable outcomes in a variety of situations. Hedstrom and Swedberg (as cited in McAdam, et al., 2001,
claim that the study of mechanisms linking variables "has become the stock in trade of quantitative social science and causal modeling."

There are three types of mechanisms as defined by McAdam, et al. First, environmental mechanisms are "externally generated influences on conditions affecting social life" (McAdam et al., 2001, p. 25). Examples of environmental mechanisms include the real life problems that affect real people and the ways they receive and interpret frames, as detailed in Chapter Four. Next, "cognitive mechanisms operate through alterations of individual and collective perception..." (McAdam et al., 2001, p. 26). Examples of cognitive mechanisms include any collective action frame that changes the way people perceive a problem or solution to that problem, as articulated in Chapter Four. Finally, "relational mechanisms alter connections among people, groups, and interpersonal networks" (McAdam et al., 2001, p. 26). Examples of relational mechanisms include frame extension and frame transformation and are further articulated in Chapter Four of this research.

Processes. Mechanisms combine in various combinations to form processes, which McAdam and others (McAdam et al., 2001, pp. 24, 27) define as "regular sequences of such mechanisms that produce similar generally more complex and contingent) transformations of those elements." It is important to note that mechanisms aggregate to form processes, but that those processes can also be considered as mechanisms of greater processes. For example, various mechanisms of communication come together to form the process of
diffusion. In turn, mechanisms of diffusion combine with mechanisms of relativity and credibility to form the process of frame resonance. Meanwhile, the mechanism of frame resonance combines with identity and agency mechanisms to form the overall framing process. The concepts of frame resonance, identity, agency, and other mechanisms and processes of framing are further articulated in Chapter Four of this research.

**Human Resources**

For the purposes of this research, it is important to have clear definitions for the multiple facets that combine to make up what will be referred to as “human resources.”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Members (M)</th>
<th>Supporters (S₁)</th>
<th>Sympathizers (S₂)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>True Believers (TB)</td>
<td>Pragmatic Members (PM)</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

HR = M+S₁+S₂
M = TB+PM

Figure 1. Aggregate of Human Resources (HR)

As explained by Grisham¹, human resources are “essential for the staying power of the movement” (Grisham, 2009, p. 83). Human resources are the aggregate

¹ Resource mobilization theories generally regard resources as material in nature, and regard collections of people as organizations rather than resources. On that same note, organizational theories and theories of human capacity tend to focus primarily on organizations that are not socio-political in nature. Grisham’s human resource classifications are both simple and elegant, while fitting within the socio-political scope of this research. It is for these reasons that they are the classifications used.
of the members, supporters, and sympathizers of a movement, as displayed in Figure 1. While socio-political movements must often make due with whatever limited material resources they can acquire, they cannot survive without continuously acquiring and maintaining human resources. Political scientist Harry Eckstein agrees, writing that, without popular support, a contentious movement has little chance of success (Eckstein, 1965).

**Members.** Members are the most important facet of human resources. Members are the current members of the movement, including rank-and-file and leadership members. Whether it is gathering in protest, taking part in acts of collective violence, or organizing such activities, movement members are the people who actively take part in the collective actions of the movement. While extremely difficult, it is arguably possible for a socio-political movement to exist without the presence of other human resource categories. The same cannot be said of movement members. Simply put, a movement cannot exist without members.

Depending on the particular socio-political movement, membership may not always be readily apparent to those on the outside. For example, movements that are perceived by some to be terrorists, such as Hamas, may not be as willing to disclose the identity of its members as movements that use more universally acceptable forms of collective action. Likewise, the members of violent socio-political movements may not be as willing to disclose their own membership in the group as members of a peaceful movement may.
Members of a socio-political movement are classified into one of two categories: true believers or pragmatic members. Kevin Grisham defines true believers as members of the movement who are unwilling to compromise on the original beliefs and ideals of the movement. Grisham explains that their uncompromising positions make true believers less likely to create or react favorably to themes or frames that greatly differ from the original ideologies of the movement (Grisham, 2009). In contrast to the hard-line positions of true believers are pragmatic members. Pragmatic members view compromise as necessary means of survival for the movement. Grisham further explains that opportunities of "political accessibility" often arise during the natural cycle of a movement. When such opportunities are recognized, pragmatic members are more willing to alter the movement's themes, frames, and ideologies to meet the new opportunities and challenges that have been created (Grisham, 2009, p. 78-80).

Supporters. Another facet of human resources is supporters. Supporters are not actual members of the movement. They do not take an active role in the collective actions of the movement in the same way as the movement's members do. Rather, supporters act as boosters for the movement, providing it with vital material resources and general assistance. For example, while movement members may gather at a particular location in protest of a particular issue, a movement supporter might be the person, such as the property owner or
manager, who has given authorization for the movement to gather at that location (Grisham, 2009). Direct general assistance also includes voting in favor of the movement, as well as for or against things that directly aid in the group’s short- or long-term goals.

**Sympathizers.** Sympathizers of a socio-political movement are not members or supporters of the movement. They do not provide direct assistance to the movement; they do not provide material resources to the movement; they do not directly participate in the activities of the movement. However, sympathizers play a crucial role in the life of a socio-political movement. Sympathizers act as a human resource to a group giving the group direct and indirect moral support and authority (Grisham, 2009). Sympathizers provide direct moral support to a movement through actions such as displaying its recognizable flag or emblem in public. Indirect moral support is more subtle, and comes in the form of inactions such as not complaining about a neighbor displaying a movement’s flag or emblem, not complaining about a noisy protest, or not exposing members of a movement.
CHAPTER TWO
ASSESSMENT OF LITERATURE

The idea of frames and framing began taking shape in the 1960s and '70s. The early research and theories developed by these pioneers paved the way for more extensive and elaborate research and theoretical concepts on these topics in the 1980s. Just as research on framing processes and mechanisms was ramping up in the '80s, so was a little-known socio-political movement that called itself the Islamic Resistance Movement, or Hamas. From its 1988 introduction to collective action at the beginning of the first Palestinian Intifada to its introduction into the political arena in the 2006 election of the Palestinian Legislative Council, Hamas has proven its proficiency in the mechanics of collective action framing. Yet, while the study of collective action frames and framing has continued to progress at a relatively steady pace, the study of how Hamas uses this mobilization method has not.

Literature on Frames and Framing

While the intricacies of frames and framing are articulated in the subsequent chapter of this research, a brief examination of the concept is helpful in gaining an understanding of how scholars and authors have—and have not—given attention to those concepts when covering the Hamas movement. Much of the academic discussion on frames and framing began in 1974 with Erving
Goffman's *Frame Analysis*. Goffman (1974) writes that, in order to explain the ever-present question, "what is going on here?," people break up their individual experiences into "strips" of reality that are based on and organized by a set of social principles he defines as "frames" (pp. 8-10). These primary frameworks can be social in nature, and can "incorporate the will, aim, and controlling effort on an intelligence, a live agency, the chief one being the human being" (Goffman, 1974, p. 22). Social frameworks, as Goffman (1974) explains, set up "guided doings," that are influenced by the social norms and values of those giving and receiving the controlling effort (p. 22).

After Goffman published his groundbreaking work in 1974, social scientists soon began expanding on the concepts of frames and framing, turning them from a relatively passive act involved in person-to-person communication to a more intentional and motivated act between social movement entrepreneurs and audiences. Theorists Robert D. Benford, David A. Snow, and William Gamson were, and continue to be especially prolific in the study of what became known as collective action frames and framing. Approaching the idea from the perspective of an audience, Gamson published *Encounters with Unjust Authority* in 1982, wherein he theorized that frames could be used as a motivating factor for people to join a collective action. In contrast to Gamson's audience perspective, Benford and Snow published an article entitled *Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilization* in 1988, wherein they articulated
elaborate concepts of strategic framing that would help a message resonate with a target audience.

Following the 1980s works of Benford, Snow, and Gamson, social scientists of the 1990s and 21st century began applying theories of collective action frames and strategic framing to their own theories of movement mobilization and contentious politics. Theorists, such as Bert Klandermans, Mayer N. Zald, and others wrote numerous case study articles describing the use of frames by the media, government, and social movements in order to sway public opinion on a particular issue. Hamas, however, was not one of the cases they examined. Meanwhile, theorists, such as Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly were applying the use of frames to their groundbreaking models on the dynamic mechanisms and processes of contentious politics and collective action. And scholars, such as Hank Johnston and John A. Noakes, among many others, continue the discussion on the use of collective action frames as a mobilizing factor in the relationship between social movements and their target audiences.

Literature on Hamas

There has been no shortage of literature on Hamas since its introduction to the world in the late 1980s. To their credit, historians, journalists and experts in the field of terrorism and violent movements have been relatively prolific on the topic, continuing to update what we know about Hamas. A vast majority of the
early literature on Hamas, however, was not analytical in nature, but rather, highly descriptive histories, with each attempting to detail what the authors believe to be the true history of the group.

While some authors opted to take only initial steps in their coverage of Hamas, writing detailed or not-so-detailed histories, others chose to go further in depth. In 1994, during the relative lull between the First and Second Intifadas, Shaul Mishal, co-author of The Palestinian Hamas, teamed up with Middle East expert Reuben Aharoni to publish Speaking Stones: Communiqués from the Intifada Underground. In Speaking Stones, Mishal and Aharoni give historic context and critical content analysis to several publicly distributed handbills from two Palestinian factions, including Hamas. The authors review the handbills, which are included and translated for the reader, for directive themes from the movements that produced them to the public that received them. Those themes are then quantified and somewhat qualified by the authors through content analysis.

Unfortunately, few authors followed the mixed method approach to the topic of Hamas taken by Mishal and Aharoni. From 2006 to the present, much of the works on Hamas have provided, at best, qualified content analysis, ignoring any quantified support of their findings and claims. For example, in 2006, author Khaled Hroub published Hamas: A Beginners Guide, wherein he posed questions about the movement and then answered those questions with considerable support from Hamas texts and statements. That same year, Hroub
published analytical work on Hamas and its use of communications. Hroub's article, "A 'New Hamas' and its Documents," was published in a 2006 edition of the *Journal of Palestinian Studies*. In it, the author performs content analysis on Hamas's 2006 electoral platform, its draft proposal for a Hamas/Fatah coalition government, and its proposed cabinet platform following its victory in the 2006 Palestinian legislative election. Interestingly, Hroub's content analysis starkly differs from that of Mishal's, in that Hroub does not include a quantified analysis, choosing to stick purely to an interpretative analysis of themes that the author argues show pragmatism on the part of Hamas, while still maintaining its core values. The following year, author Zaki Chehab published *Inside Hamas: The Untold Story of the Islamic Militant Movement*. Chehab takes a different approach that that of Hroub, offering the reader insights from Hamas leaders drawn from interviews with the author.

Since 2006, claims regarding the 1988 charter of Hamas have become much more prominent in literature on the group. In 2007, author Azzam Tamimi published *Hamas: A History from Within*. Tamimi somewhat combines the formats of Hroub and Chehab, drawing his claims from various Hamas texts and interviews that the author conducted with Hamas members. One of the main documents discussed throughout Tamimi's book is the Hamas charter, which is also featured as an English translation its appendices. In 2009, journalist Paola Caridi published *Hamas: From Resistance to Government* wherein the author draws heavily from the works of other authors who analyzed documents and
conducted interviews to launch a seemingly biased attempt to excuse the charter. And in 2012, authors Beverly Milton-Edwards and Stephen Farrell published *Hamas*: a largely unbiased look at the movement that also draws heavily on content analysis to support positions the authors take regarding the movement's history, ideologies, and motivations.

While there has been a good deal of coverage regarding the content of Hamas's documents, there has been little research done in regards to its use of frames in those documents. One marked exception is from framing expert Joas Wagemakers. In 2010, Wagemakers published his article, "Legitimizing Pragmatism: Hamas's Framing Efforts From Militancy to Modernization and Back?" In his analysis that specifically looks at Hamas material with a perspective grounded in the mechanisms and processes of collective action framing, Wagemakers examines a variety of texts and speeches by Hamas put out over the history of the movement. Wagemakers' analysis finds particular themes in the Hamas communications, upon which the group creates frames to attract people, and helps to provide a solid foundation by which to further examine the framing efforts of Hamas. Wagemakers, however, like the vast majority of authors and researchers before him, does not support his qualified frame and content analysis with quantified research.

Conclusion

The pace of academic research on Hamas's framing mechanisms and
processes has not kept up with that of the more generalized attention given to the movement's history and textual content. If we are to gain a complete understanding of this complex movement, we must begin to gain an understanding of the motivations it, and its potential and existing human resources have. Such an understanding is achieved through mixed-method analysis of what Hamas says and attempting to decipher why it says it, as well as by studying why its messaging seems to resonate with so many people for such a long period of time.
CHAPTER THREE

METHODOLOGIES

This research employs a mixed-methods strategy that combines qualitative and quantitative content and frame analysis to the case study of the socio-political movement known as Hamas in order to answer the proposed question regarding the group’s use of collective action framing mechanisms and processes for the purpose of attracting and maintaining potential and existing human resources.

Case Study Research

According to Leonard Cargan (2007, p. 204), case study research is a “strategy that focuses on the behavior, history, social context, and treatment of one organization at one defined point in time or on a small number of individual cases that have features in common” in order “to either explain or describe in-depth and in-detail the characteristics of a single unit.” This research method often involves gathering data through the analysis of documents, interviews of individuals, and observation of organizations. Such a strategy has both advantages and disadvantages to it. Perhaps the greatest advantage is that, by studying a single unit, researchers are able to gain detailed information on a particular organization. By contrast, perhaps the greatest disadvantage is that, by studying a single unit, research findings are not always able to be applied to
other organizations (Cargan, 2007, p. 204). Regardless of such a disadvantage, however, case study research “can be useful in generating theories or for developing tentative conclusions, so it is appropriate for descriptive or exploratory studies” (Cargan, 2007, p. 204).

Why Hamas?

The case study in this research is the Islamic Resistance Movement; better known to the world as Hamas. Hamas is a highly complex Palestinian socio-political movement that is loved and loathed throughout the world. Its members are seen as terrorists and freedom fighters by the movement’s respective opponents and supporters. This dichotomy makes Hamas a particularly interesting case study for research investigating various forms and facets of resource mobilization and social movement theory. The fact that Hamas has managed to exist for nearly 25 years, and does not appear to be going away any time soon, only increases the need to gain a complete and unbiased understanding of the movement, as well as an understanding of what motivates those who are a part of its potential and existing human resources.

Hamas has a wide variety of controversial documents that have been the subject of largely biased analyses which were seemingly motivated by the desire to either demonize or apologize for the movement. In order to discover a greater, unbiased picture of Hamas, the focus of this research is to compare and contrast many of those documents as a collection in order to discover how they do or do not relate to each other in the context of human resource mobilization and
collective action framing. As such, the relatively large collection of documents and the level of analysis going into them did not allow for other cases to fit within the scope of this research. Of course, as mentioned above, the findings of this research based on a single case study cannot be applied across the board to every socio-political movement. With that stated, however, the theories from which it draws and supports can be applied to the framing tactics of many social movement entrepreneurs, as well as to the motivations of human resources to join a particular movement. Obvious examples include, but are certainly not limited to Hamas’s primary Palestinian rival, Fatah, as well as fellow Islamic nationalists, Hezbollah.

Methods

The purpose of this research is to investigate the use of collective action framing mechanisms and processes by Hamas in order to acquire and maintain potential and existing human resources. The methods used combine content and frame analysis with qualified and quantified analyses. An assorted collection of documents from Hamas have been analyzed using these methods and the results of that analysis have been qualified in order to give their contents context, as well as quantified to lend numerical support to the qualified contextual findings.

Qualitative and Quantitative Analysis

Qualitative data "refer[s] to the characteristics, concepts, definitions,
descriptions, metaphors, and symbols of things and events” and consists of mainly “written or spoken words” (Cargan, 2007, p. 9). By contrast, quantitative data consists of “counts and measures of items, or the quantitative rendering of social phenomena” (Cargan, 2007, p. 9). Each of these methods of analysis can be utilized independently of the other, or can be used in conjunction with one another. As explained by Cargan (2007, p. 10):

Studies that collect primarily quantitative data may also include items requiring written responses that will be used in qualitative analysis in order to uncover unexpected patterns... Similarly, it may be necessary to convert some of the qualitative data into quantitative data to add numerical backing for claims.

Krippendorff (2004, pp. 19-20, 87) echoes this sentiment, citing that both methods have proven their usefulness in the field of content analysis, and that, “for the analysis of texts, both are indispensable.”

Content and Frame Analyses

Content analysis, as defined by Klaus Krippendorff (2004), “is a research technique for making replicable and valid inferences from texts (or other meaningful matter) to the contexts of their use” (p. 18). Krippendorff's framework for performing content analysis begins with an individual body of text to be analyzed. Next, the researcher must formulate a research question to be answered by analyzing that particular text. Following this, the researcher must recognize the context of the text being analyzed and form “an analytical construct
that operationalizes what the analyst knows about the context" (Krippendorff, 2004, p. 30). In the event there are missing or unidentified contexts within the text, the researcher must then make abductive inferences about those missing pieces. For example, "one might infer the religious affiliations of political leaders from the metaphors used in their speeches" (Krippendorff, 2004, p. 37). Finally, the researcher validates his or her evidence and inferences by creating a research construct that can be reproduced by others wishing to test the findings and the support of other primary and secondary sources on the topic of the text or context in question. Krippendorff (2004) cites this framework as being able to "handle unstructured matter as data," as well as "cope with large volumes of data" in a way that is "context sensitive" (pp. 41-42).

Similar to content analysis is the method of frame analysis. As described by Jim A. Kuypers (2009), frame analysis takes many of the qualities of content analysis, but applies them to the discovery and interpretation of frames and framing themes. Kuypers (2009) uses frame analysis to "detect frames" by looking "for key words, metaphors, concepts, symbols, and visual images" (p. 191). He first examines a speech or text "to find the main themes" (Kuypers, 2009, p. 191). The presence of a theme signifies the presence of a frame, so he then examines the speech or text to "determine how these themes are framed by looking for key words, concepts, labels (names), metaphors, and phrases that help contextualize remarks" (Kuypers, 2009, p. 191). Finally, Kuypers compares his findings against other sources of framed information—in his case, the
mainstream print press—to see if the original themes are present or not. He then
draws his conclusions based on those comparisons. Kuypers points out the
advantages as well as risks inherent with using frame analysis. He states that
the research method "is especially well-suited for comparative analyses" and that
those who employ it will find that "clear results are to be had" (Kuypers, 2009, p.
198). However, the author also warns that "careless critics often find what they
set out to find," and that care must be taken to "examine the entire rhetorical
artifact before determining what frames are operating" (Kuypers, 2009, p. 198).

**Sampling.** The design of this research holds, largely, to the design
 specifications of content and frame analysis listed above. The bodies of text, or
sampling units, used in this research are Hamas's official 1988 charter, a
collection of 25 Hamas leaflets, ranging from 1988 through 1991 during the First
*Intifada*, and the official 2006 electoral platform from the Hamas-based List of
Change and Reform. The charter text that was analyzed was the 1990 English
translation by Muhammad Maqdsi for the Islamic Association for Palestine in
Dallas, Texas, and was published in the Journal for Palestine Studies XXII no. 4
edition. That same translation of the charter is also featured in Shaul Mishal and
leaflets that were analyzed are the English translations featured in Shaul Mishal
and Reuben Aharoni's *Speaking stones: Communiques from the Intifada
underground* (1994, pp. 201-285). And the List of Change and Reform electoral
platform that was analyzed is the English translation of that text featured in Azzam Tamimi’s *Hamas: A history from within* (2007, pp. 292-316).

The 1988 charter and 2006 election manifesto samples are thematic units selected due to their official nature as officially recognized platforms of Hamas in their respective periods. Due to the limited availability of original or reprinted leaflets from the First Intifada, the leaflet samples are convenience samples provided as part of a published collection that did not include all of Hamas's leaflets from that period. Mishal and Aharoni offer a total of 25 leaflets by Hamas. They are not in complete sequential order, nor are they equally weighted year-to-year. Due to this deficiency in sourcing, analysis of the leaflets is incomplete and the conclusions drawn from them are imperfect. While they were not all referenced, all 25 were the subject of analysis in this study, making the conclusions drawn from them as valid as relatively possible.

**Coding.** Coding in content and frame analysis is a highly-interpretive process by which analysts “interpret what they see, read, or find and then state their experiences in the formal terms of analysis... according to observer-independent rules” (Krippendorff, 2004, p. 126). As such, coders must be able to identify, not only specific terms, but also contexts and implications within a sample that might not be easily identifiable or interpreted by those not familiar with their frameworks. Such identification needs require content and frame analysis coders to have proficient knowledge of the culture and potential intent, if any, of those that produced the sample being studied, as well as proficient
knowledge of the theoretical frameworks by which they are being analyzed (Krippendorff, 2004, pp. 127-128). For example, it might be just as difficult for a specialist in American history to code and analyze a translated Chinese document as it could be for a Chinese specialist to code and analyze an American document. Similarly, it would be potentially difficult for those with a chemistry background to recognize the mechanisms and processes of sociological frameworks found in a text, just as it would be potentially difficult for a sociologist to identify the mechanisms and processes at work in a study of atomic fusion.

In order to hold to Kuypers’ requirement that frame analysts allow texts to speak for themselves, rather than analysis beginning with preconceived notions about what texts should or might contain, the coding process used in this research began with complete readings of the sample texts. With those initial readings, patterns, themes, and framing concepts in use were identified through contextual qualitative interpretation. Once those items were individually identified, repeated readings of the data samples were done in order to then quantify their occurrences within the samples. Finally, the qualified and quantified findings of those readings were interpreted into conclusions regarding the collective action framing theories articulated in CHAPTER FIVE of this research.

Reliability and Validity of Data. Reliability refers to "the extent to which a process of measurement produces the same result if used repeatedly" (Cargan,
2007, p. 318). On the other hand, validity refers to “an estimate of how well a dependent variable measures what it is intended to measure” (Cargan, 2007, p. 319). The reliability and validity of data is an important factor of any research; and, because of the necessary inferences and contextual interpretations involved in content and frame analyses, these factors are of great concern (Smith, 1981, p. 328). Content analysis is considered valid if the conclusions drawn from its samples “withstand the test” of independent research, observation, or interpretation (Krippendorff, 2004, p. 313). Unfortunately, it is, according to H. W. Smith (1981, p. 329), “rare for researchers to obtain perfect reliability between independent measurements,” and that fact “must be taken into account” by researchers attempting to replicate a study.

This research draws heavily on face validity, which is defined by Krippendorff (2004, p. 313) as validity that is “obvious,” or “common truth” that simply “makes sense.” Krippendorff explains that “it makes sense, indeed, to measure public attention to an issue by the relative frequency with which the issue is mentioned.” Therefore, the same holds true for the frequency with which particular words and ideas are mentioned. It is this form of “sense” that has gone into this study’s measurement of collective action frame resonance. As a result, those attempting to reproduce or test the findings of this research will have to make sure they draw the same contextual inferences and use the same theoretical “sense” as those made in the original study.
CHAPTER FOUR
COLLECTIVE ACTION FRAMES

Socio-political movements provide people with a way for their grievances to be heard and to take collective action in attempt to resolve those grievances. And just as socio-political movements provide people with a way for their voices to be heard, collective action frames provide the movement with a way for its voice to be heard. Sociologists David Snow and Robert Benford (1992, p. 137) define a frame as an "interpretive schema that simplifies and condenses the 'world out there' by selectively punctuating and encoding objects, situations, events, experiences, and sequences of action" and depicting them to be significant. Socio-political movements distribute framed ideas to receiving audiences through framing mechanisms and processes designed to attract, maintain, and mobilize their human resources. These mechanisms and processes must arrange frames in a way that convince their target audience that in injustice has taken place against it, identify who has committed that injustice, and the specific actions that should be taken to correct the injustice (Noakes & Johnston, 2005, p. 2). When successful, this motivational framing encourages individuals to participate in the movement by attempting to influence their decision-making processes (Gamson, 1992b).

This chapter defines, in detail, the mechanisms and processes involved in collective action framing, and provides an assessment of literature by several
distinguished social scientists on the topic. First, the basic concept of a frame is
described, showing how people use frames to define experiences. Next, the
chapter turns from basic frames to collective action frames; where they are
broken down to their base components in order to display the ways they are
strategically constructed and employed by social movements. Finally, the
chapter details the concept of frame resonance in order to show how and why
some collective action frames are so successful, while others fail, at convincing
current and potential human resources to mobilize for collective action.

Frames and Framing

Much of the academic discussion on frames began in 1974 with Erving
Goffman’s *Frame Analysis*. Collective action framing experts Robert D. Benford
and David A. Snow (2000, p. 611) cite Goffman’s book as the greatest influence
on the applied study of the concept of frames and the process of framing.
Goffman (1974, p. 8) writes that an individual is constantly attempting to answer
the question, “what is it that’s going on here?”. People ask themselves this
question in response to the experiences in which they are a part, as well the
experiences of others that are going on around them. Yet, while everyone asks
himself or herself this same perennial question, not everyone answers it the
same way. Just as some people might see a violent socio-political movement as
freedom fighters while others see terrorists, the answer to “what is it that’s going
on here?” is often a subjective gray area where the difference is a matter of
perspective (Goffman, 1974). In the constant attempt to answer the ever-present question, “what is it that’s going on here?”, individuals break up their experiences into “strips” of reality that Goffman (1974, p. 10) describes as “any arbitrary slice or cut from the stream of ongoing activity.” A set of social principles called “frames,” in turn, interpret those strips (Goffman, 1974, p. 10-11).


> Everybody tries to make sense of their own experience. We assign meaning to what is going on, both inside us and around us. Sometimes the meaning is shared, and sometimes it is not. Sometimes it is clear and other times vague or contradictory. (p. 3)

In communications theory, these assigned meanings allow people to communicate their experiences to others in a more efficient manner (Littlejohn, 1999). Goffman (1974, p. 24) echoes that point, writing, “We tend to perceive events in terms of primary frameworks, and the type of framework we employ provides a way of describing the event to which it is applied.”

Goffman’s (1974, p. 21) primary frameworks form a "schemata of interpretation" that are classified as either natural or social. “Natural frameworks,” he writes, “identify occurrences seen as undirected” or “purely physical,” involving things such as the weather or other events that are subject to
only "natural determinants" (Goffman, 1974, p. 22). By contrast, social frameworks “provide background understanding for events that incorporate the will, aim, and controlling effort on an intelligence, a live agency, the chief one being the human being” (Goffman, 1974, p. 22). Social frameworks set up “guided doings,” that are influenced and judged by the social norms and values of those giving and receiving the controlling effort (Goffman, 1974, p. 22). These social norms and values “constitute a central element” of a group’s culture (Goffman, 1974, p. 27).

When guided doings come in the form of active agency, they do so through a process called framing. Framing involves the construction and manipulation of perception and the shared understandings in which people understand and define reality (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 614; Grisham, 2009, p. 75). In the words of framing experts John A. Noakes and Hank Johnston (2005, p. 2), “framing functions in much the same way as a frame around a picture: attention gets focused on what is relevant and important and away from extraneous items in the field of view.” Such attention is focused by amplifying the “elements of existing beliefs and values” that are usually “associated with existing ideologies” (Snow & Benford, 2005, p. 209).

Just as the basic concept of frames has academic crossover with a wide variety of disciplines, so does the basic concept of framing. Due to its prevalence in a wide variety of social theories, the study of framing is found in such social science fields as sociology, psychology, and political sciences, as
well as in the disciplines of communication and rhetorical studies (Benford & Snow, 2000). Snow and Benford (2005, p. 210) cite the availability of source material and the relative ease of “first-hand observation, examination, and analysis” as the reason for the recent academic popularity of collective action frames. For example, there are striking similarities between the framing concepts articulated by Snow, Benford, Noakes, and Johnston and theories of discourse articulated by Stephen W. Littlejohn. Littlejohn (1999, p. 83) states that discourse, or “complex acts that form messages” is a way to use language in order to achieve a particular goal, and has different structures depending on the nature of that goal. He accents the sentiment of those above, claiming that, by analyzing discourse, we can discover “the various ways in which accomplishments are achieved through messages” (Littlejohn, 1999, p. 83). Littlejohn (1999, p. 97) seems to find the means of discourse to be as important as the ends, reiterating the point that all human communication conveys, not only “our own version of the truth but also an intent to do something with the words we use.” And it is in those intentions that we find the true meaning of the words used (Littlejohn, 1999).

**Collective Action Frames**

Intentions are what differentiate basic frames and framing from collective action frames and collective action framing. While basic framing merely attempts to answer the question, “what is it that’s going on here?” collective action frames also answer, “what should be going on here?” and “what should we do about
what is going on here?” (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 614). Noakes and Johnston (2005, p. 2) write that “individuals must be convinced that an injustice has occurred, persuaded that collective action is called for, and motivated to act if a social movement is to occur.” Collective action frames give a socio-political movement a “structured voice” in which to communicate with potential and existing human resources by acting as an ideological link between an individual and a collective identity (Benford & Snow, 2000, pp. 631-2; Grisham, 2009, p. 56). These frames are “intended to mobilize potential adherents and constituents, to garner bystander support, and to demobilize antagonists” by legitimating “the activities and campaigns of a social movement organization” (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 614). In other words, the purpose of collective action frames is to attract, maintain, and mobilize the human resources of a social movement.

The academic study of collective action frames largely began in 1980. Since then, social scientists consider frames to be a critical element in understanding the motivations and life cycles of social movements (Benford & Snow, 2000). That same year, Todd Gitlin’s *The Whole World is Watching: Mass Media in the Making and Unmaking of the New Left* introduced social movement academics to the idea that Goffman’s concept of frames could be applied to their research. In it, Gitlin (1980) focused on the ways the American mainstream media depicted the Students for a Democratic Society, and proved that the New York Times had applied a variety of negative frames to the movement. Two
years later, William Gamson and others published *Encounters with Unjust Authority*, turning the focus of frames from their use by the media against a social movement to their use by a social movement (Gamson, Fireman, & Rytina, 1982). By offering collective action frames as a potential motivating factor in the decision to join a collective action, Gamson’s (1992b) work provided a structural alternative to the then conventional “organizational theory and decision-making models that stressed participants’ cost-benefit calculations” (Noakes & Johnston, 2005, p. 3). As academic understandings of social movements continued to evolve through the works of Gitlin, Gamson, and others, so did the study of the collective action framing theories that were being used to help define and understand those movements.

By 1990, noted sociologists such as David Snow and Robert Benford had developed elaborate theories on the processes and mechanisms of collective action framing, including those of frame alignment, frame resonance, and master frames. Social movement entrepreneurs, defined by Noakes and Johnston (2005, p. 7) as “people who exhibit strategic initiative in spreading the word about their cause and promoting its message,” utilize such processes and mechanisms. Since the 1990s, Gamson and Snow continue to be leaders in the study of framing processes, while each focusing on a separate, yet equally important perspective, as shown in Figure 2. Gamson gives attention to the social and psychological mechanisms going on within an individual to motivate a person to join a social movement, while Snow focuses on the ways social movement
entrepreneurs use collective action frames to try to motivate such responses (Benford & Snow, 2000; Noakes & Johnston, 2005).

Figure 2. Primary Foci of Snow and Gamson

**Components of a Collective Action Frame.** Collective action frames identify what a movement perceives as a problem, those responsible for creating the problem, and a proposed solution to the problem. These primary frames perform their "core tasks" through a combination of what Benford and Snow (2000, p. 615) call diagnostic framing, prognostic framing, and motivational framing (Noakes & Johnston, 2005, p. 5). Social movement entrepreneurs perform this strategic framing. Alternatively, Gamson (1992a) identifies a collective action frame as a combination of identity components, agency components, and injustice components. The main difference between the frame components of Benford and Snow and those of Gamson is that Gamson (1992b) opines that collective action frames *must* have an injustice component in order to
be a collective action frame (Noakes & Johnston, 2005, p. 6). Citing the absence of injustice frames in many "religious, self-help, and identity movements," Benford and Snow (2000, p. 615) acknowledge the existence of Gamson's injustice frames, but argue that his assertion of their required presence in a frame is too "sweeping" and lacks "theoretical or empirical support." As Noakes and Johnston (2005, p. 6) point out, however, "the overlap between these two approaches is substantial enough that we consider them two sides of the same mobilization coin." This overlap is shown in Table 1.

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<th>Table 1. Components of a Collective Action Frame</th>
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<td><strong>Benford &amp; Snow</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Diagnostic</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Motivational</strong></td>
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The purpose of diagnostic framing is to identify to potential human resources "a new interpretation of issues or events" that "tells what is wrong and why" (Noakes & Johnston, 2005, p. 5). Diagnostic frames accomplish their function by strategically articulating a problem and "focusing blame or responsibility" for it onto a particular subject or subjects (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 616). Benford and Snow (2000, p. 616) take care to remind that different
social movements, or those within an individual movement, might not always agree whom or what is to blame for a particular injustice, and that internal conflicts can arise as a result of such disagreements.

The diagnostic framing explained by Benford and Snow encompasses much of the same qualities as Gamson’s identity and injustice components of framing, but with some notable differences. While Benford and Snow’s diagnostic framing makes an effort to convince people there is a problem, Gamson’s identity component assumes that the people already recognize the problem as a problem. Rather than convincing people of a problem, identity components make a connection with a group or groups, delineating the terms of “we” and “them,” where “we” becomes the individuals within the group. Once the identity component has defined “we” and “them,” the injustice component completes the diagnostic framing process by placing blame for the known problems on “them” (Gamson 1992a).

After diagnostic framing and identity and injustice components have convinced people there is a problem and identified who the problem affects and who is to blame, prognostic framing offers “a proposed solution to the problem, or at least a plan of attack, and the strategies for carrying out the plan” (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 616). Benford and Snow (2000, p. 617) point out that prognostic framing can go on between multiple organizations, with each articulating their own solutions to the same problem, and can even contradict each other’s prescriptions or their own previous solutions.
Once the problems and causes have been identified and prescriptions for its cure have been articulated, motivational framing attempts to get people off the couch and into the streets, so to speak. Motivational framing is the social movement's "call to arms," which, depending on the nature of the movement can be taken figuratively or literally (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 617). This component of collective action framing "attempts to give people a reason to join collective action" by creating "socially constructed vocabularies" with which they can identify (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 617; Noakes & Johnston, 2005, p. 6). The ideas of motivational framing and social vocabularies are reminiscent of Goffman's (1974) guided doings and primary frameworks mentioned above, and are very similar to Gamson's agency component, in which people are encouraged to become agents of change.

**Strategic Framing Mechanisms and Processes.** Collective action frames originate from a variety of sources. Sometimes they are born from the actual street protests for which they were intended to mobilize (Noakes & Johnston, 2005, p. 7), such as the rallying cry, "long live Egypt" that was heard rising from the streets of Cairo during the 2011 uprising against the Mubarak regime. Most of the time, however, collective action frames originate as part of an "active process" by social movement entrepreneurs to mobilize current and potential human resources into collective action (Zald, 1996, p. 269). Social movement

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rhetoricians take a "strategic initiative in spreading the word about their cause and promoting its message" (Noakes & Johnston, 2005, p. 7). Strategic framing takes place through a combination of processes; including frame bridging, frame amplification, frame extension, and frame transformation. These frame alignment processes, as shown in Figure 3, put the message of the social movement in line with the interests of its target audience so that it might resonate with people and motivate them to become a human resource for the group (Benford & Snow, 2000).

Figure 3. How Frames Become Resonant

Frame bridging takes place by "linking two or more ideologically congruent but structurally unconnected frames regarding a particular issue or problem" (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 624). Examples of frame bridging include the alignment of secular or religious ideas with nationalist perspectives, known respectively as "secular nationalism," such as that found in the Palestine Liberation Organization, or "Islamic nationalism," such as that found in Islamic Jihad. Benford and Snow (2000, p. 624) point out that frame bridging is perhaps
the least-studied frame alignment strategy and is probably the one that is the most used.

According to Benford and Snow (2000, p. 624), most social movements try to amplify frames in one way or another. Collective action frames are amplified using elements such as catchy slogans, shared histories, and cultural symbols, which echo the movement's message and allow people to receive it in a more digestible manner. Benford and Snow (2000) point out that frame amplification is especially important to the life of movements whose ideologies and actions go against the values of the dominant culture, such as with white supremacist movements amplifying frames with ideas of “pride” and “heritage” (p. 625).

Frame extension involves extending the boundaries of an existing frame to include areas that potential human resources believe to be important. Many social movements have used this frame alignment strategy; but it is not, however, without its inherent risks. As Grisham (2009, p. 77) and Benford and Snow (2000, p. 625) point out, the inclusion of outside values can sometimes lead to schisms between the true believers and pragmatic members of a movement. Benford and Snow (2000, p. 625) further note that the internal conflicts that can arise from frame extension show that the framing strategies of a movement are not always dictated by the leaders of that movement, “and that employing a particular alignment strategy does not always yield the desired results.”
Benford and Snow (2000, p. 625) list frame transformation as the "final strategic alignment process," and define it as "changing old understandings and meanings and/or generating new ones." The pair point out that frames are not static, but rather, dynamic; constantly being produced, reproduced, refined, and contested as the needs of the movement and the needs of its framing audience change (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 628). Three primary factors motivate social movement entrepreneurs to transform their frames: political opportunity, culture, and the intended audience (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 628).

Sometimes, either by the nature of an existing political structure, or by the past gains of the socio-political movement, opportunities arise for the movement to gain entry into "the institutionalized political system" (Grisham, 2009, p. 79; Tarrow, 2011, pp. 32-33). When a movement takes advantage of such opportunities, gaining entry into the formal political structure, it must alter its collective action frames to reflect its new position within that political structure in which it used to be critical and from which it used to be marginalized (Benford & Snow, 2000; Grisham, 2009; Tarrow 2011).

In the words of anthropologists Javier Xavier India and Renato Rosaldo (2008, p. 12), culture "refers to a group of people – whether a nation, ethnicity, tribe, or so forth – who more or less use a system of shared meanings to interpret and make sense of the world." They argue that modern globalization has formed "circuits of economic, political, cultural and ecological interdependence" that transcend both time and space (India & Rosaldo, 2008,
pp. 7-8). Such connectivity, when combined with naturally occurring cultural changes brought on by proximity to other cultures and other natural evolutionary processes, has created "a world of culture in motion" and in flux (India & Rosaldo, 2008, pp. 12-14). As with changes in political opportunities, changes in cultural ideologies and identities require social movement entrepreneurs to alter their frames to fall in line with those continual changes (Benford & Snow, 2000).

Regardless of the existence of political opportunities or constant cultural shifts, frame alteration must occur to suit the rhetorical sensitivities of the audience for which they are intended. Roderick Hart first articulated the idea of rhetorical sensitivity in 1972. Then, Hart and others (1972) opined that individuals are able to communicate more effectively when they alter their message to suit particular audiences. Later, in 1980, Hart further expanded on his ideas of rhetorical sensitivity, defining it as "a particular attitude toward encoding spoken messages," which "represents a way of thinking about what should be said and, then, a way of deciding how to say it" (Hart, Carlson & Eadie, 1980, p. 2). Social movements must also account for the rhetorical sensitivities of their intended audience. In order to maximize their potential to attract human resources, social movements must “appeal to multiple audiences who vary in terms of their relative interests, values, beliefs, and knowledge” (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 630). As the audiences change, so must the frames used to communicate with them.
Frame Resonance Mechanisms and Processes. The decision whether or not to take part in a social movement or collective action is not made in a vacuum. Many factors, both conscious and subconscious, go into such a choice.

One such factor is the resonance of a collective action frame. When social movement entrepreneurs successfully employ the strategic frame alignment processes articulated above, their collective action frames resonate with the target audience and mobilize people to become or remain a human resource of the movement (Gamson, 1992a; Benford & Snow, 2000; Noakes & Johnston,
2005; Grisham, 2009; Tarrow, 2011). Alternatively, frames that fail to resonate with the target audience do not mobilize potential or existing human resources, and could even encourage people to remove themselves from the movement’s pool of human resources, altogether (Benford & Snow, 2000; Noakes & Johnston, 2005). This dynamic is shown in Figure 4, above.

While the basic concept of frame resonance is difficult to quantify or measure (Noakes & Johnston, 2005, p. 16), its place in the practice and study of framing processes is greatly substantiated. Noakes and Johnston (2005, p. 11) define frame resonance as “the relationship between a collective action frame, the aggrieved community that is the target of mobilizing efforts, and the broader culture.” Benford and Snow (2000, p. 619) equally recognize the importance of frame resonance, citing it as the measure of the “mobilizing potency” of a frame, and the reason why some frames are “effective” and others are not. And Gamson (1992a, p. 115) recognizes the concept and processes of frame resonance as “resources” by which people construct and negotiate meaning.

While all of these noted academics agree on the importance of frame resonance, they do not, however, agree on all of the factors that affect it or on the organization of those factors. Benford and Snow (2000, p. 619) identify two distinct, “interacting factors” that affect the level of resonance in a frame: “credibility of the proffered frame and its relative salience.” Credibility is influenced by factors the pair identifies as frame consistency, empirical credibility, and the credibility of the frame makers, while salience is influenced by what they
call centrality, experiential commensurability, and narrative fidelity (Benford & Snow, 2000). Citing substantial crossover and an interest in making the concept of frame resonance easier to understand for newer students of framing processes, Noakes and Johnston (2005, p. 12) “suggest a more straightforward way of organizing the terms” used to describe the intricacies of resonant frames. Rather than focusing on the “consciousness of the audience” and the strategies used by social movement entrepreneurs, the pair focus on what they consider the sources of frame resonance: frame makers, frame receivers, and frame qualities (Noakes & Johnston, 2005, pp. 11-12). They do, however, note the need to have an understanding of “the entire gamut of terms” used to describe the factors of frame resonance in order to fully appreciate its “finer distinctions” (Noakes & Johnston, 2005, p. 24). Gamson (1992a), meanwhile, directs his focus, as usual, toward the perceptions of the target audience, and the factors that guide those perceptions.

When considering literature on the topic, this research identifies three primary factors that affect frame resonance: credibility, relativity, and diffusion. Credibility speaks to the credibility of the frame, as well as the credibility of the movement producing it. Collective action frames must also be relative to the real world, as well as to the real people living within it. And, framed ideas must be marketed in a deliberate, strategic fashion that resonates with potential and existing human resources and will ultimately result in the diffusion of its message.
Credibility. The effects of credibility on the resonance of a frame come down to two factors: the credibility of the frame and the credibility of the movement doing the framing. Frames must be relatively consistent with the movement's previously stated goals, ideologies, and actions (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 620; Noakes & Johnston, 2005, p. 15). Alternatively, "inconsistency between elements can undermine a frame," decreasing its resonance (Noakes & Johnston, 2005, p. 15). The inconsistency of a frame makes itself obvious to its audience when the framed message goes against what the movement has said in the past, as well as what it has done in the past. Further inconsistencies show themselves when a movement performs actions it has previously deemed unacceptable, or when it fails to perform actions it previously stated it would perform (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 620). In simple and common terms, frame consistency for a social movement is about "practicing what you preach." Benford and Snow (2000, p. 620) cite that there has been little research on this factor of frame resonance.

Popular wisdom also affects the credibility and resonance of a frame. As explained by Gamson (1992a, p. 123), "people bring to bear many popular beliefs that transcend the specific issue in question," employing phrases such as "As everyone knows," and "You know what they say." Tapping into popular wisdom gives social movement entrepreneurs a greater potential audience, and, in turn, a greater pool of potential human resources. However, "as everyone knows," what "everyone knows" is not always accurate or true. Popular wisdom
and common knowledge is not always a gauge for reality. Benford and Snow (2000, p. 620) point out that a collective action frame does not have to reflect the absolute truth, or even be "generally believable, but that it must be believable to some segment of prospective or actual adherents." That being said, it must also be recognized that, with a greater audience comes greater scrutiny of the frame, rendering absolutely false claims a difficult sell for even the most skilled social movement entrepreneurs.

The resonant factor of credibility does not end with the collective action frame; the movement creating and propagating the frame, as well as its leaders, must also be credible. The more credible the social movement and its entrepreneurs, the more "persuasive" the message (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 621). Such credibility comes from status, claimed, as well as "perceived expertise," and the overall credibility of the movement (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 621). By making "claims of expertise" about themselves and their representatives, social movement entrepreneurs "amplify their frame and increase its resonance" (Noakes & Johnston, 2005, p. 13). Such claims often draw scrutiny by critically thinking audience members, who may also be "experts" in their own right, and who may view the frame makers "as acting outside their area of expertise" (Noakes & Johnston, 2005, p. 13). Such potential perspectives may inhibit members of the target audience from mobilizing, and may also "inhibit some actors from promoting their frames as aggressively as they would like" (Noakes & Johnston, 2005, p. 13).
The credibility and charisma of a movement's leaders also plays a significant part in the resonance of a collective action frame. In *Charisma, Bureaucracy, and Revolution*, sociologist Max Weber (1947, p. 358) defined charisma as "a certain quality of an individual personality by virtue of which he is set apart from ordinary men and treated with... exceptional powers or qualities." Weber (1947, p. 361) goes on to describe charismatic authority as being "sharply opposed to... traditional authority." Noakes and Johnston (2005, pp. 13-14) posit that, either by their very nature, or through strategic effort, the qualities of a charismatic leader "can amplify frames and attract followers."

**Relativity.** In order to resonate with the target audience, collective action frames must relate to the real, everyday lives of that audience, as well as to its real, everyday people. As stated by Sidney Tarrow (1992, p. 189), "movement organizers must operate within the cognitive and evaluative universe that they find rather than create a new one." Frames that address the everyday lives of people show that the movement understands the daily trials of the frame audience. On the other hand, frames that are not relevant to the daily lives of the frame audience can give the impression that the movement does not "get it," decreasing the credibility of the frame and its promoters. Benford and Snow (2000, pp. 620, 621-622) describe the alignment of collective action frames to real world events and issues as "empirical credibility" and "experiential commensurability." Noakes and Johnston (2005, pp. 13, 15-16) wholeheartedly agree, while opting to refer to the factor as "frame relevance." Gamson (1992a,
pp. 122-123, 163), on the other hand, focuses on the ways individuals react to relative frames based on their "experiential knowledge" and the "proximity" of the claims to an individual's "personal life." Yet, despite their differences, they all recognize the resonant effects of frames that tap into the real life issues of people.

It is not enough for collective action frames to relate to the daily lives of individuals; they must also relate to the individuals themselves. Collective action frames relate to individuals on two levels: ideologically and culturally. The term "ideology" refers to the ideas and beliefs of an individual or group. Benford and Snow's (2000, p. 621) "centrality" addresses "the beliefs, values, and ideas associated with the movement's frames" being important to "the targets of mobilization." The two theorize that the more the movement's frames are able to tap into the audience's core beliefs, "the greater the probability of their mobilization" (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 621). Likewise, Noakes and Johnston (2005, p. 14) cite that an individual's "beliefs and values affect how targeted groups perceive a frame's claims and symbols, and consequently, whether they are likely to be mobilized by it." As with other factors of frame resonance, Benford and Snow (2000, p. 621) admit to there being little research on the factor of salient centrality in collective action frames, limiting their support to "a few studies" that "appear to confirm it."

Collective action frames must also relate culturally to their target audience. Benford and Snow (2000, p. 622) cite cultural resonances as the most important
factor of frame resonance, supporting their claim by pointing to “a plethora of studies across a wide array of social movements,” which includes a Central American refugee sanctuary movement and a democratic movement in China. Whether it is the “narrative fidelity” articulated by Benford and Snow (2000, p. 622), the “cultural resonance” of Gamson (1992a, pp. 135-162), or Noakes and Johnston’s (2005, pp. 14-15) “demographic orientations” and “cultural compatibility,” scholars in the field are in general agreement; frames are more resonant when they “synchronize with society’s cultural stock – and especially the ‘cultural toolkit’ of the target audience” (Noakes & Johnston, 2005, pp. 15). Gamson (1992a, p. 135) supports that point, stating that collective action frames that appeal to cultural resonances have a “natural advantage” over those that do not.

Diffusion. The methods in which social movement entrepreneurs introduce their frames to a target audience are as important as the message being framed. Collective action frames require deliberate, strategic marketing in order to be effectively resonant. However, not all marketing strategies are created equal. Repertoires, or the methods in which movements contend for power, including framing, must be effective, while simultaneously meeting the expectations of others (Tarrow, 2011, pp. 39-40). Furthermore, not all repertoires will resonate the same way with people. Messages marketed through violent means, for example, may resonate with some, while repulsing others. An example of the latter was clearly displayed in the negative reaction of Jordanians
to the 2005 bombing of three hotels in the capital, Amman, by the violent Islamist movement, al Qaeda. While al Qaeda claimed the hotels were targeted due to their prominence with American and Israeli tourists, Jordanians saw the act as a terrorist affront to their nationalism, alternatively framing the event as “Jordan’s 9/11.”

Framed ideas also spread through natural processes of diffusion. When an idea or claim resonates with an individual or group, people will naturally talk about it with others. While unclear as to the extent, the power of modern communications technologies and social media networking, as displayed in the recent series of Middle East uprisings known as the “Arab Spring,” acts as a multiplier to the power of word-of-mouth to spread ideas. Gamson (1992a, p. 118) points to the diffusion into contemporary culture of the United Negro College Fund slogan “A mind is a terrible thing to waste” as proof of the connection between media discourse and frame resonance.

Conclusion

Noted academics in the field of social sciences generally agree; frames allow individuals to give context and meaning to the world around them, and make communication between people more efficient and effective. As a result of those shared understandings, collective action frames facilitate communication.

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from social movements to their current and potential human resources. Through processes of strategic construction and marketing, social movement entrepreneurs construct frames that resonate with individuals and groups, encouraging their mobilization as members, supporters or sympathizers for a social movement organization. However, as noted above, not all social scientists agree on the processes and mechanisms by which frames are constructed, nor do they agree on how and why they resonate. Further research is necessary to forward our understanding of this powerful form of human resource mobilization.
CHAPTER FIVE
CASE STUDY

Hamas

Hamas (Harakat al-Muqawamat al-Islamiyyah or “Islamic Resistance Movement”) is a highly complex organization that spans decades. The organization is motivated by Islamist and nationalist ideologies, and its staunch opposition to the state of Israel. This dichotomous, multi-faceted socio-political movement -- both loathed and loved -- has been aptly described as terrorists by its enemies and freedom fighters by its supporters. Yet, regardless of its many monikers and faces, as well as the many challenges against it, Hamas has managed to grow as a movement and maintain its socio-political viability and influence in the region.

The complex nature of Hamas requires one studying the movement to have a general understanding of its ideologies\(^5\) and its history\(^6\). By

\(^5\) It should be noted that, while Hamas does subscribe to particular ideologies, not everyone who subscribes to those same ideologies individually or collectively is a member, supporter, or sympathizer of Hamas. It should be further noted that the coverage of the ideologies mentioned in this research is limited to that which pertains directly to this research.

understanding these facets of the movement, we gain a greater understanding of its use of frames and framing processes. As previously explained in detail, ideologies shape the frameworks by which individuals perceive and communicate about the world around them. And the organization’s history before and after its inception have greatly influenced the direction and tone of its collective action frames.

**Ideologies**

As detailed in the above section on frames and framing processes, the ideologies of individuals and of groups form basic frameworks by which they perceive the world and ideas around them, as well as the ways by which they communicate and respond to the world and ideas around them. The primary ideologies that shape the frameworks of Hamas are Palestinian nationalism and Islamism. A general understanding of these two ideologies, as they apply to Hamas, is vital to understanding the ideological frameworks of the group and its pool of human resources.

**Palestinian Nationalism.** At its core, Palestinian nationalism is the concept of a recognized and independent Palestinian state. While there have been, and continue to be varying definitions and demands regarding what exactly such a state should entail, that it must exist is a longstanding and widely held opinion within the greater Palestinian community, as well as with many in the international community. Palestinian nationalism is marked largely by a series of
events and conflicts with varying imperialist or occupying powers, and is an ideology that has been building over decades.

The general idea of Palestinian nationalism began taking shape as we know it today after the fall of the Ottoman Empire. When the borders of the post-WWI Middle East were being negotiated by policy-makers and emerging world leaders, Palestinians were largely left out of the discussions. Such was the case of the Faisal-Weizmann Agreement of 1919. In that agreement, a delegation representing Zionist interests came to terms regarding a Jewish state and Arab kingdom with Faisal bin Hussein bin Ali al-Hashemi, seen by many as the sole representative of Arab, and by default, Palestinian interests. Unfortunately, however, "no Palestinian Arab view was consulted," leading many to believe that Faisal "had abandoned Palestine," and giving Palestinians their first notice that they would have to walk the path to statehood without much help from fellow Arabs (Smith, 2010, p. 77-8, 98-100).

One non-Palestinian Arab who was willing to aid in the Palestinian cause was Syrian-born Izz al-Din al-Qassam. Al-Qassam, a staunch anti-imperialist and anti-Zionist who saw moral, political, and violent jihad as the "remedy" for the problems of the Palestinian people, led his 1935 group, The Black Hand, against Zionist and British forces in the British Mandate of Palestine (Schleifer, 1993, p. 173). Surrounded and facing the prospect of capture, "al-Qassam told his men to

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7 Zionism is the idea of a sovereign Jewish state of Israel in the region of Palestine. As with the ideology of Palestinian nationalism, there are varying definitions as to what that state should entail.
die as martyrs, and he opened fire" (Schleifer, 1993, p. 166). In the months and years that followed, "peasant guerrilla bands and urban commandos led by other Qassamiyum (as his followers were called) sprang up across Palestine," continuing al-Qassam's Great Arab Revolt until 1939 (Schleifer, 1993, p. 166). The memory of al-Qassam continues to inspire martyrdom and nationalist revolt against Israel, and is the name of the military wing of Hamas, as well as the homemade rockets that are routinely fired from the Gaza Strip into Israel.

The 1947 United Nations partitioning of Palestine and the subsequent declaration of the state of Israel the following year marks another defining era in the formation of Palestinian identity. Following the recommendations of a special committee on Palestine, the United Nations voted to end the British Mandate of Palestine and partition the region into Jewish- and Arab-controlled territories. The following year, on May 14, David Ben-Gurion declared the formation of the Jewish state of Israel. On May 15, hundreds of thousands of Palestinians were instantly transformed into refugees and internally displaced people's, pouring into camps in the Palestinian territories in what continues to be known as Yawm an-Nakbah, or "day of the catastrophe" (Smith, 2010; Khalidi, 1997). By the end of the resulting 1948 Arab-Israeli War, the perceived need for a Palestinian state was intensified by the Egyptian and Jordanian takeovers of the Gaza Strip and West Bank, respectively. Such sentiment was mirrored when Israel decisively captured and subsequently occupied both territories in its 1967 war with Egypt, Jordan, and Syria.
The First and Second Intifadas (Uprisings) have also influenced Palestinian nationalism. These uprisings against Israeli occupation of the Palestinian Territories unified Palestinians in a common goal against a common enemy. While there were certainly divisions and competition regarding the groups vying for leadership of the uprisings, the revolts had a rallying effect on the Palestinian people, and served as yet another example of the need for recognized national sovereignty (Khalidi, 1997).

Islamism. The term "Islamism" means many different things to many different people. Growing prevalent in the 1980s, the word quickly came “to signify the belief among radical Muslims that political and social action should be based on Islam,” and has, with the rise of Islamic-based terrorism, maintained much of that subjective connotation ever since (Sfeir, 2007, p. 170). As explained, however, in The Columbia world dictionary of Islamism:

Islamism is a political and religious ideology that aims to establish an Islamic state under the Shari'a\(^6\) law and to reunify the Muslim *Umma* (i.e. the Islamic community). Behind this relatively simple definition lies a complex picture where the situation varies in different countries, or as interpreted by different ideological movements.... (Sfeir, 2007, p. 170).

Therefore, while those who espouse an Islamist ideology may be radical

\(^{6}\) The term *Shari'a* basically translates to "Islamic law," which is based on the Qur'an and the words and deeds (*Sunna*) of the Muslim prophet Muhammad, as well as various interpretive factors.
Muslims, not all Islamists are necessarily radicals. Hamas’s version of Islamism was adopted largely from the teachings of two influential Egyptian Islamists and Ikhwan members – Hassan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb (Chehab, 2007; Hroub, 2006; Milton-Edwards & Farrell, 2010; Mishal & Sela, 2000; Schanzer, 2008).

Hassan al-Banna is widely recognized as the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood (Lapidus, 2002). Dissatisfied with the secular and what he considered decadent state of Egyptian social conditions at the time, Al-Banna professed the need of “the restoration of Islamic principles, and a return to the Quran [SIC] and Islamic piety” (Lapidus, 2002, p. 522). In 1928 he founded the Society of Muslim Brothers (The Muslim Brotherhood), quickly building “an extensive following divided into cells or chapters, which organized mosques, schools [and], clinics…” (Lapidus, 2002, p. 522). Later, throughout the years between 1942 and 1945, al-Banna travelled to Palestine, “establishing several branches of the Brotherhood in some of its major cities” (Chehab, 2007, p. 18).

Hassan al-Banna was assassinated in Egypt in 1948 following the assassination of Egyptian Prime Minister Mahmoud Fahmi Nokrashi by a member of the Ikhwan (Chehab, 2007). In the months immediately following al-Banna’s death, the Ikhwan adopted a greater political tone, “call[ing] for the establishment of an

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9 Terms such as "moderate" and "radical" are highly subjective and are often a matter of perspective and relativity. For example, Hamas may be considered radical compared to the modern-day Muslim Brotherhood, but may be considered moderate when compared to groups like Afghanistan’s Taliban.
Islamic government based on consultation with the 'ulama and devoted to the application of the Shari'a..." (Lapidus, 2002, p. 522).

That tone seemed to resonate with one of Egypt's noted intellectuals. Sayyid Qutb was a teacher, prolific author, and critic of Western imperialism. Appointed to Egypt's Ministry of Education in 1940, Qutb became, like al-Banna before him, dissatisfied with the corrupt state of Egyptian socio-political conditions he saw. For reasons still unknown, Qutb's relatively secular, nationalist writings became much more religious in tone (Calvert, 2010). As John Calvert (2010) explains in Sayyid Qutb and the origins of radical Islamism:

Writing in 1948, [Qutb] began to base his call for a just political, economic, and social order on the teachings of the Qur'an and the example of the Prophet.... In the manner of the Muslim Brothers, Qutb came to define Islam as an "action-oriented force not only in the traditional areas of morals but also in the areas of collective ethics, domestic politics, and international relations" (p. 127).

By 1953, Qutb had become a member of the Ikhwan, quickly rising through its ranks. Following a failed 1954 assassination attempt on Egyptian President Abdel Nasser, a ban was placed on the Muslim Brotherhood, and many of its members, including Qutb, were imprisoned. While serving his ten-year sentence, Qutb wrote what would become an Islamist "manifesto" entitled Milestones. In it, Qutb cited that Muslims in the West, as well as many in the Middle East, had
adopted *jahiliya*\(^\text{10}\) (ignorance of Islam), asserting that “the primary task of good Muslims must be retreat (*hijra*), as the Prophet had retreated to Medina; excommunication (*takfīr*) of the false Muslims; [and] the waging of *jihad*...” (Lapidus, 2002, p. 531). In the words of historian Ira Lapidus (2002), “This was an uncompromising revolutionary point of view” (p. 531). In 1966, Qutb was again arrested for sedition and was executed (Calvert, 2010).

**History**

A general understanding of the history before and during the existence of Hamas is important to gaining a greater understanding of its framing processes and mechanisms. The years and days that lead up to the creation and introduction of Hamas influence the framework of its potential human resources, and, therefore, the framework of Hamas. Similarly, the conflicts that perpetuate the existence and viability of Hamas shape the frameworks of human resources and of Hamas, as well as the resonance factors that make its framing efforts so successful.

**The Muslim Brotherhood.** While there are certainly a variety of factors that went into the eventual creation of Hamas, arguably the most influential factor is the organization’s ideological and physical connection to Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, or *Ikhwan*. Filling the void created by the fall of the Ottoman Empire, Islamist groups began springing up in the British Mandate of Palestine

\(^{10}\) *Jahiliya* refers to the period before Islam, which many Muslims consider to be a time of relative ignorance and barbarism.
throughout the 1920s, ‘30s, and ‘40s. In 1945, the Brotherhood opened a branch in the city of Jerusalem. By the time of the 1947 termination of the British Mandate and subsequent partitioning of Palestine into separate Jewish and Palestinian territories by the United Nations, the *ikhwan* had opened more than thirty-five branches throughout the region that attracted approximately ten thousand members (Mishal & Sela, 2000).

Following the 1948 war for Israeli independence, Jordan annexed the Palestinian territory of the West Bank, while Egypt maintained military administration over the Palestinian territory of the Gaza Strip. During that time, Jordan and Egypt each enacted policies that attempted to address the Islamist sentiment growing within their respective areas of control. In the West Bank, the Hashemite Kingdom maintained a relatively tolerant relationship with Islamists, including the Muslim Brotherhood, who it did not see as a threat. Such was not the case in the Gaza Strip, however. Following a failed coup attempt, after which the gunman claimed *ikhwan* affiliation, Egypt’s president, Gamal Nasser, closed all Brotherhood branches, arrested its leaders, and banned the movement throughout Egypt and the Gaza Strip (Milton-Edwards & Farrell, 2010).

The 1967 war between Israel, Egypt, Jordan, and Syria marked a turning point for the Palestinian Territories, and for the people who resided within them. The war left the West Bank and Gaza Strip in the hands of Israeli occupiers, while also proving to the Palestinian people that they could not rely on their fellow Arabs to protect them, or to help them achieve a recognized Palestinian state.
With the idea of Arab nationalism teetering on the brink of oblivion, Palestinian nationalism was pushed to the forefront by the largely secular Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Made up of various nationalist movements, the PLO was formed in 1964, with the blessings of multiple “Arab kings and heads of state,” to be the “entity” to represent the Palestinian cause (Nassar, 1991, p. 19).

“Across the region, the socially conservative and anti-nationalist Muslim Brotherhood was, yet again, perceived as badly out of step with the revolutionary ethos of the time” (Milton-Edwards & Farrell, 2010, p. 38).

**Ahmed Yassin.** That was not the case, however, within the Gaza Strip. Ahmed Yassin, a quadriplegic schoolteacher who later became the spiritual, charismatic leader of Hamas, had been a key member of the *Ikhwan’s* efforts there since 1968 (Mishal & Sela, 2000). Yassin believed it was his duty as a Muslim “to bring Islam to the secularized youth” of the Gaza Strip, “devoting himself to promoting Islamic revivalism through preaching and education” (Milton-Edwards & Farrell, 2010, p. 39). To facilitate that revival, Yassin founded Gaza’s Islamic Center in 1973.

The purpose of the Islamic Center, however, proved to be more than just that of Islamic revival. In a 1999 interview with journalist Zaki Chehab, Yassin admitted that those within the Center had begun thinking about armed resistance against Israel. Yassin claimed:

> By the 1980s we had grown in strength, and began amassing weapons. Many of us were imprisoned for this but, on our release in 1985, we had
developed a strategy (Chehab, 2007, p. 21).

The multi-phased strategy developed by Yassin and his associates involved first setting up social institutions, followed by the strengthening of the “political credibility” of the Center, the development of “military capabilities, and, finally, the eventual engagement of Arab and Islamic leaders in direct dialog (Chehab, 2007, p. 22). Near the end of 1987, Yassin and others had completed the first two phases of their plan. In an October meeting, they agreed that the time was right to form a new movement that combined the existing socio-political institutions of the Islamic Center with a military wing to fight against Israeli occupation and a security wing to monitor Palestinian activity. Two months later, events in Gaza’s Jabalya Refugee Camp would spark the First Intifada and introduce Hamas to the world (Chehab, 2007).

The First Intifada. The First Palestinian Intifada began in early December, 1987. On the 8th of that month, an Israeli tank transport crashed into automobiles in the Jabalya Refugee Camp in the northern portion of the Gaza Strip, killing and wounding several Palestinians. Reaction by Palestinians was both swift and spontaneous. Almost immediately, secular, Muslim, and Christian Palestinians, alike, took to the streets in leaderless protest of the incident. Within days, multiple organizations, including the PLO and Hamas, were vying to fill that leaderless vacuum (Smith, 2010).

One of the primary methods of communication between the Intifada’s rebellious organizations and the rebellious public with whom they were trying to
engage were leaflets. The leaflets that “enjoyed the widest circulation” were those of Hamas and the PLO-backed United National Leadership of the Uprising (UNLU) (Mishal & Aharoni, 1994, p. 28; Milton-Edwards & Farrell, 2010). Both groups published and generously distributed pamphlets that called for strikes and boycotts against Israeli businesses, civil disobedience against Israeli authority, and violent conflict against the Israeli occupation. Leaflets by both parties also addressed a wide range of social issues, such as “work, health, transportation, education, agriculture, [and] commerce” (Mishal & Aharoni, 1994, p. 29). Hamas literature, which was published in and favored by the Gaza Strip, took on a religious tone, while the UNLU’s leaflets were largely based on secular nationalism. And, of course, each group put out literature that tried to damage the credibility and influence of the other (Mishal & Aharoni, 1994).

**Madrid and Oslo Peace Talks.** The First Intifada raged on for more than five years, leading to many casualties on both sides. By 1991, Israel, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and Palestinian representatives from the PLO met in Madrid, Spain to negotiate a peace deal sponsored by the United States and the Soviet Union. The initial meeting went for three days, with eleven subsequent meeting to follow over the course of two years. Hamas was excluded from the talks. As such, the organization denounced, and made routine efforts to derail the Madrid talks. That same year, the organization formed a new military wing, the Izz Ed Din Al-Qassam Brigades, named after the revered leader of rebellion against post-Ottoman British occupiers after World War I (Milton-Edwards & Farrell,
In the summer of 1993, a cease-fire agreement was finally reached by those in attendance, which still did not include Hamas. The Madrid cease-fire agreement of 1993 led to further negotiations in Oslo, Norway that same year. As with the Madrid talks, Hamas was excluded from the process. And, as with the Madrid talks, the organization summarily rejected and made every attempt to discredit the Oslo talks, as well as the PLO that was selected to be a part of it. Eventually, through the Oslo negotiations and its subsequent meetings, the PLO would agree to "recognize Israel, renounce violence, amend its charter, and recognize Israeli sovereignty over the parts of historic Palestine which Israel had gained in the 1948 war" (Milton-Edwards & Farrell, 2010, p. 68). In return, Israel agreed to redeploy its forces in the Palestinian territories it occupied, and that the PLO would be the sovereign, yet stateless voice of the Palestinian people; a move that gave eventual birth to the Palestinian National Authority and Yasser Arafat as its president (Smith, 2010).

The Second Intifada. Tit-for-tat violence between Hamas, Fatah, and Israel continued during and after the Oslo Agreements, with all three entities fighting each other. Such violence was exasperated by Hamas's new tactic of suicide bombings in response to an attack on a Muslim place of worship by an Israeli settler. Back-and-forth negotiations between the PLO's Fatah\(^\text{11}\)-controlled PNA and Israel also continued. However, that would change on September 28,

\(^{11}\) Fatah is the largest and most influential organization within the greater Palestinian Liberation Organization.
2000. That day, Israeli opposition leader Ariel Sharon took a stroll through the Old City portion of Jerusalem, making sure to stop at one of Islam's holiest sites – the Noble Sanctuary (Haram al-Sharif), which features the Al Aqsa Mosque and the Dome of the Rock. Palestinians, "seeing it as an attempt to assert Israeli control over the long-disputed site\textsuperscript{12}," reacted predictably (Milton-Edwards & Farrell, 2010, p. 87). By the following day, Palestinians were again called on to wage civil unrest and violence against Israel (Schanzer, 2008). The Second Intifada had begun.

Authors of books on the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict, as well as Israeli officials disagree as to the spontaneity of the Second Intifada. While some subscribe to the opinion that it was a spontaneous action sparked by Sharon's walkabout, others assert that it was a planned event that was simply waiting for an excuse to happen (Milton-Edwards & Farrell, 2010, pp. 87-8; Schanzer, 2008, p. 49). Regardless, what quickly became clear and indisputable was that Arafat and the PLO/Fatah was going to use it to try and bolster their standings within the greater Palestinian community. Calls went out from PLO-controlled media to the Palestinian people to revolt against Israel in what "some called... Arafat's War" (Schanzer, 2008, p. 49). Hamas, meanwhile, garnered significant attention during the Second Intifada by continuing its leaflet campaign, as well as waging violent acts against Israeli soldiers, militia, and civilians. Being the president of

\textsuperscript{12} The site has been home to and in very close proximity to Jewish, Christian, and Muslim temples for centuries, and has been fought over as early as the Crusades and as recent as the 1967 Arab-Israeli War.
the PLO, which was now recognized as the sole voice of the Palestinian people,
Arafat was challenged by Israeli and Western officials to address the problem of
Hamas, of violent PLO-based groups, and of the Intifada, in general (Milton-
Edwards & Farrell, 2010). By the close of the Second Intifada in 2005, Yasser
Arafat and Ahmed Yassin would both be dead\textsuperscript{13}, and the PLO’s attempt to play
on both sides of the political and actual battlefield resulted in decreasing its
popularity and influence with Palestinians, while simultaneously increasing
popular support for Hamas (Milton-Edwards & Farrell, 2010).

The Palestinian Legislative Elections. The sense of growing public
support for Hamas was not lost on the organization, itself. Having boycotted the
PNA elections of 1996, Hamas made the decision to enter the political arena in
the 2005 Palestinian local elections. While missing the first round of voting in
late 2004, the Hamas-based List of Change and Reform party quickly put its
extensive socio-political network into action to gain control of “forty-eight local
244). It was quickly becoming evident that Hamas would be a political force to
be reckoned with; a point that would be made crystal clear in the PNA legislative
elections the following year. In those 2006 elections, “Hamas won seventy-four
seats in the 132-seat parliament and Fatah won just forty-five” (Milton-Edwards &
Farrell, 2010, p. 259). Furthermore, Hamas took forty-five seats in various

\textsuperscript{13} Yasser Arafat died of unknown and still disputed causes on November 11, 2004 and Ahmed
Yassin was killed by a Hellfire missile fired from an Israeli gunship on March 22, 2004.

Hamas's electoral victory should have given it control of the PNA. Outside pressures from the West, however, influenced Fatah to deny Hamas its democratic victory, including the right to name the Palestinian prime minister. Such actions served only to widen the rift between Hamas, Fatah, and the PLO, coming to a head in the 2007 Palestinian Civil War that ended with Hamas firmly entrenched and in administrative control of the Gaza Strip. Since then, Hamas and the PNA have made a number of attempts at reconciliation. And, of course, Hamas has continued its often violent struggle against Israel (Milton-Edwards & Farrell, 2010).
CHAPTER SIX
DOCUMENT ANALYSES

This chapter will provide an analysis of a variety of primary sources by Hamas in order to discover the collective action framing mechanisms and processes and recurring themes contained therein. First, the official charter of Hamas will be examined, followed by an examination of various leaflets by Hamas during the First Intifada, and finally, an examination of the political platform(s) used by the Hamas-based List of Change and Reform party of the 2005-2006 Palestinian legislative elections. By analyzing this series of documents that span a full 18 years, we can get a greater sense of the ways Hamas has used and refined its frames and framing techniques over time to suit its changing needs and appeal to its changing audience.

The Hamas Charter

The difficulties with studying movements such as Hamas are numerous. The very nature of the movement requires a liberal amount of secrecy, and creates a good deal of biases both for and against it. Examining Hamas's official charter, often referred to as The Covenant, provides such difficulties. Assumptions, biases, and contradictions abound regarding who wrote, ratified, and edited the document, and similar issues are prevalent concerning its
message and how much the organization continues to believe in and act upon that message.

There is very little about _The Covenant_ that we know with a full measure of certainty. One thing we do know is that the document was made public on August 18, 1988, approximately nine months after the beginning of the First Intifada, which introduced Hamas to the world (Tamimi, 2007, p. 147; Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Center for Special Studies, 2006, p. 2). According to Azzam Tamimi (2007), the document's author “is believed to have been Abd al-Fattah Dukham, one of the seven founders of Hamas and a long-time leader of the Palestinian _Ikhwan_,” who “often acted as second-in-command to Sheikh Ahmed Yassin” (Tamimi, 2007, p. 150). In a 2003 interview, Hamas Political Bureau Chairman, Khalid Mishal, told Tamimi (2007) that “the Charter was rushed out to what was perceived at the time to be a pressing need to introduce the newly founded movement to the public” (p. 149). Khaled Hroub (2006) makes a similar assertion, citing that the document was written “by one individual and was made public without appropriate general Hamas consultation, revision, or consensus...” (p. 33). Israeli analysts of Hamas, on the other hand, tell a much different story. The Israeli-based Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Center for Special Studies (C.S.S.) (2006) asserts that the charter “was edited and approved by Ahmad Yassin [SIC],” and “is Hamas's most important ideological document...” (p. 2). Regardless of the contradictions listed above, the Hamas charter provides a snapshot of the ideologies and
framing that appealed, and continues to appeal, to at least some of the people in the organization, as well as at least some of its prospective human resources.

**Framing Mechanisms and Processes**

The Hamas charter contains a total of seven sections, including five chapters, an introduction, and postscript, all of which encompass 120 paragraphs. More than 30 of its paragraphs are Islamic scripture in the form of Qur'anic and sunnic passages. Within its chapters, Hamas employs all forms of frame components, including Benford and Snow's diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational components, as well as Gamson's identity, injustice, and agency components.

**Frame Components.** The document employs Benford and Snow's diagnostic component and Gamson's identity and injustice components to delineate the "we" and the "they," and places blame in its framing. The charter opens with a passage from the Qur'an, with its first sentence stating that "Ye are the best of Peoples, evolved for humanity, enjoining what is right, forbidding what is wrong, and believing in Allah" (Charter, 1988, p. 122). This statement identifies Hamas as Muslims who believe they hold the moral high ground in their conflict, as shown by the portions claiming them to be "the best of Peoples" who are "enjoining what is right," and clearly delineates the "we." The following paragraph delineates the "they" by quoting Muslim Brotherhood founder Hassan al-Banna as stating "Israel will be established and will stay established until Islam nullifies it..." (Charter, 1988, p. 122). This statement not only identifies who
Hamas sees as the problem, it also uses Benford and Snow’s prognostic framing in giving the solution. The charter further shows that Hamas also considers its “we” as Palestinians, mujahids (freedom fighters) and fellow nationalists, while also regarding “they” as Jews and Zionists, as well as imperialists, the “Communist East,” and the “Capitalist” or “Crusading West,” whom it sees as supporting its enemy. One of the most thorough and complete “we” and “they” delineations of the charter (1988) states:

The Islamic Resistance Movement is a link in [a long] chain of the Jihad against the Zionist occupation, which is connected and tied with the initiation [of the Jihad] of the Martyr 'Izz al-Din al-Qassam and his Mujahid brothers in 1936. And the chain continues on to connect and tie another episode to add to the Jihad of the Palestinians and the Jihad of the Muslim Brotherhood in the war of 1948 and the Jihad operation of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1968 and thereafter (p. 124).

This statement clearly names Hamas and Muslims who have taken part in past conflicts against Zionists and Israel as “we,” while simultaneously naming “the Zionist occupation” as “they,” and recommending further jihad against it.

Table 2 shows a breakdown of the diagnostic/identity-injustice components found within the Hamas charter. While many of the references to the words listed are literal, many others are implied through context.14

14 Throughout this study of documents, multiple references of the same word within the same paragraph are counted as a single reference.
The charter blames part of the problems facing Palestinians, and the world in general, on "the lack of the Islamic Spirit [that] has brought about distorted judgment and absurd comprehension" (Charter, 1988, p. 125), and claims that the only "solution to the Palestinian Problem" is "Jihad," rather than "Peaceful Solutions' and 'International Conferences,'" which it claims are "a waste of time and a kind of child's play" (Charter, 1988, p. 126). Table 3 shows a breakdown of the agency/prognostic-motivational components found within the Hamas charter. As with the previous table, many of the references to the words listed are literal, while many others are implied through context, and multiple
references of the same word within the same paragraph are counted as a single reference.

Table 3. Agency/Prognostic-Motivational Components in the Charter

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency/Prognostic-Motivational Component</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Islam</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>13.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jihad</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4, below, shows that the Hamas charter makes extensive use of diagnostic, identity, and injustice components, and considerably less use of agency, prognostic, and motivational components.

Table 4. Comparison of Frame Components in the Charter

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Diagnostic/Identity-Injustice</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agency/Prognostic-Motivational</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: The frequency percentages are not applicable to this table because some paragraphs contain multiple components.*

There are nearly three times as many identity and injustice components as there are agency, prognostic, and motivational components. These figures highly
suggest that the primary motivation behind the content of the Hamas charter is to identify and place blame for a perceived injustice, as well as to identify against whom the perceived injustice has taken place, rather than placing an emphasis on offering solutions to the perceived problem or motivating people to do something about it.

Frame Alignment Mechanisms and Processes. The frame alignment processes used by Hamas in its charter are relatively few when compared to its use of frame components, but are not at all subtle in the instances in which they are used. For example, Hamas makes no attempt to mask its frame bridging, opting instead, to embrace the tactic. The document unapologetically states, "Nationalism, from the point of view of the Islamic Resistance Movement, is part and parcel of religious ideology" (Charter, 1988, p. 125), and "is part of its religion" (Charter, 1988, p. 126). The same can be said of its use of frame amplification, which is done primarily through the use of passages from the Qur’an and sunna. Further frame amplification takes place through the use of shared history, such as references to Saladin and the Crusades, Izz ad-Din al-Qassam’s 1930s rebellion, and the 1967 June War.

Hamas’s use of frame extension in its charter is much more rare and subtle than its use of the other frame alignment processes. Frame extension takes place in only three implied instances where the group states that other movements are seen as favorable, "even if it disagrees with them on an issue or viewpoint," provided they have "good intentions" (Charter, 1988, p. 129). Context
suggests that those movements be both Islamic and nationalist. Interestingly, the document states specifically that the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) is like a family member of Hamas, holding no ill will toward the group, but that, due to its secular ideology, Hamas cannot fully support, nor will it become part of the organization (Charter, 1988, pp. 130-131). Another noteworthy rejection of alignment is seen in the charter’s criticism of Egypt’s removal “from the circle of struggle” because of its agreement to the Camp David Accords of 1979 (Charter, 1988, p. 132). Such statements show a rejection of frame extension and transformation, applying to the group’s previously stated Islamic beliefs and its stated positions on international treaties.

Table 5. Frame Alignment Processes in the Charter

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Alignment Process</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bridging</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amplification</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>34.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extension</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transformation</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note. Frame transformation is not applicable to the charter because it is one of the first documents produced by Hamas.*

Table 5 shows the extent to which Hamas uses frame amplification as part of its alignment process. More than 34% of its paragraphs include some form of frame amplification, most of which is done using religious passages. This
extensive use of religion would potentially make the document more palatable to the Palestinian people, which, according to the Central Intelligence Agency’s World Factbook, have an 87.1% Muslim combined makeup among the West Bank\textsuperscript{15} and Gaza Strip.\textsuperscript{16} The further use of shared history, frame bridging, and frame extension would potentially appeal to all Palestinians, including the remaining 12.9% of the non-Muslim population, even if the non-Muslim portion were only be seen as potential supporters and sympathizers of the group, rather than potential members, who would obviously be exclusively Muslim.

Frame Resonance Mechanisms and Processes. Measuring and quantifying frame resonance factors is not as easy as measuring and quantifying frame components and alignment processes. One cannot simply read and analyze a document and declare with any measure of certainty how or what other people will or did think about it. Nor can the diffusion factor be accurately measured, as we simply do not know who might have told whom about it. As articulated by Hank Johnston (2005, p. 238), “Frames are mental constructs, not observable behaviors.” He goes on to mention that the problems inherent in frame analysis are operational measurement and imprecision (Johnston, 2005, p. 239), which would certainly apply to quantifying the ways people might react to


frames. Furthermore, the difficulties of measuring frame resonance are compounded by the fact that Hamas does not make public its membership numbers, nor do all of its human resources actively identify themselves as such; and that is especially true of the period of time in which the charter was produced and originally distributed. As a result, without actively polling individuals on the ways they reacted to the Hamas charter during the First Intifada, we cannot obtain a quantified measurement of that reaction, and, therefore, cannot quantify the document's resonance factors.

There are, however, some key points regarding the frame resonance of the Hamas charter that can be inferred by context, especially in the resonant factor of frame credibility. For example, as previously mentioned, the charter makes extensive use of Islamic passages from the Qur'an, giving the document a potentially greater resonant quality among fellow Muslims. Furthermore, the charter calls for social welfare that "provid[es] aid to everyone who is in need of it, be it material, or spiritual, or collective cooperation to complete some work," (Charter, 1988, p. 129) which Ahmed Yassin and the Islamic Center had been doing for years. The use of the religious passages and calls for social welfare show that Hamas was not only "practicing what it preached," but also "preaching what it practiced." As previously mentioned, this enhances both the credibility of the frame, as well as the credibility of the frame producer. The charter's use of the shared history of Palestinian suffering and invasions by outside forces tells as much about its potential appeal to popular wisdom as it does of its measurable
frame amplification. So too do its delineations of "we" and other measures of
diagnostic, identity, and injustice components tell of its relativity to real people
and the real world in which they live.

Ironically, another resonant quality of the Hamas charter, the credibility of
the frame producer, does not come from the document itself, or even from
Hamas. Rather, it comes from those who emphasize Ahmed Yassin’s potential
role in producing the document. While many in Hamas "question the idea of the
1988 document as a founding charter" and regard it as a "mistake" (Caridi, 2009,
pp. 103, 104), Israel insists it was "edited and approved" by the movement’s well-
loved, spiritual leader (Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the
Center for Special Studies, 2006, p. 2). Such a claim serves to potentially
enhance the document’s credibility with followers of Yassin.

Recurring Themes. There are multiple themes present within the Hamas
charter. Without a doubt, its primary theme is Islam. As shown in Table 6, more
than 70% of the paragraphs within the document contain some form of reference
to Muslims or Islam, with more than 25% of them being Islamic scripture. There
are, however, other overlying and underlying themes present within the
document. Drawing largely from the primary Islamic theme is the secondary
theme of obligation. The charter makes it clear in more than 10% of its
paragraphs that Muslims, Palestinians, and Arabs have an obligation to protect
the land of Palestine, which it considers an Islamic waqf (property endowment)
(Charter, 1988, p. 125), from the Zionist “invaders” (Charter, 1988, p. 133). The
charter (1998, pp. 126-7) states, "When an enemy occupies some of the Muslim lands, *Jihad* becomes obligatory for every Muslim."

Table 6. Primary Themes of the Hamas Charter

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Islam</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>70.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obligation</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loyalty</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>20.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A more underlying theme is that of loyalty. The charter lays out who does—and does not—deserve the loyalty of Muslims, Palestinians, and the Arab world. In it, Hamas declares its "loyalty to Allah" (Charter, 1988, p. 124), while stating it will give its support to other nationalist movements, provided they do not give their "loyalty to the Communist East or Crusading West" (Charter, 1988, p. 130). There are only four direct references to loyalty in the document. There are, however, other indirect and implied references. For example, the document states that Hamas “welcomes all Muslims who adopt its doctrines and ideology, enact its program, guard its secrets, and desire to join its ranks to perform the obligation and receive their reward from Allah” (Charter, 1988, p. 123). In another example, Hamas castigates Egypt for its role in the 1979 Camp David agreement, stating that the Arab state has been “removed... from the circle of struggle” in a move Hamas regards as “treason” (Charter, 1988, p. 132).
Conclusions Regarding the Charter

The particular use of framing mechanisms and processes in the Hamas charter show that the primary purpose of the document is to distinguish Hamas from its rival, the Palestinian Liberation Organization. Hamas uses identity and agency components of a frame to display its Islamic nature. It bridges Islam with nationalism and then amplifies those frames with Islamic passages and shared nationalist history, maximizing the charter's resonant factors with multiple demographics within its pool of existing and potential human resources. Its latent use of the themes of obligation and loyalty are overshadowed only by its blatant use of Islamic themes in an attempt to show that the PLO does not meet its obligations to the Palestinian cause, nor is it loyal to that cause. Such varied themes also help to maximize the resonant qualities of the document with those potential human resources that were disillusioned and dissatisfied with the practices and ideologies with the Hamas rival. The charter shows that Hamas wants to be spokesman for the "Islamic Trust" (waqf) of Palestine (Charter, 1988, p. 125), challenging the PLO for that role, which it had held virtually unchallenged since the 1974 Rabat Declaration, in which Arab leaders recognized the PLO as "the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people..." (Smith, 2010, p. 326).

Hamas's First Intifada Leaflets

Beside its official charter, Hamas produced an extensive series of leaflets
that the movement distributed to the Palestinian population throughout the entirety of the First Intifada. The complications with studying the leaflets produced by Hamas during the First Intifada are almost as numerous as those of the Hamas charter. While there have been multiple works on the movement that reference various leaflets, there are few that provide any type of analysis or information of them as a collection. Shaul Mishal and Reuben Aharoni did perhaps the most detailed analysis of collected Hamas leaflets from the First Intifada in their 1994 book, *Speaking stones: Communiques from the Intifada Underground*. Even this detailed source, however, is lacking. Mishal and Aharoni (1994, pp. 28-29) cite that Hamas put out 33 leaflets in the first year of the Intifada and 18 in the second year of the conflict. Yet, the authors do not give any indication how many leaflets were produced in the years that followed, nor do they provide a complete collection of the documents in their work.

There is also not much consensus among historians and scholars of the movement regarding the leaflets, especially when they were first published and distributed to the public. It is widely believed that Hamas introduced itself to the world in its initial leaflet. Author Zaki Chehab (2007, p. 25) claims that Hamas founder, Ahmed Yassin, has stated that the movement “issued its first statement on 14 December [1987].” Author Khaled Hroub (2006, p. 12) echoes that sentiment, writing that “Hamas came into being officially on 14 December 1987, declaring itself in an official communiqué...” Author Jonathan Schanzer (2008, p. 24) asserts that the time of the first leaflet ranges from December 14, 1987 to
February 11, 1988. Alternatively, authors Ze’ev Sciff and Ehud Ya’ari (1989, p. 222) claim that Hamas was created in February 1988, which is supported by historian Charles D. Smith (2010, p. 410). In direct contradiction to his own claim, however, Smith (2010, p. 430) dates the first Hamas leaflet as January of 1988, which is supported by Mishal and Aharoni (1994, p. 201). Compounding the issue is the fact that Hamas leaflets were not always dated, and were not sequentially numbered until leaflet number 21, which was released in May 1988 (Mishal & Aharoni, 1994, p. 28). That date and leaflet number, however, is only accurate if Mishal and Aharoni are correct in their initial dating assertions.

Regardless of when Hamas leaflets were first printed and distributed, historians generally agree that the homemade communiques were originally produced and primarily distributed in the Gaza Strip until October 1988, when leaflet number 30 was produced and also distributed in the West Bank (Schiff & Ya’ari, 1989, p. 238; Mishal & Aharoni, 1994, pp. 28, 29; Chehab, 2007, pp. 26, 28). As with the claims regarding the Hamas charter, there are assertions that all leaflet content required the approval of Hamas leader Ahmed Yassin (Schiff & Ya’ari, 1989, p. 222; Mishal & Sela, 2000, p. 55). But whenever and wherever the leaflets were produced and whoever wrote and approved them, like the Hamas charter, the leaflets provide a series of virtual snapshots that give a glimpse of the professed actions, ideologies, and framing that appealed to at least some of the existing and potential human resources of Hamas during the First Intifada.
Framing Mechanisms and Processes

Hamas's leaflets are structured much differently than its charter. The charter is made up of 120 paragraphs that cover several pages. By contrast, the individual leaflets are often only about a dozen paragraphs that cover only a couple pages. Regardless of their lack of comparable scale, however, the leaflets contain the same framing processes and mechanisms found in the much larger charter.17

Frame Components. The Hamas First Intifada leaflets contain all of the components of a frame, including delineations of "we" and "they", as well as diagnostic and agency components that diagnose a perceived problem and propose an action to correct it. As with the Hamas charter, the Hamas leaflets commonly define "we" as Palestinians, Muslims, and mujahids. Unlike the charter, however, the leaflets add a new element to their "we" delineation in the form of "murabitun". As translated by Mishal and Aharoni (1994, p. 201), the term is defined as “Muslims who settled in outlying areas during the initial period of the Muslim conquests in order to defend the borders.” In the context in which it routinely used, beginning with Leaflet No. 1,18 the term implies that modern Palestinians are also defending the borders of Islam from its enemies, as well as

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17 Due to the lack of access to many of Hamas's leaflets from the First Intifada, accurate quantification of their framing mechanisms and processes is neither possible, nor would it be meaningful for the purposes of this research. They have been, therefore, only subject to qualified analysis.

18 As numerically marked by Mishal and Aharoni.
making them a part of Hamas's expansion of Islamic territory. Such a term and definition would not likely be lost on the Arabic-speaking Muslims of the region, and would serve as a resonant quality of shared understanding and history.

The leaflets, like the charter, also commonly define “they” as Jews, Israel, and Zionists, as well as others that include the PLO and Fatah, the United States and the West, and Arab states and leaders. The leaflets, however, place a greater emphasis than the charter when identifying particular “they” categories and use much greater emotive and resonant rhetoric than that of the charter. In a prime example of diagnostic framing, Leaflet No. 4 (Mishal & Aharoni, 1994, p. 208) states:

An army equipped from head to foot is fighting our weaponless people. Tanks, armored vehicles, and airplanes pursue the inhabitants. Ingenious toxic bombs are hurled at our masses, sometimes from airplanes and sometimes by soldiers. Curfew is imposed on towns, villages, and camps; houses are broken into by day and by night, and all the furniture smashed; women are intimidated and children are terrorized; they are pursued, arrested, and tortured.... The plunderer has revealed his malice and unmasked his true face, wielding his iron fist to impose a death sentence on the liberty and honor of our people.

This statement articulates some of the real world problems experienced by many Palestinians during the First Intifada. The leaflet goes on to name who is responsible for such reprehensible acts. It states, “These criminal methods are
clear proof of the Jews’ hatred and despotism” (Mishal & Aharoni, 1994, p. 209). Hamas then instructs people to “fortify” their homes, to “organize guards”, and to “equip [themselves] with stones, sticks, axes, and knives”, as well as to be aware of “suspicious” leaflets from Hamas rivals “express[ing] fear at the rising power of religious reactionaries” and “calling for a halt to the uprising” (Mishal & Aharoni, 1994, pp. 209-210). Other leaflets make even greater admonition against Hamas rivals. For example, in an April 1990 “Special Leaflet” that informs Palestinians of the injustices placed upon imprisoned Hamas members by the rival Fatah faction. The leaflet claims that Fatah members have shown “contempt for the sanctity of Islam”, have perpetrated acts of violence against Hamas members, and have even denied the existence of Hamas. The leaflet compares Fatah members to other “enemies of Islam”, presumably Zionists (Mishal & Aharoni, 1994, pp. 274-277). It goes on to call for “a stop to this distress” and advises unity among all Palestinians (Mishal & Aharoni, 1994, p. 277).

The call for unity against Israel is also placed upon the people of Egypt and other Arab states. For example, the second paragraph of Leaflet No. 1 (Mishal & Aharoni, 1994, pp. 201-202) asks:

What has happened to you, O rulers of Egypt? Were you asleep in the period of the treaty of shame and surrender, the Camp David treaty? Has your national zealousness died and your pride run out while the Jews daily perpetrate grave and base crimes against the people and the children? And you, O army of Egypt, O descendants of Salah al-Din al-Ayyubi...,
what has happened? Have the rulers paralyzed your movement and stripped you of your power, making you so impotent that even the usurpers are no longer frightened of you?

The context of this statement shows that Hamas regards the rulers and military of Egypt as a part of “they” to whom Hamas is opposed. The leaflet goes on to state that the "Muslim Palestinian people rejects the surrender solutions" and "accuses all who seek this [solution] of weaving a plot against its rights and its sacred national cause" (Mishal & Aharoni, 1994, p. 202).

Hamas’s leaflets from the First Intifada also employ extensive agency components. As with the charter, the primary form of agency called for by Hamas is jihad and a return to Islam. In Leaflet No. 1 (Mishal & Aharoni, 1994, pp. 201-202), the movement states, “Only Islam can break the Jews and destroy their dream," and that “Liberation will not be complete without sacrifice, blood, and jihad that continues until victory.” This sentiment is repeated often in Hamas’s leaflet rhetoric. Hamas also routinely calls for civil disobedience in the form of strikes against Israeli employers, boycotts against Israeli businesses, and protests against Israeli occupation and aggression. Such calls often coincide with important dates, such as the start of Ramadan or historic battles. For example, the “action plans” in Leaflet No. 39 (Mishal & Aharoni, 1994, p. 260) call for, among other things:

1. To designate the first day of Ramadan as a day of escalation and confrontation marking the onset of the month of conquests and
victories.

2. A general strike on Saturday, April 8, 1989—marking the day on which the mujahid ‘Abd al-Qadir al-Husseini and his comrades fell in the Battle of the Qastel.

3. A general strike on Sunday, April 9, 1989—marking the advent of the 5th month in the second year of the blessed uprising. The uprising should be escalated to commemorate the massacre at Deir Yassin by the Jewish terrorists.

4. Wednesday, April 12, 1989—A day for calling out “Allah akbar” and reading the Qur’an aloud from the mosques and the roofs of houses to mark the opening of fire at the worshippers in al-Aqsa mosque in 1982.

Dates and events such as these remain important to the shared history and culture of Muslims and the Palestinian people, who would be well aware of their significance.

Another form of agency called for in the Hamas leaflets is education. Multiple leaflets make reference to educating not only the youth of Palestine, but also its general population. For example, Leaflet No. 8 (Mishal & Aharoni, 1994, p. 220) reminds Palestinians, “Everyone must know that activity against the occupation does not conflict with education but is parallel to it. We must be armed with education.” Leaflet No. 45 (Mishal & Aharoni, 1994, pp. 262-264) goes even further, with the entire pamphlet being devoted to education, referring to pupils as “the beacons of knowledge, the way of integrity and light, [and] the
hopes of this nation...” It calls on Palestinians to ignore the Israeli closure of schools and instructs “all the students and teachers to go to schools this Saturday, July 22, 1989, and to conduct regular classes out of concern for the well-being of the educational process” (Mishal & Aharoni, 1994, pp. 263-264).

Frame Alignment Mechanisms and Processes. Like the Hamas charter, its leaflets from the First Intifada make overt and extensive use of the frame alignment process of amplification, while largely ignoring other alignment processes, such as bridging, extension, and transformation. The primary frame amplification techniques employed by Hamas are the use of Islamic and historic references. The movement begins almost all of its leaflets with the phrase “In the name of Allah the merciful and compassionate,” which is then followed by a passage from the Qur’an that relates to the message being put forth in that particular pamphlet (Mishal & Aharoni, 1994). Passages from the Qur’an and sunna are also placed throughout the documents. In addition, many of the leaflets are dated with both the Muslim and traditional Western calendar systems.

Hamas leaflets also draw upon shared history as part of their frame amplification processes. In them, Palestinians are reminded of historic people and events that range from the time of Muhammad to the present day. Leaflets regularly refer to Palestinians as descendants of such people as Abu ‘Ubayda, Ma’ad Bin Jabal, and Khalid Ibn al-Walid, referring to 7th century figures important to the Islamic faith (Mishal & Aḥaroni, 1994, pp. 208, 212). More
recent references include the 1917 Balfour Declaration, the 1948 formation of the State of Israel, and the 1967 Six Day/June War.

**Frame Resonance Mechanisms and Processes.** The same problems with measuring the frame resonance factors in the Hamas charter are present when attempting to measure the resonance factors in the Hamas leaflets. While we can assume, based on the fact that Hamas managed to survive and grow as an organization during the time of the First Intifada, without having access to the actual readers of the documents, we cannot know with any amount of certainty how everyone reacted to them. Similarly, while we can assume, by the nature of the documents, themselves, as well as the method of distribution, that diffusion of the leaflets was greater than that of the charter. Without having the actual numbers of how many leaflets were produced and distributed, however, assumption is all that we can do.

But, like the charter, there are certain points regarding the resonance of the documents that can be pointed out. The extensive use of Islamic passages would certainly make the documents more resonant with Palestinian Muslims; especially when compared to the secular nature of Hamas's primary rival, Fatah. Equally important, the Islamic passages combined with the calls to return to Islam show that Hamas is willing to practice what it preaches, strengthening the credibility of the frame and the frame producers. Furthermore, Hamas's graphic rhetoric regarding the actions of Israel increase the relativity of the documents to the real world that Palestinians were facing at the time. Finally, the assertion that
Ahmed Yassin had a hand in producing, editing, and approving leaflet content strengthens the resonance factor of the leaflets with the followers of the group's spiritual leader.

Recurring Themes. There are two primary themes that are repeated throughout Hamas’s First Intifada leaflets: Islam and resistance. As previously mentioned, the leaflets are introduced with Islamic references to Allah and are laced with repeated passages from the Qur'an and include the Islamic calendar in its dating. Equally obvious are the numerous calls for resistance against Israeli occupation and Western influence. Leaflets regularly encourage Palestinians to “escalate [the struggle] from day to day” and to “let the uprising continue” (Mishal & Aharoni, 1994, pp. 207, 223). While the term jihad is used in multiple leaflets, the idea of multi-faceted resistance has taken its place as a recurring theme, in order to, perhaps, be more palatable to a greater pool of potential human resources, some of which may not be Muslim or may not be attracted to calls for outright violence.

A more underlying theme in the Hamas leaflets is that of unity; unity among Palestinians, in general, as well as unity among the numerous Palestinian factions. Regarding the former, for example, Leaflet No. 8 makes multiple overt calls for Palestinian unity, as well as some that are less obvious. The pamphlet calls for “compassion... between people, between neighbors, rich and poor, buyer and seller...” and asks that “leasers... release tenants from their burden [of paying rent] to the extent possible” while also encouraging tenants to “not delay a
payment due to the owners..." (Mishal & Aharoni, 1994, pp. 216-220). Of course, Hamas's idea of unity regarding the latter equates to other factions, namely Fatah, unifying with Hamas's ideas, rather than Hamas meeting the ideas of others, or even meeting them half way. Regarding both the Palestinian and Arab people, Leaflet No. 8 (Mishal & Aharoni, 1994, p. 218) asks "when did it have unity without Islam?"

Conclusions Regarding the Leaflets

The use of framing mechanisms and processes in Hamas's First Intifada leaflets shows a greater interest on agency than on defining Hamas or its rivals. While there is certainly no shortage of identity and diagnostic components, agency and motivational components are much more obvious and prevalent. The extensive use of Islam as an amplification mechanism and overt theme aligns the frames to existing and potential Muslim human resources, while the themes of resistance and unity serve to try and draw in the remaining pool of potential human resources. The leaflets show that Hamas wants to be the unofficial leader of the uprising, issuing warnings for Palestinians not to be drawn in by rival leaflets or alternative protest dates, as well as directly admonishing such rivals as Fatah and Arab leaders who might try and sway influence over human resources away from Hamas.

The Hamas Election Manifesto

The election manifesto for the Hamas-based List of Change and Reform
party that was introduced as part of the 2006 Palestinian legislative elections show a stark contrast to its documents produced during the First Intifada more than 15 years before. Analysis of the 2006 election manifesto put out by Hamas for the Palestinian elections that year do not pose the same problems as those of the previous documents analyzed in this research. For example, there are no contradictory claims of authorship or importance of the document, as it is believed that it was written with considerable forethought and internal discussion by Hamas leadership, rather than claims of micromanagement from a single and often controversial individual (Caridi, 2009, p. 107). That does not, however, mean that there are not some of the same inconsistencies in our knowledge of the document. One such inconsistency is the date in which it was first delivered to the public. Schanzer (2008, p. 96) asserts that the election manifesto was dated January 25, 2006, which seems unlikely considering that is the date of the election. Alternatively, the British Broadcasting Corporation reported on the publication of the document on January 12, 2006.¹⁹ Most other authors, wisely, do not attempt to date the document or discuss its creators.

The most important features of the 2006 election manifesto, however, are not when it was published and distributed, but the reaction people had to it once it was. Like the charter and First Intifada leaflets, the election platform of Hamas provides a snapshot of the movement's professed ideologies and use of framing

at that time. Perhaps even more importantly, unlike the charter and leaflets, the results of the 2006 election provide a reasonably measurable assessment of the document’s resonance among the movement’s existing and potential human resources.

Framing Mechanisms and Processes

The 2006 election manifesto of Hamas is made up of eighteen sections, plus an introduction and conclusions, with a total of 220 paragraphs. Like the Hamas charter and First Intifada leaflets, the election manifesto contains all of the various components of a frame. Unlike those previous documents, which focus primarily on frame amplification, it also contains a wide variety of frame alignment strategies, including frame bridging, frame extension, and frame transformation.

Frame Components. Hamas’s 2006 election manifesto immediately introduces the organization’s “we” delineations and agency components. In fact, the name of the Hamas political party, alone—List of Change and Reform—bears a great deal of the movement’s proposed agency. Its first paragraph is a passage from the Qur’an that states, “...my success [in my task] can only come from Allah...” (Tamimi, 2007, p. 292). This agency component is followed in the second paragraph by declarations that Hamas believes it is its “responsibility” and “duty” to “reform the Palestinian reality... from the ills of corruption... in the hope of reinforcing national unity...” (Tamimi, 2007, p. 292). These statements show that Hamas is still committed to its previously-stated positions that Islam
and unity are significant parts of its agency, and that it represents the interests of the Palestinian people. The document, however, does introduce some new identity components that are not as broadly articulated in its charter or leaflets: citizens, corruption, and occupation, as well as a new agency component: politics.

Table 7. Diagnostic-Injustice Components in the Election Manifesto

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Diagnostic/Identity-Injustice Component</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>24.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mujahid</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizens</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zionists</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7 shows the frequency of the document's individual and collective diagnostic and identity components in relation to those of previously analyzed documents. Nearly 40% of the document's 220 paragraphs contain some form of
"we" delineation, which is a relatively close comparison to the 46.7% found in the charter. While the Hamas charter focused, largely, on defining "we" as "Muslim", with the "Palestinian" delineation being secondary, the Hamas election manifesto reverses that trend, making "Palestinian" the primary "we" delineation and "Muslim" being secondary. Furthermore, the prior "we" delineation of "mujahid" does not appear at all in the document, seemingly being replaced by the more generic delineation of "citizen".

Another striking contrast from previous documents is the definition of "they", which made up over 25% of the charter. By contrast, delineations of "they" make up less than 14% of the election manifesto, with the terms "Zionist" and "Israel" being sparsely used, and "Jews" not appearing anywhere in the document. These "they" identity components have been largely replaced by the injustice components "corruption" and "occupation," removing the idea of who is causing the perceived problems, and replacing it with the definition of the perceived problem.

These same trends carry over into the document's use of agency and motivational frame components, which are present in nearly every paragraph. Table 8 shows the frequency of the document's primary agency components, which are "reform" and "resistance and liberation", as well as some mentioned in the charter and First Intifada leaflets. Only 25% of the charter's paragraphs contain an agency or motivational frame component. Further contrasts between
the Hamas charter and its election manifesto abound. For example, while the
document leads with a reference to an Islamic agency component, Islam is not
the primary form of agency listed throughout the document.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency/Prognostic-Motivational Component</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Islam</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jihad</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reform</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>12.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unity</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resistance/Liberation</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Similarly, the once-used agency component of *jihad* is sparsely used in the
election manifesto. This does not, however, suggest that Hamas has entirely
changed its position regarding its style of resistance. As part of its stated
"essential principles", the movement still reserves the "right... to end the
occupation by using all available means, including armed resistance" (Tamimi,
2007, pp. 293-294). This change suggests that Hamas recognized the violent
and solely Islamic nature of the term "jihad" and wanted to replace it with a more
all-encompassing idea that might appeal to a greater number of prospective
human resources, which could include non-Muslims interested in taking part in
armed resistance, as well as Muslims and non-Muslims interested in more peaceful means of resistance. Similarly, the move from Islam as its primary agency component to a wider variety of agency components suggests that Hamas is aware that Islam, alone, cannot solve all of the perceived problems facing the Palestinian people, and that, as a political party, it must have a more all-encompassing platform to address those particular issues in order to attract potential human resources to whom those issues are important.

Frame Alignment Mechanisms and Processes. The 2006 election manifesto employs all four frame alignment processes, as shown in Table 9.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Alignment Process</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bridging</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amplification</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extension</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transformation</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Like the Hamas charter and First Intifada leaflets, it contains a liberal amount of frame amplification. The document, as with the others, amplifies many of its frames with the use of passages from the Qur'an and other Islamic texts. Its other frame amplification techniques, however, are much more subtle, using specific wording to potentially heighten the emotional response of the reader and
to try to appeal to as many viewers as possible—including those outside of its electorate.\footnote{It must be noted that it is possible that some of the subtle frame amplification in the document could be the result of wording used in its translation, rather than by original intent by Hamas.} For example, one passage in the document calls for the party to “immunize” the youth of Palestine “against corruption,” as if the vice is an infectious virus for which Hamas is the cure (Tamimi, 2007, p. 308). Other sections of the manifesto call for “separation among the three powers: the legislative, the executive, and the judiciary” (Tamimi, 2007, p. 299), and also makes reference to “inalienable rights” of Palestinians that “are fixed and cannot be compromised by any political concessions” (Tamimi, 2007, p. 294). Being so closely related to specific wording in such American documents as the constitution and Declaration of Independence, such wording in the Hamas document suggests the possibility that it is trying to appeal to American and Western sensibilities and extend its pool of potential human resources to a greater international level.

Unlike prior Hamas documents, its election manifesto also contains generous quantities of frame bridging, frame extension, and frame transformation. For example, its frame bridging techniques include the bridging of such ideas as “Divine religions and international law” (Tamimi, 2007, p. 297), “individual and community rights” (Tamimi, 2007, p. 301), and “the social and political stability of both the family and society” (Tamimi, 2007, p. 303). The election manifesto also shows the extension of the movement’s previously-stated
Islamocentric policies that were once only extended to others that resided “in the shadow of Islam” (Charter, 1988, p. 124). For example, the document makes a point to call for “preserving Palestinian Islamic and Christian endowment properties,” as well as the call to “Form a national parliamentary committee to inspect the dispensing of Palestinian endowment funds, both Islamic and Christian…” (Tamimi, 2007, pp. 296, 298). While such extension processes can be risky, they are an obvious attempt by Hamas to try and maximize its frame resonance with the greatest amount of people. This point suggests that Hamas’s attempt to succeed in the formal democratic political process takes precedence over ideas of hardline message discipline.

The final and potentially most influential frame alignment process in the 2006 election manifesto is that of frame transformation, most of which take the form of references to participation in the formal political process. The fact that Hamas had never before taken part in formal elections makes the very existence of its 2006 manifesto a transformative document, as a whole. Hamas, in seemingly full realization of that fact, is quick to try and lessen true believer criticism of its frame transformation by mentioning in the document’s introduction that the movement sees its participation in the election as falling “within the framework of the comprehensive program for the liberation of Palestine,” and points out, in the document’s conclusion, that it is taking part in the election because “The blessed al-Aqsa Intifada has created new facts on the ground that have rendered the Oslo program a thing of the past” (Tamimi, 2007, pp. 292;
315). Statements such as these allow Hamas to transform its frames, while attempting to not have a negative effect on the credibility of the frame or frame makers.

Frame Resonance Mechanisms and Processes. Unlike those of the Hamas charter and First *Intifada* leaflets, the frame resonance factors of its 2006 election manifesto are somewhat easier to quantify. Records\textsuperscript{21} show that Hamas’s List of Change and Reform party received a total of 440,409 votes, or 44.45% of the total 1,042,424 electorates that participated in the 2006 Palestinian legislative elections ("The final results for the electoral lists", 2006). Due to the fact that not all Palestinians were permitted or chose to take part in the election process, these figures in no way reflect the total number of people with whom the election manifesto resonated. Nor do they begin to shed light on its resonance with those outside the region who were ineligible to vote. They do, however, offer a quantified minimum figure for the document’s frame resonance. Simply stated, Hamas’s 2006 election manifesto, either in part or in its entirety, resonated with at least 440,409 people.

\textsuperscript{21} While continuing to offer such information for other elections, both before and since 2006, the Palestinian Authority no longer offers English translations of statistical information regarding the 2006 legislative elections on its official elections website. Such information can still be found through Internet page archive services, although that is subject to change at any time without notice and at the discretion of the archiving service. See http://web.archive.org/web/20081029054121/http://www.elections.ps/pdf/Final_Results_PLC_Summary_Lists_Seats_2_En.pdf
The factors that went into such resonance are relatively few, yet obviously very powerful. First, the 2004 death of long-time spiritual and charismatic leader, Ahmed Yassin does not appear to have decreased the credibility of Hamas among the Palestinian Muslim population. Although relatively sparse, the document’s multiple references to Islam and Islamic principles, combined with Hamas’s reputation as an Islamic organization increase the credibility of the frame and the frame producers, and, as such, increases the resonance of the manifesto with existing and potential Muslim human resources.

Next, the document’s identity and agency components make it relative to the real people living in Palestine, as well as the real world in which they live. Hamas’s List of Change and Reform, as its name suggests, ran on a platform against the perceived corruption that was ripe within the Palestinian Authority. A January 2006 Gallup poll of 1,000 Palestinians found that 79% of those polled believed that “widespread corruption” was present in the Palestinian government.22 Similar findings were reflected in a February 2006 poll by the Jerusalem Media & Communication Center, which found that 72% of those polled said “that they consider the performance of the previous Palestinian Legislative Council ‘bad’ or ‘very bad.’”23 Concluding whether or not such levels of


corruption were indeed present in that body is not within the scope of this research. Nevertheless, the above statistics show that many Palestinians believed that it was, and popular belief does not have to be accurate in order to be popular.

Finally, the level of diffusion enjoyed by the document must have surely attributed to its resonance with existing and potential human resources. While we can assume that prior forms of diffusion, such as that of pamphlet distribution and word-of-mouth, were in action with the diffusion of the election manifesto, we can also assume there were other, more wide-reaching mediums that were involved. Unlike the years during the First Intifada (1988-1993), Hamas was not limited to such basic forms of diffusion in 2006, when it had a well-established media wing that had multiple newspaper outlets and Internet websites by which to convey its message to existing and potential human resources.

Recurring Themes. As with the Hamas charter and leaflets, there are multiple themes within the 2006 election manifesto, as shown in Table 10.

Table 10. Primary Themes of the Election Manifesto

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reform</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Unity</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>14.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Populism</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>25.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Naturally, with the party name “List of Change and Reform,” one of the document’s primary themes is reform. While the idea of change is certainly widespread throughout the document, specific and implied references to reform are made more obvious, making up nearly 10% of the document’s paragraphs, and, as such, have more of a thematic presence than that of the more general idea of change.

Another of the document’s primary themes is that of national unity. A full 14% of the manifesto’s paragraphs contain some form of overt or implied reference to national unity. The opening paragraph of its introductory section declares that Hamas believes it is its “responsibility” and “duty” to “reinforc[e] national unity and bolster internal Palestinian ranks…” (Tamimi, 2007, p. 292). Such sentiment is repeated throughout the document with specific references to national unity, as well as references to “the establishment of the Palestinian independent state” (Tamimi, 2007, p. 292) and citizenship.

A less obvious, yet more prevalent theme is that of populism. The term is not found in any part of the manifesto, but is implied in more than 25% of its paragraphs. According to Robert S. Jansen (2011), the term traditionally “appli[es] to any person, movement, or regime that makes claims by appealing to ordinary (i.e., non-elite) people,” while “imply[ing] that the accused is corrupt, undemocratic, or cynically opportunistic” (pp. 76-77). Jansen (2011) goes on to allege that the term is too generalized, asserting, rather, that the idea of populist mobilization “combin[es] popular mobilization with populist rhetoric,” and is a
more “a flexible way of animating political support,” defining it as “any sustained, large-scale political project that mobilizes ordinarily marginalized social sectors into publicly visible and contentious political action, while articulating an anti-elite, nationalist rhetoric that valorizes ordinary people” (p. 82). Regardless of which definition of the term is applied, it is undeniable that Hamas’s election manifesto meets either the traditional definition of populism or Jansen’s idea of populist mobilization.

Conclusions Regarding the Election Manifesto

The use of framing mechanisms and processes in Hamas’s 2006 election manifesto show that the organization continues to be more interested in defining itself and its potential human resources that it is in defining its opposition, while also showing an interest in altering those definitions from their previously specific nature to more general, all-encompassing categories. Similarly, its agency components have taken on a more generalized and more peaceful nature, rather than focusing largely on direct and often violent conflict. Finally, its frame alignment processes have been changed from near-solely amplification to include bridging, extension, and transformation, displaying a more pragmatic and inclusive resonance strategy. Such resonance is further amplified by its overarching themes of reform, unity, and populism. When taken together, these points show the extent to which Hamas is willing to go in order to be successful in the formal political process and potentially take control of the Palestinian Authority from its rival, Fatah.
Conclusion

The Hamas charter, its First Intifada leaflets, and its 2006 election manifesto all contain the various forms of collective action framing mechanisms and processes. All make use of identity and agency components, as well as multiple frame alignment strategies that help to increase their overall frame resonance. And their use of varying themes shows a willingness to alter its message over time in order to appeal to a changing audience and maximize its appeal to potential human resources.
CHAPTER SEVEN
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

Detailed analysis of Hamas’s primary source documents show that the socio-political movement employs a wide variety of collective action framing mechanisms and processes in order to attract and maintain its human resources. Identity frame components help Hamas label itself and its enemies, as well as classify perceived injustices against the Palestinian people. Meanwhile, agency frame components motivate its human resources in what actions to take to correct the perceived injustices inflicted by perceived enemies. At the same time, frame alignment mechanisms and processes help Hamas to make its message to the masses more meaningful to more people, while frame resonance mechanisms and processes serve to give those messages greater credibility and significance within the movement’s target audience.

First Intifada Documents

The Hamas documents from the First Intifada, its official charter and series of leaflets, ultimately served to accent each other as counterbalancing and reinforcing frames. While the charter largely served its purpose as a document to give an identity to Hamas, its human resources, and its enemies and rivals, the leaflets succeeded in emphasizing those identities, and in motivating its human resources and directing them in ways to respond to those identities. Both also
employed similar alignment and resonance mechanisms and processes. As such, they warrant a final analysis that reflects their connectivity.

The 1988 Hamas charter and its First Intifada leaflets sets the tone of the movement’s framing mechanisms and processes for more than a decade after their release to the Palestinian public. As a new entity in the longstanding Arab- and Palestinian-Israeli conflict, Hamas needed to strongly establish with its target audience who it was and was not, its enemies and the injustices brought on by those enemies, and what Hamas intended to do in order to address those injustices. Hamas successfully addressed those needs through the extensive use of identity and agency frame components, frame alignment and resonance mechanisms and processes, and encapsulating themes that ultimately propelled Hamas into a leadership role during the Palestinian uprising.

Identity and Agency Frame Components

As a matter of necessity, Hamas needed to distinguish itself from its enemies and rivals and inform the Palestinian people that it was Muslim, Palestinian, and a resistance movement. In addition to its highly descriptive name, Islamic Resistance Movement, Hamas used its First Intifada documents to accomplish its identity goals through multiple references to Islam and Palestine, and by referring to itself and its human resources as mujahids (freedom fighters) in its charter and murabitun (defenders of the Islamic frontier) in its leaflets. At the same time, Hamas identified its enemies as Israel, Zionists, and Jews, while simultaneously implying that its rivals were secular entities, specifically the PLO.
and Fatah, which had turned their backs on Islam and the Palestinian cause, as well as the neighboring Arabs who had made peace with its enemy and the West that supported it. By identifying itself as Muslims loyal to the Palestinian cause, Hamas was able to enfranchise any Muslims who may have felt marginalized or dissatisfied by the PLO's secular nature and potentially tip the scale of influence over Palestinians to its favor. Such overt and implied terms not only informed potential human resources who Hamas was, but also who it was not; an important first step in the identity creation of the new movement and its appeal to prospective human resources.

The agency components employed in Hamas's First Intifada documents lacked the subtlety often used in their use of identity components. The Islamic movement made it clear, following the ideologies of al-Banna and Qutb, that it believed that the root of all problems facing the Middle East in general, and the Palestinian people specifically, was that their leaders had turned their backs on Islam. As such, Hamas called for the Palestinian people to reject their secular representatives, the PLO, and to return to a life guided by Islamic principles as Hamas alleged to represent them. Hamas also overtly and unapologetically called upon Palestinians to wage jihad (religious struggle) against its Zionist enemies. Such a struggle certainly included violence, but also included such acts as regularly declaring the greatness of God (Allahu akbar) as a statement of defiance against Israel. Such religiously based forms of agency were not only
attacks against the Israeli enemy of Hamas, they were also attacks against its secular rival.

However, Hamas did not rely upon religion, alone, in its agency rhetoric and motivation of its human resources. The movement also routinely called for the education of the Palestinian population on such issues as Islam and the ills of the Palestinian people at the hands of Israel and the western nations that support it, as well as strikes and boycotts against Israeli businesses, and protests over Israeli occupation and aggression. Strikes, boycotts and acts of civil disobedience were often timed to coincide with important Muslim and Palestinian dates and holidays, and were routinely called for on dates that contradicted the same actions recommended by the PLO-based Fatah. Such contradictions underscored the conflict over influence and leadership of Palestinian human resources between Hamas and Fatah during the First Intifada as much as they highlighted the inherent struggle between Hamas and Israel.

The identity and agency components used in Hamas’s First Intifada documents show that Hamas was just as interested in targeting the PLO with its rhetoric as it was in targeting Israel. While there were certainly extensive rhetorical attacks against Israel in both the charter and leaflets, such attacks were overt and straightforward. By contrast, the attacks against its secular rivals were explicit, as well as subtle and implied. By widening its scope of enemies to include Israel and the PLO and Fatah, Hamas was able to appeal to a greater number of people—those who were opposed to Israel and those who were
dissatisfied with the PLO. Such appeal helped to not only build up Hamas's base of influence and pool of human resources; it also decreased the influence and human resources of its rival. In time, both factors became more and more important to the long-term viability of Hamas.

Frame Alignment Mechanisms and Processes

While the frame components in Hamas's First Intifada documents were often subtle, its use of frame alignment mechanisms and processes in those documents were anything but. Being a new movement, Hamas had not put out much material or issued many statements before releasing its First Intifada documents, so frame transformation was not a factor in those documents. However, Hamas did employ sparse, yet obvious frame bridging mechanisms, linking the ideologies of Palestinian nationalism and Islamism, especially in its charter. Similarly, its sparing use of frame extension is quite overt, with explicit statements of nationalist support in its charter for the PLO, provided the secular movement fell in line with the Islamic principles espoused by Hamas. At the same time, in a non-extension mechanism worth noting, Hamas used its leaflets to speak out against the PLO-based Fatah, who it claimed was mistreating Hamas members while both factions were imprisoned with each other.

Yet, these few instances of frame bridging and extension mechanisms paled in comparison to Hamas's extensive use of frame amplification mechanisms in its First Intifada documents. In both its charter and leaflets, Hamas amplified its frames with references to Islam, passages from the Qur'an,
and historic events important to Muslims, as well as Palestinians, in general. Many of its First intifada documents, including the charter, begin with the declaration that the messages contained therein were issued in the name of Allah, and many of the Hamas leaflets from the period were dated with the traditional western and Islamic calendar systems. By amplifying its frames with such elements, Hamas was attempting to connect itself, not only with the rich history of Islam, but also with the vast history of the Palestinian people. Hamas even went so far as to claim outright, in its charter (1988, p. 124), that it was "a link in [a long] chain" of history going back to the 1936 conflict between Izz al-Din al-Qassam and the British and Zionists that occupied Palestine at the time. Such a connection to religion and history amplified Hamas's message to its target audience, and made that message, which may have gone against the values of some Palestinians, more palatable, resulting in a greater pool of prospective human resources.

Frame Resonance Mechanisms and Processes

The primary frame resonance mechanisms employed Hamas's First intifada documents were its uses of religion, popular wisdom, and credibility. The documents strategically reminded Palestinians of the centuries of invasions and injustice they had suffered at the hands of Israel and the West, a history of which many Palestinians still speak and recount vividly and emotionally over servings of tea and puffs of tobacco. This use of shared history and popular wisdom by Hamas told Palestinians that Hamas understood their problems, and, as such,
knew what it took to solve them. It also displayed a substantial and conscious effort to get the First Intifada documents to resonate with the Muslim majority of Palestine. Such efforts certainly served a twofold purpose to both attract human resources to the Hamas brand, as well as siphon human resources from its secular rival, Fatah.

Other resonating mechanisms present in the First Intifada documents were those of relativity and credibility. Hamas was the beneficiary of credibility through its connection to the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) and Hamas's founder, Ahmed Yassin. Both the MB and Yassin were known for their social works, which Hamas had also called for in its documents from the First Intifada. Such connectivity and motivations showed that Hamas was practicing what it was preaching, and that the movement understood that Palestinians needed help with their real world problems. The internal and external claims that Yassin edited and approved the documents would have only served to enhance their credibility with those within the Palestinian community who appreciated the works of the Hamas spiritual, charismatic leader.

Recurring Themes

There were a variety of primary themes used by Hamas to encapsulate the framing mechanisms and processes the movement employed in its First Intifada documents. The Hamas charter and leaflets both had ample uses of Islam as their primary theme. The documents used Islamic passages, histories, and ideologies to give identity to the movement and to motivate the Muslim
majority of Palestine. By centering its messages on the theme of Islam, Hamas was able to get the attention of a target audience that may have felt overlooked and marginalized by the secular identity of the PLO and Fatah.

While Hamas’s First Intifada documents shared the theme of Islam, they also employed specific themes not shared. In addition to the primary theme of Islam, the Hamas charter had secondary themes of obligation and loyalty; each of which were framed as a part the overarching theme of Islam, as well as being individual themes. Hamas framed its theme of obligation around the idea that Palestine was an Islamic waqf (land gift) and, as such, modern Palestinians were obligated to defend it with acts of jihad, just as it had been defended by the murabitun and mujahids that came before them. Those within the Islamic community that were not already attracted to the Islamic themes within the document were faced with the claim that they were not meeting their religious obligations. Such a claim would have certainly been a powerful motivator for potential human resources to join the Hamas cause.

If the question of religious obligation was not enough to encourage Palestinians to take up the cause for Hamas, the charter also put their loyalty to Palestine into question. The theme of loyalty within the charter has two facets: those who should be loyal and those who deserve loyalty. Hamas explained that Palestinians needed to be loyal to those who were loyal to them. Such a directive was meant to work for Hamas and against fellow Arabs in Egypt, who were seen as disloyal for the peace treaty with Israel, as well as secular
movements that rivaled Hamas. Loyalty was also expected from fellow Muslims who may have previously given their loyalty to the PLO due to the lack of viable alternative movements.

The Hamas leaflets from the First Intifada shared the charter’s use of Islamic themes. In addition to the primary theme of Islam, the leaflets also employed a secondary theme of resistance. As in the Hamas charter, its leaflets certainly called upon Palestinians to engage in jihad against their enemies. However, the resistance called for in the leaflets went further than the generalized connotations of violence often associated with the term jihad. Leaflets also encouraged Palestinians to engage in non-violent forms of resistance and civil disobedience, such as labor strikes, boycotts, and protests against Israel. The inclusion of non-violent resistance ideas with those of jihad already present meant that anyone could be involved in resistance against Israel. Those who sought aggressive and violent forms of resistance were certainly not discouraged. At the same time, those who may have been disinterested in such forms of resistance were given an alternative deemed acceptable to Hamas. This all-encompassing theme of resistance made a place for anyone who sought to confront Israel, maximizing the potential appeal of Hamas to prospective human resources.

The other secondary theme employed by Hamas in its First Intifada leaflet campaign was unity. Palestinians were urged to show their unity by helping each other through the trying times of the First Intifada. At the same time, Hamas
encouraged the various Palestinian factions, including its rivals in the PLO and Fatah, to unify their efforts against their common enemy, rather than against each other. Of course, as far as Hamas was concerned, unity among Palestinian factions meant that it was up to others to meet the standards of unity set by Hamas, as opposed to Hamas altering its standards and unifying with others. The theme of unity worked well in conjunction with the charter’s theme of loyalty, and potentially worked against those who disavowed the idea or practice of working with Hamas. As such, it would have displayed the notion that those unwilling to come to or work with Hamas were more interested in personal motivations, rather than in the greater Palestinian effort, and would have been a powerful appeal to potential human resources.

**Conclusions on the First *Intifada* Documents**

The framing mechanisms and processes of Hamas’s First *Intifada* documents display a significant effort by the movement to create an identity for itself and its human resources and to motivate those human resources into courses of action that would benefit them, as well as Hamas. Yet, the effort was not only about identifying Hamas and its supporters and sympathizers, it was also about identifying the entities to which they were, and should be opposed. Hamas and its human resources were loyal Palestinian Muslims who were unified in their struggle against Israel and those who had turned their back on Islam. These ideas were reinforced with frame alignment mechanisms designed to help Hamas’s message resonate deeply with its target audience, and the
relative lack of frame extension shows that there was little place within Hamas’s pool of potential human resources for those who did not fit into the finely-focused identity Hamas was attempting to create at that time. Such a lack of inclusion did not appear to have hurt the long-term viability of Hamas as a resistance movement. Instead, it bred a largely cohesive, hard-lined group of human resources who were often willing to go to extreme measures for the movement and its cause.

Electoral Platform

The 2006 electoral platform of Hamas saw a complete makeover of its framing mechanisms and processes from those of its 1988 charter and First Intifada leaflets. The motivations driving those frames, however, did not change. While Hamas stayed relatively true to its statements of resistance against its enemy, Israel, it also stayed true to its resistance against its political rival, Fatah. What changed was the ways in which it presented itself and its opposition to those entities to which it opposed, and the forms of agency through which it sought to bring such change.

Identity and Agency Components

There was a major shift in the ways Hamas used identity components in its electoral platform from the ways the movement used them in its First Intifada documents. The most notable shift was in the naming of the Hamas political party. Hamas did not enter the formal political arena under the moniker of
"Hamas." Rather, it did so under the name "List of Change and Reform." This alteration was not an attempt at political trickery or to make the electorate believe the party was something that it was not. Surely, every Palestinian who supported the List was well aware to whom they were lending their support. The change was not about renaming Hamas, but about *adding* a new identity to the movement. The traditional Hamas, in name and in action, still existed. The List of Change and Reform simply added another layer to it. And with that added layer of identity came an increased target audience and an increase in potential human resources.

However, Hamas made more identity changes in 2006 than simply naming its political party. The group also altered the identity components it used within its party platform. True to Hamas form, terms such as "Palestinian," "Muslim," and "Islam" were sprinkled throughout the document. Yet, there was a notable absence of a prior identity mainstay of Hamas—the term "mujahid." The Arabic term, roughly translated to "freedom fighter," was replaced by the repeated term of "citizen." Such a change signifies a major shift in the way Hamas wanted the Palestinian electorate to identify with its political party and its human resources. No longer was Hamas to be seen as simple freedom fighters identified, identified with terminology that gave rise to mental images of armed masked men. Rather, Hamas and its human resources were to be seen as concerned citizens, seeking a positive, democratic, and legitimate change to the socio-political and economic
landscape of Palestine. This shift certainly brought a good deal of increased legitimacy to the movement, as well as to the idea of being a part of it.

There was also a marked shift in the identity components Hamas used in its 2006 electoral platform to identify those to whom it opposed. Terms such as “Israel” and “Zionists,” liberally used in its First Intifada documents, were sparsely used in its electoral document. Furthermore, the term “Jews,” “Fatah,” and “PLO” were not used in the document, at all. It was not that Hamas no longer saw those entities as an enemy or rival, it simply gave them different names—“occupation” and “corruption.” By focusing less on who its enemies were, and, instead focusing on what its enemies did, Hamas attempted to increase the legitimacy of its political rhetoric, and, in turn increase its legitimacy with its potential and existing human resources.

Once Hamas redefined itself and its enemies, it needed to redefine what needed to be done to rectify the problems those enemies had caused. As such, with new framing components of identity came new frame components of agency. Like the First Intifada documents, the electoral platform called for a return to Islamic principles, resistance against and liberation from Israeli aggression and occupation, and the education of the Palestinian people. The 2006 document, however, added a new form of agency to the rhetorical arsenal of Hamas—“reform.” Hamas recognized that it would not be enough to simply identify itself as potential reformers of what it labeled as a corrupt Palestinian system of government, but that it also needed to propose and articulate real
reforms to that system. The movement called for wide-ranging, Islamic and non-Islamic reforms in both the domestic and foreign policy sectors that included the increasing of public liberties, executive, legislative, and judicial reforms, and renewed examinations of existing alliances. Hamas also altered the wording of its past calls for jihad against Israel, opting, instead, to state that it reserved the right to use any means against Israeli occupation. These shifts in tone and wording from previous documents shows that Hamas wanted to appeal to a wider range of people, while still attempting to hold true to the positions that attracted its original base of human resources. Calls for jihad and a return to Islam may have been enough to create and maintain a resistance movement, but they were not enough to create and maintain a viable political party. What attracted a particular type of Muslim to resistance against Israel might not be enough to attract other Muslims to vote for Hamas. And it certainly would not be effective at bringing any non-Muslims to support it. Hamas seemed to sense that potential problem and successfully addressed it with its marked shift in agency components, widening its target audience and pool of potential human resources, while also staying true to its existing human resources.

Frame Alignment Mechanisms and Processes

The shifts in Hamas's framing mechanisms and processes in its 2006 electoral platform were not limited to identity and agency components. There were also major alterations to its frame alignment strategies. The document contained a fair amount of Hamas's usual Islamic frame amplification, beginning
the text with a passage from the Qur'an, while sprinkling other Qur'anic passages throughout its pages. Also present were its typical emotive phrasings, designed to tug at the heartstrings of the Palestinian electorate. There were, however, frame alignment mechanisms and processes in the document that were not part of Hamas's traditional rhetorical repertories. Hamas integrated into its platform frames that bridged ideas such as religion and law, individual and collective rights, and family and society, which were not as prevalent in its First Intifada documents. Similarly, its electoral platform employed frame extension mechanisms that included Christians in frames that were once only intended to align with the sensibilities of Muslims. Yet, the most significant change in Hamas's frame alignment strategy was its uses of frame transformation. Such changes were relatively subtle and implied, resting on the fact that Hamas, who had once been outspoken against participation in the formal political process was releasing a document intended to bolster its standing within such a process. The subtlety of those changes, however, did not take away from their notable inclusion, and were likely noticed by the potential and existing human resources who were ready for Hamas to enter the political arena.

The significant adjustment in Hamas's frame alignment mechanisms and processes signifies the fact that the movement was aware that a change in alignment strategies was required to take it from a resistance movement to a political party. In order to take on its politically established and entrenched rival on the virtual battlefield of democracy, Hamas had to maximize the amount of
human resources to which it was aligning its message. Every Palestinian, regardless of religious affiliation or socio-political ideology, became the target audience of the movement, and Hamas’s frame alignment strategies reflected that ideal.

**Frame Resonance Mechanisms and Processes**

The frame resonance mechanisms and processes employed by Hamas in its electoral platform were not much different from those used in its First *Intifada* documents. Like those previous documents, the electoral platform relied on the credibility of Hamas and the relativity of the message the movement was relaying to the public. While Hamas continued to maintain its religious credibility through the use of Islamic passages and ideas, by 2006 Hamas could no longer rely on the inherent credibility of its charismatic spiritual leader, Ahmed Yassin, who was assassinated by an Israeli airstrike 2 years prior. Instead, Hamas borrowed the resonance strategies that had worked so well in its First *Intifada* leaflet campaign, gaining credibility by attacking the credibility of its rival. Further credibility was surely gained by the decades of social services that had been provided to the Palestinian people by Hamas. Hamas had a history of not only recognizing many of the problems facing Palestinians, it also had a rich history of doing something about them. Such a boost to the credibility of the movement also served to enhance the relativity mechanism that affects frame resonance, as did the exploitation of popular opinion regarding the corruption of the existing Palestinian government.
However, messages cannot resonate with an audience if there is no audience to hear them. And perhaps the most significant factor that affected the resonance of Hamas's 2006 frames was that of diffusion and the widening of Hamas's target audience. During the years of the First Intifada, Hamas was reliant on the word of mouth by religious leaders in its sponsored mosques and people on the street who told each other of the deeds and words of the movement, and on a rudimentary leaflet campaign in order to disseminate its message to a relatively limited target audience. By 2006, the movement had combined those factors with control of mass media outlets and the benefit of the Internet, allowing it to spread its message around the globe. People did not have to wait for Hamas's message to find them, they could actively seek out that message and consume it at will. By expanding its target audience, Hamas was able to expand its pool of potential human resources.

Recurring Themes

Three primary and secondary themes encapsulated Hamas's 2006 framing mechanisms and processes. The most obvious theme, as its party name suggested, was that of reform. Hamas made it clear in nearly every paragraph that its chief motivation was to reform the socio-political, economic, and cultural landscape of Palestine. Next, Hamas pushed the theme of national unity. As it had done in its First Intifada leaflets, the movement encouraged Palestinians to stick together during trying times. The difference between 2006 and the years during the First Intifada was that in 2006 it was encouraging unity as citizens of a
nation, rather than as the people of a resistance movement. But the overwhelming theme present in the 2006 electoral platform was populism. Hamas played upon the populist sentiment that the Palestinian National Authority was sick with the disease of corruption, and that Hamas was the cure for the ills of the nation. As was witnessed by its stunning victory in the 2006 Palestinian Legislative elections, Hamas's themes played well with the Palestinian electorate, and were certainly helpful in obtaining and maintaining human resources.

**Conclusions on the 2006 Electoral Platform**

Hamas altered its use of collective action framing mechanisms and processes in its 2006 electoral platform because its needs and motivations had changed from the days of the Fist *Intifada* decades earlier. The movement was transforming from a sheer resistance movement to a viable political movement and needed to disseminate a pragmatic message that reflected that change to its potential and existing human resources. At the same time, Hamas needed to stay relatively true to its previous frames so that it would not alienate the human resources that came to and remained in the movement because of its prior messaging. In the end, Hamas seemingly found a balance in its electoral platform between satisfying its existing base of human resources, while also maximizing its appeal to new human resources.
Conclusions

The analysis performed in this research clearly shows that Hamas employs all of the framing mechanisms and processes available to social movement entrepreneurs. It uses identity and motivational agency components, it uses various frame alignment and resonant mechanisms and processes, and it encapsulates those mechanisms and processes into themes that keep the movement on message. With that stated, however, this research also shows that Hamas utilizes those mechanisms and processes in different ways, depending on its needs at the time. As a new resistance movement introducing itself to the world at the start of the First Intifada, Hamas needed to build its initial base of human resources. It did so by writing resonant documents that aligned the movement's message to the ideologies of its target audience, while simultaneously identifying itself as a viable alternative to its well-established rivals and providing direction and motivation to its fast-growing pool of human resources. Once Hamas had firmly established itself as major player in the greater Palestinian-Israeli conflict and decided to make the move into the arena of formal politics, it needed to re-introduce itself and expand its base of existing human resources in order to meet the needs of a major player in the democratic process. It met that challenge by altering its identity, agency, alignment, and resonance strategies, ultimately making the movement and its message more acceptable to a greater number of people. This change in messaging shows a pragmatic willingness by Hamas to risk sacrificing a portion of its hard-lined
human resources in order to appeal to a larger target audience—a gamble that appears to have paid off for the controversial and complicated movement, at least through 2006.

However, the history of Hamas goes well beyond the First Intifada of the 1980s and its stunning victory in the 2006 Palestinian Legislative elections. The years up to and including the Second Intifada, that began in 2000, saw the emergence of a much more organized and violent movement, posing new messaging and human resource challenges for the movement. Similarly, its takeover of the Gaza Strip following the 2006 elections and subsequent war with Fatah over control of that contested piece of land transformed the movement from a political party to the sole administrators of an area that houses more than one and a half million people. While these critical periods of Hamas history were not included within the scope of this research, future researchers are encouraged to acquire a working knowledge of them and to use that knowledge, in conjunction with critical analysis of its documents, to analyze the framing mechanisms and processes Hamas employed to meet its human resource needs of those periods. By gaining a more complete understanding of the ways Hamas attracts and maintains its human resources, we not only gain an understanding of what truly motivates this complex, multi-faceted movement, we also gain an understanding of what motivates those who join, support and sympathize with it. As Hamas does not appear to be losing its overall influence in the Palestinian-
Israel conflict, such understandings are a crucial component in bringing an eventual peace to a region that has seen violence and heartache for far too long.
REFERENCES


