The Palestinian Shahid and the development of the model 21st century Islamic terrorist

Benjamin Timothy Acosta

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THE PALESTINIAN SHAHID AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF 'THE MODEL 21ST CENTURY ISLAMIC TERRORIST

A Thesis
Presented to the
Faculty of
California State University,
San Bernardino

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts
in
National Security Studies

by
Benjamin Timothy Acosta
June 2008
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ABSTRACT

Since the early 1990s, Palestinian organizations have drawn from many sources and incrementally refined the process of suicide terrorism. By making the *modus operandi* socially acceptable and even fashionable, Palestinian organizations have normalized the deployment of suicide-homicide bombers. These organizations have optimized the progress individuals take from reasoning and justifying to rationalizing and actually committing suicide terrorism. Palestinian organizations have not only developed a strategic weapon for their war with Israel, but also provided Islamist-terror organizations, such as those within the global al-Qaeda network, with the model 21st Century terrorist, as well as efficient methods to produce such individuals. By mobilizing mass support in the Sunni world and empowering the individual through the concepts of *jihad* and *istishhad*, the *shahid*, as epitomized by Palestinians during al-Aqsa intifada, secured suicide terrorism’s growing organizational partiality, ensured lethality, decreasing targeting discrimination, and frequency in the international arena. Thus, the phenomenon of the Palestinian *shahid* has become a driving force behind the increasing spread of suicide terrorism worldwide.
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For Sabina and those who suffer as she does...
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NOTE ON TRANSLATION AND TRANSLITERATION

Translating and transliterating a Semitic language to a Germanic one is like trying to replicate a brilliant painting using a sculptor’s tools. That both Arabic and English maintain a richness that increases the amount of meanings words have contextually further complicates matters. Each Arabic root-word has various forms that lead to any number of representations. Regional dialects make translation even harder. So for the purposes of this work, translations refer to a word’s common use within the context of the topic at hand. Transliterations simply reflect an attempt to minimize confusion. Arabic and other foreign words are italicized throughout the text unless the word’s English equivalent is identical (e.g. Sunni) or similar (al-Qaeda versus al-Qa’eda). Silent Arabic letters, such as the ta’marbuta and haa’, are not written, unless a word’s English equivalent is the identical; for example, instead of shahadah, just shahada is written, but Allah is written as it commonly is in English. Oftentimes translations denote Arabic letters that have no English equivalent with numbers. Avoiding such confusing methods, apostrophes signify these unique letters. For example,
depending on the vowel within the word, either 'a, 'e or 'u
denotes the Arabic letter 'ayn.

Words are transliterated to English from Fousha
(Modern Standard Arabic); however, proper nouns defer to an
'Ammiyya (Spoken Arabic) transliteration, in order to
represent the colloquial form of Arabic that relates to the
individual or organization. For example, the Palestine
Liberation Organization's Arabic name, Munazzmat al-Tahrir
al-Filastiniyya, employs the Arabic letter dHaa' to sound
like a "z"--reflecting the Levantine dialect. Similarly, as
an Egyptian, Ayman al-Zawahiri uses the Egyptian dialect
for his name, which turns the dHaa' into a "zh" sound.
Words like Hezbollah, which have numerous spellings in
English, defer to the spelling that has the simplest
English pronunciation; for example, although Hezbollah
represents two Arabic words, Hezb-Allah (Party of God), and
the organization itself has at times spelled its name in
English as Hezbollah and Hizballah, it is written as
Hezbollah throughout the text. Oftentimes one sees al-
Qa'eda written as al-Qaida; to increase the
transliterations' consistency, this work reserves the "i"
for words requiring an "ee" sound. As a result shahid is
written with an "i," although its English pronunciation more closely resembles "sha'heed."

For Hebrew proper nouns, all spoken Hebrew letters are given an English equivalent in order to maintain the integrity of the transliteration. For example, the letter khet maintains a "kh" denotation. Oftentimes one sees place names such as Mekhola spelled Mehola. As with the Arabic transliterations, however, the silent Hebrew heh is not identified; so Herzliya is written rather than Herzliyah. However, in words with an identical English equivalent the heh is maintained. A'a denotes the Hebrew letter ayn.
GLOSSARY

Arabic

'amalyya istishhadiyya: "martyrdom operation"
al-'ard: "female sexual honor"

da'awa: literally "calling"—meaning "proselytizing"
dar al-harb: literally "dwelling of war"
dar al-Islam: literally "dwelling of submission"
fard ayn: "individual obligation (to jihad)"
fard kafiya: "collective obligation (to jihad)"
fatwa: "(Islamic) edict" or "decree"
feda'i: literally "self-sacrificer"—meaning "one who risks his or her life"
fedayin: "self-sacrificers"—meaning "those who risk their lives"

hamula: "clan"
houriyyat al-ayn: "virgin maidens"
hudna: "armistice"
intifada: literally "shaking off"—meaning "uprising"
intihar: "suicide"

'irhab: "terror"

Islam: "submission"

istishhadj: literally "martyrdom"—meaning "self-sacrifice for Allah’s sake"
istishhadi: literally “martyr”—meaning “one who intentionally commits martyrdom”

jannat al-firdaous: “heavenly gardens”

jahiliyya: “ignorance”—meaning “darkness without Allah”

jihad: literally “struggle”—meaning “holy war”

kafir: literally “infidel”—meaning “one who hides the truth”

Khalifa: literally “successor”—meaning “Islam’s highest living authority”

kufr: literally “blasphemer”—meaning “one who conceals revelation”

madrassa: “(Islamic) school”

mufti: “(Islamic law) functionary”

mujahid: literally “struggler”—meaning “one who wages holy war”

mujahedin: literally “strugglers”—meaning “those who wage holy war”

al-Naqba: “the Catastrophe”

qadiyya: “a greater cause”

qowmiyya: “(Arab) nationalism”

sahwa: “awakening”

al-salaf al-salihin: literally “pious ancestors”—meaning “Mohammed’s immediate successors”
salafi: “(one who follows the ways of the) immediate successors”

Salafiyya: “Salafism”

sammid: “one who practices steadfastness”

sammud: “steadfastness” or “perseverance”

shahada: literally “witness”—meaning “professing one’s submission to Allah” or “death for Allah’s sake”

shahid: literally “(male) witness”—meaning “martyr”

shahida: literally “(female) witness”—meaning “martyr”

al-shahid al-hai: “the living martyr”

shari’a: “(Islamic) law”

sharif: literally “noble”—meaning “descendant of Mohammed (through his daughter)”

sheikh: “(local) leader”

Shi’a: “partisan”

shirk: “polytheism”

shuhada: literally “witnesses”—meaning “martyrs”

Sunni: “orthodox”

tawhid: literally “oneness”—meaning “monotheism”

’ulema: “(Islamic) scholars”

um’ma: “(global) Islamic community”

’urf: “(Arab) customary law”

waqf: “(Islamic) endowment”
Yesha: refers collectively to "Judea, Samaria and Gaza"

Yishuv: "(Jewish) community"
ABBREVIATIONS

AHC: Arab Higher Committee
AMB: Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade
AQI: Al-Qaeda in Iraq (al-Qaeda in the Land of Two Rivers)
DFLP: Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine
DOP: Declaration of Principles
ICT: International Institute for Counter-Terrorism
IDC: Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya
IDF: Israel Defense Force
IRGC: Islamic (Iranian) Revolutionary Guard Corps
ISA: Israel Security Agency
LTTE: Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
MEMRI: Middle East Media Research Institute
MFA: Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs
PA: Palestinian Authority
PIJ: Palestinian Islamic Jihad
PKK: Kurdish Workers’ Party
PLO: Palestine Liberation Organization
PRC: Popular Resistance Committees
PFLP: Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
SLA: Southern Lebanese Army
SSNP: Syrian Socialist-National Party
INTRODUCTION: SHAHID FASHIONS

When Israel routed a coalition of Arab armies in the 1967 Six-Day War, some in the Arab world realized that they could not defeat the Jewish state in a conventional land war. Palestinian Arabs, however, sought to lead the way in a different type of warfare against Israel. In 1968, Palestinian terrorist groups under the structural umbrella of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)\(^1\) began using a myriad of different terror tactics against Israeli and Jewish targets in and outside the Middle East.\(^2\) These groups ushered in the era of modern terrorism by launching spectacular attacks (e.g. symbolic airline hijackings),\(^3\) which were only made possible by assailants' willingness to sacrifice their lives. With the success of these shocking

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1 Established in January 1964 at a summit of Arab states, Munazzmat al-Tahrir al-Filastiniyya (the Palestine Liberation Organization) or PLO did not find widespread acclaim by Palestinians until its cooptation by Yasser Arafat's militant group Fatah. Meaning "conquest" in Arabic, Fatah is the inversion of the acronym Harakat al-Tahrir al-Watani al-Filistini (the Palestine National Liberation Movement).


attacks, the PLO learned that operations using fedayin (self-sacrificers) had utility well beyond their apparent tactical advantages.

The PLO accordingly incorporated self-sacrificing operations into its overall political strategy. The new approach resulted in such romanticized creations as the Black September Organization, which with its horrific massacre of 11 Israeli Olympians at the 1972 Munich Games brought about the contemporary symbiosis between terrorism and the media. Garnering the spotlight of worldwide media attention, the PLO succeeded in arousing international sympathy and support for the Palestinian movement. These early Palestinian groups, however, neither truly harnessed nor exploited the strategic potential of suicide terrorism. Despite sending their fedayin on high-risk operations, which usually projected certain death, Palestinian leadership did not begin to promote laying down one’s life intentionally as an end unto itself until years later.

Between the mid-1970s and early-1990s, a number of events affecting the Arab and Islamic worlds drastically changed the political atmosphere in the Middle East. A Sunni-Muslim sahwa (awakening) swept across Arab countries; Grand Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini led an Islamic revolution
in Iran, overthrowing Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi’s pro-Western government; the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan; sectarian strife ravaged Lebanon in a bloody civil war; the Cold War’s end, the first Palestinian intifada (uprising), and the Gulf War all fostered vast political and social change. Accordingly, as identities formed and new viewpoints took effect politically and socially, the manner in which organizations employed violence also fluctuated. As a by-product of the Iran-Iraq War and Hezb’ollah’s guerrilla campaigns in Lebanon against the United States (U.S.), France and Israel, the Shi’a-Muslim world catapulted the concept of the shahid (martyr) to the forefront of militants’ imaginations.

By framing the Iran-Iraq War as a “re-enactment” of the historic battle of Karbala in 860 between Hussein the leader of Shi’at Ali (Faction of Ali) and Yazid the Umayyad

---

4 In Arabic intifada literally means “shaking-off.” In the case of the two Palestinian uprisings, it refers to shaking off the “occupiers.”

5 Hezb’ollah stands for the “Party of God” in Arabic. Although not officially founded until February 16, 1985, Iranian Pasdaran operatives set up Hezballah in 1982, and operated it under the cover name Islamic Jihad Organization.


7 Initially, the Shi’a were simply a political faction that supported Mohammad’s son-in-law and cousin Ali. The battle in 860
Caliph, Iran’s Supreme Leader Khomeini directly shaped the way Iranian soldiers approached warfare against the advancing Iraqi army. Because the battle in 860 left Hussein dead and thus heralded by Shi’a Muslims as a great Islamic “martyr,” Khomeini’s framing invoked many Iranians to seek death on the modern battlefield, so they too might reap the benefits of martyrdom as articulated in Shi’a tradition. Indeed, in 1980, amid a fire fight with Iraqi troops, a 13-year old Iranian named Hussein Fahmideh gathered explosives, attached them to himself, charged an Iraqi tank and detonated the explosives—disabling the tank while killing himself. Like that of his namesake, Hussein’s act of self-sacrifice found widespread praise among Shi’a Muslims. Soon after, the Iranian government plastered his picture on billboards across Tehran; Hussein’s martyrdom, like that of the Shi’a patriarch’s, inspired countless others. By 1982, Khomeini harnessed the power of the Shi’a narrative of martyrdom, and began employing “human wave attacks,” which regularly consisted of thousands of Iranian youth simultaneously rushing Iraqi positions, oftentimes protected by surrounding minefields; armed usually with

nothing more than clinched fists and a plastic key around their necks, which ensured their post-martyrdom entrance through the gates of paradise, Khomeini's "mine jumpers" helped turn the tide of the war.\textsuperscript{8}

With significant success on the battlefields of the Iran-Iraq War, the Iranian Pasdaran,\textsuperscript{9} or Revolutionary Guard, sought to export Khomeini's martyrdom strategy to Lebanon. Engulfed in an overlapping sectarian-divided civil war and Israel-PLO war, Lebanon became the testing ground for suicide-homicide attacks as a tool of guerrilla warfare. In an ultimately successful effort to expel Western peacekeeping forces, the Pasdaran's Lebanese creation, Hezballah, repeatedly attacked U.S. and French targets using suicide-homicide bombers. Hezballah's campaign reached its zenith with the 1983 suicide-homicide attack on the U.S. Marines barracks, which left 241 American servicemen dead, and convinced U.S. President Ronald Reagan to "redeploy" U.S. forces from Lebanon.\textsuperscript{10}

\textsuperscript{9} Meaning "Guards" in Persian, \textit{Pasdaran} is short for \textit{Sepah-i Pasdaran-i Engelab-i Islami} (the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps) or IRGC.
Continuing to advance the tactic in its campaigns against the Southern Lebanese Army and Israel Defense Force throughout the 1980s, Hezbollah inspired numerous pro-Syrian Lebanese groups to use suicide-homicide bombers.\(^\text{11}\) Deeming suicide-homicide attacks "martyrdom operations," the Pasdaran and Hezbollah effectively convinced many that the modus operandi held legitimacy, particularly regarding Shi'a tradition.\(^\text{12}\) Moreover, by concurrently galvanizing the Lebanese Shi'a population and expelling foreign militaries from Lebanon, Hezbollah made the symbolic and strategic utility of suicide-homicide attacks clear to its enemies and other militant organizations alike.

By 1986, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)\(^\text{13}\) began flirting with the idea of employing "exceptional martyrdom operations" against civilian Israeli targets.\(^\text{14}\) In 1989,

\(^{11}\) These groups included: Amal, the Syrian Social-Nationalist Party, the Syrian \textit{Ba'ath} (Renaissance) Party, and the Syrian Socialist-Nasserite Party.

\(^{12}\) Not only does the Shi'a martyrdom narrative and Ashura holiday derive from the story of Hussein and his 72 faithful followers, who died with him, but the 12\textsuperscript{th} Century Assassins also contribute to the tradition of Shi'a self-sacrifice, as they used daggers in suicidal assassination missions.

\(^{13}\) Some refer to \textit{al-Jihad al-Islami fi Filastin} (The Islamic Jihad in Palestine) simply as \textit{Jihad Islami} (Islamic Jihad). Others call it \textit{Harakat al-Jihad al-Islami al-Filastini} (The Palestinian Islamic Jihad Movement), and Palestinian Islamic Jihad or PIJ.

\(^{14}\) Notes from International Institute for Counter-Terrorism seminar on "The Global Jihad," given by Reuven Paz, in Herzliya, Israel (21 June 2005); Scott Atran, "Genesis of Suicide
Hamas\textsuperscript{15} similarly accepted the idea of using suicide-homicide attackers\textsuperscript{16}; however, not seeing a strategic opportunity to carry out such "martyrdom operations" amid the first Palestinian \textit{intifada} (December 1987 to early 1993), PIJ and its Islamist-counterpart\textsuperscript{17} Hamas refrained from deploying suicide-homicide attackers. However, as a rebuke to the PLO's participation in negotiations with Israel,\textsuperscript{18} Hamas and PIJ carried out eight suicide-homicide attacks in 1993 alone.\textsuperscript{19} By the mid-1990s, some Palestinians hoped for the success of the Oslo peace process, but many others put their faith in the continuation of violent

\textsuperscript{15} Meaning "zeal" and "courage" in Arabic, the acronym Hamas stands for \textit{Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya} (the Islamic Resistance Movement).

\textsuperscript{16} Ami Pedahzur, \textit{Suicide Terrorism} (Malden, Mass.: Polity Press, 2005), 55.

\textsuperscript{17} "Islamist" refers to an individual or organization that subscribes to a political ideology based on the fundamental tenets of Islam. Furthermore, just as various interpretations of those tenets spawned a variety of Islamic sects, nearly an equally number of versions of Islamism or political Islam exist—whether, Salafi, revolutionary Shi'a, or otherwise. One could understand a "hardline Islamist" as an Islamic supremacist, who views political Islam as the only viable and righteous political ideology. An "Islamic fanatic" demonstrates a willingness to sacrifice his or her self-interest for a collective cause.

\textsuperscript{18} Rapprochement publicly commenced in October 1991 at the Madrid Conference, and began showing progress with the signing of the Declaration of Principles in September 1993, in which Israel and the PLO recognized one another diplomatically.

\textsuperscript{19} For a complete list of Palestinian suicide-homicide attacks carried out against Israeli targets from April 1993 to April 2008, see Appendix A.
resistance, as predominately carried on by Hamas and PIJ’s shahids. From 1994 to 2000, the two Palestinian Islamist organizations carried out 25 suicide-homicide bombings against Israeli targets. As a result of political Islam’s return to the forefront of Palestinian politics and the emergence of a complementary culture of martyrdom in Palestinian society, the shahid rose as the Palestinian movement’s new icon—in effect replacing the feda’i (self-sacrificer), and making suicide-homicide bombings the operational mode of choice. With the failure of the Oslo peace process, Fatah sought to maintain popularity by joining the Islamist-Palestinian organizations in the suicide-terror industry and established al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade.\(^\text{20}\) The early 2000s, thus, saw massive waves of suicide-homicide bombers targeting Israeli civilians in the joint terror effort of al-Aqsa intifada.\(^\text{21}\) From September 2000 to December 2005, Palestinian organizations

\(^{20}\) Fatah created Kataeb Shuhada al-Aqsa (al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade) or AMB. However, the majority of its members come from Tanzim (meaning “squad” in Arabic), which operates Fatah’s grassroots following. Furthermore, members of Force 17, Fatah’s elite Presidential guard, often organize and conduct AMB’s attacks.

\(^{21}\) Commentators also commonly refer to al-Aqsa intifada simply as the second intifada.
successfully carried out 155 suicide-homicide bombings and launched at least 525.\textsuperscript{22}

Effectively convincing their own constituencies of the Islamic justifications for suicide-homicide attacks, Islamist organizations, particularly Hamas, gained widespread support within Palestinian society for carrying out such operations. Moreover, by targeting civilians en masse, Palestinian organizations transitioned suicide-homicide operations from a guerrilla tactic, as previously used on a wide scale first by Hezbollah and later by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, to a weapon of terror. Additionally, by demonstrating that participation in a “martyrdom operation” marked the fulfillment of a personal goal, the Palestinian shahid/suicide-homicide bomber captivated mass media and sympathetic populations alike, especially in the Arab and Islamic worlds--eventually having effects stretching far beyond the pales of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Today, posters glorifying the latest shahid litter the walls of Palestinian cities, villages and "refugee camps".

\textsuperscript{22} See Appendix A; and Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, \textit{Anti-Israeli Terrorism, 2006: Data, Analysis and Trends} (March 2007): 51-55; accessed at <www.terrorism-info.org.il>. 
in the disputed territories\textsuperscript{23} of the West Bank,\textsuperscript{24} Gaza and East Jerusalem. Everyone from corner shop owners and cab drivers to the 20-something year olds drinking coffee at the local café extol past Palestinian terror leaders such as Chairman Yasser Arafat, Dr. Fathi Shaqaqi, Sheik Ahmad Yassin and Dr. Abdul Aziz al-Rantissi, along with the heinous terrorist acts they spent their days sponsoring. In Bethlehem, children argue in the street over whose turn it is to play the \textit{shahid} in their casual game of a mock suicide-bomb attack. These sentiments expressed on the Arab streets of the disputed territories represent a popular culture of martyrdom,\textsuperscript{25} which has gained and continues to strengthen a stranglehold on Palestinian society.

\textsuperscript{23} The term “disputed territories” is used because the listed areas do not qualify as “occupied territories,” considering there has never been a “Palestinian” state. From the years 1967 to 1979 and 1967 to 1994, it could have been argued that the territories in question were “occupied Egypt” and “occupied Jordan,” respectively, since these were the nation-states that Israel captured the territories from during the Six-Day War; however, both the Egyptian and Jordanian governments have since relinquished all claims to the territories. Thus, they are not “occupied,” but, indeed, rather “disputed” between Israel and the Palestinian Authority—especially since the failure of the Oslo peace process has left a final status agreement on the territories indefinitely unresolved.

\textsuperscript{24} A term coined during the British Mandate, “West Bank” collectively refers to the areas of Judea and Samaria.

\textsuperscript{25} First used in explaining Palestinian society’s support for suicide-homicide bombers sometime after the initiation of the second \textit{intifada}, a number of researchers, scholars and political analysts have since elaborated on the concept “culture of
Identifiable by shahid worship and praise for terrorism, Palestinian society, however, no longer exclusively exhibits this culture of martyrdom. Cities from Jakarta to Baghdad and London have witnessed the fruits of this terror-breeding culture. Similarly, the rapid diffusion of suicide terrorism, geographically and across ideological lines, exemplifies how terror organizations have garnered the strategic utility of employing “martyrdom operations.” Furthermore, Palestinian developments in the evolution of suicide-homicide attacks have functioned as alerts of these various strategic components. Moreover, by setting a precedent among Sunni Muslims, and gaining legitimacy for attacking civilians from prominent Islamic authorities within the Sunni world, the Palestinian shahid/suicide-homicide bomber precipitated its own duplication in numerous other conflicts. Thus, to fully

appreciate the implications of the Palestinian culture of martyrdom and shahid, one needs to understand the former's social development, the latter's doctrinal roots, and the influence the pair have had on terror campaigns outside the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Since the early 1990s, Palestinian terror organizations have drawn from many sources and incrementally refined the process of suicide terrorism. By making the modus operandi socially acceptable and at times even fashionable, Palestinian terror organizations have normalized the deployment of suicide-homicide bombers. In doing so, the progress individuals take from reasoning and justifying to rationalizing and actually committing suicide terrorism has been eerily optimized.\(^\text{26}\) Consequently, Palestinian terror organizations have not only developed an extremely successful, if not strategic, weapon for their war with Israel, but also provided Islamist-terror organizations such as those within the global al-Qaeda\(^\text{27}\)

\(^{26}\) Optimization refers to the fact that one finds no shortage in Palestinian society of individuals willing to carry out suicide-homicide operations; potential shahids have become a sort of Palestinian natural resource, which terror organizations can extract from society at any given time.

\(^{27}\) Literally "the Base" in Arabic, al-Qa'eda additionally means "the Vanguard." Abdallah Azzam established the organization in 1988 building off the well-established Mektab al-Khadimat (Office
network with the model 21st Century terrorist, as well as efficient methods to produce such individuals. By mobilizing mass support in the Sunni world and empowering the individual through the concepts of jihad and martyrdom, the shahid, as epitomized by Palestinians during al-Aqsa intifada, secured suicide terrorism’s growing organizational partiality, ensured lethality, decreasing targeting discrimination, and frequency in the international arena. Thus, the phenomenon of the Palestinian shahid has become a driving force behind the increasing spread of suicide terrorism worldwide.

of Services), which served as a logistics base for mujahedin (holy warriors) in Afghanistan.
CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW: APPROACHING RESEARCH ON SUICIDE-HOMICIDE ATTACKS

Since the onslaught of the second Palestinian intifada and the September 11, 2001 attacks shortly thereafter, numerous scholars, analysts, journalists and filmmakers have attempted to understand and explain the suicide-terrorism phenomenon. Studies on suicide terrorism in general and in particular contexts, as well as those on specific organizations or campaigns, have sprung up in the form of books, journal, magazine and newspaper articles, as well as documentaries. More often than not, identifying the motivations behind suicide terrorism lies at the heart of research.¹

Terrorism experts generally agree that most terrorists are “ordinary people,”² without a particular profile or


common characteristic that links them. One leading expert explains how he is

...always struck by how disturbingly "normal" most terrorists seem when one actually sits down and talks to them. Rather than the wild-eyed fanatics or crazed killers that we have been conditioned to expect, many are in fact highly articulate and extremely thoughtful individuals for whom terrorism is (or was) an entirely rational choice, often reluctantly embraced and then only after considerable reflection and debate.

So, what possesses such "ordinary" or "normal" people to perpetrate acts of terror? Moreover, what motivates suicide terrorists to take their own lives so that they might murder others? Within the literary and documentary collection on suicide terrorism, one finds various schools of thought that provide answers to these important questions.


3 One study, however, argues that proper "psychological autopsies" have not been performed on any suicide-homicide bombers, so it is premature to suggest that they are not suicidal and that a psychological profile does not exist; the study concludes: "the absence of such studies should not lead us to possible erroneous assertions such as those claiming that the suicide bombers are not suicidal or that there are no psychological profiles applicable to them." David Lester, Bijou Yang and Mark Lindsey, "Suicide Bombers: Are Psychological Profiles Possible?" Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 27 (1 July 2004): 293.

Definitional and Investigative Differences

Disparate findings in the fairly new academic field of terrorism studies tend to arise from the varying approaches. Most trends in suicide terrorism research accordingly divide along lines drawn by definition and scope. Failing to distinguish between terror and guerrilla campaigns, many notable works lump together all episodes of suicide-homicide operations.5 Others sidestep this important issue of targeting by refraining from employing the term "suicide terrorism," and commonly replacing it with "suicide attacks." Both terms represent attacks dependent on the perpetrator's death for the operation's success6; however, the previous specifies a civilian target, whereas the latter maintains ambiguity. Expanding the investigative range, some studies focus on "suicide missions," which denotes a larger variety of attacks as the term includes

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6 Boaz Ganor, "Suicide Attacks in Israel," in Countering Suicide Terrorism (Herzliya, Israel: International Institute for Counter-Terrorism [ICT], 2002), 140-141; and Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 132.
“any operation that is designed in such a way that the terrorist does not expect to survive it, even if he or she is actually killed by police or other defenders.”\(^7\) Another study views attacks, in which self-inflicted death is not a requirement for operational success, as a “high-risk mission.”\(^8\) This collection of works, edited by Oxford scholar Diego Gambetta, defines “suicide missions” similarly to how other researchers define “suicide attacks,” wherein self-inflicted death is “strictly essential for [the operation’s] success.”\(^9\)

Under the terminological umbrella of suicide terrorism sits “suicide bombing.” Researcher Assaf Moghadam notes, “[a]ll suicide bombings are suicide attacks, but not all suicide attacks are suicide bombings. Strictly speaking, the 9/11 attacks were not suicide bombings, since no conventional explosive device was used... They were, however, suicide attacks.”\(^10\) Still yet, a myriad of similar terms exist, including “homicide bombing” and “martyrdom operation.” Mostly meaning the same thing, such terms

\(^7\) Pape, 10.
\(^8\) Gambetta, vii.
\(^9\) Gambetta, vi.
express opposing viewpoints relating to the legitimacy of the acts they represent. To avoid using "highly charged, normative terms that do not aid in the effort to analyze and explain this deadly phenomenon," scholar Mohammed M. Hafez promotes the terms "suicide bomber" and "human bomb," both of which he defines as "an individual who willingly uses his or her body to carry or deliver explosive materials to attack, kill, or maim others." His terminology is a direct response to the dialogue often spun in the media. Hafez notes:

Those who support these acts of violence prefer to call them "martyrdom operations," and their perpetrators "heroes" and "freedom fighters." Those who oppose them prefer to call them "homicide bombers," "suicide terrorists," or "suicidal murderers."11

Within the same controversy, as Hafez recognizes above, some have replaced "suicide bomber," with the term "homicide bomber," placing emphasis on the target rather than the perpetrator, but still leaving the term somewhat incomplete; Moghadam contends, "the term fails to describe the particularity of this type of bombing--namely the death

12 Hafez, Manufacturing Human Bombs, 4.
of the perpetrator as an integral part of the attack."\textsuperscript{13} Still, others who emphasize the martyrdom component of suicide-homicide attacks, such as scholar Rafael Israeli argue, "it [is] a fallacy to dub these people 'suicide bombers', because their primary concern [is] to kill their enemies...though they [are] ready to sacrifice themselves in the process."\textsuperscript{14} Within the literature, nomenclature stands as far as it could from universal consistency. Thus, in any study on terrorism, clearly it has become imperative to illustrate definitions, rather than simply articulate a term.

**Levels of Analysis**

Usually due to the disciplinary backgrounds of the researchers conducting them, studies on suicide terrorism tend to focus on a single level of analysis: usually either the individual, organizational or environmental level. While at times studies traverse multiple levels of analysis, most rely heavily on one. In recent years, the most common trend has placed emphasis on the organizational

\textsuperscript{13} Moghadam, "Defining Suicide Terrorism," 16.
level—leaving many scholars to view it as the sole level of importance.

At the organizational level, a significant amount of research has found strategies to sit at the forefront of suicide terrorism’s growing employment. The late scholar Ehud Sprinzak noted that strategic utility of suicide-homicide attacks has driven its use since Hezbollah first began carrying out attacks as the central component of its coercive campaigns against foreign militaries. While most scholars agree that organizational strategy marks the most influential component in propelling suicide terrorism, a heated debate exists over the most important audience of that strategy. Some argue the defined enemy marks the primary audience, others the domestic population or rival organizations.

Spearheading one of these trends, University of Chicago professor Robert Pape contends, “what nearly all suicide terrorist attacks have in common is a specific secular and strategic goal: to compel modern democracies to withdraw military forces from territory that the terrorists consider to be their homeland.” This represents the

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15 Sprinzak, "Rational Fanatics."
16 Pape, 4.
"suicide terrorism is a secular response to occupation" argument, which disregards the employment of cultural and religious narratives in the mobilization of suicide-homicide attackers outright. University of Georgia professor Mia Bloom, offers a rebuttal to this notion that the defined enemy always represents the primary reason for organizations employing suicide terrorism. Bloom states:

Although Pape's explanation is useful for understanding how suicide bombing is directed against the external enemy, it glosses over the domestic political dynamics and organizational motivations for outbidding. Pape's model...does not fully explain why religious groups (with goals beyond territorial demands) might use [suicide terrorism].

Concerning the Palestinian context, Bloom asserts that competition between rivals lies at the core of suicide terrorism's increase in frequency. Similarly, the director of RAND Corporation in Washington D.C. Bruce Hoffman recognizes that organizations such as the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and Hamas began employing suicide-homicide attacks as a way to distinguish themselves from rival groups, in order to gain notoriety/increase popularity

17 Bloom, Dying to Kill, 84.
within their domestic populations.\textsuperscript{19} Pape, Bloom and Hoffman, while not always in agreement on why organizations employ suicide terrorists, indeed agree that organizational strategies dictate when, where and why suicide terrorism erupts.

Considering the motivations of individuals, researchers have overwhelmingly posited that suicide terrorists often carry out attacks for purposes of revenge.\textsuperscript{20} Scholars have also found that individuals pursue "martyrdom," as commonly connected with suicide-terror attacks, for personal reasons, whether religious, cultural or otherwise.\textsuperscript{21} Hafez notes: "at the individual level, religious and nationalist appeals that equate self-sacrifice with martyrdom and national salvation are instrumental in producing volunteers for suicide attacks."\textsuperscript{22}

\textsuperscript{19} Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 137-168.
\textsuperscript{20} For example, see Eyad El Sarraj, "Wounds and Madness: Why We’ve Become Suicide Bombers," Peacework (May 2002); John Rosenberger, "Discerning the Behavior of the Suicide Bomber: The Role of Vengeance," Journal of Religion and Health 42, no. 1 (Spring 2003); and Pedahzur, Suicide Terrorism, 135-151.
\textsuperscript{21} Berko and Erez, 603-623; Barbara Victor, Army of Roses: Inside the World of Palestinian Women Suicide Bombers (Emmaus, Penn.: Rodale, 2003); and Yoram Schweitzer ed., "Female Suicide Bombers: Dying for Equality?" Memorandum No. 84 (Tel Aviv: Jaffe Center for Strategic Studies, 2006).
\textsuperscript{22} Mohammed M. Hafez, "Dying to Be Martyrs: The Symbolic Dimension of Suicide Terrorism," in Root Causes of Suicide Terrorism: The Globalization of Martyrdom, ed. Ami Pedahzur (New York: Routledge, 2005), 76; Pedahzur, Suicide Terrorism, 134-145.
In this sense, desire for revenge and self-sacrifice converge to motivate individuals. Scholar Ami Pedahzur argues that either "commitment" or "crisis" motivate suicide terrorists.\textsuperscript{23} In Pedahzur's first type, suicide terrorists seek "to fulfill their duty as devout members of their organizations."\textsuperscript{24} His second type of suicide terrorist acts in response to "the intensification of both personal and community crisis situations."\textsuperscript{25} In researching individuals' impetuses for self-sacrifice, many scholars have applied sociologist Émile Durkheim's typologies of suicide. Commonly, scholars have arranged his model of "altruistic suicide"\textsuperscript{26} as a basis for furthering research on suicide terrorism.\textsuperscript{27}

At the social level, researchers have recognized the importance that death cultures play in promoting and sustaining suicide terrorism.\textsuperscript{28} Moghadam recognizes: "a

\textsuperscript{23} Pedahzur, Suicide Terrorism, 151-154.
\textsuperscript{24} Pedahzur, Suicide Terrorism, 153.
\textsuperscript{25} Pedahzur, Suicide Terrorism, 153.
\textsuperscript{27} Chapter Six further explores this idea.
\textsuperscript{28} Reuter, 79-114; Strenski; David Brooks, "The Culture of Martyrdom: How Suicide Bombing Became not just a Means but an End," The Atlantic Monthly 289, no. 6 (June 2002): 18-20.
phenomenon that is not only present in most conflicts where suicide attacks are widely used, but that also appears to be the distinguishing characteristic between suicide terrorism and ordinary terrorism is what is known as the culture of martyrdom."  

29 Pedahzur adds:

In certain societies that perceive themselves as weak and who feel hopeless and oppressed by a powerful enemy, suicide terrorism, with its potential to cause considerable pain, damage and confusion to the aggressor, can empower that society. It may even offer hope that things will eventually change; it may at least ensure that the aggressor suffers... [P]erception of the enemy as evil and dehumanized makes it easier for people to support acts in which not only soldiers and politicians but also innocent civilians and children are killed.  

30 Hafez identifies the "[convergence of] three conditions" that makes suicide terrorism possible:

(1) prevailing cultural norms encompass belief systems, symbolic narratives, and historical traditions that justify and celebrate martyrdom; (2) legitimate authorities promote or acquiesce to extreme violence; and (3) communities feel victimized and threatened by external enemies in the course of political conflict.  

30 Pedahzur, Suicide Terrorism, 159.  
In a groundbreaking 2002 article, researcher David Brooks noted, "the best resource [Palestinian] terrorists have is the culture of martyrdom." Accordingly, scores of studies have acknowledged the important roles social conditions play in propelling suicide terrorism.

Superceding or at least tangling together the organizational and social levels, some researchers view social networks as central to the suicide terrorism phenomenon. Similarly, scholars Anat Berko and Edna Erez contend that "individual motivation (internally or externally induced) to self-sacrifice combined with access to or support of an organization are necessary conditions in suicide bombing." Oftentimes scholars make links between various levels of analysis in passing and without clear articulation.

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32 Brooks, 20.
35 Berko and Erez, 607.
Recognizing the disparate but important findings that these approaches produce, Moghadam designed a "multi-causal approach to the study of suicide terrorism." In it he acknowledges the respective utility of "individual/psychological," "organizational/strategic" and "environmental/structural" approaches. Accordingly, Moghadam's framework seeks to show how the three levels "interact with each other, and at times are thoroughly intertwined, resulting in synergetic effects." Similarly, in 2006, Hafez published a study on Palestinian suicide-homicide bombers, which used a combination of analyses at a similar three levels: "organizational strategies, individual motivations, and societal conflicts." Hafez asserts that

Social movement approaches have a distinct advantage over purely political, psychological, or cultural approaches because they are interdisciplinary and multipronged. They analyze relationships among political environments, organizational dynamics, and cultural frameworks. Above all, they seek to explain collective action at three levels of analysis: individual

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37 Moghadam, "The Roots of Suicide Terrorism," in Root Causes of Suicide Terrorism, 88.

38 Hafez, Manufacturing Human Bombs, 15.
involvement, organizational strategies, and sociopolitical facilitators of activism.\textsuperscript{39}

Importantly, Moghadam and Hafez have seemingly slowed the debate over approaches to suicide terrorism for the time being. They show that integrating the three approaches works to provide a comprehensive analytical method. Context, however, still dictates the importance one level might take over another at a given time and/or place.\textsuperscript{40}

The Palestinian Context

Generally in studies on suicide terrorism, one notices an analysis of the "root causes." Within this discussion relating to the Palestinian context, academic literature provides a spectrum ranging from studies that solely blame the aggressor to those which only find culpability with the targeted. Numerous studies pinning the blame of Palestinian suicide terrorism on its Israeli victims suggest that the phenomenon epitomizes the desperation of a people.

Palestinian Psychiatrist Eyad El Sarraj promotes this type


\textsuperscript{40} Note the differences in Hafez's own findings on his independent studies of suicide terrorism on the Palestinians and in Iraq. See Hafez, \textit{Manufacturing Human Bombs}; and Hafez, \textit{Suicide Bombers in Iraq}.
of reasoning, as he suggests, "[t]he hopelessness that comes from a situation that keeps getting worse, a despair where living becomes no different from dying...It propels people to actions or solutions that previously would have been unthinkable."\(^4^1\) Also commonly found within the general suicide terrorism literature, El Sarraj’s statement summarizes the “they made me do it” explanation that seeks to the credit harsh conditions imposed by an opposing nation or group for the desperate realities a people might face, in which an act of suicide-vengeance offers the optimal escape. Along similar lines, some scholars also view “humiliation” as a primary impetus for Palestinian suicide terrorism.\(^4^2\)

Unsurprisingly, Israeli academics and analysts offer the most thorough research on Palestinian suicide-homicide bombers. Particularly, the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT) sits at the top of this expertise. Headed by scholar Boaz Ganor, ICT offers a profusion of

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quality studies on varying aspects of Palestinian suicide terrorism. ICT scholars Shaul Shay and Ely Karmon, Tel Aviv University professor Ariel Merari, Project for the Research of Islamist Movements (PRISM) director Reuven Paz, University of Texas-Austin professor Ami Pedahzur, Jaffe Center for Strategic Studies researcher Yoram Schweitzer, Hebrew University professor Raphael Israeli, Palestinian Media Watch director Itamar Marcus, and Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center director Barry Rubin, to name a few, additionally provide in-depth


45 See collection of articles at <www.instituteforcounterterrorism.org>.


48 See Pedahzur, *Suicide Terrorism*.

49 See Yoram Schweitzer ed., “Female Suicide Bombers: Dying for Equality?” Memorandum No. 84 (Tel Aviv: Jaffe Center for Strategic Studies, 2006).


51 See a comprehensive documentation of the Palestinian culture of martyrdom, overseen by Marcus at <www.pmw.org.il>.

52 See a collection of Rubin’s articles at <www.gloriacenter.org>.
research and analysis that displays expertise derived from years of frontline research.

Many Israeli scholars draw from and build on the work of the late Dean of the Lauder School of Diplomacy and Strategy\textsuperscript{53} at the Interdisciplinary Center (IDC)\textsuperscript{54} in Herzliya, Ehud Sprinzak, who initially brought attention to suicide-homicide attacks' rational/strategic component. This tradition implies that Palestinian suicide terrorism represents a tactical by-product of organizations matching means to an end—in this case, the destruction of the state of Israel. However, a new trend in Israeli scholarship on Palestinian suicide terrorism has recently made findings contrasting the strictly organization-centric model summarized by Ganor’s contention that Palestinian suicide terrorists do not volunteer but are recruited.\textsuperscript{55} The newer trend identifies more closely the social forces that work as a corollary to organizational models. Indeed, Pedahzur and Arie Perliger have worked to shed light on suicide-terror attacks launched at the intra-organizational and

\textsuperscript{53} Formerly the Lauder School of Government
\textsuperscript{54} IDC also houses ICT, as well as Rubin’s GLORIA and Paz’s PRISM.
\textsuperscript{55} Sprinzak, “Rational Fanatics.”
inter-organizational levels. ICT research fellow Jonathan Fine argues for the necessity "to assess culture, ideology, and motivation," on a case-by-case basis. ICT scholar Anat Berko additionally highlights the importance of individual motivations, playing off another tradition in Israeli scholarship pioneered by Sprinzak: "to maintain contact with terrorists, and talk to them, in order to understand them"; or as another scholar summarized: "[Sprinzak] had this elegantly simple notion, that the best way to find out what leads people...to be willing to kill in the name of their cause, is--to ask them!" Holding true to all levels of analysis, Sprinzak's simple, yet "elegant" notion can help elucidate why not only individuals but also organizations and large portions of a society might support

suicide terrorism. Taken together, the scholarly literature concludes that in most contexts, including the Palestinian one, society, organizations and individuals work as one in launching and sustaining suicide-terror campaigns. So, it makes sense to look at the words and deeds of those individuals, organizations and social forces perpetrating Palestinian suicide terrorism to determine why it has emerged and remains a problem of the utmost consequence.
CHAPTER THREE

METHODOLOGY: DEFINITIONS, CONCEPTS
AND THE RELATION BETWEEN IDENTITY
AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE

Purpose of Study

From Thucydides to Carl Von Clausewitz to Donald Kagan, Kenneth Waltz and Joseph Nye, insightful observers of warfare have recognized that war erupts from multiple causes and at a number of levels, whether international, state, individual or a combination. Likewise, as recent scholarship determines, gaining a comprehensive understanding of terrorism and more specifically suicide terrorism requires a multilayered approach. In the

1 Here the use of "political violence," a somewhat controversial term, refers to any form of violent conflict designed for political purposes. In this sense, political violence functions as an umbrella term for war, asymmetrical warfare, guerrilla warfare and terrorism.


3 While there have been many excellent contributions to the study on suicide terrorism that look at a specific cause or use a single level of analysis, many of these studies miss the "big picture." See Moghadam, "The Roots of Suicide Terrorism,"
Palestinian context, suicide terrorism revolves around the phenomenon of the shahid, which acts on behalf of a popular culture of martyrdom that represents decades of influence on society from a variety of terrorist and other militant political organizations. Accordingly, the following research seeks to uncover the relationship between the political objectives of the primary Palestinian political entities, the methods used by those entities to pursue their goals, and the socio-cultural fluctuation vis-à-vis the acceptability of, and participation in, suicide terrorism that has occurred as a result. Clausewitz recognizes that war is a product of a "trinity" made up of the people, their government and its army. Similarly, one can view contemporary terror campaigns through the lens of a people who identify with one another and have a set of common goals (i.e. a collective), their representative organizations, and the armed fighters of those organizations or affiliated social networks. As a

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supplement to the multi-layered approach, the following study analyzes the development and evolution of Palestinian suicide terrorism using the "trinity" model as a socio-political gauge for shifts in the Palestinian collective identity--viewed here as the primary source behind Palestinians' employment of suicide terrorism.

Any lasting solutions to suicide terrorism lie within the exposure of its ideological, as well as tactical and operational, sources. Furthermore, detecting the motivations that propel suicide terrorism's continued use can create a starting point for establishing a suitable counter-terrorism policy. This is not, however, a study on counter-terrorism methods, but rather an analysis of the motivations of individuals, entities and a society that participate in a particular terror modus operandi, so as to open the door for a better understanding of how one might best deter, preempt or prevent participation in such acts in the future. Surely, the rational allures to committing acts of suicide terrorism provide inherent rational deterrents.5 And there is no better context to review suicide-homicide attacks than the Palestinian one, wherein

5 The "rational" actor is defined here as one who operates with reason.
the *modus operandi* has had significant comparative success politically and in turn inspired numerous other campaigns internationally. Indeed, the Palestinian organizations that have used suicide terrorism represent the *host* to the spread of the larger suicide-terror epidemic. Often identifying and understanding the host to a disease marks the first advancement toward finding a cure for it. The same logic applies here.

Thus, the following study has three purposes: first, to determine how certain Palestinian terror organizations developed an efficient process to deploy suicide-homicide bombers; second, to display how a specific-terror supporting culture has influenced international terror campaigns; or, to decode the effects that the Palestinian *shahid* phenomenon has had outside its own context in order to provide insight into the learning process that allows the global-terror community to evolve various *modi operandi* and strategies; last, and most importantly, to provide a thorough understanding of the motivations behind the *shahid/suicide-homicide bomber* phenomenon. Two methods central to this last part include: eradicating "mirror
imaging" from analysis by understanding the specifics of the socio-cultural environment from which the phenomenon under study arises, and, as stated above, by using various levels of analysis, which can elucidate the connections between the three components within the trinity model. Accordingly, the four following questions warrant further research than that which is readily available: first, what effect has Palestinian organizations' accommodating da'awa infrastructures and/or supportive political/governmental institutions had on the process of creating suicide-homicide bombers? Second, what effect has the Palestinian culture of martyrdom had on suicide terrorism in the disputed territories as well as in the international arena? Three, what political victories have Palestinian terror organizations gained by employing suicide-homicide bombers, and how have these lessons-learned affected international terror campaigns? Four, how do rationality and culture play into Palestinian suicide-homicide operations for the perpetrating individual, deploying terror organization, sanctioning society, and nation-state that seeks to deter

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6 Oftentimes, deterrence policies suffer a problem of "mirror-imaging," in which the deterring nation-state assumes that a foe maintains a similar worldview that arrives them to identical cost/benefit analyses.
such actions? This work contends that the answers to the questions above also answer questions posed by scholars pondering the general suicide-terror phenomenon. Bloom articulates:

The almost daily occurrences of suicide attacks in Iraq, the July 25 attack in Sharm el Sheikh in Egypt...coupled with the July 7 and 21 attacks against the London Tube and buses, the first such instance of suicide terror from homegrown cells in the West, raise the question of why a once occasional mode of attack increasingly appears to be the terrorists’ weapon of choice. The increase in the number of attacks throughout the world...and the increasing lethality of the improvised explosive devices themselves require further investigation and understanding.7

Terrorism trends spiral, from an inner core to the outer periphery—-from local conflicts to global campaigns; fashionable tactics adapt and evolve to new environments and accordingly embed themselves into varying strategies. Like a product of the fashion industry, a terror modus operandi such as suicide-homicide bombing snags onto a wave of popularity. That which is new, shocking and often brilliantly devised captures the attention of youthful masses. The following study seeks to decipher the shahid fashion, by identifying its chief designers, producers and

their methods, in order to help prevent further imitation and adaptation.

Definitions

Clausewitz states "war is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means."\textsuperscript{8} War in perhaps its most rugged and callous incarnation takes on the form of terrorism. Often today, so brutal are the tactics and vile the choice of targets that acts of terrorism lose their ability to provoke an understanding of the political pursuits, which drive the employment of such acts. One can easily forget that behind an act of terror lays a political goal, driven by an organizational ideology that a collective identity empowers. It is far easier to understand terrorists as "crazy," "insane," "deranged," "mentally ill," or possessing other pathological states of mind that explain their actions with a simple psychotic diagnosis. For some, suicide terrorism exacerbates this issue of comprehension. But despite the intuition to write off acts of terrorism and specifically suicide-homicide attacks as crazy, such acts stand far from anything of the

\textsuperscript{8} Clausewitz, 99.
sort. Terrorism and suicide-homicide attacks have found their place as strategy and tactic in the pursuit of political goals; they are just as much "the extension of politics by other means," as are other forms and acts of warfare. Whether they are legitimate or not is another question--one that definitions can only answer.

In any discussion on warfare of any kind and particularly on terrorism, maintaining clarity requires a brief explanation of general terms and their intended usage. First and foremost, it is necessary to define "terrorism." Terrorism is the use of violence by a non-state actor against civilians and/or non-combatants for the purpose of political gain. Three parts, all equally important, make up the definition. First, by removing "non-state actor," the wording simply defines war in its modern sense as between nation-states. Second, if one replaces "civilians and/or non-combatants" with soldiers and/or their commanding-civilian officials, then the wording defines guerrilla warfare and not terrorism; if a specific attack targets a mixture of the two types of victims, then the definition reverts to the aggressor: that is, if a state actor perpetrates the attack then it is an act of war, whereas if a non-state actor perpetrates the attack
then it is an act of terrorism. The distinction might seem esoteric to some. Nevertheless it is important to recognize that governments of nation-states are the only legitimate facilitators of coercive force, as they represent the only entities responsible for citizenry and to the potential negative responses of foreign entities, which could be detrimental to the nation as a whole.\(^9\) Third, by taking out “political gain,” the wording defines violent crime. Furthermore, when executed without some type of attached political purpose, emotional acts or “revenge” acts constitute crimes and not terrorism—although in many instances a specific political act might have instigated a perpetrator’s desire for vengeance.

“Suicide\(^{10}\) terrorism” for all intents and purposes refers to an act of terrorism, in which the perpetrator kills oneself while initiating the attack. Furthermore, operational success, whether tactically, symbolically or both, requires the perpetrator to take his or her own

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\(^9\) A guerrilla war carried on after the fall of the particular nation-state’s government maintains legitimacy to the effort’s end; a nation-state after all is deemed “successful” or not by its ability to own a monopoly on the use of coercive force, as a state’s monopoly allows for its nation’s stability and security, as well as maximizes the potential for securing against external threats.

\(^{10}\) “Suicide” is defined here simply as one committing the premeditated, or intentional, killing of oneself.
"Suicide-homicide bomber" represents an individual that detonates explosives either strapped to his or her person, directly carried, or contained within a vehicle for the purpose of carrying out a suicide-homicide attack. Importantly, suicide-homicide bomber, rather than "suicide bomber" or "homicide bomber," explicitly expresses the two separate, albeit simultaneous, acts that such an attacker intends to commit while carrying out his or her operation—i.e. suicide and murder.

"Political Islam," or "Islamism," simply refers to a political ideology based on the fundamental tenets of Islam. Furthermore, just as various interpretations of those tenets have spawned a variety of Islamic sects, nearly an equal number of versions of Islamism exist—such as Sunni, Shi'á and others, including a variety of sub-sect offshoots and juxtapositions like Salafi and revolutionary Shi'á. One could understand "hardline Islamism" simply as Islamic supremacism, or the viewpoint that political Islam offers the only viable and righteous political ideology.

"Islamic fanaticism" represents those ideas and individuals

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within Islamist movements that promote a willingness to sacrifice individual self-interest for the collective cause.\textsuperscript{12}

Literally "struggle," but meaning "holy war," jihad has functioned differently throughout Islamic history. The primary Islamic texts, Qur'an and Hadith, complement jihad with the notions of \textit{dar al-Islam} (dwelling of submission) and \textit{dar al-harb} (dwelling of war); when infidels, i.e. non-Muslims, invade \textit{dar al-Islam}, Muslims have a \textit{fard ayn} (individual obligation) to physically defend their sacred territory. \textit{Dar al-harb} denotes territory that still requires Islamic conquest; accordingly, during such Islamic expansions, Muslims have a \textit{fard kifaya} (collective obligation) to jihad, meaning able-bodied individuals may opt to participate through means other than physical combat. The additional notion of \textit{dar al-sulh} (dwelling of armistice) represents those territories where non-Muslims have signed an armistice with Muslims and agreed to pay a tribute.\textsuperscript{13} The Shaffi school of Islam\textsuperscript{14} adds the category of

\textsuperscript{12} For an explanation of the term "fanatic," see Lee Harris, The Suicide of Reason: Radical's Islam's Threat to the West (New York: Basic Books, 2007), xx.
dar al-ahd (dwelling of agreement), in which a territory receives a neutral designation. Furthermore, Sufi or mystic Muslims promote the idea of breaking jihad down into general two forms: jihad al-nafs (spiritual holy war) refers to a Muslim’s spiritual struggle within oneself, whereas jihad bil-saif (holy war of the sword) stands for a physical struggle against the enemies of Islam. Unless otherwise noted, the traditional definition is how the work uses the term throughout, as “Islamic thinkers [on the whole] reject the quietist and mystical version.”

The next two definitions, in their verb, gerund and noun forms, often cause some confusion for non-Arabic speakers, as they hold similar connotations, yet with subtle differences, and are commonly used interchangeably in colloquial discourse. Shahada literally stands for “witness”--however, depending on context, it either means

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14 Sunni Islam has four schools, including Hanafi, Maliki, Shaffi and Hanbali.
15 Khosrokhavar, 13.
17 Khosrokhavar, 15.
the “affirmation of one’s submission to Allah,”¹⁸ or “death for Allah’s sake.” Istishhad literally stands for “martyrdom”—although, meaning “self-sacrifice for Allah’s sake.” Shahada refers to incidental death during jihad, whereas istishhad indicates deliberate death during jihad. Regarding where each relates to suicide terrorism, the former connotes a “willingness to die” and the latter an explicit “eagerness to die”—thus leaving only istishhad in the realm of suicide terrorism.¹⁹

Concepts

Similarly to definitions and the key distinctions they make, concepts and their explanations work to increase the level of lucidity. The following research contains discussions on four concepts in particular. Each has a distinct function in the Palestinian suicide terror phenomenon.

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¹⁸ In this sense, shahada also refers to the first pillar of Islam—confirming one’s affirmation as a Muslim by declaring loyalty to Allah.
¹⁹ One scholar explores the importance of making distinctions between these two types of self-sacrificial acts. See Jon Elster, “Motivations and Beliefs in Suicide Missions,” in Making Sense of Suicide Missions, expanded and updated ed., ed. Diego Gambetta (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 237-238.
First and foremost, "Palestinian shahid" refers primarily to the Palestinian perpetrators of suicide-homicide attacks beginning in 1993; the concept secondarily represents those deemed "shahids" in Palestinian society, whether participants in suicide-homicide bombings or otherwise. Palestinian society views both the shahid and the istishhadi as martyrs who deserve the rewards of paradise.\textsuperscript{20} Indeed, colloquially, as noted above, Palestinians speak about both the istishhadi (one who intentionally commits martyrdom during jihad) and the shahid (one who incidentally attains martyrdom during jihad) as shahids.\textsuperscript{21} To confuse matters further, when discussing a suicide-homicide attacker and/or a suicide-homicide attack, Palestinians (as other Arab Muslims) usually use shahid in referring to the suicide-homicide attacker and istishhad in describing the act. However, as one researcher points out, Palestinians frequently say things like: "Before the istish’hadi, there were shuhada

\textsuperscript{20} Yasser Mahmoud Ali Abu Bakar cited in Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, \textit{Suicide bombing terrorism during the current Israeli-Palestinian conflict: September 2000-December 2005} (1 January 2006), 7-8; accessed at <www.terrorism-info.org.il/>.

\textsuperscript{21} Additionally, one should not confuse the shahid/istishhadi with the fedai’i or mujahid, both of whom display a willingness to sacrifice their lives for Islam, but usually seek to fight as long as circumstances permit.
"martyrs"—such a statement refers to the specific tactical change, from dying while throwing rocks at soldiers to blowing oneself up on a civilian bus, that occurred between the first intifada and al-Aqsa intifada. The social blurring of these terms oftentimes creates analytical difficulties. Simply put, one could think of it as all istishhadis are shahids, but not vice versa, and therefore the more encompassing term usually wins out in the layman’s everyday usage. Thus, for purposes of this work, although istishhadi, or one who “intentionally commits martyrdom,” might represent a more precise denotation of a suicide terrorist, shahid is used throughout as Palestinians more commonly use the term colloquially to define one who has participated in an 'amalyya istishhadiyya (martyrdom operation)—i.e. suicide-terror attack.

Second, “culture of martyrdom” represents the forces in Palestinian society that accommodate participation in terrorism; moreover, it is the socio-cultural fabric that often instigates participation in suicide-homicide bombings and other such “martyrdom operations.” Furthermore, the

culture of martyrdom stands for the components of the shahid/suicide-homicide bomber phenomenon not necessarily affiliated with a particular organization, as it collectively signifies the elements in Palestinian society, such as music videos, popular poems, educational texts books, mass rallies, memorabilia, etc. that support ideas of, and sanction beliefs in, jihad, shahada and istishhad or commemorate a past shahid. Additionally, it represents less tangible components that accommodate suicide terrorism, such as popular acceptance and praise of shahids, as well as scarce condemnation by authority figures and other forms of tacit consent.

Third, “terror machine” signifies the established social apparatuses as well as the political institutions that support, from time to time, one or more organizations, including Hamas’s al-Qassam Brigades, Palestinian Islamic Jihad’s al-Quds Brigades, Fatah’s al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade, and others. An organization’s “terror machine” refers to the actual components of an infrastructure behind the process of deploying suicide-homicide bombers, such as the bombmakers and dispatchers, inspirational sermons, videos of previous shahids, etc.
Fourth, the Palestinian notion of *sammud* (steadfastness) or national perseverance refers to "staying on the land despite immense Israeli pressure to leave."^23^ *Sammud* symbolizes a daily "form of resistance activism."^24^ Moreover, *sammud* represents Palestinian Arabs' conceptual response to the narrative of *al-Naqba* (the Catastrophe), which signifies the establishment of a Jewish state on sacred Islamic land. Containing deep a "religious sensibility,"^25^ which shapes the national consciousness in the form of Islamic concepts and promotes maximalist goals, *sammud* accordingly encourages Palestinians to reject any proposal compromising the prospects of establishing an Arab/Islamic state over the old territory of Mandatory Palestine. Furthermore, *sammud* has played a central role in the "development of Palestinian society," and the shahid's popularization.^26^

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^23^ See Mark Levine, "Chaos, Globalization, and the Public Sphere: Political Struggle in Iraq and Palestine," *The Middle East Journal* 60, no. 3 (Summer 2006): 473.


^25^ Levine, 473.

^26^ Notes from discussion with Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs (PASSIA) Director Mahdi Abdul Hadi, in Jerusalem, Israel (19 December 2005).
Key to understanding all four concepts is gathering how they developed overtime through the interplay and fluctuation between a Palestinian collective identity, its related political goals, organizational strategies on obtaining those goals, the corresponding tactics employed, and the mobilization of individuals to carry out tactical operations. Particular identities, for purposes of this study, are extremely important as their attached narratives lend varying levels of support and legitimacy to any number of types of violence, including suicide terrorism.

Identity Construction and Fluctuation in Pursuit of a Nation-State

Two central parts compose the modern nation-state: the nation, which reflects a collective identity, and the state, which governs the people who embody the collective. The legitimacy of a specific nation-state, as understood in international relations, derives from the fulfillment of three areas: (1) building a nation--or group of people in agreement with one another on a common identity and civic culture or social contract (i.e. the establishment of non-violent means for the resolution of civil necessities); (2) erecting a state--or governmental monopoly on the use of
physical coercion; and, (3) recognition by a world power of
the previous two—-that is, the nation/collective and the
state/government. Accordingly, realizing a nation marks an
imperative first step, not only to legitimizing a state but
also making one function at an acceptable level to the
population that it governs. For decades, various
Palestinian movements have sought to simultaneously
construct a national identity, establish a state and garner
international support for recognizing the fulfillment of
the previous two.

A group’s realization that it comprises a separate and
distinguishable nation, whether contrived after the
formation of a state, sought after the dismemberment of an
empire or otherwise, acts as the source of the “nation’s”
staying power. A historical narrative operates as one of
the pillars that holds up the social and political cohesion
of a nation. Narratives tell a historical story, describe
the present, and imagine a future. Narratives help define a
collective identity and accentuate it politically and

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27 While debatably an imperative to a nation-state’s legitimacy, the importance of a nascent revolutionary nation-state seeking and securing support from world powers goes back to the efforts of the emerging United States, which dispatched Benjamin Franklin, John Adams, and John Jay across Europe to secure recognition of America’s legitimate establishment of self-determination.
culturally.\textsuperscript{28} The "imagined future" accordingly lends itself to those articulating common goals for the collective. Supplemented with cultural values and beliefs, and personal attitudes, common goals pave the way for collective behavior.

It comes as no surprise then that the manner in which Palestinian Arabs have viewed themselves since the Ottoman Empire has shaped their political behavior—including how they have employed violence. Palestinian Arabs, like most people across the globe and throughout time, have ascribed and subscribed to multiple identities simultaneously. Whether religious, ethnic, national, tribal, clan, family, occupational, gender, age, etc., individuals find themselves in a continuous negotiation of a "hierarchy of identities"; scholars Michael Barnett and Shibley Telhami explain, within such a hierarchy "one [identity] constitutes the core and others...are 'activated' during certain social situations and do not undermine the pillar."\textsuperscript{29} Nations find themselves in a similar negotiation

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\textsuperscript{29} The "hierarchy of identities" notion is also referred to as a "menu of choices." See Michael Barnett and Shibley Telhami,
that is occasionally swayed by a charismatic leader, religious resurgence, social reformation, en vogue political ideology or other collective-identity altering phenomena. Scholar Samuel P. Huntington explains,

Identity is an individual’s or a group’s sense of self. It is a product of self-consciousness, that I or we possess distinct qualities as an entity that differentiates me from you and us from them. Identities are important because they shape the behavior of people.  

Maintaining a collective (e.g. national) identity can at times be taxing on a populace and/or governing body. This is particularly the case when a group finds itself geo-politically dislocated from others with whom it has a common identity. Palestinian Arabs after World War I (WWI) exemplify such a case; during this period, they found themselves, most of whom self-identified as “Southern Syrians,” under British rule in Mandatory Palestine, and

31 An identity’s strength is usually determined by the amount of people, influential elites and/or community leaders who ascribe or subscribe to it as an important signifier of their overall hierarchy of identities. Newly established political boundaries, however, oftentimes function as a political tabula rasa.
separated from the newly carved-out protectorates of Syria and Transjordan. Many Palestinian Arabs had viewed Islam as their most important identity prior to WWI, but with the Ottoman Empire and Caliphate dissolved, Arab ethno-linguistic identity arose as the natural and pragmatic alternative.\(^3\) The Arab world, however, found itself superficially divided by British and French imperial design. Accordingly new, constructed, national identities crept to the forefront of many Middle Eastern peoples' hierarchy of identities.

Often collective identity is just as much about the "them" as the "us." In the decades preceding WWI, the arrival of waves of Zionists in Ottoman Palestine heightened the sensitivities of Arab nationalism. Thus, a key catalyst to Arab nationalism in the Levant and Palestine proved to be the "us"-versus-"them" scenarios that played themselves out in confrontations between the \(Yishuv\) (Jewish settlement)\(^3\) and the local Arab population.

\(\text{Palestine Complete: Jews and Arabs under the British Mandate (New York: Owl Books, 2001).}\)

\(^3\) The Young Turks' loosening of the Ottoman imperial grip precipitated national awareness among Levantine Arabs, including those in Palestine. However, Arabism did not fully flourish until after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire.

\(^3\) The \(Yishuv\) stands for the pre-state Jewish establishment in Ottoman and British Palestine.
first during Ottoman rule, followed later by the British and U.N. Mandates and lastly after the state of Israel’s establishment in 1948. The fluctuation of the Palestinian Arab population’s collective identity often resulted in a reshaping of how leading political bodies viewed and approached the political situation. Throughout the Zionist-Arab, Israeli-Arab, and Israeli-Palestinian conflicts, these changes have significantly affected how Palestinian Arab organizations have utilized political violence.

By no coincidence, Palestinian political violence strategies and tactics have progressively obtained higher levels of brutality as the primary objectives of the Palestinian populace have remained untenable over the decades. At times organizations have attempted to negotiate away various objectives, only to be met with popular rejection. A combination of the apparent permanence of the state of Israel, coupled with a Palestinian collective identity that increasingly attaches identifiable components

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35 The varying “conflicts” do not refer to those between different groups per se, but rather signify different time periods of the century-long conflict between Jews and Arabs over the territory of Ottoman Palestine, British Mandatory Palestine, and lastly the State of Israel.
36 When asked why he did not agree to a final status in 2000 with Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak’s offer of 90 percent of the disputed territories on the table, Arafat remarked: “[the rest] is not mine to give.”
(e.g. victimhood, glorification of martyrdom, hatred of Israel\textsuperscript{37}) that distinguish it as the pure antithesis to Israel, has exacerbated the “us” versus “them” mentality. Therefore, while identity has served as a primary device to maintain social cohesion amid the Palestinian nation absent a state, it has also functioned as the narrating source to the virulent ideologies that have waged a continuous and escalating war first against the Yishuv and later against Israel.

Whether during 1929 riots,\textsuperscript{38} the Arab revolt from 1936 to 1939, the Jewish-Arab Civil War from late 1947 to May 1948, the PLO’s decades-long terror campaign, the first intifada from December 1987 to early 1993, or the more recent \textit{al-Aqsa intifada} from September 2000 to late 2005, Palestinian Arabs have demonstrated that organized political violence serves at the request of a supportive constituency. By identifying some kind of common ground and goals as a collective foundation, groups sustain cohesion. While constituencies might disagree from time to time over the means, the broader collective identity remains unified

\textsuperscript{37} Notes from ICT seminar on “The Counter-Terrorism Puzzle,” given by Boaz Ganor, in Herzliya, Israel (19 June 2005).

\textsuperscript{38} The riots are also known as the “disturbances,” which was a term preferred by the British in order to deceptively insinuate minimal severity to its own population.
on the ends. For nearly 80 years, whether through the death squads of the Arab Higher Committee,⁹ PLO fedayin or Hamas shuhada, Palestinian Arabs have demonstrated how a society, an organization and empowered individuals can operate as one in pursuit of a state, all while attempting to construct and maintain a nation, and fight the ever-important “other.”

Producing the Contemporary Shahid

Various rationales and attractions draw individuals into the world of terrorism. More often than not, however, personal and collective identity and ideology-infused organizations play key roles in highlighting the allures and duties of participating in political violence. Identity shapes one’s desires at varying levels of human interaction—political, social and so forth. Moreover, one’s hierarchy of identities, as dominated by the negotiated spearhead, often directs or indirectly arrives the individual during his or her lifetime to a corresponding ideology, which focuses his or her

"[political] view of the present and vision of the future," and simultaneously buttresses his or her identity. Thus, whether consciously or subconsciously, the symbiotic relationship between identity and ideology mark the starting line of an individual's race to political action. Terrorists are by definition political actors. For religion, revolution, rebellion or otherwise, terrorists act in pursuit of political change. The actions terrorists take represent the pursuit of an end goal, which a specific ideology usually defines. But, ideological attractions do not seduce individuals in the sense of hypnotization--lacking coercion, they must play directly into the one's natural sense of a cost/benefit analysis, as constituted by his or her cultural mindset, in order to result in the individual taking action.

41 Central characteristics of terrorism, and terror organizations, have drastically changed over the last 30 years. Whereas the terrorism of the late 1960s and 1970s reflected more elitist ideological campaigns (i.e. generally Marxist-Leninist), today's terror organizations predominately pursue identity-based goals (i.e. usually religious or ethno-nationalist). Nevertheless, both identity and ideology play key roles in the overwhelming majority of modern terror campaigns. For extensive studies on the evolution of modern terrorism, see Laqueur, New Terrorism; and Hoffman, Inside Terrorism.
Values, beliefs and attitudes produce behavior.\textsuperscript{42} Culture, unlike anything else, has the ability to develop, condition and refine one's mindset; as it shapes how knowledge, or in the case of terrorism, how one receives and understands a doctrine. Culture, ultimately, acts as a filter for behavior's three primary instigating factors. Scholar Ernest Gellner explains culture as "a system of ideas and signs and associations and ways of behaving and communication."\textsuperscript{43} Huntington adds, "[culture] refers to a people's language, religious beliefs, social and political values, assumptions as to what is right and wrong, appropriate and inappropriate, and to the objective institutions and behavioral patterns that reflect these subjective elements."\textsuperscript{44} Culture thus enables rationales, which sanction specific behavior--leaving individuals with an understanding of the world around them, as well as with direction for the choices that lay before them. Philosopher Lee Harris notes:

Our culture trains us. It teaches us what to be ashamed of, what is permissible to do in front of other people and what is not. It teaches us how

\textsuperscript{42} Notes from lecture on "Government and Politics of Japan," given by Ray Geigle, in Bakersfield, California (January 2003).
\textsuperscript{44} Huntington, \textit{Who Are We?}, 30.
to show respect and deference, how to indicate that we have a peaceful intent, how to assert ourselves without offending others, and in general how to behave ‘properly’ with others in our interactions with them.\textsuperscript{45}

Culture, nonetheless, works as the individual’s gauge for socially acceptable behavior, as well as an organization’s guidelines for that which a given collective deems permissible.

Today, when an individual Palestinian volunteers, prepares and lastly becomes a suicide-homicide bomber, he or she does not merely fulfill some shadowy cult’s religious ritual or an honorary duty. Rather, he or she acts on an individual finding of a cost/benefit analysis, as weighed through social norms, expectations, bonds and personal interests. This “weighing procedure” marks the final step in a larger process, wherein the individual initially receives exposure to a framing of a problem, secondly gets introduced to potential solutions to the problem, subsequently finds justifications and legitimacy for the proposed solutions, and lastly considers the prospects of acting in pursuit of the solutions. Thus, the act of killing oneself to murder others, while certainly

considered a religious duty or maintenance of ethno-cultural honor for some, ultimately marks the final product of a lengthy process that incorporates the functions of identity, ideology and culture, the institutions of socialization, and the psychology of a sane individual. Therefore, a pair of cooperative relationships, one between the individual's identity and subscribed ideology, and another between one's reasoning and specific cognitive boundaries placed on it by his or her socio-cultural milieu, determine one's participation in political activism, including acts of terrorism.
CHAPTER FOUR

RAISING THE SHAHID WITH IDENTITY AND IDEOLOGY:

PALESTINIAN SOCIETY, ORGANIZATIONS AND THE

DEVELOPMENT OF A CULTURE OF MARTYRDOM

Palestine, with the boundaries it had during the British Mandate, is an indivisible territorial unit.¹
- Palestinian National Charter, 1968

There is no solution to the Palestinian problem except by Jihad.²
- Hamas Charter, 1988

We will murder them all; we won’t leave a single Jew.³
- Palestinian girl on PA Television, October 22, 2000

During the initial-era of “Palestinian” nationalism, from the early 1920s to the establishment of Israel in 1948,⁴ the Arabs of Palestine looked predominantly to

religion for guidance in the political arena. With the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, Hajj Amin al-Husseini in place as the Palestinian-Arab population’s undisputed leader, religious overtones saturated the Zionist-Arab conflict over these years. The 1949 armistice between Israel and Arab states brought about a relatively dormant period in Palestinian nationalism, as Arabs in the West Bank formed part of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and Gazan Arabs


Hajj Amin al-Husseini arrived to the national stage, when he helped lead the 1920 riots and was subsequently convicted of his involvement in absentia by the Mandatory government. See Morris, Righteous Victims, 95 and 98; Chuck Morse, The Nazi Connection to Islamic Terrorism: Adolf Hitler and Haj Amin al-Husseini (New York: IUniverse, 2003), 17. A year later in 1921, Arabs again resorted to “pogrom”-like violence against Jews; yet, this time rather than sentence him to another ten years in prison for his role in inciting the violent episodes, the British decided to install Amin al-Husseini as the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, which made him the highest Islamic authority in Palestine. Amin al-Husseini’s grandfather, father, and elder brother had previously held the position of Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, and his appointment displayed the political and religious clout his clan, the Husseinis, continued to enjoy among the Palestinian Arab population. Segev, One Palestine, Complete, 159-160; also Morris, Righteous Victims, 100. Aside from being the “preeminent Palestinian nationalist leader,” Amin al-Husseini was also a local leader of the Muslim Brotherhood. See Ziad Abu-Amar, “Hamas: A Historical and Political Background,” The Journal of Palestine Studies 22, no. 4 (Summer 1993): 6.

came under Egyptian rule. This era saw Palestinian nationalism lapse into inertia, as Jordan and Egypt’s leaders promoted the status quo—keeping the notion of Palestinian self-determination frozen. Palestinian nationalism however found a new source of life with the creation of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), and its subsequent cooptation by Yasser Arafat and his outfit of Fatah fedayin. The defeat of Egypt, Syria and Jordan in the 1967 Six-Day War not only initiated the sounding of pan-Arabism’s death knell, but also left a majority of the Palestinian population under Israeli rule, disconnected from an Arab state, and once again left to reformulate a collective identity.

From the mid-1960s until the first intifada in December 1987, the PLO, an umbrella for numerous

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9 The PLO was created in January 1964 during a summit of Arab states at the behest of Egypt’s President Gemal Abd’ul Nasser. Its first leader, Ahmad Shuqari, was a known Nasserite and pan-Arabist. After Arafat’s takeover, the PLO readjusted its affiliation with the Arab League, Nasser and pan-Arabism in general. See Alexander and Sinai, Terrorism: The PLO Connection.
nationalist-terrorist groups, held a virtual monopoly on the Palestinian movement for self-determination. As Arafat and the PLO sought to maintain a staunch "secular-nationalist" timbre that fit well against the backdrop of the Cold War,\(^\text{10}\) political Islam remained largely in the Palestinian underground. But, by the mid-1980s, a collection of Palestinian organizations affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood\(^\text{11}\) began to mechanize participation in "resistance.\(^\text{12}\) With the PLO's leadership, including Arafat, mostly exiled in Tunisia the organization lacked a dominant command and control over the first Palestinian intifada--

\(^{10}\) As a primary backer of the PLO, the Soviet Union expected maintenance of some ideological solidarity with the entities it supported. See Ray S. Cline and Yonah Alexander, *Terrorism: The Soviet Connection* (New York: Crane, Russak & Company, 1984).

\(^{11}\) Established by Hassan al-Banna in 1928, as an Islamist rebuke of Egyptian King Farouk al-Awwal, Jamiat al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin (the Muslim Brotherhood) became a mainstay in Arab and Islamic political circles when one of its members, Sayyid Qutb called for an active *jihad* against secular-Arab governments and the West. See Seyyid Qutb, *Milestones* (Damascus, Syria: Dar al-Ilm, [no date] obtained in 2005). As the Muslim Brotherhood spread throughout the Arab and Muslim worlds, it established a Palestinian branch in 1945, but respective Jordanian and Egyptian politics dominated most of the organization's operations. For an extensive study on the formative decades of the Muslim Brotherhood, see Richard P. Mitchell, *The Society of Muslim Brothers* (London: Oxford University Press, 1969).

\(^{12}\) A popular euphemism used in Palestinian society, as well as throughout the Arab and Islamic worlds, "resistance" refers to political activism, including terror and guerrilla acts, against an "occupying" force. Accordingly, the terms resistance and occupation go hand in hand in the popular Palestinian lexicon.
allowing for the Muslim Brotherhood in Gaza\(^\text{13}\) to gain a share of the political benefits afforded by the uprising.\(^\text{14}\)

As the influence of Islamic organizations spread, competition with the PLO for popular support soared. The intense rivalry between these two main Palestinian political factions, one doctrinally Islamic and the other nationalistic, precipitated a vast mobilization of political participation within Palestinian society. As Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) rose to prominence, political Islam reaffirmed its role in Palestinian politics—ultimately emerging as the primary alternative to the PLO.

Eventually, in the 1990s, competition between the two sides over which best represented the Palestinian political movement led to a social synthesis of the two political movements' ideologies, qowmiyya (Arab nationalism) and

\(^\text{13}\) In the 1970s the different groupings of the Muslim Brotherhood in the West Bank, Gaza and Jordan united as “The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan and Palestine”; however, the Gaza component of the organization held the most power as it oversaw al-Mujamma and the Islamic University in Gaza.

\(^\text{14}\) There is some debate over which organization, if any, “controlled” the first intifada. Some argue the PLO did under the Fatah-led al-Qaeda al-Wataniyya al-Muwahhada li-Intifada (Unified National Leadership of the Uprising) or UNLU; see Mohammed M. Hafez, Manufacturing Human Bombs: The Making of Palestinian Suicide Bombers (Washington D.C.: United States Institute for Peace Press, 2006). Others argue Hamas had more of an edge; see Mishal and Sela, The Palestinian Hamas.
Islamiyya (political Islam). The notion of regaining the Islamic waqf (endowment) of "Palestine" matched the nationalist cry against "colonial occupation." Political Islam’s reappearance alongside the traditional PLO line, as instituted in the Palestinian Authority (PA), forced the Fatah-led body to look for ways to reacquire popular support. Thus the grassroots elements within the Muslim Brotherhood’s Gaza branch that initially provoked sustained-resistance at the beginning of the intifada in 1987, had by the end of al-Aqsa intifada in 2005, spawned a highly efficient terror apparatus, which operates to date at the behest of Hamas. The return of political Islam to prominence in the Palestinian political arena precipitated competition over political leadership, social direction and, most importantly, violent resistance. Consequently, a popular culture of martyrdom based on Islamic concepts developed in Palestinian society and directly led to the shahid/suicide-homicide bomber phenomenon.

Terror Organizations as the Voice of the Palestinians

In the Palestinian context, collective identity is inextricably linked to political violence strategies and
tactics employed by representative organizations. The phenomenon of the suicide-homicide bomber demonstrates this interrelation in full-force, as it mandates connectivity between a motivated political organization and willing individuals and an accommodating society, which provides an impetus for both.\textsuperscript{15} Distinguished terrorism expert Bruce Hoffman notes, "[t]he resilience of [terrorist] groups is doubtless a product of the relative ease with which they are able to draw sustenance and support from an existing constituency."\textsuperscript{16} Organizations rely on their constituencies for accommodation and momentum, and in return constituencies expect organizations to provide political representation. Ultimately they form a symbiosis.

More often than not, two factors primarily determine if and how political entities use violence against an enemy—or in this case, when and how Palestinian organizations target the state of Israel and its interests. First, whether the destruction of Israel and in its stead the establishment of a Palestinian state, the creation of a Palestinian state alongside Israel, or the establishment of an Islamic empire constituting all the lands of dar al-

\textsuperscript{15} See Hafez, \textit{Manufacturing Human Bombs}.

Islam, organizations’ political goals guide their strategies. Various means usually exist for a given setting. Strategy, thus, additionally determines the timing of violence, as well as whether restraint or negotiation might offer better options. Second, the population represented must sanction the type of violence used in order for the organization to maintain support over the long-run. Just as the population at hand oftentimes reaps the benefits of an organization’s success, the population, along with the organization, also pays the consequences. Both factors underline the necessary relationship between organizations and the population they attempt or claim to represent.

The evolution of the PLO exemplifies the importance of an organization’s interaction with its constituency. Effectively representing the Palestinian population during the 1960s and 1970s, the PLO maintained political stances that offered little compromise—thus reflecting the views of the Palestinian populace. By following a “strategy of

protracted struggle,"19 i.e. a variant of the Maoist three-stage guerrilla model, the PLO had to constantly keep media attention focused on itself. As a result, the PLO’s fedayin20 attained utmost importance within the organization’s strategy. Fedayin provided a romanticized icon for the Palestinian struggle, and as their international terror attacks brought the Palestinian issue to the world stage, the PLO’s ability to use a mixture of violence and diplomacy to further the Palestinian cause increased.21 The PLO, its fedayin, and the Palestinian population worked together, like Clausewitz’s “trinity” of war model suggests, furthering their collective goals

20 The feda‘i traces it roots far before the creation of the PLO, Fatah and Arafat. “Feda‘i is Islamic but its expression owes more to Arab-tribal culture. For decades, the PLO employed fedayin as its most trusted operatives. The Palestinian National Charter of the PLO declares: “[Fedayin] action constitutes the nucleus of the Palestinian popular liberation war.” See in Yonah Alexander and Joshua Sinai, Terrorism: The PLO Connection (New York: Crane, Russak & Company, 1989), 6-7 and 198.
21 By the late 1970s, more nation-states had recognized the PLO than the state of Israel. Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 70.
against their defined enemy. Accordingly, when the PLO became more responsive to international calls for peace and therefore less representative of the Palestinian population in the disputed territories, the patience of those same Palestinians wore thin. Arafat and his fedayin eventually found themselves outflanked during the intifada on the domestic-resistance front by kids armed with nothing more than stones and slingshots. The will of Palestinian youth to throw rocks at Israeli tanks captured the media attention that for so long the PLO had solely enjoyed. The PLO lost connection with the population it claimed to represent, and as a result other organizations filled the gap and made the moves the Palestinian population demanded—chiefly, the continuation of violent resistance. But, more importantly, the shift of the PLO’s strategy away from its icon, the feda’i, and onto sources that brought

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[23] The PLO’s long-time official number two in charge, Salah Khalaf, aka Abu Iyad, as early as 1981, admitted: “What we feared most of all...has happened. Our movement has become bureaucratized. What it gained in respectability it lost in militancy. We have acquired a taste for dealing with governments and men of power.” Quoted in Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 80.
the organization and Arafat international legitimacy,\textsuperscript{24} signaled to the Palestinian populace that it needed a new representative.

By seizing parts of the PLO’s following, Islamist-Palestinian organizations significantly expanded their own constituencies. Accordingly, as Hamas and PIJ consolidated power within Palestinian society, they sought to capitalize on it politically. The first intifada provided them with a prime opportunity to flex their political muscles. The re-elevation of political Islam within the Palestinian collective identity opened the door to changes in the population’s views on legitimate political violence tactics and targeting, and consequently led to the employment of new \textit{modi operandi}.

Suicide-homicide bombings made their mark in the 1990s as one such \textit{modus operandi}. Islamist-Palestinian organizations, and particularly Hamas, utilized suicide terrorism to distinguish themselves from the PLO/PA,\textsuperscript{25}

\textsuperscript{24} In 1988, Arafat banned PLO terror operations outside of Israel. Hoffman, \textit{Inside Terrorism}, 80.

disrupt the Israeli-PA peace process, and reshape the national consciousness. Hamas learned that suicide terrorism provided new moves in an extremely lethal yet stagnant political bout. Once discovering its signature mode of operation, Hamas realized just how to spend the social capital it had accumulated over nearly two decades.

The Hamas Terror Machine: Organizing Da’awa and Mechanizing Jihad

Hamas’s version of resistance, which relies heavily on the Islamic concepts of jihad (struggle) and istishhad (martyrdom), resonates quite differently with Palestinians than the PLO’s campaign for self-determination. This has as much to do with Hamas’s use of violence as it does with the terror organization’s intimate relationship with the Palestinian populace in the disputed territories and particularly in Gaza. Although the jihad operations of Hamas and its cousin organization PIJ brought notoriety to political Islam, the Gaza Muslim Brotherhood’s da’awa (Islamic calling) or proselytizing institutions, set up in

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the years preceding the intifada, deserve more of the credit for political Islam’s revival in Palestinian society. In the 1970s and 1980s, with Arafat in one exile after another, Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated organizations seized the opportunity to set up social services, such as health clinics, education facilities, Islamic centers, as well as to provide a wide range of other social services that were sure to win the loyalties of local populations.

Founded in 1973, al-Mujamma operated as a da’awa and administrative base for the Muslim Brotherhood in the Gaza Strip. Its leaders would eventually lead the intifada in

28 During the 1970s, as the political shortcomings of pan-Arabism, secular-Arab nationalism, and Nasserism became evident, an Islamic sahwa (awakening) spread across the Sunni-Arab world. See Hafez, Manufacturing Human Bombs, 34-35, etc. Iranian leader Ayatollah Khomeini led a similar Shi’a revival at the end of the decade. See Shaul Shay, Axis of Evil: Iran, Hizballah, and the Palestinian Terror (London: Transaction Publishers, 2004).
29 Al-Mujamma’s full name, Al-Mujamm’a al-Islami, means “the Islamic Gathering” in Arabic.
30 In 1978, al-Mujamma registered as a non-profit organization with the Israeli authorities, marking the initial cordial relations between the Jewish state and Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated organizations in the disputed territories and Jordan. After seeing its popularity stagnate due to a refusal to participate in armed resistance, the Muslim Brotherhood slowly began a change of course, culminating with its overt participation in the intifada and the establishment of Hamas. See Ziad Abu-Amr, “Hamas”; and Diego Baliani, “The Internecine Struggle among Palestinian Factions after Hamas’ takeover of the Gaza Strip,” ICT: Articles (23 October 2007): accessed at <www.instituteforcounterterrorism.org> on 28 October 2007.
1987; they included most notably, Sheikh Ahmad Yassin, who had been the most prominent Muslim Brotherhood member in Gaza since 1968, and "systematically" spread da'awa operations throughout Gaza. Over two decades, Yassin successfully established an Islamic organization, which provided vast social services to the Arab Gazan population, and an underground infrastructure that leaders could instantaneously activate to do the organization’s bidding. Historian Benny Morris explains, “[t]he growth of the [Muslim] Brotherhood--and Islamic fundamentalism in general--among Palestinians owed much to the organizational skills of Sheikh [Yassin].” He accomplished this while arousing little attention from the PLO and minimal concern by Israeli security services. In 1986, Yassin established Majd, which acted as al-Mujamma’s internal security force--i.e. it protected the Muslim Brotherhood’s interests from rival organizations, primarily the PLO’s Fatah, and

31 Mishal and Sela, The Palestinian Hamas, 16-19.
32 Yassin accomplished this by dividing Gaza into five areas, which were filled with operational cells made-up of three men each. See Mishal and Sela, The Palestinian Hamas, 19.
33 Morris, Righteous Victims, 563.
34 Meaning “glory” in Arabic, Majd represents the acronym of Munazzamat al-Jihad wal-Da’awa (the Organization of Jihad and Da’awa).
violently punished "collaborators." When PIJ began drawing members from al-Mujamma’s ranks due to an appealing activist-jihadi approach, Yassin, recognizing the need to match PIJ’s actions in order to maintain membership levels, increased Majd’s operations. In January 1988, as the intifada had swept across the disputed territories, the Gaza Muslim Brotherhood/al-Mujamma established Hamas as its official armed-wing in the disputed territories.

With the opportunity the intifada provided, Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood elements turned accumulated social capital into political action. Initially, al-Mujamma pressured young men in Gaza to participate in the intifada

35 Mishal and Sela, The Palestinian Hamas, 34-35.
36 Although founded in the late 1970s by Dr. Fathi Shaqaqi, Palestinian Islamic Jihad mostly lagged behind Yassin’s al-Mujamma and later Hamas in terms of social and political influence. See Levitt, 25-28.
37 PIJ’s ideology intertwines the teachings of Qutb and Khomeini making the organization politically right of Hamas.
39 On December 14, 1987, the Muslim Brotherhood released its first leaflet calling for resistance against Israel; this leaflet is often attributed as Hamas’s first communique. The name Hamas was not announced however until January 1988. This suggests the Muslim Brotherhood played it safe first before taking overt credit for its role in the intifada. See Abu-Amr, "Hamas," 10. Released in August 1988, Hamas’s Covenant states in Chapter One, Article Two: "The Islamic Resistance Movement is one of the wings of the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine." See Mishal and Sela, The Palestinian Hamas, 36 and 177.
by reminding them of their Islamic duty to do so. However, over the course of the first intifada, Hamas transformed its social apparatus into a political action machine—that is, it learned how to maximize political participation, including acts of violence, among its growing constituency. By the second intifada, Hamas would daily turn away scores of individuals seeking to participate in a "martyrdom operation." Or, as one Hamas official put it, "Our biggest problem is the hordes of young men who beat on our doors, clamoring to be sent... It is difficult to select only a few. Those whom we turn away return again and again pestering us, pleading to be accepted." 

Breeding Efficiency: The Effects of Competition over Resistance

Distinguished historians of the Zionist-Arab conflict have suggested, "the intifada accomplished more in its first few months than decades of PLO terrorism had

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achieved.\textsuperscript{42} The intifada brought perspective back to the Palestinian populace regarding their political representation. Scholars Shaul Mishal and Avraham Sela explain, "[t]he perception that the PLO was militarily and politically bankrupt apparently induced the Mujamma' leadership to contemplate the possibility that it could become a political alternative."\textsuperscript{43} Similarly, most Gazans viewed al-Mujamma and eventually many West Bank Arabs saw Hamas as a potential bulwark against the PLO's totalitarianism and Arafat and Fatah's vast corruption. Ultimately, the PLO's ability to dictate Palestinian politics ended with the intifada,\textsuperscript{44} as Hamas, and to a lesser extent PIJ, "began to challenge the legitimacy and leadership of the PLO and 'Arafat."\textsuperscript{45} As a result, competition, rivalry, and timely cooperation between the PLO/PA and the explicitly Islamist-Palestinian terror


\textsuperscript{43} Mishal and Sela, The Palestinian Hamas, 33.

\textsuperscript{44} William Cleveland, "Israeli-Palestinian Relations Since the Gulf War," in The Contemporary Middle East, ed. Karl Yambert (Cambridge, Mass.: Westview Press, 2006), 79.

organizations manifested themselves in the political and social arenas and in approaching the conflict with Israel. Political Culture and Irrevocable Beliefs

The competition that developed between terror organizations during and directly after the first intifada led to a significant increase in the brutality and frequency of political violence over the following decade. Hamas’s ability to tap into the social networks established by al-Mujamma for the purposes of launching terror operations or other political actions, as well as PIJ’s ability to use Islamic revolutionary allures among its support base,46 restructured the make-up of socio-political relations in the disputed territories. Most importantly, however, the advent of the suicide-homicide bomber onto the scene, as well as the refinement of the selection and deployment process of suicide-homicide bombers, triggered a number of latent components in Palestinian Arab political culture.

46 Unlike Hamas in the 1990s, which had a vast array of social services to attract adherents, PIJ relied more on its ideological attractions, which Fathi Shaqaqi linked to the aura of revolutionary Iran.
Palestinian collective identity, while fluid over the decades, interacts with a political culture\textsuperscript{47} that has remained mostly consistent as it is entrenched in the concept of \textit{sammud} (steadfastness).\textsuperscript{48} Representing the Palestinian Arabs' conceptual response to the narrative of \textit{al-Naqba} (the Catastrophe), which refers to the establishment of a Jewish state on sacred Islamic land, \textit{sammud} accordingly promotes maximalist goals relating to the establishment of an Arab/Islamic state on the former territory of Mandatory Palestine. Over the years such unwavering aims have spawned and led to the refinement of a number of practices in the Palestinian political arena, including: no compromise, violence as the choice means for pursuing political goals, and intra-group intimidation and conflict. All of the practices find their modern roots in the British Mandate period, wherein Hajj Amin al-Husseini

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{47} A specialist on political culture in the Arab world, Basheer Meibar contends, "political culture is defined by the types of belief prevalent among its members and the patterns by which beliefs are constrained in integral belief systems. The members of a political culture are classified into groups (constituencies) delineated by these two determinants." Basheer Meibar, \textit{Political Culture, Foreign Policy and Conflict: The Palestine Area Conflict System} (London: Greenwood Press, 1982), 23.
\item \textsuperscript{48} Also translated as "perseverance," Palestinian \textit{sammud} refers to the concept of "staying on the land despite immense Israeli pressure to leave." See Mark Levine, "Chaos, Globalization, and the Public Sphere," \textit{The Middle East Journal} 60, no. 3 (Summer 2006): 473.
\end{enumerate}
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socially codified them into Palestinian political culture.\footnote{During the 1920s, the Husseini clan, spearheaded by Haj Amin, used Islam and incitement against Jews to out-maneuver their political/tribal rivals, the Nashashibis--ultimately gaining control of the leadership of the Arabs of Palestine as a result. See Morris, \textit{Righteous Victims}, 100-110. During the revolt from 1936 to 1939, along with propelling a tradition of violence as the choice means to an end, the Arabs of Palestine, set a precedent among their popular political culture—that being, accepting the violent domination of a specific leader who systematically targeted his dissenters. Hajj Amin al-Husseini, even while in exile for the majority of the revolt (similarly to Yasser Arafat decades later), used terror, not only against his enemies, but also against Palestinian Arabs. Amin al-Husseini biographer, Chuck Morse notes: “Arabs assassinated by al-Husseini inspired death squads during the riots of 1936-1939 would include Palestinian Arab leaders Sheikh Daoud Ansari, Imam of the Al Aqsa Mosque, Sheikh Ali Nur el-Khattib, Sheikh Nusbi Abdul Rahim, Council of Muslim Religious Court, Sheikh Abdul el-Badoui from Acre, Sheikh el-Namouri from Hebron, Nasr el-Din Nassr, Mayor of Hebron, and eleven Mukhtars, or community leaders who were murdered along with their entire families by al-Husseini’s roving killers.” Morse, 43-44. This deadly pattern, which finds its historical roots in Arab-tribal/hamula (clan) warring, continues to present day to serve as an instrumental component of Palestinians’ political culture, as demonstrated by recent Hamas-Fatah fighting, as well as PLO in-fighting during the 1970s and 1980s.}

Diluted by two decades of PLO dominance, the dormant traditions in Palestinian political culture, systemically reliant on competing tribal forces,\footnote{One scholar notes: “Studies on factionalism in the early days of the Palestinian national movement have indicated clearly that the organization of national politics around factional loyalties in patriarchal structures has been a major factor in the national movement’s inability to achieve its goals. The competition between the Husseinis and the Nashashibis, as well as those groups’ elitism and detachment from the needs of the common Palestinian, has prevented them from mobilizing the Palestinian public under one common and agreed upon strategy. The patterns of the pre-1948 period seem to have remained consistent, although they have taken on new forms. The familial politics of the pre-} returned to full
effect once Arafat had a formidable rival in the Hamas/PIJ confederation and its rapidly developing constituency.\textsuperscript{51} For the most part, Palestinian Arabs' beliefs about the world around them have stayed stagnant since before Israel's establishment, as have, until recent decades, the varying Palestinian constituencies.

Consistent refusals by the Palestinian populace to accept Israel's permanence or its Jewish identity\textsuperscript{52} represent core tenets of a political culture that views compromise on this issue as unacceptable.\textsuperscript{53} This forms the basis of the Palestinian conflict with Israel. Also, most Palestinians do not entertain proposed compromises over Jerusalem or the right of "refugees" to return (to Israel

\textsuperscript{51}In 1993, as a response to the Oslo peace process, Hamas and PIJ "joined" the Alliance of Palestinian Forces (APF), which worked out of Damascus. "Regular" collaboration however did not occur until the second intifada. See Levitt, \textit{Hamas}, 14 and 26.

\textsuperscript{52}The Palestinian population has remained consistently opposed to accepting a Jewish state. In 1937, the Arabs of Mandatory Palestine rejected the British Peel Commission's suggestion of a two-state solution, as they did again in 1948 with the U.N.'s Partition Plan. As recent as the Annapolis meeting in December 2007, the PA maintains its refusal to accept Israel's "Jewishness."

proper), as well as other territorial issues based on the ideas of *wagf* and *dar al-Islam* (dwelling of submission). Moreover, when a representative body has made a movement toward compromise on these issues, a rival organization/faction has initiated intra-group conflict as a response. Moreover, when a representative body has made a movement toward compromise on these issues, a rival organization/faction has initiated intra-group conflict as a response. Additionally, violence as the choice means of political pursuits, rather than negotiation, is engraved in Palestinian Arab political culture. When the PLO recognized Israel’s right to exist with the signing of the *Declaration of Principles* (DOP) on September 13, 1993, it sent the Palestinian collective identity into a "momentous political crisis." The fairly cohesive Palestinian populace fragmented into three constituencies; some Palestinians were “enthusiastic,” many gave “conditional approval,” and others viewed the process as “potentially fatal for Palestinian national aspirations and survival as a people.” The initial period of the Israel-PA peace

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54 Such a case occurred in 1939, when a group attempted to go against the AHC and accept British compromises. Opposition leaders were either assassinated or intimidated, so as to change their minds. See Morse, 43–44.


57 Farsoun and Aruri, 379.
process, better known as the Oslo years, ultimately served as a testament to a consistent Palestinian political culture that expressed itself through a fluid collective identity. Indeed, Palestinians have not vacillated over their goals as a people—rather, only their representative political organizations have from time to time.\textsuperscript{58}

Political Islam Carries on as the Palestine Liberation Organization Acquiesces

The PLO’s political disconnect from sections of the Palestinian population, along with an inability to own a monopoly on the use of coercive force, allowed for the rise of Hamas and its Islamist counterparts. In January 1992, Hamas merged its West Bank militia, Abdallah Azzam Brigades,\textsuperscript{59} with its Gaza militia, ‘Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades,\textsuperscript{60} and established the latter as the official “military wing” of Hamas.\textsuperscript{61} For the duration of the intifada, the reputation of “al-Qassam Brigades” as a

\textsuperscript{58} One should note that a majority of Palestinians view diplomatic processes as a potential tool of warfare; accordingly, “support for the peace process” or for a peace conference does not equal “support for peace.” For analysis, see Ricolfi, 108-110.

\textsuperscript{59} Abdallah Azzam Brigades took its name from the founder of al-Qaeda, who hailed from a small village outside Jenin in Samaria.

\textsuperscript{60} ‘Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades takes its name from the Palestinian national hero and jihadi leader whose death/martyrdom “helped spark the 1936 [Arab Revolt].” See Levine, 472.

\textsuperscript{61} Hafez, \textit{Manufacturing Human Bombs}, 36; Although already the official “armed wing” of the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine, Hamas for political reasons established al-Qassam Brigades as its own “military wing.” See Levitt, \textit{Hamas}, 1-35.
formidable militant force only grew. As Hamas’s appeal swelled within the Palestinian population, the PLO’s expanded in the international community, and some in Israel began viewing Arafat’s terror organization as the lesser of two evils.

In 1993, just as the PLO’s political power seemed on the verge of collapse, an unimaginable peace process, announced to the world by Israel, the PLO and the United States (U.S.), revived and empowered Arafat’s terror organization as the “legitimate” political representative of the Palestinians. After the intifada, the PLO’s only move rested on relinquishing the long-held goal of liquidating the state of Israel.\(^{62}\) After losing further influence over the Palestinian population,\(^{63}\) Arafat realized the necessity to reposition the PLO vis-à-vis the population it claimed to represent in order to maintain minimal functional control. Israel’s signing of the DOP in 1993 not only legitimized the PLO as the PA and welcomed Arafat back to the disputed territories but also demonstrated that Israel, if pressed hard and long enough,

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\(^{62}\) See the PLO’s Palestinian National Covenant in its original form from 1964 and its amended version from 1968.

\(^{63}\) The reduction in influence resulted from a loss of legitimacy in the sense of credibility on the Arab street.
would give in to terrorism. Therefore, the PLO's international legitimacy as advanced by the Oslo Accords and peace process in the following years provided other Palestinian terror organizations with a precedent for justifying and legitimizing their own continued use of terrorism against Israel. The intifada, signing of the DOP, and peace process served to restructure the "official" goals of Palestinian society, and as a result intensified competition between the PLO (and later the PA) and Islamist organizations, which carried on the Palestinian Arab tradition of no compromise. Moreover, the peace process provided Hamas and PIJ with a renewed raison d'etre: continued violent resistance in pursuit of "all Palestine" and pointedly in spite of the PLO's official acquiescence.

The Palestinian Suicide-Homicide Bomber

The inevitable post-intifada political maneuvering between the PLO/Fatah-controlled PA and the Hamas-PIJ

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64 Chapter Five discusses at length the strategic threat this has posed to Israel's national security.
65 Hamas states in its 1988 charter that "Neither a single Arab state nor all the Arab states, neither a king nor president, not all the kings or presidents, not any organization or all of them...[may give up any part of Palestine] because the land of Palestine is an Islamic Waqf." See Hamas charter in Mishal and Sela, The Palestinian Hamas, 181.
collective, marked a new era in Palestinian politics, wherein PA leadership straddled the fence between negotiation and continuance of the "struggle." Accordingly, the popular Islamist organizations consistently worked to keep the PLO off balance. The peace process posed a major threat to Hamas and its fellow Palestinian-Islamist terror organizations, and thus the mid-1990s saw sabotage make its mark as a useful strategy.

On April 6, 1994, Hamas carried out its first successful suicide-homicide attack inside Israel proper in the Northern city of Afula, killing eight people and wounding 34. A week later on April 13, a Hamas suicide-homicide bomber blew himself up on a bus in Hadera, Israeli—leaving five dead and scores wounded. The entrance of suicide-homicide bombers into the center stage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict virtually gave Hamas and PIJ veto power over the peace process. To disrupt negotiations or the implementation of agreements, Hamas or

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66 PIJ did not seek a direct conflict with the PLO or non-Islamist groups. See Abu-Amar, "Hamas": nonetheless, PIJ participated greatly in the overall scheme of things relating to an ideological rivalry between Islamism and Arab nationalism within Palestinian society.

67 Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 150; Hafez, Manufacturing Human Bombs, 79.

PIJ would attack Israel, and simply wait for the Israel Defense Force (IDF) to respond.

The 1990s saw the alteration of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict’s surficial make-up, and suicide terrorism played a major role in displaying the effects. Palestinian society became further infused with Islamic concepts that fuel conflict. Calls for jihad and istishhad drowned out voices for peace. No longer could one deny the underlying religious causes of the conflict (e.g. holy sites in Jerusalem, the notion of dar al-Islam, etc.). As Islamic justifications provided a basis for such attacks, incidents of suicide terrorism magnified religious issues within the conflict. Moreover, the mid-1990s saw the early development of a popular Palestinian culture that praised shahada, or “death for Allah’s sake.” Hamas bombmakers such as Yahya Ayyash and Mohammed Deif rose to superstar status. Suicide-homicide bombers and other shuhada (martyrs) received glorification as heroes. As the Palestinian youth who threw stones during the intifada grew up and looked for new avenues to express themselves religiously/politically, Islamic organizations obliged them by illuminating the path

69 Indeed, Palestinians often refer to a martyr as a shahid batal, or “martyr hero.” See Hassan.
to martyrdom. Ultimately, Hamas and PIJ recognized that the suicide-homicide bomber provided a prime method for implementing their respective strategies vis-à-vis Israel and the Palestinian population, as well as the PLO/PA.

Generally, a terrorist organization designs attacks to further serve the achievement of its political goals. Three primary groups make up the intended audience: the population and government of the foreign enemy, the international community, and the domestic population as well as rival organizations. Accordingly, terrorist organizations use different tactics for any number of reasons. The employed tactic, like the choice of target, represents part of the calculation an organization makes. Both tactic and targeting reflect a political statement. Hoffman notes, “[suicide terrorism] is seen by its adherents as a particularly effective way to communicate a

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70 Palestinian psychiatrist Iyad El Sarraj states: “The children who threw stones and Molotov cocktails and confronted Israeli soldiers in 1987 are the young men [and women] who are the martyrs of today.” Quoted in Barbara Victor, Army of Roses: Inside the World of Palestinian Women Suicide Bombers (Emmaus, Penn.: Rodale, 2003), 40.

71 Pedahzur, Suicide Terrorism, 58-61.

72 In 2004 Mia M. Bloom identified two “audiences.” In 2005, she included the international community as a third audience. See Mia M. Bloom, “Palestinian Suicide Bombing: Public Support, Market Share, and Outbidding,” Political Science Quarterly 119, no. 1 (2004): 64; and Bloom, Dying to Kill. Another scholar separates the internal population from rival organizations within it. See Pedahzur, Suicide Terrorism, 44.
violent message...[and such] attacks are thus conducted for the purpose of demonstrating the terrorist organization's ability and determination to use violence to achieve its political objectives." In addition to terrorizing Israeli society, Hamas has utilized suicide-homicide bombers to distinguish itself within the greater Palestinian movement, so as to achieve its political objectives on the "domestic" front.

As Arafat used the PA's newly acquired power to repress rival-militant groups in the mid-1990s, Hamas and PIJ had to look for ways to dodge PA-imposed "political limitations." Suicide-homicide attacks against Israelis worked as the perfect instrument not only to maintain resistance against Israel, but also to undermine the PA's legitimacy. When an Islamist organization launched a suicide-homicide attack against Israel, the Palestinian population's subsequent praise circumvented Arafat's political ability to reign in Hamas or PIJ leaders and other culprits who designed or participated in specific

73 Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 136-137.
74 Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 137.
75 Directly after the initiation of the Oslo peace process, Arafat "arrested over 2,000 [Hamas and PIJ] operatives, and killed twenty of their leaders." Bloom, "Palestinian Suicide Bombing," 66.
76 Hafez, Manufacturing Human Bombs, 18.
suicide-terror attacks. Hoffman explains, "Hamas decided to challenge simultaneously the entire DOP framework, Arafat’s leadership, and the PLO’s authority." Without the Palestinian population’s support specifically for acts of suicide terrorism, Hamas could not have survived a simultaneous confrontation with the Fatah-led PA and Israel.

Terrorism is a learning process for organizations. So when a tactic works in the manner that the suicide-homicide attack worked for Hamas and PIJ, it has a tendency to take on a life of its own within the particular organization; hence the old film noir detective notion: ‘It’s their MO, so they must have done it.’ The importance that certain modi operandi play in an organization’s overall strategy encourages the organization to seek ways to ensure continued availability of individuals willing to participate in the specific types of operations. For Hamas, other Islamist-Palestinian organizations, and eventually some of the “secular” Palestinian groups represented in the PLO/PA, the ability to deploy suicide-homicide bombers reached the top of their respective priority lists. In the Palestinian context, Hamas’s initial success of the modus

77 Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 149; see also Abu-Amr, “Hamas,” 13.
operandi spawned widespread organizational realization of suicide-homicide bombers' strategic value. One of PIJ's founders, Fathi Shaqaqi, indeed articulated the idea of using "'exceptional' martyrdom operations" as a potential Palestinian strategy sometime in the mid-1980s. And in 1986, Israel's domestic security agency, the Shin Bet, foiled a PIJ plot to send a 19-year old girl from Bethlehem on a suicide-homicide bombing attack into Israel. Hamas however succeeded first on April 16, 1993 in using the modus operandi against Israeli interests. Due to the success suicide-homicide attacks brought the organization on a variety of levels, particularly after the signing of the DOP, Hamas sought to do everything within its power to accentuate various elements in the Palestinian environment and collective identity so that they conditioned

78 Some researchers put Shaqaqi's statement circa 1988, but an attack plotted two years earlier by PIJ suggests the organization had thought about using suicide terrorism sometime well before its leader articulated it publicly. See Scott Atran, "Genesis of Suicide Terrorism," Science 299, issue 5612 (7 March 2003): 1534-1539; Hafez, Manufacturing Human Bombs, 17; and Hassan.
80 In 1993, Hamas and PIJ launched a combined eight suicide-homicide bomber attacks. This debunks a popular notion in the scholarship that suggests that Palestinian organizations' initiation of suicide-homicide attacks was in response to Dr. Baruch Goldstein's small-arms attack at the Machpela Cave in Hebron on February 25, 1994, which left 29 Palestinians dead. See Shaul Shay, The Shahids: Islam and Suicide Attacks (London: Transaction Publishers, 2004), 52-53.
individuals not only to accept and support suicide terrorism but also seek to participate in launching an attack in one way or another.

The Culture of Martyrdom and Its Socio-Political Development

"This is not suicide; it is war," so goes one Palestinian’s explanation of why he tried to attain "martyrdom" through an act of suicide terrorism.\(^1\) While complicated at the individual level,\(^2\) the statement holds true for Palestinian organizations. Far from organizational suicide, the deployment of suicide-homicide bombers simply marks an organization’s calculus of its position in relation to its end-goals.\(^3\) Functioning as a conduit between individuals and organizations, “the support of the community” sustains a suicide terror campaign.\(^4\)

Since the first intifada and culminating during the second, Palestinian terror machines, such as the one headed

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\(^1\) Interviewed in The Cult of the Suicide Bomber, prod. and dir. David Betty and Kevin Toolis, 1 hr. 35 min., Many Rivers Films, 2006, DVD.

\(^2\) Chapter Six explores at length individual Palestinians’ rationality in participating in suicide terrorism, particularly concerning most suicide-homicide bombers’ conditioned understanding of suicide as “martyrdom.”

\(^3\) Pedahzur, Suicide Terrorism, 25.

\(^4\) Pedahzur, Suicide Terrorism, 163.
by Hamas, have polished the processes of launching suicide-homicide attacks. Palestinian terror organizations advanced the recruitment/selection process by helping construct and in turn feed off of a culture of martyrdom that operates as a link between the various steps in the individual's path to "martyrdom"—the steps of reasoning, justifying, rationalizing and participating. The culture of martyrdom funnels individuals through the various steps, mentally preparing and convincing them of the legitimacy of their actions. Scholars Anat Berko and Edna Erez explain,

> Easy access to suicide-facilitating organizations, beliefs in impending rewards of martyrs, together with ever-present communal exaltation of shahids, creates an environment that produces a steady supply of candidates, [and ultimately] emboldens... individuals to join the suicide industry.⁸⁵

The Palestinian culture of martyrdom thus performs the sanctioning component that many terrorists rely on to legitimate their actions. Suicide-terrorism expert, Mohammed M. Hafez notes that Palestinian terror organizations have "promote[d] a culture of martyrdom based on religious appeals and innovative rituals to convince the

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⁸⁵ Anat Berko and Edna Erez, "'Ordinary People' and 'Death Work': Palestinian Suicide Bombers as Victorizers and Victims," Violence and Victims 20, no. 6 (December 2005): 616.
broader public of the value of suicide bombings."\textsuperscript{86} Organizations have increasingly understood that the sustained use of suicide-homicide bombers requires a daily interaction between its terror apparatus and the community at large. Hamas with its da'awa infrastructure had a jump on its rivals regarding an intimate social connection with its constituents and potential operatives.

The Social Synthesis of Competing Political Ideologies: Palestinian Identity Solidified?

By 1996 the IDF viewed Hamas as the strongest Palestinian "military" force in the disputed territories.\textsuperscript{87} Its "tenuous modus vivendi with the governing Palestinian Authority," during the mid to late 1990s, facilitated political Islam's advance further into the mainstream of Palestinian society.\textsuperscript{88} While putting a temporary halt on the deployment of suicide-homicide bombers,\textsuperscript{89} the lull in open aggression between Hamas and the PA, allowed for the

\\textsuperscript{86} Hafez, \textit{Manufacturing Human Bombs}, 32. Other explanations of the same phenomenon in Palestinian society refer to it as a "culture of suicide terrorists"; see Shaul Kimhi and Shmuel Even quoted in Levitt, \textit{Hamas}, 108; and the "cult of the suicide bomber," see \textit{The Cult of the Suicide Bomber}, prod. and dir. David Betty and Kevin Toolis, 1 hr. 35 min., Many Rivers Films, 2006, DVD.


\textsuperscript{88} Hoffman, \textit{Inside Terrorism}, 152.

\textsuperscript{89} From 1996 to September 2000, there were ten suicide-homicide bomber attacks. Refer to Appendix A.
previous to refocus its attention on its da’awa operations, which had previously suffered from the PA’s post-Oslo crackdown. The rejuvenated operations also revived the Gaza Muslim Brotherhood/Hamas’s long-held goal of displaying the PLO/PA’s ineptitude to the Palestinian population.

Thus philanthropy explains a secondary motivation for the refocusing on da’awa. Hamas expert Matthew Levitt notes, "[t]he Hamas dawa serves several distinct functions in support of the group’s objectives and through which it facilitates Hamas attacks."\(^9^0\) In addition to personal motivations derived from politics, religion, and/or other identity-induced values and beliefs, individual suicide-homicide bombers usually require affirmation that the defined enemy threatens these same values and beliefs. Accordingly, the individual’s surrounding environment plays an instrumental role.\(^9^1\) In the late 1990s, Hamas refocused on providing this necessity\(^9^2\); Levitt explains,

\[\text{...the battery of mosques, schools, orphanages, summer camps, and sports leagues sponsored by Hamas are integral parts of an overarching}\]

\(^{90}\) Levitt, Hamas, 6.

\(^{91}\) Levitt, Hamas, 108.

\(^{92}\) A central ideological component of the Muslim Brotherhood, one that often distinguishes it from its break-off organizations, remains the idea of establishing the "Other Society," i.e. an Islamic one, before jihad is launched against its defined enemies.
apparatus of terror...[all which] engage in incitement and radicalize society, and undertake recruitment efforts to socialize even the youngest children to aspire to die as martyrs. They provide logistical and operational support for weapons smuggling, reconnaissance, and suicide bombing.93

And, as with any success story in a competitive environment, organizational imitation followed.

In late September 2000, as the peace process seemed indefinitely deadlocked, Palestinians unleashed a new intifada,94 which, like the first, drastically changed the landscape of Palestinian politics. As al-Mujamma, through its establishment of Hamas, gained the ability to offer a serious alternative to the PLO during the first intifada, the second or al-Aqsa intifada demonstrated a push for the ‘new frontiersmen,’ led by Hamas and PIJ, to begin replacing the ‘old guard,’ as symbolized by Fatah, which not only controlled the PA but also had demonstrated an inability, or unwillingness on Arafat’s part, to reach a final status agreement with Israel.95 The failure of the

93 Levitt, Hamas, 5.
94 One should note, however, al-Aqsa intifada began “with guerrilla operations directed by al-Fatah and al-Fatah linked militias.” See Ricolfi, 96.
95 Bloom, Dying to Kill, 26. A variety of books authored by involved leaders and officials provide useful insight into this historical event. For example, see Bill Clinton, My Life (New York: Knopf, 2004); Dennis Ross, Missing Peace: The Inside Story
peace process left many Palestinians dissatisfied and a
gave them another reason to shift support to Hamas or other
Islamist organizations,96 which made no pretensions about
pursuing peace yet offered a sense of righteousness in
continuing violent resistance.

With more Palestinians joining the ranks of the Hamas
loyal throughout the 1990s and early 2000s the Palestinian
collective identity shifted its hierarchal components. The
constant barrage of political bombshells Hamas dropped on
the PA’s doorstep, and the popular support for such
actions, forced Arafat to match moves on the resistance
front in order for the PA to maintain functional legitimacy
with the Palestinian populace. Fatah members and
supporters, as well as those of other PLO groups began
massive political mobilization97—culminating with al-Aqsa
intifada, which served not only to revive the rivalry
between Hamas and the Fatah-led PA, but also worked to
amalgamate the opposing sides’ methods of political
expression. For the contemporary battlefield, Hamas and PIJ

of the Fight for Middle East Peace (New York: Farrar, Straus and
Giroux, 2004).
96 The unpopularity of Arafat and the PA started well before the
second intifada. From 1996 to 2000, Arafat’s approval rating
among Palestinians hovered around 27 percent. See Bloom,
“Palestinian Suicide Bombing,” 69.
97 Hafez, Manufacturing Human Bombs, 96–97.
provided the contextual testing of suicide-homicide attacks. Additionally, with Islam finding an even greater role in the Palestinian political arena, secular groups found it imperative to relate their ideologies to some form of Islamic message.\textsuperscript{98}

Hamas had, as early as 1987, ideologically outflanked all other Palestinian political organizations by adopting nationalist rhetoric without compromising a core Islamic message.\textsuperscript{99} Hamas successfully fused the Palestinian national movement’s tone with the Muslim Brotherhood’s Islamist worldview, and in doing so assembled together the two most encompassing components of Palestinian identity. Hamas reconciled these centrifugal forces by articulating, as its primary objective, the destruction of Israel, which fulfills the Islamist goal of removing a kafir (infidel) nation-state from the lands of dar al-Islam, while also satisfying Palestinian nationalists’ desire to eradicate the Jewish state rather than negotiate with it due to a

\textsuperscript{98} Bloom, \textit{Dying to Kill}, 29-34; Pedahzur, \textit{Suicide Terrorism}, 64; and Levitt, \textit{Hamas}, 13-14.

perceived "colonial/imperial" foundation that lacks any legitimacy. Thus, Hamas made holy war the cornerstone of its national struggle. As this approach appealed to more and more Palestinians, Arafat found it harder to ignore the Islamic identity and corresponding Islamist ideology that slowly crept toward the top of the Palestinian collective's hierarchy of identities. By covering its ideological bases, and literally sticking to its guns, Hamas proved its religious sincerity and credentials in relation to Palestinian sammud, not only to the general Palestinian populace, but also to rival organizations.

The inability of Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak to agree on a final-status solution at the Camp David II talks, despite U.S. President Bill Clinton's tenacious mediating efforts, marked the completion of a

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100 The Hamas charter, Chapter Three, Article 11 proclaims, "[Hamas] believes that the land of Palestine is an Islamic Waqf [endowment] to all Muslim generations until the day of resurrection. It is not right to give it up or any part of it." Chapter Three, Article 13 goes on to declare: "peaceful solutions, and the international conferences to resolve the Palestinian problem, are all contradictory to the beliefs of the Islamic Resistance Movement. Indeed, giving up any part of Palestine is tantamount to betraying Islam. The nationalism of the Islamic Resistance Movement is part of its religion, the movement instructs its members to adhere to its principles and to raise the banner of Allah over their homeland as they fight their Jihad...There is no solution to the Palestinian problem except by Jihad." See Hamas charter in Mishal and Sela, The Palestinian Hamas, 181 and 183.
long-failing peace process. With Israel and the PA's arrival at a diplomatic dead end, Arafat understood the international protection of the PA's power laid at stake. The Fatah-controlled PA saw a single option: to attempt to regain widespread popular support within the Palestinian population as a means for maintaining power. Arafat, accordingly, ordered the adjustment of Fatah's image vis-à-vis Palestinians. He understood the only way to play ball was to resuscitate Fatah's participation in violent resistance.\textsuperscript{101} As a result, the PLO/Fatah-controlled PA joined its rivals in the suicide-homicide bomber business.\textsuperscript{102}

In an effort to compete with the Islamist suicide-homicide brigades, Hamas's al-Qassam Brigades and PIJ's al-Quds\textsuperscript{103} Brigades, Fatah established al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigade

\textsuperscript{101} Indeed, many Palestinians seemingly offered Arafat a second chance by welcoming him home from the failed Camp David II talks as a "victor." See Ricolfi, 93.
\textsuperscript{102} One scholar notes: "in the first weeks of the [second] intifada, it seemed that the heads of Fatah could not decide what steps they should take. Confusion in the organization's ranks was demonstrated in the first period of these events, when veteran activists restricted themselves to shooting incidents aimed at Israeli civilian and military targets and younger members took part in heavy riots and lynching of Israeli citizens. However, these 'small noises' of the Fatah actions got lost in the mayhem of the multitude of suicide attacks perpetrated by Hamas and Islamic Jihad." See Pedahzur, \textit{Suicide Terrorism}, 63.
\textsuperscript{103} Meaning "glorification of Allah," al-Quds stands for Jerusalem in Arabic.
On November 29, 2001, marking a symbolic completion of the Palestinian collective identity's alteration, Fatah's newly formed AMB attacked Israel using a suicide-homicide bomber. A month earlier on October 17, 2001, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), a long-standing Marxist/Arab-nationalist group, deployed its first suicide-homicide bomber. Soon after, a similar organization, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, claimed responsibility for a number of suicide-homicide bombers. By January 2002, Arafat openly urged children to aspire to martyrdom on PA television. Over the following year, as scholar Ami Pedahzur notes, "[t]he new Fatah suicide squads, endorsed by the highest echelons of Fatah and the Palestinian Authority, performed their duty to the full... [and] became the most active group in the initiation of suicide

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104 Pedahzur, *Suicide Terrorism*, 64.
105 Coordinated with PIJ, this attack killed three people and wounded nine. Assaf Moghadam, "Palestinian Suicide Terrorism in the Second Intifada: Motivations and Organizational Aspects," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 26, no. 2 (March 2003): 82.
107 Bloom, *Dying to Kill*, 29.
Ultimately, al-Aqsa intifada marked an era wherein popular support for the leading Palestinian political organizations, including the PA, rose and fell according to their ability to launch successful suicide-homicide attacks.\textsuperscript{110}

With the major Palestinian political organizations all now playing to the same tune, suicide-homicide bombings attacks increased significantly.\textsuperscript{111} By 2002, a culture of martyrdom had consumed most Palestinian institutions of socialization,\textsuperscript{112} ensuring future support for suicide terrorism. Thus, by building on established religious, ethnic and national narratives, drawing from the Islamic texts of the Qur’an and Hadith, and seeking to institutionalize an aura of victimhood, Palestinian terror organizations reinvigorated the violent Palestinian movement for self-determination. Yet, this time arming it with a staunch Islamic fervor, supportive popular culture that condoned the most abhorrent violence against innocents, and, most importantly, a strategic weapon, which

\textsuperscript{109} Pedahzur, Suicide Terrorism, 64.
\textsuperscript{110} Bloom, “Palestinian Suicide Bombing,” 66.
\textsuperscript{111} See Appendix A.
would provide a number of verifiable victories in the years to come.

Palestinian Political Culture and Identity: Same Song, Different Genre

Initially, culture and society worked as a middleman for terror organizations seeking business with individuals, but by al-Aqsa intifada, the roles had reversed and terror organizations became the middleman for Palestinian society's handiwork on individuals. A widespread culture of martyrdom confirmed the ideological doctrines distributed by terror organizations, and individuals were no longer sought by organizations to commit suicide terrorism, but rather vice versa. The initial relationship between terror organizations and suicide-homicide bombers changed from one of recruitment to selection. Berko and Erez explain, "[s]ocial structures, value systems, and the collective memory of a group combine[d] to produce a steady supply of motivated [suicide-homicide bomber] candidates." Pedahzur adds:

Changing patterns of recruitment and especially the transition from a careful culling of

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113 Anat Berko and Edna Erez, "'Ordinary People' and 'Death Work': Palestinian Suicide Bombers as Victimizer and Victims," Violence and Victims 20, no. 6 (December 2005): 617.
candidates by trained recruiters to a mass mobilization of volunteers emphasizes the success of the organization in planting the roots of a 'culture of death' in a society which in return provided endless numbers of prospective bombers in time of need.\textsuperscript{114}

Hamas's role in manipulating these forces led other organizations including the Fatah-led PA to adopt similar mobilization techniques and resistance methods—leaving Palestinian society as a reflection of the same indignant ideologies\textsuperscript{115} that have maintained a death grip on it.

The culture of martyrdom and mechanized terror that one finds so properly identifiable with contemporary Palestinian society is not, however, the result of a few cynical organizations\textsuperscript{116} that play off of the desperation of a confused populace. The \textit{shahid} phenomenon, and the

\textsuperscript{114} Pedahzur, \textit{Suicide Terrorism}, 170.

\textsuperscript{115} Nominally "secular" Palestinian terrorist organizations have also contributed to the culture of martyrdom. But this is not to say that the culture is not Islamic in nature by any means. The leadership of Fatah, the PFLP and others might often declare organizations secular, yet their members are rarely secular or non-Muslims. Similarly, to provide a Western example, the U.S. House of Representatives is technically secular, but in reality it is made up of Protestant, Catholic, other Christians, Jews, and a variety of Americans who hold some kind of religious beliefs. And, it is without a doubt that the overwhelming majority of U.S. House members seek to uphold an institution founded on Judeo-Christian principles, while simultaneously maintaining a secular state.

\textsuperscript{116} One leading counter-terrorism analyst has suggested that organizations cynically use suicide-homicide bombers. See Boaz Ganor interview in \textit{Suicide Killers: Paradise Is Hell}, prod. and dir. Pierre Rehov, 1 hr. 20 min., City Lights Pictures, 2006, DVD.
mechanized terror and culture of martyrdom that facilitate the production of suicide-homicide bombers, all represent products of nearly a century of the fluctuation of a distinct national identity whose members have negotiated components within it, while pursuing "Palestinian" political goals. Certainly, precedents set by Palestinian Arab organizations in pursuit of these same goals, as well as Israeli responses to methods employed by organizations, have aided in the establishment of the phenomena listed above, but nothing accounts for them more than the process of matching ends with effective means, which have some type of justifiable employment as filtered through religion, culture and other forms of behavior-legitimizing elements of identity.

Today, the Palestinian movement stands as neither entirely ethno-nationalistic nor fully Islamist. It is both.117 The political mobilization of the Palestinian population through political Islam's establishment as a

117 Many assume that the Islamicization of the Palestinian movement for self-determination over the last two decades is simply a result of the PLO/PA's failure to obtain a Palestinian state; this notion fails to recognize Palestinian Arabs history dating back to the early 1920s and before when Islamic authorities and political leaders were one and the same. Islam has always played an important role in the national consciousness of Palestinian Arabs; it just at times has not played the dominant one.
counter to the PLO opened the Palestinian national consciousness to renewed introspection. Moreover, the development of a culture of martyrdom in Palestinian society and the anointment of the shahid as the national Palestinian icon demonstrate the lengths a society can take to ensure its values are maintained and goals are met. Furthermore, the Palestinian population has shown that it tenaciously holds on to its revered notion of sammud. Generation after generation, Palestinians have remained true to their collective standard of an appropriate final status over the old territory of Mandatory Palestine. When the PLO/PA failed to uphold these standards, it opened the door for a new Palestinian representative. Candidates emerged and precipitated an unparalleled competition with the PLO. Like all good competitions, efficiency marked the end result. Efficient representation, mobilization, and most apparently efficient uses of violence emerged at the forefront of the Palestinian movement for self-determination.

Purely erratic behavior rarely governs the pursuit of political goals. Often specific socio-cultural concepts of how to engage an enemy drives the means through which an entity, whether a nation-state, political party or terror
organization, seeks its end-goals. State and non-state actors alike usually seek to match a capability with their motivation—i.e. their political pursuits, yet culture plays a key role in filtering tactics and therefore strategy as well. As of 2007, *jihad* and *istishhad*, the main ideological forces behind suicide-homicide bombers in the Palestinian context, rested at the core of organizations including Hamas, PIJ, AMB, the Popular Resistance Committees, the al-Qaeda-linked Army of Islam, the recently formed *Kataeb Abu-Amar* (Abu Amar Brigades), and other Islamist-Palestinian organizations of the like. The *shahid*, in the form of a suicide-homicide bomber, has accordingly found a central role in these organizations. Moreover, the Palestinian use of suicide-homicide bombers demonstrates how terrorism can be just as much about internal political posturing as it is about waging an external war.

Additionally, it shows, in a time of war, when an organization strays from its army in favor of unpopular diplomatic pursuits, it signals to the represented populace that its interests have been replaced by those of the organization. Ultimately, the *shahid/suicide-homicide bomber* phenomenon confirms the necessity of the Clausewitzian people-government-army model in waging an
effective military campaign--or in this case, a terror campaign waged by a people, representative organizations, and their armies of death and murder-craving bombers.
CHAPTER FIVE

A STRATEGIC TERROR WEAPON (THE SUICIDE-HOMICIDE BOMBER) AS THE PARAMOUNT TERRORIST (THE SHAHID):

MATCHING CAPABILITY TO MOTIVATION

[Hammas] advanced the Intifada from the stone age to suicide attacks
-IDF Brigadier General Yaakov Amidor, 1995

We do not have tanks or rockets, but we have something superior--our exploding Islamic human bombs. In place of a nuclear arsenal, we are a proud arsenal of believers.²
-Hamas Member, 2001

On October 4, 2003, Hanadi Taysir Jaradat entered the Maxim restaurant in the Northern Israeli city of Haifa, ordered a chicken kebab, sat down, ate her meal, and then walked to the middle room, stood between the tables of two families dining, smiled and detonated the 22-pound bomb strapped to her stomach. Along with taking her own life, the 27-year old lawyer/Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)

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operative from a village outside Jenin\textsuperscript{3} murdered 21 people and wounded 60.\textsuperscript{4} The two Israeli families closest to the blast lost loved-ones spanning three generations. The Almog family alone lost: Zeev, age 71 and his wife Ruth, age 70, their son Moshe, age 43, his son Tomer, age 9, and another Almog-grandson Asaf Shtayer, age 11; the family also had four wounded.\textsuperscript{5} This describes only one of hundreds of suicide-homicide attacks perpetrated by Palestinian terror organizations against Israeli civilians. It is, however, representative of an attack that Palestinian terror organizations deem "successful," and the type that Palestinian society reacts to with praise; indeed, Palestinian media heralded Jaradat as the "Bride of Haifa."	extsuperscript{6}

Additionally, the attack on the Maxim restaurant represents the kind of horror that caused great anxiety in Israeli society, and eventually led the Sharon government to begin

\textsuperscript{3} Hanadi Jaradat hailed from Silat al-Hartiya, which is the same village where Abdallah Azzam, the founder of al-Qaeda was raised; see Yoni Fighel, "Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Female Suicide Bombers," \textit{International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT): Articles} (6 October 2003): accessed at <www.instituteforcounterterrorism.org> on 10 October 2007.

\textsuperscript{4} Kevin Toolis, "Suicide Bomber Caught in the Act; why these girls want to be Martyrs." \textit{Herald Sun}, 16 September 2006.


\textsuperscript{6} See Chapter Six for an explanation of this term.
erecting a security/separation barrier between Israel proper and the disputed territories.

In sum, the Palestinian's *al-Aqsa intifada*, from September 29, 2000 to November 2005, took the lives of 1,074 Israelis and seriously wounded another 7,520; Israelis spent a combined 11,724 days in hospitals due to injuries sustained from Palestinian terror attacks. The psychological damage remains incalculable. Palestinian terrorism and more acutely suicide-homicide bombers own the responsibility of the tragedy reflected in these harrowing statistics. Furthermore, suicide-homicide bombers delivered Palestinian political and territorial gains that resulted from concessions made by the Sharon and Olmert governments.

The Palestinian *shahid* thus emerged from *al-Aqsa intifada*, marking the epitome of modern terrorism. Beginning in the Oslo years, the *shahid*, who personally views the "martyrdom operation" as an end unto itself, demonstrated a new capability--to strike Israel anywhere and at anytime--all while leaving security forces with

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8 Notes from ICT seminar on "Modern and Post-Modern Terrorism Strategies," given by Boaz Ganor, in Herzliya, Israel (8 June 2005).
9 See Chapter Six for a full explanation of this notion.
minimal counter-terrorism opportunities. As an increasingly valuable weapon for their war with Israel, Palestinian terror organizations brought together decades worth of incitement methods to ensure continued availability of potential shahids. Consequently, by the end of the 1990s, a widespread culture of martyrdom had come to fruition.\textsuperscript{10} Palestinian terror organizations accordingly utilized this culture of martyrdom in optimizing the production of suicide-homicide bombers. Employing the culture of martyrdom resulted in the normalization of Palestinian “martyrdom operations,” as displayed by the unremitting flow of suicide-homicide bombers during al-Aqsa intifada.

By effectively symbolizing Palestinian sammud (steadfastness), or the refusal to abandon maximalist aims based on religious, ethnic, and nationalist components of collective identity, the shahid, coupled with defeatist responses by Israel, enabled a strategic capability within suicide-homicide attacks. Overall, the shahid phenomenon demonstrates a tenacity on the part of Palestinian society that reverberates far beyond the political ultimatums of

traditional modern terrorism, which usually provoke little more than a military response or police action by the targeted government and is likewise met with a rebellious resolve on the part of the victimized society; Palestinian suicide-homicide bombers effectively wore Israel down past this point. Additionally, the Palestinian use of suicide-homicide operations surpasses the simplicity of a guerrilla tactic that exacts a victory by continuously attacking until the targeted nation-state concedes its interests, which are rarely, if ever, strategic in nature. Israel’s very existence lays at stake, yet Palestinian suicide-homicide bombers still proved successful in extorting concessions from the Jewish state. The Palestinian shahid represents a society willing to do anything to destroy its enemy, even if it means destroying itself. Unlike anything else in the history of the Israeli-Arab conflict, the Palestinian suicide-homicide bomber has precipitated the Jewish state’s reckless reaction,\textsuperscript{11} somber reclusion\textsuperscript{12} and,

\textsuperscript{11} Careless responses to terrorism have at times worked in favor of Palestinian organizations regarding the international media war.
\textsuperscript{12} Israel’s economy suffered greatly as production slowed in Israeli society due to widespread anxiety caused by the suicide-homicide bomber threat.
most costly, its territorial retreat.\textsuperscript{13} The fruitless conclusion of the Oslo peace process, the construction of a security/separation barrier roughly along the 1967 greenline,\textsuperscript{14} the unilateral withdrawal from Gaza, and the fragmentation of the Likud party collectively demonstrate that the second-intifada's \textit{shahid} successfully delivered the message of Palestinian \textit{sammud} to Israel. By targeting civilians \textit{en masse}, and demonstrating that participation in "martyrdom operations" represent personal end-goals, Palestinian suicide-homicide bombers evolved their \textit{modus operandi} from a guerrilla tactic to a strategic terror weapon. Ultimately, the employment of suicide-homicide bombers provided Palestinian terror organizations and society with a catalog of unmatched strategic victories.

\textsuperscript{13} Territorial gains proved beyond a doubt the shahid's political success.
\textsuperscript{14} If completed, Israel's security barrier will mostly follow along the "greenline," or pre-1967 Six-Day War border, with exceptions made for some Jewish settlements in Ariel, Efrat, and in the greater Jerusalem area; see Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "The Anti-Terrorist Fence," \textit{Israel in Maps} (20 February 2005): accessed at <www.mfa.gov.il/ MFA/Facts> on 8 February 2008.
Strategy Adopted and Adapted: Fitting Goals with Means

Many think of strategic weapons as nuclear devices or weapons of mass destruction attached to inter-continental ballistic missiles that allow warheads to travel across continents, and kill large portions of a targeted populace. Such a definition derives from the Cold War-era when the use of force came predominantly from superpowers or their controllable proxies. In today’s post-9/11 era paradigm, where nation-states increasingly find themselves engaged in conflict with non-state actors, warfare often develops, not from the remaining allowances of deterrence policies, but rather from the summation of warring entities’ respective motivations and capabilities, or political will and military prowess.

Consequently, suicide-homicide attacks have become the weapon of choice by entities, which are significantly outgunned, yet highly motivated to attack their enemies. As “strategy provides the bridge between military means and political goals,”¹⁵ strategists therefore seek to match capability with motivation. Weapons are not strategic, yet some are capable, insofar as the needed motivation exists,

of strategic employment. The suicide-homicide bomber represents one such weapon, which at the predetermined cost of one's life, tends to guarantee an exponential return for the producing organization and/or sanctioning body. Indeed, at times, the Palestinian shahid/suicide-homicide bomber has seamlessly fused optimal motivation with optimum capability—effectively functioning simultaneously as the paramount terrorist and perfect weapon.

Suicide-homicide attacks exemplify, and regularly maximize, the political and socio-psychological components of terrorism. The political pressure created by suicide-terror attacks often provides those who utilize such operations with the capability to extort concessions from a particular nation-state that otherwise would have been unlikely. Given the right circumstances, suicide-homicide bombers, who are basically mobile-thinking bombs, have the ability to change geopolitical circumstances, which in turn can alter a targeted nation-state’s strategic environment.16

16 To date, suicide-homicide operations have significantly altered the strategic environments of at least three Middle Eastern nation-states: Lebanon in the 1980s, Israel during the second-Palestinian intifada, and currently in Iraq. Additionally, the 9/11 attacks forced the U.S. government to rethink its entire collection of foreign and security policies.
Guerilla groups, terrorist organizations and rogue states alike find suicide-homicide attacks attractive for a number of reasons. First, that the perpetrators die during the attack precludes an interrogation by security services, and therefore provides those who deploy suicide-homicide bombers plausible deniability and anonymity if desired (as is usually the case with state-sponsored terrorism). Second, suicide-homicide operations allow for significant attack fluidity, as the perpetrators can penetrate enemy territory often undetected and with subsequent freedom of movement. Israeli terrorism analyst Shaul Shay explains:

[The suicide-homicide bomber’s] control over timing and venue enables its direction so that it will cause maximum damage... The suicide attacker

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17 While this chapter and more specifically this section addresses organizations and their use of suicide terrorism, it should be noted that levels of subgroups’ autonomy on the ability to launch suicide-homicide attacks varies with organization and subgroup. With a variety of research pointing to the strategic use of suicide terrorism by Palestinian organizations, analysts have somewhat ignored intra-organization posturing similarly as they have inter-organization rivalries. While only a few scholars such as Mia Bloom and Bruce Hoffman have studied extensively the effects of inter-organizational rivalries on the suicide-terror phenomenon, even less research has been carried out on the effects of intra-organizational maneuvering on suicide-homicide attacks. Scholars Ami Pedahzur and Arie Perliger have discovered that suicide-homicide bombers are not always the result of a rational pursuit at the organization level, but rather at the hamula (clan) or "network" level. This provides some insight to why organizations might seem more or less cohesive and effective from time to time. See Ami Pedahzur and Arie Perliger, "The Changing Nature of Suicide Attacks: A Social Network Perspective," Social Forces 84, no. 4 (June 2006): 1987-2008.
is a kind of sophisticated guided missile that knows how to launch the explosive charge at the target [and] at the optimal timing.\textsuperscript{18}

Third, because the suicide-homicide bomber has accessibility that likens him or her to a multi-million dollar missile, yet is fairly inexpensive to deploy and possibly an even more precise killing tool than a precision bomb, makes him or her an exceptionally efficient weapon. RAND Corporation calculates that "suicide terrorist attacks cause four times more casualties than other types of terror," and in Israel that number jumps to six times as many.\textsuperscript{19} During al-Aqsa intifada, suicide-homicide bombers initiated just one percent of all the terrorist attacks, but accounted for 50 percent of the entire murders.\textsuperscript{20} A highly efficient and cost-effective weapon, the suicide-homicide bomber adds a priceless component to the arsenal of terror organizations. Indeed, a suicide-homicide attack represents a bottom-dollar operation that oftentimes

provides top-dollar results. Fourth, some terrorist organizations have learned how to use suicide-homicide attacks as a recruiting tool, by fusing the *modus operandi* with religiously and culturally sanctioned martyrdom. As a result, these organizations have increased motivation and in doing so extended their capability. Fifth, highlighting its latent strategic nature, the suicide-homicide bomber usually functions as the single weapon in an organization’s arsenal that allows it to attack an enemy at a desired level. Last and perhaps most importantly, suicide-homicide attacks assure media coverage—thus aiding in the central component of terrorism and guerrilla warfare theory: winning politically, but not necessarily through a decisive military victory against enemy armies.

While suicide-homicide attacks have many advantages, they do not serve as a magic bullet for each and every organization wishing to extort political concessions. In other words, all suicide-homicide bombers are not created equal. Context determines a suicide-homicide attack’s strategic potential, or lack thereof. Terrorism expert Bruce Hoffman states, “[s]uicide terror attacks are

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rational acts undertaken as part of a deliberately calculated and orchestrated campaign to undermine confidence in government and leadership, crush popular morale, and spread fear and intimidation." Thus the reception of the targeted government plays a vital role in granting strategic capability to a suicide-terror campaign. Over the decades, Palestinian terror organizations have manipulated social and political variables in their favor—ending with a weapon that best suited environmental circumstances, as it proved to induce desired results in the political arena. Responses from various Israeli governments, however, have played an equally important role in the suicide-homicide bomber's rise as a strategic weapon.

The Pioneer and the Refiners: Hezbollah and the Palestinians

Suicide-homicide attacks, despite frequent usage in recent years, do not constitute a new phenomenon. The modern use of perpetrators' suicides in modi operandi has

22 Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, revised and expanded ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 168. See also Ganor, "The Rationality of the Islamic Radical Suicide Attack Phenomenon."
developed mostly over the last 40 years,\(^{23}\) beginning with the “suicide missions”\(^{24}\) of the Palestinian fedayin of the late 1960s leading to Iran’s “mine jumpers”\(^{25}\) during the 1980’s Iran-Iraq War and culminating with the Palestinian shahid’s suicide-terror attacks. The pioneering of modern suicide-homicide attacks, however, lies with Hezbollah.

Suicide-homicide bombers often possess a vital characteristic that falls within traditional definitions of strategic weapons. In explaining the genesis of the term “strategic,” Lawrence Freedman notes,

...fledgling air forces, after World War I, were anxious to demonstrate that they possessed a means for getting right to the heart of the enemy’s power and destroying it with some well-chosen blows, they described this as a ‘strategic’ capability [emphasis added].\(^{26}\)

Such “well-chosen blows,” in the form of suicide-homicide attacks, have been dealt to the United States (U.S.),

\(^{23}\) There are examples that predate 1968, such as the Imperial Japanese use of Kamikaze pilots against the U.S. Navy during World War II.

\(^{24}\) A common definition explains “suicide missions” as those in which “the terrorist does not expect to survive,” but does not intentionally seek death; “suicide attacks” or suicide-homicide attacks, are those “in which the attacker kills himself or...herself” during the operation. See Robert Pape, *Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism* (New York: Random House, 2005), 10-11.


Israel, Iraq, the United Kingdom (UK) and a number other nation-states in attempts by organizations to directly target an enemy’s power, whether symbolic, military, economic, political or otherwise. Over the last few decades, a targeted nation-state’s political will rather than its sheer military might has frequently characterized the “heart of the enemy’s power.” The example of U.S. involvement in Lebanon in the early 1980s validates this point.

In 1982, the Reagan administration dispatched U.S. Marines to Lebanon to act as the chief contingent of an international peacekeeping force, charged with the mission of curtailing the ongoing civil war, and overlapping Israel-PLO war. While Lebanon remained a fragile environment, U.S. and French forces made headway in marginalizing Iran and Syria—the state sponsors of the various aggressors in the conflicts. However, the Pasdaran’s Frankenstein creation, Hezbollah, along with a federation of other Muslim groups,27 operating under the name Islamic Jihad Organization, set out on a suicide-

27 While most of the groups were Shi’a, Palestinian Fatah, which is Sunni, did play an important role. See Robert Baer, See No Evil: The True Story of a Ground Soldier in the CIA’s War on Terrorism (New York: Random House, 2002).
homicide attack campaign with the goal of driving out U.S. and French forces, in order to establish Iranian-Syrian-PLO dominance in Lebanon and to battle Israel on favorable turf without an American presence.

On April 18, 1983, a suicide-homicide bomber drove a van into the U.S. embassy in Beirut and detonated 400 kilograms of explosives, killing 63 people, including numerous CIA employees, and wounding 120 others. On October 23, 1983, suicide-homicide truck bombers attacked the U.S. Marines (killing 246) and French paratroopers barracks (killing 58) in Beirut. After these and a few other devastating suicide-homicide attacks on its interests, the U.S. pulled the Marines out of Lebanon on February 26, 1984. For the first time in modern history, a superpower pulled out of an engagement due to the actions of an enemy, which investigators could not even identify.

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28 Shay, The Shahids, 91.
29 The Cult of the Suicide Bomber, prod. and dir. David Betty and Kevin Toolis, 1 hr. 35 min., Many Rivers Films, 2006, DVD; Shay, The Shahids, 91.
31 French paratroopers account for all 58 killed in this attack. Norton, 71.
Thus a few “well-chosen blows” against U.S. targets convinced the Reagan administration to end America’s presence in Lebanon, rather than stay and “run the risk of another suicide attack on the Marines,” to put it in President Ronald Reagan’s words.\textsuperscript{32} One should note that it is highly unlikely that the attacks could have succeeded with the level that the did had the attackers, instead of taking their own lives, opted to try and plant the explosives close enough to the embassy and barracks to inflict an equal amount of casualties and damage. The attack on the U.S. Marine barracks marked the largest conventional explosion at the time since the end of World War II (WWII).\textsuperscript{33} Therefore, reason suggests that a few suicide attackers, armed with automobiles and enough explosives to destroy a score of buildings, altered the security environment of a state, as well as drove out a superpower, both of which proved to have severe repercussions for the decades to come.

Accordingly, many accredit the suicide-homicide bomber’s advent to its successful usage in Lebanon. Since its campaign against the U.S. in Lebanon, Hezbollah has

\textsuperscript{32} U.S. President Ronald Reagan quoted in Pape, 65.  
\textsuperscript{33} See The Cult of the Suicide Bomber.
influenced and inspired Amal,\textsuperscript{34} the Syrian Socialist-National Party (SSNP), Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), Hamas, al-Qaeda, and others in their uses of suicide-homicide attacks. Hezbollah's influence on other Muslim (both Shi'a and Sunni) organizations, however, surpasses the importance of the impression it left on militant groups spanning the ideological spectrum; militarily, Hezbollah directed various Islamic organizations' attention away from suicide missions and onto suicide-homicide attacks. In religious and cultural terms, Hezbollah shifted the focus from the \textit{feda'i} to the \textit{shahid}. Middle East Historian, Rafael Israeli explains the subtle but important difference between the two notions:

\begin{quote}
...both shahid and fida'I are motivated by a profound and numbing religious fanaticism which pushes them to commit acts of self-sacrifice, which we usually refer to as 'suicide attacks'... However, while the shahid is a martyr in the sense that he is serving a cause, the fida'I connotes more of a devotion to a leader.\textsuperscript{35}
\end{quote}

Thus the focus of Islamic martyrdom shifted from the specific to the universal. It moved away from the

\textsuperscript{34} Meaning "hope" in Arabic, the acronym Amal stands for \textit{Afwaj al-Muqawamat al-Lubnaniyye} (Lebanese Resistance Detachments).

\textsuperscript{35} Rafael Israeli, \textit{Islamikaze} (London: Frank Cass, 2003), 75.
established organization member to any individual who aspired ad hoc to answer the call of jihad.\textsuperscript{36}

One should not downplay the impact Hezballah has had on many militant organizations around the globe. However, its widespread usage of suicide-homicide attacks slowed in the late 1980s, due to leaderships’ concerns over its long-term social effects.\textsuperscript{37} Regarding the evolution of suicide-homicide attacks, Hezballah passed the baton to the Palestinians. As a result, Palestinian organizations hold more of the responsibility than any others for the fine-tuning of the shahid, as simultaneously a religious symbol and ruthless-killing machine.\textsuperscript{38}

\textsuperscript{36} This difference has played an important role concerning the development of Palestinian suicide terrorism, considering most Palestinian shahids are not long-time members of an organization at the time of launching their suicide-homicide attacks. Rather Palestinian suicide terrorists are oftentimes periphery members of a social network affiliated with an organization, and capriciously decide to carry out an attack; see Ami Pedahzur and Arie Perliger, "The Changing Nature of Suicide Attacks: A Social Network Perspective." \textit{Social Forces} 84, no. 4 (June 2006): 1987–2008.

\textsuperscript{37} Hezballah’s spiritual advisor, Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah issued a \textit{fatwa} (Islamic degree) authorizing martyrdom operations “only on special occasions” due to a fear of over “exaggerated use [by] over-zealous youth.” See Rafael Israeli, "A Manual of Islamic Fundamentalist Terrorism," \textit{Terrorism and Political Violence} 14, no. 4 (24 January 2002): 30.

\textsuperscript{38} Perhaps, most importantly, Palestinians successfully transferred the explicitly Shi’a version of martyrdom and the shahid to the Sunni world. Chapter Seven reviews the significance of this in depth.
Death by Ten Thousand Bee Stings

In late 1992, as a response to the seemingly endless first intifada, Israel’s Rabin government made the disastrous mistake of deporting the uprising’s leaders and other “Islamic Palestinian activists,” including both Hamas and PIJ members, to Southern Lebanon.39 Under the auspices of Hezbollah and the Pasdaran, these Hamas and PIJ members learned the functional elements of suicide-homicide attacks, and established enduring connections with their hosts.40 Compounding its mistakes, the Rabin government allowed many of the 418 deportees to return to the disputed territories by the end of 1993.41 It is by no coincidence then that Hamas and PIJ attacked Israel with suicide-homicide bombers a combined eight times during 1993.

39 At this time, Israel deported between 415 and 418 Palestinians to Lebanon; see Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 148; and Scott Atran, “Genesis of Suicide Terrorism,” Science 299, issue 5612 (7 March 2003).
40 Hoffman notes, “PIJ...benefited doubly, forging tighter relations with Iran while significantly enhancing its military capabilities under Hezbollah’s tutelage.” Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 148.
41 Although Hamas is 100 percent Sunni, they were more than willing to cooperate with the Shi’a in Lebanon, as they view Israel as a common enemy. Jessica Stern, Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill (New York: Harper Collins, 2003), 47.
The mid-1990s, accordingly, saw "the heyday of [Palestinian] suicide-bombers."\(^{42}\) The "heyday" that is, until the situation worsened exponentially, when al-Aqsa intifada brought daily suicide-homicide attacks on Israeli civilians. At the height of this campaign, Israeli Historian Benny Morris explained, "[t]he Palestinians say they have found a strategic weapon, and suicide bombing is it...The streets are empty. They have effectively terrorized Israeli society. My wife won't use a bus anymore, only a taxi."\(^{43}\) The constant attacks on soft, i.e. civilian and non-combative military, targets by Palestinian suicide-homicide bombers paralyzed Israeli society and its once burgeoning economy. As suicide-terror attacks began to represent "one of Israel's gravest strategic threats"\(^{44}\) and take their toll on the Israeli civilian population, the Israeli government, headed by a newly elected Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, acknowledged that it had to deny entry of terrorists from the disputed territories into Israel proper at all costs. Scholar Ami Pedahzur notes, "[a]bout halfway through the year 2002, Israel defined

\(^{42}\) Morris, Righteous Victims, 626.
\(^{43}\) Hoffman, "The Logic of Suicide Bombers."
suicide terrorism as a first-degree strategic threat and
began to take great pains in dealing with it."  

For months Israel responded with extensive military and counter-
terrorism operations. But, after a two and half-year
barrage of continuous suicide-terrorist attacks, the Sharon
government, in order to decisively put a stop to the daily
infiltration of suicide-homicide bombers, began
construction of a security/separation barrier roughly along
the "greenline," which demarcates Israel proper from the
disputed territories.

Although Israel's (partially built) security barrier
has resulted in short-term tactical success, the lack of a
larger territorial buffer zone could very well turn out
only to expose a strategic blunder in the long-term. With
the barrier's construction, Israel has significantly
altered its security situation in its favor regarding the
prevention of suicide-terrorist attacks. However, the

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45 Pedahzur, Suicide Terrorism, 64.
46 Specifically, the "greenline" refers to Israel's pre-1967 Six-
Day War borders; however, today many use the term as including
some settlement blocs as well.
47 In the areas where the security barrier has already been
constructed, it has successfully cut off potential suicide-
homicide bombers' access into Israel proper from the disputed
territories. This has resulted in a reduction of suicide-homicide
attacks by 90 percent in Israel; and, it has reduced terrorist
attacks in general by 80 percent. Israel Ministry of Foreign
security barrier has different implications for Israel’s national military strategy, as the barrier acts as a tourniquet, which has stopped the bleeding caused by the second intifada’s suicide-terror spree, but in doing so forces the amputation of a vital portion of Israel’s geographical body. Ultimately, Israel’s security barrier project offers tactical pros at the expense of paying strategic cons. Israel acted to barricade itself largely, if not solely, in response to the suicide-homicide bomber campaign unleashed by Hamas, PIJ, and al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade (AMB). While many view the security barrier as a counter-terrorism necessity to prevent infiltration by suicide-homicide bombers, terror organizations that surround Israel in the disputed territories as well as Hezbollah in Southern Lebanon, have already exploited the Jewish state’s increased territorial vulnerability; these organizations have adapted to the barrier and capitalized on the strategic advancements provided by suicide-homicide attacks, as evidenced by the rocket attacks of the last few years and the 2006 war with Hezbollah that many argue represented a response to Israel’s display of weakness via its retreat and separation policies.\textsuperscript{48}

\textsuperscript{48} This debate over the effects of caving to suicide-homicide
Nearly 40 years have elapsed of the one-sided war of attrition, and as an efficient and cost-effective weapon, the importance for the Palestinians of the suicide mission/suicide-homicide attack has only grown over the years. In the Palestinian movement's continuation of a strategy to wear Israel down, the suicide-homicide bomber found a central role in the conflict during al-Aqsa intifada, in which "strategic bombardment" took on a new meaning, as vigilant citizens had to view every person on Israeli streets as a potential bomber. The separation barrier, while an effective safeguard against potential bombers goes back to Israel's pullout from Lebanon in 2000. In August 2002, IDF Lieutenant General Ya'alon articulated that "the Israeli army is strong, Israel has technological superiority... but its citizens are unwilling any longer to sacrifice lives in order to defend their national interests and national goals. Therefore, [as Hezbollah's Nasrallah suggests,] Israel is a spider-web society: it looks strong from the outside, but touch it and it will fall apart," Originally published in Ha'aretz and quoted in Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 156-157. Furthermore, Hoffman notes that the "IDF high command...does not dispute Hezbollah's explanation for why the IDF withdrew from Lebanon, or the influence of the 'spider-web' theory on Palestinian thinking." Ultimately, high-ranking IDF officials and Hoffman, the leading RAND Corporation terrorism researcher, view Palestinian terror organizations' suicide-homicide bomber campaign during al-Aqsa intifada as a result of Israel's retreat from Lebanon. Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 157. 

First with the suicide mission of the feda'i and then with the suicide-homicide attacks of the shahid, Palestinians have consistently utilized such attacks as symbolical weapons, as well as tactical ones.
suicide terrorists' infiltration, represents a Palestinian advancement toward its strategic ends.

As Palestinian organizations' level of violence has increased most notably since the signing of the Declaration of Principles, the goals of erecting a Palestinian state and driving Israel off sacred Islamic land have come closer to fulfillment. The increasing level of pressure exerted on Israel has forced the Jewish state to concede territory that it might not ever have otherwise. Pedahzur notes:

[Suicide terrorism] succeeded where a vision of peace had failed. These attacks had brought about a substantial increase in Israeli public support for withdrawal from the territories—but this was out of a sense of resignation and not from a feeling that it was possible for Israelis and Palestinians to coexist peaceably, at least not in the near future. Therefore, it can be inferred that both Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, groups that from the very beginning objected to the Oslo Accords, had realized their goals. The Israeli public was fed up with the Accords and, at the same time, was willing to accept the idea of secession from the territories without a Palestinian commitment to peace or even an end to terror.⁵⁰

Additionally, the Sharon government's unilateral withdrawal from Gaza came without a national referendum or clear support from the majority of the Israeli populace for such a move. Nevertheless, the government saw it fit as a first

⁵⁰ Pedahzur, Suicide Terrorism, 66.
step to getting at the "root causes" of Palestinian terrorism--i.e. "occupation"; Sharon's use of the word in 2003, marked the first time a Likud Prime Minister accepted the Palestinian/Arab/Islamic stance on the disputed territories--eventually leading to the fragmentation of the long-standing right wing Israeli party a year later.

**Contextualizing Success**

While the successes appear similar on the surface, a number of differences distinguish Hezbollah's usage of suicide-homicide bombers as a tool of asymmetrical warfare from Palestinian organizations' employment of the modus operandi as a weapon of terror. Hezbollah, in classic guerrilla fashion, sought to expel a foreign enemy, which had no vital national interest connected to Lebanon's territory, but operated with other interests. Palestinian organizations, on the other hand, have utilized suicide-homicide bombers in an effort to bring about the state of Israel's ultimate destruction. Hezbollah did not claim its attacks on U.S. and French forces, nor did the Iranian proxy seek dialogue. Hezbollah and its Iranian backers simply pursued their goal of getting Western players out of the Lebanon game as quickly as possible. To the contrary, Palestinian society has used the shahid as dialogue--as a
message from one society to another—as an articulation of a resolute identity and collection of fervent ideologies.\textsuperscript{51}

Although many organizations with a wide variety of political ideologies have incorporated suicide-homicide attacks, responsibility for the spread and pre-9/11 advancement of the \textit{modus operandi} rests primarily with Hezbollah, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad.\textsuperscript{52} Before Hezbollah’s use of suicide-homicide bombers, similar operations had either been used alongside conventional forces as a supporting tactic or had simply been “high-risk” missions lacking a blatantly “suicidal” element—limiting their operational capability. Thus Hezbollah’s method established the cornerstone of the contemporary suicide-homicide attack when it forced the U.S. out of Lebanon five years before the \textit{Mujahedin} expelled the Soviets from Afghanistan.

Palestinians used suicide terror to rob Israeli society of its Western normalcy and break the status quo, and in doing so ensnared the Sharon government and

\textsuperscript{51} This is evidenced by Palestinian organizations competing with one another over which was best suited to relay this message.\textsuperscript{52} These groups specifically influenced other groups to use suicide-homicide operations. The LTTE is not included because there is little evidence to suggest it has influenced groups outside its own conflict to incorporate suicide-homicide operations, with perhaps the PKK as an exception.
compelled it to isolate the Jewish state, which has resulted in, and promises to continue in the future to have, consequences of strategic proportions. The Palestinians forced territorial concessions, which were more fruitful than the entire Oslo peace process, and backed Israel into a corner, where it became vulnerable to Hamas and Hezbollah rocket attacks and audacious kidnappings. Effectively, Israel now finds itself on a constant defensive on its own territory—a position the Jewish state has not faced since prior to the 1967 Six-Day War. Palestinian terrorist organizations long ago learned how to use the media to maximize the effects of a self-sacrificing or suicide-homicide attack, as initially demonstrated by choice of venue, such as the 1972 Olympics, but in the last two decades by the simple mass targeting of average civilians, which in manner and disregard was unprecedented in any terror campaign. While reprehensible, Palestinian-terrorist organizations learned to use suicide-homicide attacks in a way that provided the modus operandi with the political power its symbolism had always warranted—adding again to its strategic potential.
Balance of Terror?\(^{53}\)

By mid-2005, *al-Aqsa intifada* had all but officially ended, as willing bombers had lost easy access into Israel. Hamas quickly shifted tactics, by launching homemade “Qassam” rockets into Southern Israel from Gaza.\(^{54}\) PIJ, AMB and the Popular Resistance Committees (PRC) followed suit. The suicide-homicide bomber’s effects, however, remain in place, as Qassam attacks reflect the new reality in the armed dialogue between Israel and Palestinian terror organizations--one reminiscent of military parity, despite Israel’s vast military superiority.

During *al-Aqsa intifada*, Palestinian leaders began claiming they had struck a “balance of terror”\(^{55}\) by deploying suicide-homicide bombers. Hamas political bureau member Azet al-Rushuq argues:

> This weapon is our winning card, which turned our weakness and feebleness into strength, and created parity never before witnessed in the history of struggle with the Zionist enemy. It

\(^{53}\) Initially coined by Albert Wohlstetter to refer nuclear deterrence, Palestinians began using it once it seemed that suicide terrorism proved its own deterrence value.

\(^{54}\) During the 2006 war, Hezbollah berated the Jewish state with Kaytusha rockets to create a similar, yet far worse, situation on Israel’s more densely populated Northern cities. The attacks were reminiscent of PLO Kaytusha attacks launched from Southern Lebanon in the early 1980s, which prompted Israel’s 1982 invasion.

\(^{55}\) Others have called it a “balance of horror.”

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The balance of terror notion, whether genuinely believed by Palestinian terror organizations or simply part of the ever-existent diplomatic MacGuffin, functions the same vis-à-vis Israeli policy. The Palestinians effectively convinced successive Israeli governments from those led by Prime Ministers Rabin, to Sharon and Olmert, with the exception of the Netanyahu and Barak governments, that military parity was and continues to be a reality—resulting in Israel forfeiting policies vital to its national interests.

Today, it does not matter that the security barrier has decreased suicide-homicide bombers ability to infiltrate Israel proper and allowed Israeli society to revert to some form of normality. The balance of terror notion remains in effect, due to the combination of the Qassam rocket threat and the reality that without a separation barrier, which blocks the capability of suicide-homicide bombers but does not dilute potential shahids’ motivation, the suicide terror threat would

57 Today, the term “security barrier” is fairly a misnomer since it does not provide security against Qassam rocket attacks.
instantaneously reemerge. Thus, the suicide-homicide bomber, while rendered nearly combat ineffective by the barrier, has still brought Palestinian terror organizations, virtual deterrence, in addition to important territorial gains and political victories.

When Organizational Means Are Individuals’ Ends

By juxtaposing organizational method with person goals, the shahid/suicide-homicide bomber obfuscates a clear delineation of means and ends, and tactic and strategy. As a result, the modus operandi enjoys a predisposition to success as its operational ambiguity provides the foundation for a powerful mythology. Terrorism succeeds from the fear it instills in a targeted population, and terrorists that are impossible to understand only add to, and accelerate, the myth-induced fear factor. Even when a Palestinian suicide-homicide bomber fails in the tactical component of an operation, the act of “martyrdom” itself functions as success on the personal level. Similarly, and more importantly for Palestinian society and its representative organizations, an act of suicide terrorism, even when an operational
failure, succeeds strategically; the mere deployment of terrorists willing to kill themselves to murder their enemies sends a powerful message. One academic explanation contends: “[t]he rational use of terrorism can be thought of as a signaling game in which high profile attacks are carried out to communicate a player’s ability and determination to use violence to achieve its political objectives.” An act of suicide terrorism, perhaps only second to an attack using nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction, marks the ultimate “high profile attack.” Furthermore, the deployment of a suicide-homicide bomber to match a specific event (e.g. an election) delivers a message that expects a particular response--effectively, stripping a targeted population’s confidence in its government’s ability to secure the nation. To send a message against the peace process, scholar Luca Ricolfi notes, “one does not need to carry out devastating attacks,

59 Some scholars place the Hamas/PIJ’s 1996 suicide terrorism campaign in this category. In an attempt to derail the peace process, Hamas and PIJ launched a series of suicide-terror attacks so as to hurt the dovish Prime Minister Shimon Peres’ chances of being elected to his own term. See Pedahzur, Suicide Terrorism, 60-61; also Andrew Kydd and Barbara F. Walter, “Sabotaging the Peace: The Politics of Extremist Violence,” International Organization 56, no. 2 (Spring 2002): 263-296.
since small-scale but ‘heroic’ actions carried out by suicide attackers may convey the message even more effectively than large scale ones.⁶⁰ Such political signaling games are only made possible by the shahids who are willing to carry out attacks that predetermine their deaths. Moreover, the Palestinian shahid represents the fearless killer who loves death and craves murder. This image, more than the actual attacks, forced Israel to rethink its policies on the disputed territories.

The evolution of martyrdom in the modern Islamic world hit a peak with the second-intifada Palestinian shahid, who embodies the intrepidity of the mujahid⁶¹ yet also carries on the vitality of Arabist romanticism and the existential dedication of the revolutionary, all of which help to captivate angry-Muslim youth as well as cosmopolitan reporters. Palestinian terrorist organizations have refined the suicide-homicide bomber to near optimization; they have evolved the modus operandi from a guerrilla tactic to a terror strategy. In doing so, they have encouraged the strategy’s spread and escalation. With a culture of

⁶¹ Mujahid means Muslim holy warrior, or literally “one who wages jihad.”
martyrdom that has eclipsed most Palestinian institutions that shape thought,62 Palestinian society has nearly unanimously accepted suicide terrorism as a perfectly legitimate political tool permitted by Islam.63 For Palestinians, the shahid embodies the highest religious role model. By superimposing the shahid onto the suicide-homicide bomber, suicide terrorism became an end unto itself--serving individuals with an insured ticket to "paradise." For terror organizations, the shahid/suicide-homicide bomber provided a tactic that granted a number of strategic victories and has put them on the path to obtaining their overall defined political objectives.

With vast support for suicide-terror attacks, in words and deeds, the Palestinian movement sent a message to Israel that the Palestinian people will stop at nothing to force political and territorial concessions, even if it means sending their children to blow themselves up.64 It is

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64 Increasingly woman, children and the elderly have become shahids in the jihad against Israel. See Barbara Victor, Army of
with this show of socio-cultural tenacity, coupled with suicide terrorism’s effectiveness in stifling Israeli society, that brought the Jewish state to drop the official peace process altogether and adopt a policy of complete separation between itself and the Palestinians. Israel’s security barrier, however, is a mirage. It only reflects the inability of Israeli security forces to prevent numerous low-intensity terror attacks plotted in the disputed territories. On the surface, the barrier project seems like realpolitik pragmatism at its best. Yet, in pursuit of eliminating short-term threats, which are not existential in nature, Israel has risked its long-term ability to survive in a dangerous and unforgiving neighborhood. Ultimately, Palestinians displayed they have beaten Israel back and forced it to retreat into isolation—not with a powerful coalition of skilled armies, but rather with a confederation of terror organizations equipped simply with bomb belts and individuals willing to wear and detonate them.

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CHAPTER SIX

ALLAH, "PALESTINE," AND TRIBE: MOTIVATING INDIVIDUAL PALESTINIANS TO COMMIT MARTYRDOM

Offering a precise summary of the Palestinian suicide-homicide bomber phenomenon, political analyst David Brooks states:

Suicide bombing is the crack cocaine of warfare. It doesn’t just inflict death and terror on its victims; it intoxicates the people who sponsor it. It unleashes the deepest and most addictive human passions—the thirst for vengeance, the desire for religious purity, the longing for earthly glory and eternal salvation.¹

In so many words, the succinct description captures the motivations behind Palestinian suicide terrorism. Themes of passion, vengeance and self-interest motivate “ordinary” and “normal”² Palestinians to assume bomb-laden vests, find a target of value, position themselves, push a detonator button and kill themselves and as many of the defined enemy as possible. While subtle, this type of simultaneous murder-suicide means something different for the individual

than it does for the organization that sponsors the operation, or for the society that sanctions the attack and the political message it sends. But as always, the devil is in the details.

That a people with collective goals provides representative organizations with ends to pursue often leads terrorism researchers to overlook, with the exception of leaders or pioneering tacticians, the important roles individual terrorists play in their vicious game of political extortion. Average individuals are central to terror campaigns' success. They compose the people seeking political/social change or restoration, as well as form the body of organizations. This is especially the case in today's era of "new terrorism,"\(^3\) wherein organizations are less ideologically elitist and more focused on religion and/or ascriptive components of identity.

In contrast to research on general terrorism, suicide terrorism has spawned a plethora of studies that seek to perform a "psychological autopsy"\(^4\) on individual suicide-

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homicide operatives. These studies commonly divorce the individual terrorist from his or her organization and collective identity. As a result, the findings paint suicide-homicide bombers as desperate, humiliated, deprived or possessing other characteristics that point the blame of suicide terrorism to those who are targeted. Despite popular research that compartmentalizes motives into varying levels, terror campaigns, and particularly those that employ the suicide-homicide modus operandi, require not only organizational design and environmental conditioning, but imperatively the mobilization of willing individuals, who after all function as the link between the three.

Organization, environment and the individual thus work as one in sustaining the terror component of a political campaign. Furthermore, suicide-homicide bombers commit two separate, albeit simultaneous, acts while fulfilling their terror operations: murder and suicide. One could surely assert then that each behavior represents a distinct set of

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5 Robert Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism (New York: Random House, 2005), 171.
6 For example, see El Sarraj “Wounds and Madness: Why We’ve Become Suicide Bombers,” Peacework (May 2002).
7 Equally void of a comprehensive analysis include those studies that solely look at the strategies of organizations in search of the driving forces behind suicide terrorism.
motivations—some of which might overlap but not necessarily in every case. Accordingly, a variety of values, beliefs and attitudes, pulled from identity and environment, provide Palestinian suicide-homicide bombers with individual sets of motivations for carrying out their attacks.

Absent a Profile

The shahid video, which documents the last will and testament of almost every Palestinian suicide-homicide bomber, sheds light on individuals’ religious motivations, as well as their political views and usually include a declaration calling for continued resistance. These digital testaments generally begin in the same manner, “Praise be to Allah... I am the living martyr...,” but then take on a more personal tone, often addressing individual family members, specific political and religious grievances, or issuing particular threats against Israel or Jews or warning against supposed Zionist conspiracies. Once past the Islamic salutations there is no uniformity.

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Many leading researchers have concluded a profile for Palestinian suicide-homicide bombers does not exist, other than the fact that all of them have been Muslims, most male, and many under the age of 25.\(^9\) Reflecting the society from which they emanate, Palestinian suicide-homicide bombers have spanned the spectrum of political affiliation; they have represented organizations from the ultra-right Palestinian Islamic Jihad to the extreme-leftist Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. Education levels have varied from no formal education to those with graduate or law degrees.\(^{10}\) Similarly disparate, Palestinian suicide-homicide bombers have come from every level of social class, including two millionaires' sons.\(^{11}\) Most never married but some had full families. Many knew people or

\(^9\) See Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, Suicide Bombing Terrorism during the Current Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: September 2000-December 2005 (1 January 2006): 7-8; accessed at <www.terrorism-info.org.il/>.

\(^{10}\) One should note, however, that in Palestinian society, the higher the education level one has increases the likelihood he or she holds fanatical viewpoints. See Luca Ricolfi, “Palestinians, 1981-2003,” in Making Sense of Suicide Missions, expanded and updated ed., ed. Diego Gambetta (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 108.

personally were affected negatively by Israeli police or military action. Yet most had never met an Israeli or Jew.

Therefore one must acknowledge Islam as the foundation of suicide terrorism in the Palestinian context. Palestinians not only receive justification for suicide terrorism from interpretations of Islamic texts and sermons, but Islamic tradition also provides tempting religious perks; these notably include: for the shahid the procurement of 72 houriyyat al-ayn (virgin maidens) or "black-eyed" virgins, and for the shahida (female martyr) a marriage to a "perfect husband" and the promise that she

13 For Palestinian suicide-homicide bombers, Islam offers the spiritual impetus for taking one’s life that is evident in most contexts where suicide-homicide attackers are employed, including those where a non-Islamic organization uses the modus operandi. In the Palestinian context, submission to Allah’s will and sacrifice for the future of the um‘ma, as well as the individual’s pursuit of his or her own sanctity instills the individual with a variety of spiritual allures to kill oneself. A similar phenomenon exists in other Islamic contexts such as with Hezbollah and al-Qaeda suicide terrorists. Additionally, for the LTTE and the PKK, two secular-nationalist organizations, leader worship and cultic sacrifice for the group provide a similar impetus. However, suicide terrorists from these organizations demonstrate characteristics of “fatalistic suicide,” or suicide induced from coercive conditioning, i.e. "brainwashing." Jon Elster, "Motivations and Beliefs in Suicide Missions," in Making Sense of Suicide Missions, expanded and updated edition, ed. Diego Gambetta (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 238-241. Elster notes that the PKK and LTTE “run on dictatorial lines,” which leads to forms of leader worship; see page 246.
will be the most beautiful of his wives; both shahid and shahida earn exemption from painful time spent in the grave after death, gain the ability to see the face of Allah, receive eternal glorification, a guaranteed place in heaven for 70 loved-ones, the permission to drink alcohol and enjoy the pleasures of an unimaginable paradise or jannat al-firdaous (heavenly gardens), wear a crown that has a jewel worth more than all that is in the entire world, as well as other incentives declared by various Islamic authorities.\textsuperscript{14} Such reasons to pursue shahada (incidental martyrdom) or commit istishhad (deliberate martyrdom), however, often represent secondary motivations when viewed in the smaller, more personal, context of life in Palestinian society. Additionally, the conflict with Israel, because it is a Jewish, Western and non-Islamic

\textsuperscript{14} Some female suicide-homicide bombers are told they will be the most beautiful of the 72 virgins for a male shahid. See Suicide Killers: Paradise Is Hell. prod. and dir. Pierre Rehov, 1 hr. 20 min., City Lights Pictures, 2006, DVD; also Anat Berko and Edna Erez, "'Ordinary People' and 'Death Work': Palestinian Suicide Bombers as Victimizers and Victims," Violence and Victims 20, no. 6 (December 2005): 611; additionally Kevin Toolis, "Suicide Bomber Caught in the Act: Why These Girls Want to Be Martyrs," Herald Sun (16 September 2006). Shahids' post-temporal unions are also referred to as "weddings with eternity." See Barbara Victor, Army of Roses: Inside the World of Palestinian Women Suicide Bombers (Emmaus, Penn.: Rodale, 2003); and Mohammed M. Hafez, "Dying to Be Martyrs: The Symbolic Dimension of Suicide Terrorism," in Root Causes of Suicide Terrorism: The Globalization of Martyrdom, ed. Ami Pedahzur (New York: Routledge, 2005), 65; Pedahzur, Suicide Terrorism, 156.
state, provides Palestinian society, organizations and individuals with Islamic justifications for suicide terrorism. But, beyond justifying the Palestinian point of view in the Conflict, individuals rely on specific passions and desires for vengeance, as well as personal interests, in order to convince themselves that "martyrdom" offers the best future. In these details lays the variable that often tips the scale to the side of action in the individual's cost/benefit analysis. Thus, research must consider Islam, yet look past its explicit influence to reach a comprehensive explanation of individual motives.

The Semantics of "Suicide" and "Martyrdom"

Palestinian suicide-homicide bombers never consider their actions of self-induced death and killing of innocents as committing suicide or murder. Rather, they see it, as Palestinian society does, as attaining istishhad, or "martyrdom" through an act of self-sacrifice for Allah's sake. Moreover, Palestinian society places the shahid atop a hierarchy of honored Islamic fighters and warriors.15 Accordingly, the culture of martyrdom plays a central role

15 The shahid/istishhadi enjoys even more social praise than the feda'i and mujahid.
in buttressing these notions in the mainstream discourse on suicide-homicide bombers within Palestinian society. For example, when a suicide-homicide bomber detonates his or her explosives and completes an operation, the bomber’s family does not mourn but rather celebrates the “marriage” of its son to the 72 black-eyed virgins\(^\text{16}\) or its daughter to a perfect husband,\(^\text{17}\) i.e. a shahid, assigned to her in paradise. Indeed, families oftentimes do not post obituaries in the local papers—opting instead to list wedding announcements.\(^\text{18}\) Thus it goes without surprise that the social acceptance of suicide-homicide bombers as “martyrs” rather than suicide-murderers, surpasses polled support for “suicide terrorism.”\(^\text{19}\)

\(^{16}\) In the mythology propagated, the “black-eyed virgins” are not only perpetual virgins but also non-human; they are some type of cosmic being, if not angelic. This is synthesized from discussions with numerous Palestinians and Israeli-Arabs. See also Pedahzur, *Suicide Terrorism*, 144.

\(^{17}\) Some failed Palestinian suicide-homicide bombers have articulated that they expect a “perfect husband” in paradise. See Berko and Erez, 611.

\(^{18}\) Moghadam, “Palestinian Suicide Terrorism in the Second Intifada,” 73.

\(^{19}\) Often polls are cited in arguments to whether Palestinians support suicide terrorism or not. Despite the polling on this question, which has fluctuated between 15 and 75 percent since suicide-homicide bombers first struck Israel in 1993, when a suicide-homicide bombers does attack Palestinian society accepts him or her as a martyr. See Gal Luft, “The Palestinian H-Bomb: Terror’s Winning Strategy,” *Foreign Affairs* 81, no. 4 (July/August 2002). Thus, polls reflect support for the strategy
As a matter of fanciful semantics, Palestinian society rebukes the idea that a shahid commits suicide. Since a suicide-homicide bomber intentionally commits an 'amalyya istishhadiyya (act of self-sacrifice), or “martyrdom operation,” in compliance with “Allah’s will,” various authorities in Palestinian society utilize Qur’anic suras and Hadith sayings to argue that the shahid does not commit intihar (suicide), nor truly dies, but lives on as a spirit in paradise. Indeed, the Qur’an explicitly suggests it is sinful to even state a shahid is dead. Furthermore, the difference between one’s incidental shahada, or “death for Allah’s sake,” and an 'amalyya istishhadiyya by al-shahid al-hai (the living martyr) is subtle but important, as the latter’s invocation leaves a powerful insinuation for

at a given time--not support for the act itself, which already enjoys deep cultural dispositions toward acceptance of the act. This is a pervasive belief in other Islamic societies that deploy suicide terrorist as well. See The Cult of the Suicide Bomber, prod. and dir. David Betty and Kevin Toolis, 1 hr. 35 min., Many Rivers Films, 2006, DVD.

21 Hafez, Manufacturing Human Bombs, 37-38.
22 Qur’an 2:154 states: “And call not those who are slain in the way of Allah ‘dead.’ Nay, they are living, only ye perceive not.” Refer to Hafez, “Dying to Be Martyrs,” 64.
23 Palestinian society refers to an individual who an organization has offered a specific suicide-homicide attack to as al-shahid al-hai, or “the living martyr.” While a chosen individual’s identity is usually kept secret for the sake of operational integrity, the individual still takes great joy in knowing he or she will most likely attain martyrdom.
future potential shahids to feed on by providing an example of unmatched 'heroism' and 'bravery.' The image of the shahid intentionally sacrificing his or her life for an Islamic/Arab/Palestinian struggle functions as an endlessly powerful symbol. Fusing the shahid with the suicide-homicide bomber works to reinforce the act of suicide terrorism within society by framing it as an imperative to maintain cultural honor, individual respect and fulfill religious sanctity. Hence the importance of the suicide-bomber’s farewell videotape, the family’s celebration of his or her marriage with “eternity,” and the grandiose istishhad posters on wall after wall, street by street--all of which symbolically eternalize the shahid. Additionally, al-shahid al-hai often enjoys greater temporal benefits by predetermining to die in an ‘amalyya istishhadiyya (versus the mujahid who wages jihad and obtains incidental shahada). Al-shahid al-hai accelerates the Faustian logic, foregoing lasting-temporal benefits in exchange for promises of paradise, which lie simply beyond the pushing of a detonator button.
In effect, Palestinian society absolves suicide-homicide bombers of their suicide and murderous intent. Moreover, the culture of martyrdom venerates the shahid with the highest religious and national honors. The stigmas of suicide and murder therefore never enter the individual's calculus; society replaces them with 'self-sacrifice for Allah's will' and 'defense of Palestine.' Like Westerners who gauge success by their 'contributions to society,' or at least their 'social status,' a Palestinian suicide-homicide bomber's willingness to commit istishhad reflects the desire to contribute to the betterment of the 'greater good'--i.e. the collective, as defined as the um'ma (global Islamic community), "Palestine" or both; furthermore, the heroic status placed on shahids in Palestinian society adds to the general motivation of individuals seeking to 'make something' of their lives.

25 Prestigious Islamic authorities that are not Palestinians such as Sheik Yousef Qaradawi also play an important role in legitimizing Palestinian suicide-homicide bombers. See Chapter Seven for an explanation of his fatwa (Islamic decree) sanctioning Palestinian suicide-homicide bombers.

26 Or simply "to do something" with their lives, which just as often demonstrates a rebuke of Arab society, as it does the conflict with Israel. See Berko and Erez, 611.
Between Altruism and Egoism

Invoking the ideas of sociologist Émile Durkheim, some researchers of suicide terrorism have explored the suicide terrorism phenomenon from the side of "altruistic suicide." However, scholars have more or less overlooked Durkheim's "egoistic" side of suicide, if not purposely shunned it as an overly suicidal expression of suicide. But, as depicted in Palestinian suicide-homicide bombers' own words and deeds, both altruism and self-interest play important roles in stimulating their motivation. Accordingly, the promoted allures of suicide terrorism, either by accident or design, play off a concoction of altruism and egoism.

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29 Durkheim’s notion of “anomic” suicide is also regularly overlooked. To his credit, scholar Assaf Moghadam recognizes, "there is no reason to assume that the shaheed’s decision to embark on a martyrdom operation is entirely selfless." Moghadam, "Palestinian Suicide Terrorism in the Second Intifada," 71.
The Institutionalization of "Victimhood"

Vengeance stands out as an oft-cited motive in the literature on Palestinian suicide terrorism. Whether or not one believes that Palestinians have a right to avenge Israeli policy or actions of Israeli citizens is irrelevant. For the "victim," only perception matters. Again the culture of martyrdom's functions play a crucial role, as they have facilitated the establishment and maintenance of "victimhood" in Palestinian society. After all, vengeance based on falsehoods can still effectively produce an "avenger," who while satisfying his or her bloodlust also implements policy. Social, Islamic and political organizations, the Palestinian Authority (PA), and other contributors to the culture of martyrdom have successfully ingrained victimhood into the Palestinian collective identity, allowing for individuals to give and take from a widespread feeling of injustice. Frequently articulated components of Palestinian victimhood include: Israel's refusal\textsuperscript{30} to allow the return of the descendants of 750,000 Arabs\textsuperscript{31} who left the nascent Jewish state amid the

\textsuperscript{30} One should note that this would effectively end Israeli's existence as a Jewish state.
\textsuperscript{31} The leading historian in this field puts the number around 700,000, but within the debate figures have ranged from 250,000
1947-1948 Jewish-Arab civil war or subsequent 1948-1949 Israeli War of Independence, checkpoints strategically placed across the West Bank, Israel's separation barrier, and Israeli control of simultaneous Jewish/Muslim holy sites in Jerusalem and Hebron, as well as a lengthy catalog of other complaints passed down generation after generation.

As determined in many criminological studies, the "victim" often grows up to victimize. Researchers who have interviewed numerous failed Palestinian suicide-homicide bombers in Israeli prisons report: "[t]he participants' social identity as Palestinians, who are dispossessed, oppressed and humiliated, was a recurrent theme in discussing their lives."\(^{32}\) In most cases such perceptions of victimization and injustice demonstrate a clear nexus to behavior patterns culminating in one's participation in to 800,000; see Benny Morris, The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004. Today, the "refugee" population numbers around 4.4 million people, most of whom are scattered across the Levant; see Evelyn Gordon, "Civil Fights: The Palestinians Don't Want a State," Jerusalem Post, 24 October 2007; Samih K. Farsoun and Naseer H. Aruri, Palestine and the Palestinians: A Social and Political History, 2\(^{nd}\) ed. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 2006), 105.\(^{32}\) Berko and Erez, 609; see also Jessica Stern, Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill (New York: Harper Collins, 2003), 32-62.
suicide terrorism. 33 Islamist-Palestinian terror organizations and the Fatah-led PA have perpetuated the institutionalization of victimhood, in order to help condition Palestinian society to support “martyrdom operations” and to instigate individuals to seek participation. 34 Playing the “martyr” first requires accepting the role of the “victim.” In Palestinian society, “justice,” victimhood and martyrdom often work as the logical social impetus for political mobilization. If victims deserve justice, and martyrdom operations provide victims with a method to serve justice, then the conclusion is simple. New York University Psychiatrist John Rosenberger recognizes,

One is visited by vengeance in response to one’s being a victim... Vengeance is a strangely sweet feeling, accompanied by a clear and unambiguous sense that one is entitled to retaliate. Possessed of vengeance one feels exhilarated,

34 One should note that today Palestinian suicide-homicide bombers are not “recruited” per se, but rather are members of a social network loosely affiliated with a terrorist organization; Palestinian suicide-homicide bombers usually seek out, when they want to participate in a “martyrdom operation,” terrorist dispatchers who are also connected to the social network at hand. See Ami Pedahzur and Arie Perliger, “The Changing Nature of Suicide Attacks: A Social Network Perspective,” Social Forces 84, no. 4 (June 2006).
empowered, almost invincible. It is a consuming passion.  

Perceptions of injustice ultimately provide a sense of righteousness to the avenger. Accordingly, collective affirmation of victimization, coupled with religious justifications for retribution,\(^{36}\) engender individuals to believe without a doubt that their acts of terror exemplify justice and righteousness, if not holiness. So, if vengeance explains the motive for mass murder, what explains the individual’s suicide?

Arab Prison, Islamic Escape: Killing to Die

"Death is...the ultimate narcissistic injury...While we hope, and may have faith, that death is a beginning, we know for sure that it is an ending."\(^{37}\) Rosenberger’s assertion provides a useful basis for deciphering those motives of Palestinian suicide-homicide bombers left unarticulated. The general understanding that death brings an end demonstrates the suicide-homicide bomber’s


\(^{36}\) Hamas and PIJ operational planners claim they reject individuals who seek to participate in a "martyrdom operation" if their motive is purely based on vengeance; *shahid* candidates must demonstrate first and foremost Islamic reasoning to be sent on a suicide-homicide operation. See Hassan.

\(^{37}\) Rosenberger, 14-15.
sacrificial/altruistic motives, but the “hope” and “faith” suggest a more egoistical line of reasoning also exists. Self-interest stands as the most overlooked element in scholarly collections on Palestinian suicide-homicide bombers’ motivations. Perhaps this is the case because researchers have not delved deep enough into the contradictory world of a society that hopelessly attempts to hold on to the past, while an ever-globalizing Western culture demands to influence or clash with the societies that it meets.

Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza live in a traditional society based on the principles of 'urf (Arab customary law).\textsuperscript{38} In such a society, the hamula (clan) system determines and organizes the individual’s life and place in society. Far from their bedui (nomadic) past, contemporary Palestinians generally receive a high level of education, and Palestinian society boasts an established middle class and elite/technocrat class. Nevertheless,

tribal norms still dominate daily life among average Palestinians. The individual lacks a substantial personal identity in the Western sense of individuality.\textsuperscript{39} As with any traditional or conservative society, social norms and codified law heavily guard against interaction between the sexes. Men and women have distinct non-negotiable roles, and the protection of females' chastity, or al-'ard (female sexual honor), is of the utmost importance to the family and its hamula. Guarding a woman's purity supercedes all other functions of daily life. A hamula views an assault on, or dishonoring of, one of its females as the highest insult, which requires a violent response, usually against the perpetrating male and involved female without regard to her culpability or lack thereof. Additionally, without an established income, Palestinian men cannot marry, as families commonly demand high dowries and require that the male prove his ability to support a woman before they marry.\textsuperscript{40}

\textsuperscript{39} Khalil Shikaki, "The Views of Palestinian Society on Suicide Terrorism," in Countering Suicide Terrorism, updated ed., ed. Boaz Ganor (Herzliya, Israel: International Institute for Counter-Terrorism [ICT], 2007), 100.

\textsuperscript{40} The Cult of the Suicide Bomber, prod. and dir. David Betty and Kevin Toolis, 1 hr. 35 min., Many Rivers Films, 2006, DVD.
As one example of scores of constraints that Arab cultural traditions and social norms put on Palestinians, it is not surprising that many failed suicide-homicide bombers have acknowledged frustration with this way of life as a motivation for committing murder-suicide. Anat Berko and Edna Erez, two scholars who interviewed various failed Palestinian suicide-homicide bombers, report:

Quite often the interviewees restated the fact that they live in Arab society or are part of a culture that dictates various restrictions, and monitors gender-appropriate behavior. They mentioned that they cannot date or socialize unless the contact is for marriage purposes, is approved by the family and under its supervision... [Moreover] the social background of the interviewees and the cultural gender scripts that Arab society provides for men and women were reflected in the paths the participants took in becoming suicide bombers.\textsuperscript{41}

Environment and culture surely dictate "what is right and wrong, appropriate and inappropriate,"\textsuperscript{42} and as a result sometimes motivate individuals to seek a way out. One failed Palestinian suicide-homicide bomber admitted:

All that is forbidden in this world is permitted in the Garden of Eden...[which] has everything—God, Freedom, the Prophet Mohammed and my friends, the 'shahids'...There are 72 virgins. There are lots of things I can't even describe...I'll find everything in the Garden of

\textsuperscript{41} Berko and Erez, 610.

Eden, a river of honey, a river of beer and alcohol...\textsuperscript{43}

The fact that Palestinians live side by side with Israel, which promotes an open society often characterized by its empowered military women and Mediterranean beaches filled with scantily clad young men and women drinking alcohol and freely interacting with one another, perhaps exacerbates young Palestinians' sentiments of hostility\textsuperscript{44} and frustration, as the contrast adds a component of incorrigible jealousy to the Conflict. Average Palestinians oftentimes find themselves, not only caught up in the ongoing religious/ethnic conflict that surrounds them, but also between the stubborn traditions of Palestinian society and the modernizing components of personal and collective identity.

For Palestinians discontent with, or held hostage by, their Arab identity, they elevate their Islamic identity to a higher standing. In Arab-Islamic societies, suicide represents the greatest moral transgression, which is unforgivable by Allah, just as family and society abhor any suicide attempts. Indeed, Arab-Islamic societies boast one

\textsuperscript{43} \textit{Quoted in Berko and Erez}, 613.

\textsuperscript{44} \textit{Suicide Killers}.
of the lowest suicide rates across the globe.\textsuperscript{45} But Palestinian society, and the individuals that collectively comprise it, view intihar (suicide) as extremely different, if not the polar opposite of istishhad (deliberate martyrdom). For Palestinians, intihar represents the worst action an individual Arab could take under any circumstance, but paradoxically in time of a holy struggle, or jihad, istishhad represents the greatest achievement any Muslim could attain. Thus, fulfilling ideological calls from their Islamic identity allows individuals an escape from their Arab identity, yet without explicitly or symbolically betraying it—as might be perceived by emigration or simple rebellion against social norms, and as "suicide" or an attempt at suicide definitely would demonstrate. Furthermore, martyrdom, as it provides glorification and fame, grants the individual an eternal Islamic escape from the daily tyranny of Arab traditions. The idealized Islamic paradise lures individuals from the harsh reality that marriage, and therefore heterosexual relations, might never occur; this exponentially increases the appeal of such martyrdom incentives as the marriage of

\textsuperscript{45} Pape, 181-182.
a shahid to 72 perpetual-virgins, or a shahida to her one perfect husband.

"We Love Death--It Brings Us Our 15 Minutes"

Outside the frustrations related to restrictions on male-female interaction, Arab cultural traditions and social norms also present individuals with significant deterents against any burgeoning individuality. In an increasingly small world populated by individuals, the contradictions of a traditional society, based on the collective that promotes shahids as individual heroes, sparks another attraction to a Palestinian who views his or her life as monotonous, contained, predetermined or individualistically stifled in any number of manners. Attaining martyrdom provides the individual with one of only a few ways to distinguish him or herself in a society that strives on collective thought, conformity and the ostracizing of those who dissent or rebel.46 Scholar Martha Crenshaw notes, "[f]or someone whose life otherwise has

46 One researcher notes that for Palestinians “achieving any degree of economic or personal ‘success’ may seem impossible. Becoming a martyr, on the other hand, may well present a remedy to this predicament by providing an opportunity to stand out of the crowd and become, literally, a celebrity. The shaheed is endowed with a sense of individuality that he is unlikely to achieve in any other way.” Moghadam, “Palestinian Suicide Terrorism in the Second Intifada,” 76.
little significance, transcendent fame can be a powerful motive...The individual, whose identity might otherwise fade into obscurity, has now established a legend for all time."\(^47\)

In pursuit of fame, while an egotistical end, individuals commonly take a path paved in altruism. Palestinian terrorists, like other Islamic militants, regularly state that they love death, while their enemy only loves life--usually implying that this is how Allah intends to provide victory.\(^48\) Importantly, Palestinian, as well as other influential Arab, Islamic authorities have declared jihad a fard ayn (individual obligation), as opposed to fard kifaya (collective obligation).\(^49\) Islamic martyrdom expert Mohammed M. Hafez notes,

\(^{48}\) Indeed, during al-Aqsa intifada, even the highest Palestinian-Islamic authority, the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem Ikrama Sabri stated: “The Muslim embraces death...Look at the society of the Israelis. It is a selfish society that loves life. These are not people who are eager to die for their country and their God. The Jews will leave this land rather than die, but the Muslim is happy to die.” Originally published in The New Yorker and quoted in Moghadam, “Palestinian Suicide Terrorism in the Second Intifada,” 71.
\(^{49}\) Scholar Rafael Israeli notes: “The duty to fight jihad is universal and perpetual until the entire world comes under Muslim dominion. However, because Muslim countries have desisted in practice, under various theological and practical considerations, from this idea, which otherwise would have permanently pitted
Islamic scholars construe individual obligation to mean that it is the duty of every Muslim to wage jihad in the path of [Allah] in defense of Islam, its lands, religious institutions, people, property. Individual obligation usually arises when Muslim lands are besieged by powerful foes that cannot be easily repelled with a small force. Under these circumstances, jihad is the religious obligation of every Muslim capable of fighting, just as all Muslims are obligated to pray, fast, and pay alms.  

Accordingly, organizations present and society accepts an individual’s martyrdom firstly as a dutiful sacrifice for the collective, and secondarily as the individual’s ascension to a higher religious status. Thus, the individual can easily rationalize the pursuit of personal fame and glory in the name of Allah, “Palestine,” and loved-ones. But who is to say which plays the greater role in motivating an individual—the altruistic or the egotistical component—especially considering the social lines between these interests are frequently blurred.

The rituals involved in preparing and memorializing a suicide-homicide bomber exemplify a melding of altruism and egoism, and display how a society founded on pre-modern

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them against the rest of the world, Muslim fundamentalists have come to take this duty as a personal one (fard 'ayn), and so have consecrated any struggle of theirs against Unbelievers as a pursuit of that holy duty." See Israeli, Islamikaze, 39-40.  

traditions exudes tinges of postmodern marketing and consumerism. In Palestinian shops and marketplaces, one can easily find videos, t-shirts, key-chains and other mass-produced shahid memorabilia. The walls of Palestinian towns are dedicated to posters of shahids. Imams, politicians and TV-personalities alike promise suicide-homicide bombers eternal glorification in paradise, and without a doubt bombers already receive in-full everlasting fame in Palestinian society, where the shahid’s image rests as an ubiquitous symbol. Ultimately, suicide-homicide bombers act out of both egoism and altruism—“martyrdom operations” offer an escape from traditionalism and an exchange of namelessness for celebrity, yet they also represent a prideful act of social solidarity.

Motivations in Sum

Thucydides recognized that "honor, fear and self-interest" motivate people to fight and die for their beliefs. One could argue, today this insight holds up.

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51 For example, see Appendix B.
52 Paraphrased in Victor Davis Hanson, “Battles Change, Wars Don’t: From ancient Greece to modern Iraq, history shows us that fear, honor and self-interest drive hostilities between the states," Los Angeles Times, 23 October 2005; and Victor Davis Hanson, “Old Is ‘New’ Warfare: Iraq conflict shares uncanny
Palestinians demonstrate a similar trend in their expression of a most brutal form of warfare. First, the culture of martyrdom perpetuates the idea that Palestinians embody the truest of victims. Marking one of its greatest impacts, the culture of martyrdom has ingrained "victimhood" in the Palestinian collective identity—to the extent that it has convinced the latest generation of children to love death and hate life. Ultimately, a martyrdom operation offers restoration of the victim's wounded honor. Second, a fear of forsaking "Palestine" and a fear of failing to answer the call of Islam, lays the ideological foundation for the conflict with Israel—the Jewish, Western and "infidel" state. Third, and perhaps most importantly for the individual, martyrdom contains a variety of personal allures; it eternalizes the individual as a hero or heroine in the very society that previously inhibited him or her from developing as an individual free to choose one's own destiny, and mature a unique identity owned all to his or herself. On top of pardoning suicide likenesses with the Peloponnesian War," National Post, 5 November 2005.

53 For examples of the damage the culture of martyrdom has done to the latest generation of Palestinian children review Palestinian Media Watch's collection on PA textbooks, PA TV programming, etc. that help indoctrinate children with the concepts of jihad, shahada, and istishhad; access at <www.pmw.org.il>.
and sanctioning murder, martyrdom gives the shahid the key to unlock the prison cell of traditional society, as well as the key to all the joys of paradise. Left unsatisfied by "the gap between expectations and reality experienced" the shahid therefore determines that a better future lies in the rewards for an act of murder-suicide.

The Palestinian suicide-homicide bomber, absolved by culture of the stigmas of suicide and murder, socialized to view all of Israel as illegitimate, facilitated by political organizations and encouraged by his or her own psyche to right the wrongs of victimhood, is equipped with the necessary tools to "retaliate." In some instances, it is likely that the perks offered by Islamic authorities are an afterthought—or just enough to give that extra nudge the individual needs to leap from the balcony of innate morality. For others, the simple lack of opportunity in Arab society to engage in heterosexual relations outside of marriage, accentuates the sexual allures promised to suicide-homicide bombers—both male and female. The Palestinian collective identity’s sammud, the culture of martyrdom within Palestinian society, the strategies of

54 This Durkheimian notion is accredited to one scholar's assessment of the social status of Palestinian shahids; see Elster, 245.
terror organizations, and the simple calculus of individuals' cost-benefit analyses, systematically work together to make the process of producing suicide-homicide bombers virtually effortless. So seamless is the operation that the societal, organizational and individual culprits often succeed in deflecting culpability onto their targets. Furthermore, this assembly line of suicide terror turns average Palestinians into sadomasochistic suicide-homicide bombers, who seek to punish the victimizers for victimizing, and punish themselves for allowing their own victimization.
CHAPTER SEVEN

THE PALESTINIAN CULTURE OF MARTYRDOM AND SHAHID:

PROVIDING THE MODEL FOR 21ST CENTURY ISLAMIC TERRORISM

In recent years, the suicide-terror phenomenon has spread across the globe at astounding rates. With attacks occurring everywhere from Moscow to Bali and from New York City to Mumbai, suicide terrorism has made its mark as a global epidemic. Most evident in its post-9/11 application of suicide terrorism, particularly in the battle for Iraq, al-Qaeda has incorporated istishhad (martyrdom) into its grand strategy.¹ Suicide-terror attacks have dominated the conflict in Iraq since major military operations ended there in late 2003.² Indeed, in Iraq alone suicide-terror attacks have reached levels surpassing almost all other similar campaigns combined.³ However, as one terrorism expert recognizes, “clearly suicide bombing in Iraq is

¹ Yoram Schweitzer and Sari Goldstein Ferber, “Al-Qaeda and the Internationalization of Suicide Terrorism,” Memorandum No. 78 (Tel Aviv: Jaffe Center for Strategic Studies, 2005), 8.
largely an imported phenomenon.\textsuperscript{4} Furthermore, the foreign fighters who predominately use this import did not develop it firsthand. Consistently coming from Saudi Arabia more than anywhere else, suicide-homicide bombers in Iraq have adapted the modus operandi and made it an important component of al-Qaeda's strategy against coalition forces and Iraq's democratic government.\textsuperscript{5} With its operational roots in Shi'a Iran,\textsuperscript{6} the sectarian and ideological nemesis of Saudi Arabia, the suicide-homicide attack went through a lengthy evolution process before finding widespread legitimacy in the Sunni-Muslim world. The now infamous import thus required significant preparation before its exportation to Iraq.

The United States (U.S.)-led War on Terror has decreased al-Qaeda's capability to launch spectacular

\textsuperscript{4} See Martha Crenshaw's "Foreword," in Suicide Bombers in Iraq, ix.
\textsuperscript{6} The first occurrence of an assailant strapping explosives to his chest and killing himself to kill others happened in 1980 during the Iran-Iraq War, when a 13-year old Iranian named Hussein Fahmideh strapped explosives to himself and detonated them while charging an Iraqi tank. Ayatollah Khomeini went on to use "martyrs" to clear Iraqi minefields and the Iranian Pasdaran subsequently exported the shahid concept to Lebanon in 1982.
attacks and forced the international network to focus more acutely on its next structural metamorphosis in order to continue advancing towards its long-term goals.\(^7\) Al-Qaeda started as a battlefront collection of "Afghan Arabs," who in a few years transformed themselves into a global-spanning organization that in less than a decade mutated into an international network with countless tentacles. But, Usama bin Laden and Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri have not finished transforming al-Qaeda; they have not kept discretion about al-Qaeda’s next metamorphous, either—that being, into a "popular trend,"\(^8\) wherein al-Qaeda would largely rely on the world’s Sunni-Muslim population to rise up and carry out operations without direct hierarchal command and control. So, where has al-Qaeda found a model to present bin Laden’s grandiose jihadi design to the um’ma? Whom does al-Qaeda’s prototype member or adherent resemble? What qualities does he or she seek to possess? What personal goals does he or she hope to fulfill by

\(^7\) Al-Qaeda’s long-term goals include: reinvigorating Islam to the extent of its “golden era.” For this to happen, however, al-Qaeda argues the Islamic world must come out of its new jahiliyya (godless dark-age) and the caliphate has to be reinstated.

participating in al-Qaeda's "World Islamic Front for Jihad against Jews and Crusaders?"

In short, the Palestinian shahid, whose glorification in the disputed territories exceeds that of a pop or movie star's in America, offers the ultimate guide. The shahid carries out the most terrifying of all terrorists' modus operandi: the suicide-homicide attack. As both a physical and symbolic act, the suicide-homicide attack marks an effective tool of warfare, optimal method of propaganda, and additionally fulfills a culturally defined religious duty. This makes the shahid the perfect weapon for al-Qaeda, which seeks to maximize the willingness of unaffiliated individuals to pursue the ideological prescripts of bin Laden and al-Zawahiri. Accordingly, al-Qaeda understands that using the shahid minimally provides twofold utility--tactical and strategic⁹--both of which, as in the Palestinian case, effectively prod the internal and external audiences. Already, as foci of inspiration, the Palestinian culture of martyrdom and shahid have contributed significantly to suicide-homicide bombers enjoying a fashionable status globally among Islamic

⁹ Schweitzer and Goldstein Ferber, 26.
fanatics. Thus, by paving the way for massive Sunni suicide terrorists, the Palestinian culture of martyrdom and shahid have instrumentally aided al-Qaeda in advancing its long-term goals.

Exporting the Palestinian Shahid

The exuberant amount of international media coverage on the Arab-Israeli conflict allots Palestinian terror organizations a paramount forum for their operations. Media attention plays a central role in any guerrilla or terror campaign, or as scholar Walter Laqueur once suggested: "[the media is] the terrorist’s best friend." With terror attacks, the media often functions as a tool for organizations to disseminate external and internal propaganda. Thus, when coupled with the added media coverage suicide-homicide attacks generally receive in any context, the sustained employment of suicide-homicide bombers within the forum of the Israeli-Palestinian

10 The intended use of the term “fanatic” here is, as philosopher Lee Harris defines, “someone willing to make a sacrifice of his own self-interest for something outside himself." See Lee Harris, The Suicide of Reason: Radical Islam’s Threat to the West (New York: Basic Books, 2007), xx.

conflict, especially during al-Aqsa intifada, brought Palestinian organizations perhaps more media attention than any other previous terror campaign, including al-Qaeda's pre-9/11 attacks. The media coverage of al-Aqsa intifada increased the various Palestinian organizations' prestige, notoriety and, most importantly, power vis-à-vis one another, Israel, and within the international audience.

In combination with prime exposure, the strategic successes provided by suicide terrorism, as demonstrated in the political realm, gave Palestinian terror organizations an even higher level of prestige among international terror organizations and networks. Palestinian terror organizations have always maintained a high, if not the highest, level of respect in the international terror community. The efforts of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic

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12 Regarding the Palestinian terror legacy, scholar Bruce Hoffman contends: “Between 1968 and 1980, Palestinian terrorist groups were indisputably the world’s most active, accounting for more international terrorist incidents than any other movement. The success achieved by the PLO in publicizing the Palestinians' plight through the 'internationalization' of its struggle with Israel has since served as a model for similarly aggrieved [identity groups].” Simply put, the Palestinians revolutionized revolutionary violence. Hoffman goes on to credit the PLO not only with “internationalizing” terrorism, but also providing ethno-nationalist terrorist organizations with a “model,” as well as establishing the Palestinians as revolutionary terror "mentors." Hoffman concludes, “the attention that the PLO has received, the financial and political influence and power that it has amassed, and the stature that it has been accorded in the
Jihad (PIJ) to derail the Oslo peace process, the daily suicide-homicide bombers of *al-Aqsa intifada* and Israel’s subsequent retreat from Gaza, brought renewed praise and admiration from those with shared values and beliefs. Accordingly, this prestige has transitioned into imitation of the Palestinian *shahid* (usually in the form of a suicide-homicide bomber) and its supplementary culture of martyrdom. Initially gaining widespread notoriety through its use by the Shi’a Hezbollah in Lebanon, it was never a given that suicide-homicide attacks would find acceptance in the Sunni world. Indeed, over 11 years passed from the time al-Da’awa 17, an Iraqi-Shi’a group, launched its first suicide-homicide attack and Hamas’s first successful suicide-homicide bomber.  

Ultimately, Palestinian terror organizations evolved the *modus operandi* of suicide-homicide bombers in two concurrent yet specific ways, setting important precedents, that precipitated al-Qaeda’s strategy of relentless suicide terrorism in Iraq.

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*International community continues to send a powerful message to aggrieved peoples throughout the world.*" Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, revised and expanded ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 64 and 71-79.  

*Hezbollah launched its first suicide-homicide attack 11 months after Da’awa 17—a group that attacked Iraqi government targets, and most likely did so with the aid of the Pasdaran, similarly to Hezbollah in its campaigns against Western forces.*
First, Palestinians legitimized suicide-homicide attacks, as “martyrdom operations,” in the Sunni-Muslim world. The Palestinian cause has always functioned as a galvanizing Islamic issue particularly for Sunni-Arab countries. As a result, the Palestinian use of suicide terrorism before and during al-Aqsa intifada had a direct effect on the general population of the Sunni-Arab world, concerning how it viewed the “martyrdom operation.” As support for martyrdom operations in Palestinian society increased, they accordingly found wide support across the Sunni-Arab world (as well as in the Islamic world in general). As of 2002, one analyst noted: “Martyrdom has replaced Palestinian independence as the main focus of the Arab media.”14 Palestinian terror organizations effectively utilized the media to spread acceptance of a modus operandi that had previously been used in the Islamic world exclusively by Shi’a organizations,15 and which deployed

15 Moreover, martyrdom has traditionally played a much larger role in Shi’a Islam than Sunni Islam. For example, Shi’a Muslims celebrate Ashura, which commemorates the “martyrdom” of Hussein at the Battle of Karbala in 660.
suicide-homicide attackers minimally and cautiously.¹⁶ The Sunni world's acceptance of the Palestinian twist of semantics that presents suicide-homicide attacks as "martyrdom operations" directly opened the door for all other militant-Sunni organizations' imitation.

Second, by turning suicide-homicide operations into a weapon of terror,¹⁷ Palestinian organizations demonstrated the strategic pros of attacking soft targets, as well as garnered Islamic legitimacy for doing so. Suicide-terror attacks on Israeli civilians took the modus operandi to a new level. Outdoing, on the "audacity" scale, the previous campaigns that used suicide-homicide operations, which specifically attacked military targets,¹⁸ Palestinian organizations made it overt policy to target Israeli civilians en masse. Due to the religious undertones of its

¹⁶ In the late 1980s, Hezbollah began to downplay its promotion of martyrdom within the population in Southern Lebanon. Hezbollah's spiritual advisor, Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah even issued a fatwa (Islamic degree) authorizing martyrdom operations "only on special occasions" due to a fear of over "exaggerated use [by] over-zealous youth." See Rafael Israeli, "A Manual of Islamic Fundamentalist Terrorism," Terrorism and Political Violence 14, no. 4 (24 January 2002): 30.


¹⁸ Prior to Palestinian use of suicide terrorism, Hezbollah and Amal in Lebanon and the LTTE in Sri Lanka used suicide-homicide attacks emphasizing military targets, with exceptions made for politicians.
conflict with Israel, Palestinians received approval by Islamic authorities not only for launching "martyrdom operations," but also for targeting civilians.

Support for suicide terrorism from important Islamic authorities across the Sunni-Arab world served to solidify the legitimacy of such acts in the eyes of hundreds of millions of people. Notably, the fatwa (Islamic decree) issued by Sheikh Yousef al-Qaradawi, a leading Sunni cleric, supporting the use of suicide-homicide attacks on civilians, worked not only to buttress the Palestinians' employment of suicide-homicide bombers against Israeli civilians, but also to somewhat close the debate within the greater Sunni world. Recently at a conference honoring

19 Al-Qaradawi is the Head of the European Council for Fatwa and Research, as well as the President of the International Association of Muslim Scholars.
20 Referring to the importance of al-Qaradawi's role in legitimizing suicide terrorism, Hamas's current leader Khaled Mash'al states: '[Qaradawi's] unequivocal fatwa, the sheikh, may Allah reward him, considered martyrdom operations to be the most noble level of jihad. That was unparalleled support for the people of Palestine, because, brothers and sisters, you cannot imagine how difficult it is psychologically for a young Palestinian man or woman to sacrifice themselves or what is most dear to them, only to encounter a conflict in their minds and hearts as to whether they are on the path of righteousness, or whether they are committing a religious violation." See Khaled Mash'al, Al-Jazeera TV on 16 July 2007, trans. in Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI), Special Dispatch Series No. 1672 (2 August 2007): accessed at <www.memri.org>.
21 Hafez notes: "Yussuf al-Qaradawi [has] declared jihad in Palestine as the individual obligation of every Muslim on many
him, al-Qaradawi recalled his role in providing Islamic legitimacy for suicide terrorism:

I support the Palestinian cause. I support the resistance and the jihad. I support Hamas, the Islamic Jihad, and Hizbullah...I support martyrdom operations, and this was the straw that broke the camel's back... Our brothers in Palestine were forced to resort to martyrdom operations. The divine destiny is just, and so it gave these brothers something the enemy lacks... Their enemy is bombing them from above and below...and all they want is [to sacrifice] their own lives. The Palestinian man or woman booby-trap themselves--they turn themselves into human bombs--and sacrifice themselves for the sake of Allah, in order to strike fear in the hearts of their enemies.22

Additionally, the endorsement of suicide-homicide attacks by countless other prestigious Islamic authorities,23 and


moreover, the subsequent widespread acceptance of suicide-homicide bombers as shahids, effectively precluded other (Sunni) Islamic figures from offering any serious rebuttals. As a result, those that propel global-Islamist ideologies, particularly al-Qaeda, have taken note of the Palestinians' successes in employing suicide terrorism—regarding both strategic and political victories, as well as their greater propagandistic value among Muslims. Consequently, al-Qaeda has sought to adapt both the suicide-terror tactic and istishhad strategy for its own goals.

**Direct Links and al-Qaeda's Palestinian Aura**

Contrary to popular belief, al-Qaeda's connection to the Palestinian cause and people is nothing new. After all, al-Qaeda's founder, Sheik Abdallah Azzam (al-Filastini) came from a village outside Jenin in the disputed territories. Al-Qaeda's pre-9/11 chief of

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Nawaf Hayel al-Takrouri cites at least thirty-two religious ruling (fatwas) by Islamic scholars around the Muslim world supporting 'martyrdom operations' in Palestine. Hafez goes on to explain: "This is one of the most important books to be published on this subject...[because the author] cites historical and contemporary Islamic scholars that affirm that martyrdom is dependent on religious faith and [jihad] in the path of [Allah]. See Hafez, "Dying to Be Martyrs," 76.

24 Many terrorism analysts frequently comment on al-Qaeda's supposed disconnect from the Palestinian issue.
operations, Abu Zubayda, who sits in U.S. custody at Guantanamo Bay for his role in the 9/11 attacks, is Palestinian. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi pulled most of Tawhid wal-Jihad's\textsuperscript{25} original lieutenants from Palestinian groups operating in the Levant.\textsuperscript{26} Even al-Zarqawi, a Jordanian-born Bedouin, claimed his \textit{hamula} (clan) originated from the Jerusalem area.\textsuperscript{27} Predating al-Qaedas founding, the first known PIJ suicide-homicide bomber plot in 1986 called for using a bomb built by an "Afghan-Alum" \textit{mujahid}.\textsuperscript{28} On April 30, 2003, al-Qaeda and Hamas launched a co-sponsored suicide-terror attack against a popular Israeli pub in Tel Aviv, killing three and wounding over 50.\textsuperscript{29} These are just a few examples of Palestinians involved with al-Qaeda or vice versa. However, the connection goes beneath the surface, and past the superficiality of individual members and network-affiliated groups. A Palestinian aura has embedded itself deep within the al-Qaeda ideology, organization, network and most importantly its burgeoning movement.

\textsuperscript{25} Meaning "Monotheism and Holy War," Tawhid \textit{wal-Jihad} eventually transitioned into al-Qaeda in the Land of Two Rivers--also commonly called al-Qaeda in Iraq.

\textsuperscript{26} Alexis Debat, "Osama bin Laden's Heir," \textit{National Interest} 80 (Summer 2005): 155-157.

\textsuperscript{27} Karmon, "Who Bombed Northern Israel? Al-Qaeda and Palestine."

\textsuperscript{28} Notes from ICT seminar on "The Global Jihad," given by Reuven Paz, in Herzliya, Israel (21 June 2005).

\textsuperscript{29} See Appendix A.
Al-Qaeda intends to mimic the Palestinian experience with *jihad*, *istishhad* and ultimately strategic success, yet on a macro-global level. Al-Qaeda recognizes that making *jihad* and *istishhad* the crux of its strategy can set the foundation for realizing a durable global movement. Before 9/11, al-Qaeda saw its main purpose as training and financing like-minded Islamists to wage *jihad*. Since 9/11, bin Laden and al-Zawahiri have simply sought to motivate as many as possible within the general *umma* (global Islamic community) to participate in terrorism, if not a "martyrdom operation." Al-Qaeda expert Rohan Gunaratna summarizes: "Bin Laden directed the attack on America's most outstanding landmarks to inspire and incite the wider Muslim community and to show the way to the other Islamist movements.""^{31}

With its ability to strike on a spectacular scale greatly reduced, al-Qaeda's post-9/11 attacks have increasingly resembled more the *modus operandi* of the Palestinian suicide-homicide bomber than the Hezbollah-inspired simultaneous and large-scale attack, which

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characterized al-Qaeda's own style from August 1998 to early 2003. The July 2005 attacks in London bore resemblance to components of both methods, as they included four simultaneous suicide-homicide bomber attacks, yet targeted common transportation systems. In Iraq, al-Qaeda's campaign has almost entirely looked Palestinian in mode—numerous individual bombers attacking average civilians on a seemingly daily basis. Sometimes the influence is explicit. For example, on the eve of the U.S. invasion of Iraq, a leader of al-Qaeda's female suicide-homicide bomber squads stated:

We are preparing for the new strike announced by our leaders, and I declare that it will make America forget...the September 11 attacks. The idea came from the success of martyr operations carried out by young Palestinian women in the occupied territories.33

The shift in method, however, goes to the top. Bin Laden has sought to strategically redirect tactical

32 One should not downplay the influence Hezbollah has had on al-Qaeda's style in simultaneously attacking multiple symbolic targets. The primary contention here is that Palestinian shahids paved the way for Sunni groups to target civilians using suicide-homicide attackers. Al-Qaeda's current reduced capability, however, has led it to look closer at the Palestinian model on a tactical/operational level.

approach and return to al-Qaeda’s rhetorical roots. In May 2008, bin Laden released a tape stating:

To Western nations...this speech is to understand the core reason of the war between our civilization and your civilians. I mean the Palestinian cause...[which] is the major issue for my (Islamic) nation. It was an important element in fueling me from the beginning and the 19 [9/11 hijackers] with a great motive to fight for those subjected to injustice and the oppressed [emphasis added].

Bin Laden’s statement demonstrates a refocusing of al-Qaeda’s attention; moreover, it echoes the distant words of Abdallah Azzam, who once stated:

Our presence in Afghanistan today, which is the accomplishment of the imperative of jihad and our devotion to the struggle, does not mean that we have forgotten Palestine. Palestine is our beating heart, it comes even before Afghanistan in our minds, our hearts, our feelings and our faith.

Marking the sixth anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, bin Laden called on righteous Muslims to participate in the “caravan” of martyrs. Playing off Azzam’s pamphlet, Join the Caravan, which called on Muslims to join the

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Mujahedin’s jihad in Afghanistan, bin Laden’s call demonstrates al-Qaeda’s commitment to a new istishhad-based strategy, replacing Azzam’s jihad-based strategy. In effect, al-Qaeda has shifted focus from the mujahid to the shahid. Reminiscent of the Palestinian movement’s own shift away from the feda’i to the shahid, al-Qaeda intends to duplicate a major play from the Palestinian playbook. It seeks to empower the individual.37

The “Occupation” of Dar al-Islam, Defensive Jihad and Fard Ayn

Today, al-Qaeda’s ideology and strategy revolve around the individual.38 Since its founding, al-Qaeda has presented jihad through the ideological tenet of fard ayn (individual obligation). Lacking a real-world method that truly lived up to its abstract ideation, deliberate “martyrdom,” as expressed through a suicide-homicide attack, offers such an outlet to express the undeniable fulfillment of one’s individual obligation to an Islamic calling to jihad. As researchers Yoram Schweitzer and Sari Goldstein Ferber

37 The mujahid and the feda’i both represent Islamic fighters who do not actively seek to die during jihad; the shahid does. Additionally, the mujahid and feda’i represent more of a participation in a group, whereas the shahid stands for any individual willing to answer Islam’s call to jihad.
38 Schweitzer and Goldstein Ferber, 11 and 40.
note, "[t]he concept of sacrificing one's life in the name of Allah (istishhad) became a supreme organizational ideal within al-Qaeda and then spread to its operatives and affiliates in what might be described as a self-reproducing, self-disseminating virus." 

Remote and mostly disconnected from the wide variety of affiliated organizations within its global "network of networks," al-Qaeda maintains a small core leadership hierarchy. Furthermore, bin Laden and al-Zawahiri, most likely camped out in the tribally administered areas of North West Pakistan, do not intend on overseeing their war with the West and the secular leaders of the Islamic world to its finish. Bin Laden and al-Zawahiri understand that they lead a war of patience, resolve and ultimately one that pits the will of the individual Muslim against that of various nation-states and the world's remaining superpower.

In order for individuals to receive social support for waging jihad, it requires establishing the necessary interpretation of Islam. Al-Qaeda has thus promoted the stance that its war with the West represents a defensive jihad, which makes participation in it, whether physically

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39 Schweitzer and Goldstein Ferber, 9.
40 CIA's Counter-Terrorism Center coined this term in the late 1990s. Gunaratna, "The New al-Qaida," 48.
or financially, a fard ayn of each and every Muslim. Going back to the teachings of al-Qaeda’s founder, Abdallah Azzam, fard ayn has played a central role in al-Qaeda’s temperament concerning “occupied” Islamic lands; Azzam argued,

...jihad will remain an individual obligation until all other lands which formerly were Muslim come back to us and Islam reigns within them once again. Before us lie Palestine, Bukhara, Lebanon, Chad, Eritrea, Somalia, the Philippines, Burma, South Yemen, Tashkent, Andalusia.

Localized social reinforcement of these interpretations has therefore become paramount to al-Qaeda effectively executing its global strategy.

Like al-Qaeda, the Islamist-Palestinian organizations view jihad as fard ayn. While Azzam and before him Muslim Brotherhood-ideologue Sayyid Qutb articulated the notion of fard ayn, Hamas and PIJ more than others put the doctrine into practice beginning in 1993 and reaching its quintessence during al-Aqsa intifada. Serving as an example of an individual’s obligation to free the land of dar al-Islam--further even, to one’s ultimate sacrifice for the

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cause—Palestinian shahids/suicide-homicide bombers opened the floor to al-Qaeda’s own shahids.

Indeed, al-Qaeda did not begin employing suicide-homicide operations until its August 1998 attacks on the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Al-Qaeda’s first operations inside the U.S., the assassination of popular Rabbi and former-Israeli Knesset member Meir Kahane in November 1990 and the first attempt to destroy the World Trade Center in February 1993, did not involve suicide terrorists. During the 1990s, al-Qaeda’s modes of operation remained in their formative state.

The Palestinian introduction of the shahid as a suicide-homicide bomber to the Sunni world during the mid-1990s surely had an impact on al-Qaeda’s decision to start using them in 1998. After all, at this time, most of al-Qaeda’s top leadership had been in the jihad business either before or since the Afghan-Soviet war, yet suicide-homicide attacks did not occur during that conflict, or directly after it when al-Qaeda first began operating as an international-terror organization. Al-Qaeda designed its attacks in the late 1990s and early 2000s to shock, yet they did not occur relentlessly.
Uniting organizational strategy with the motivations of individuals requires coordinating social forces and securing cultural accommodation. To launch suicide-terror attacks on a large scale, massive interaction with the related constituency has to exist. Scholar Ami Pedahzur contends:

In cultural terms, suicide terrorism can thus be described as a result of a spiraling feedback process between an organization and its constituency. In order to sustain a suicide campaign, every terrorist organization needs the support of the community. Raising such support depends upon the organization’s success in instilling ideas among members of the society about the importance of martyrdom and glorifying these notions by religious, nationalistic or other means.\(^{42}\)

Palestinian suicide-terror campaigns against Israel received international Sunni support for targeting Israeli civilians. Thus al-Qaeda in its macro-scale suicide-terror war had to gain the same type of support for targeting a broader defined enemy.

Al-Qaeda’s Adaptation of the Culture of Martyrdom

A related culture of martyrdom rests as the sole variable that distinguishes organizations, which employ

suicide-homicide attacks from those that do not.\(^43\) Furthermore, the social sustenance a suicide-terror campaign receives from an affiliated culture of martyrdom stands as a general testament to the support a constituency gives to its representative body. The symbiosis between organizations and individuals ultimately is communicated through cultural symbols and by the social accommodation in motivating and sanctioning behavior. Palestinian Media Watch director Itamar Marcus identifies three components imperative to motivating suicide terrorism: create an enemy, legitimate killing the enemy, and motivate a willingness to die while killing the enemy.\(^44\) Concurringly, researcher Assaf Moghadam recognizes, "two sets of motives [must] converge...a willingness to kill...[and] a willingness to die."\(^45\) The Palestinian culture of martyrdom perpetuates and ensures the function of these three components. First, the culture of martyrdom alters the defined 'other' to represent an explicit 'enemy.' Second,


\(^{44}\) Notes from ICT seminar on "Modern and Post-Modern Terrorism Strategies," given by Boaz Ganor and Itamar Marcus, in Herzliya, Israel (9 June 2005).

the culture of martyrdom legitimizes the killing of this enemy by framing its intentions as specifically threatening to the Palestinian collective identity and generally sinister in its dealings with the world. Third, the culture of martyrdom motivates and sanctions the willingness of individuals to die in the process of killing the sinister enemy.

Installed in various mosques and Islamic centers in urban areas of European cities, within underground political organizations in Middle Eastern capitals, and infested in South Asian madrassas alike, Islamic fanatics have decentralized the culture of martyrdom, just as al-Qaeda has done to its organizational structure. In contrast to the original Palestinian version, al-Qaeda’s international jihadi-Salafi culture of martyrdom is less overt. Rather it operates in the shadows of Western and Islamic societies, and flourishes more as a satellite culture of martyrdom and virtual culture of martyrdom, wherein adherents can turn on an Arabic-language news outlet or enter an online Islamist chat-room to get a dose of an Islamist worldview. Indeed, global communications and media have redrawn the boundaries of cultural enclaves. No longer are cultures society-specific, but instead
oftentimes function as transnational forces in their own right.

**Framing Conflict**

As noted above, motivating a willingness to die while killing first entails defining the enemy and explaining why those who comprise it need to die. Thus, while political value provided by suicide-homicide attacks ultimately works as the greatest catalyst to organizations' continued use of the *modus operandi*, motivating individuals to carry out such operations requires continuous framing of "social ills." Commenting on the required preparation for launching effective campaigns, Hafez notes:

> Mobilizing collective action consists of more than calling on people to rise up or take to the streets; it involves framing social ills as threats and opportunities for action, networking among activists and their constituencies, building formal and informal organizations, forging collective identities and alliances, making claims against opponents and states, and motivating individuals to assume personal costs when the benefits of success are not readily apparent.\(^{46}\)

In this regard, connecting the individual to the collective identity marks step one. Step two entails converging the individual obligation to fixing the social ills.

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[^46]: Hafez, *Suicide Bombers in Iraq*, 16.
Most Islamist denominations commonly frame the world as though it teeters on the brink of an apocalyptic struggle between the forces of Islam and a sinister "Zionist-Crusader" alliance. Al-Qaeda’s rhetoric has shaped up no differently, often warning that Muslims must defend their religion against Zionist-Crusader aggression. In 1998, the World Islamic Front for Jihad against Jews and Crusaders, an umbrella network headed by al-Qaeda, stated: The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies—civilians and military—is an obligation incumbent upon every Muslim who can do it and in any country—this until the Aqsa Mosque [in Jerusalem] and Holy Mosque [in Mecca] are liberated from their grip, and until their armies withdraw from all the lands of Islam, defeated, shattered, and unable to threaten any Muslim. This is in accordance with the Word of the Most High—"fight the pagans all together as they fight you all together" [Qur’an 9:36] and..."Fight them until there is no more tumult or oppression, and [all] religion belongs to Allah [Qur’an 8:39].

Such statements from al-Qaeda’s leadership, commonplace since 9/11, clearly articulate who their enemy is, why they are an enemy, when victory against this enemy will be apparent, and a divine obligation for all Muslims to participate in bringing about victory. Simply, al-Qaeda

seeks to energize as many individual Muslims as possible to fight the Christian, Jewish and other non-Muslim peoples that "threaten" Islam. Regarding the "occupation" of dar al-Islam, Israel, the U.S., Spain, Russia, India, Christian Lebanon, the Philippines and other non-Muslim nation-states controlling "Muslim land" become the obvious targets. At the forefront, however, sit the U.S. and Israel. Al-Qaeda suggests that the U.S. designs its foreign policy to "serve the Jews' petty state, [and divert] attention from its occupation of Jerusalem and the murder of Muslims there."48 Islamists have elevated the supposed Jewish threat to a more severe status. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict, coupled with various Qur'an suras and Hadith sayings that promote anti-Jewish beliefs,49 has allowed Islamists to frame all of the Islamic world's problems within the

48 In Ibrahim, 12.
49 For example, one Hadith saying quotes Mohammed: "The last hour would not come unless the Muslims will fight against the Jews and the Muslims would kill them and until the Jews would hide themselves behind a stone or a tree and a stone or tree would say: Muslim, [oh] the servant of Allah, there is a Jew behind me; come and kill him." In Ram Swarup, Understanding the Hadith: The Sacred Traditions of Islam (New York: Prometheus Books, 2002), 215. See also Qur'an 5:64 on page 202.
context of a Jewish "conspiracy," in which the U.S. maintains a key supportive position.\(^5^0\)

Islamist entities like al-Qaeda understand the important part the "other" plays in solidifying a collective identity—in this case, an Islamic identity as represented by the *um’ma*. Judaism, one of Islam’s earliest foes, additionally fills this role today for Islamists. In March 2003, bin Laden warned to his fellow Muslims:

One of the most important objectives of the new Crusader attack is to pave the way and prepare the region, after its fragmentation, for the establishment of...the Greater State of Israel, whose border will include extensive areas of Iraq and Egypt, through Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, all of Palestine, and large parts of the Land of the Two Holy Places...What is happening to our people in Palestine is merely a model that the Zionist-American alliance wishes to impose upon the rest of the region: the killing of men, women and children...People [there] live in perpetual fear and paralyzing terror, awaiting death at any moment from a missile or shell that will destroy their homes, kill their sisters, and bury their babies alive...The founding of "Greater Israel"

\(^{50}\) In December 1998, bin Laden argued: "The Jews have succeeded in obligating American and British Christians to strike Iraq...all the biggest [U.S] officials are Jews--have led the Christians to clip the wings of the Islamic world." See in Ibrahim, 276. On October 18, 2003, bin Laden released a tape to al-Jazeera that stated: "[Bush] is carrying out the demands of the Zionist lobby that helped him into the White House—that is, annihilate the military might of Iraq because it is too close to the Jews in occupied Palestine...he is [also] concealing his own ambitions and the ambitions of the Zionist lobby in their desire for oil." In Ibrahim, 211.
means the surrender of the countries of the region to the Jews.\textsuperscript{51}

Again, Sheikh Qaradawi has lent his authority to confirming the Islamist viewpoint; on the conflict with Judaism, he argues:

We do not disassociate Islam with war...We are fighting in the name of Islam... They fight us with Judaism, so we should fight them with Islam. They fight us with the Torah, so we should fight them with the Koran. If they say "the Temple," we should say "[the] Aqsa Mosque." If they say: "We glorify the Sabbath," we should say: "We glorify the Friday." This is how it should be. Religion must lead the war. This is the only way we can win.\textsuperscript{52}

Referring to Islamic suicide terrorism, expert on Islamist movements Reuven Paz contends that

The perception of the struggle between Islam and Judaism is actually the main justification for the general use of terrorism, and particularly for suicide bombing... The core perception of the Islamist Arab groups is that they face a global conspiracy against the Islamic world... [A]fter the establishment of Israel and the renaissance of the Islamist groups since the [1960s] and [1970s] this conspiracy came to be viewed as a constant and perhaps eternal struggle between Judaism and Islam.\textsuperscript{53}

\textsuperscript{51} In Ibrahim, 276-277.
Giving credence to his conspiratorial rants among his Muslim audience, bin Laden employs Qur’an suras to buttress his evidence against Judaism. For example, he states:

The Jews have lied about the Creator, and even more so about His creations. The Jews are murderers of the prophets, the violators of agreements...These are the Jews: usurers and whoremongers...Allah said of them: “Have they a share in [Allah’s] dominion? If they have, they will not give up so much [of it] as would equal a spot on the stone of a date” [Qur’an 4:53].

By designating an incorrigible enemy, whom even Allah condemns, and consistently articulating this enemy’s sinister goals, al-Qaeda intends to create a sense of dire urgency among Muslims to defend Islam, so that they seriously contemplate the prospects of participating in jihad, if not pursuing istishhad.

Like its role in the operational advancement and legitimization of suicide terrorism, Palestinian organizations and society have helped to construct the commonly accepted anti-Jewish narrative that currently exists in the Islamic world. For example, Hamas touts the

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traditional anti-Semitic line in its 1988 Charter, stating that

[The Jews] stood behind the French Revolution, the Communist Revolution, and most the revolutions we have heard and hear about, here and there... [It] has become common knowledge that [they caused] World War I...[and] World War II... [They also] inspired the formation of the United Nations and the Security Council instead of the League of Nations, in order to rule the world through them. No war broke out anywhere without [Jews'] fingerprints on it.55

Predating al-Qaeda’s similar practice by a decade, Hamas goes on to quote the Qur’an, citing sura 5:64: “So often as they shall kindle a fire for war, Allah shall extinguish it; and they shall set their minds to act corruptly in the earth, but Allah loveth not the corrupt doers.”56 To connect the Quranic passages to present-day, Hamas makes statements such as: “The Nazism of the Jews includes [even] women and children; it terrorizes everyone. These Jews ruin people’s livelihoods, steal their money, and their honor.”57 Hamas, like al-Qaeda seeks to arouse a sense of duty among average Muslims. Hamas declares: “jihad [in Palestine is] an individual obligation for every Muslim. In the

56 Hamas charter in Mishal and Sela, The Palestinian Hamas, 190.
57 Hamas charter in Mishal and Sela, The Palestinian Hamas, 188.
confrontation with the usurpation of Palestine by the Jews, we must raise the banner of Jihad. With the massive media exposure that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict receives across the Islamic world, Hamas and Fatah’s beliefs and rhetoric commonly get dispersed along with breaking news. Their views of Israel, Jews and Zionism accordingly reach countless households across the Arab and Islamic worlds.

Establishing a nexus between the potential jihadi and the 'larger than life' struggle of the um’ma provides an opportune way to increase the amount of new jihadis—particularly within communities already disaffected by one of the defined enemies of Islam. Furthermore, contrasting Western society with an idealized Islamic one, gives those Muslims, who might find the West disillusioning, immoral or corrupt, an additional impetus for participating in something that aims at "correcting" these ills. However, Israel’s "occupation" of al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem, the third holiest site in Islam, and the U.S. "occupation" of the Holy Mosque in Mecca, the holiest site in Islam, stand as the two most prominent Islamist grievances that arouse interest and motivation among nascent jihadis. Without

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58 Hamas charter in Mishal and Sela, The Palestinian Hamas, 184-185.
surprise, an overwhelming majority of al-Qaeda’s attacks have targeted either U.S. or Jewish/Israeli interests.\textsuperscript{59}

Ultimately, al-Qaeda has learned, from Islamist Palestinians, how to shape its arguments to best direct the individual to the decision that one must personally defend Islam at all costs—even if it means paying the price with his or her own life.

Social Networks

In both the Palestinian and jihadi-Salafi cases, social networks have played increasingly prominent roles in facilitating suicide terrorism, largely because they provide a social space for immersing individuals in the concepts of jihad and istishhad. For Palestinians, the culture of martyrdom has influenced general society to the point that organizations, since the late 1990s, no longer seek potential shahids but instead select them from a long line of willing and eager candidates. Pedahzur notes: “[today,] suicide bombers are not recruited, nor do they undergo a training process. They are peripheral figures in the network who join the ranks ad hoc from the environment

\textsuperscript{59} While many acknowledge the U.S. as a primary target of al-Qaeda attacks, many analysts fail to recognize that al-Qaeda has consistently targeted Jewish targets around the world (its attacks in e.g. Tunisia, Turkey, Morocco, Kenya, etc.).
close to the network, for the purpose of carrying out a suicide attack.  

Similarly, al-Qaeda shahids are usually not recruited per se. Rather, a future shahid joins a social network, which provides space that immerses the individual in the jihadi lifestyle—where one learns its beliefs, values, attitudes, goals, rhetoric, argumentation and puts him or her in contact with a dispatcher. Initially lured in by identity-based religious, political and social issues, the individual over time accepts the ideological framing, solutions and prescriptions of those around him or her. Eventually, if needed, the individual volunteers for a martyrdom operation. The culture of martyrdom, often within the confines of a social network, succeeds in awakening the individual’s duty to take matters into his or her own hands.

The Palestinian Legacy Today: Suicide Terrorism as a Global Phenomenon

Following the onslaught of al-Aqsa intifada in September 2000 and the 9/11 attacks a year later, suicide

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61 Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks, 121-124.
62 One should note, in the Palestinian case social networks are usually based around the hamula (clan).
attacks have dramatically increased. Palestinians launched more suicide-terror attacks than any other movement\textsuperscript{63} until al-Qaeda in Iraq surpassed them in late 2005. Today, organizations affiliated with al-Qaeda's global \textit{jihad} continue to comprise the majority of those launching such attacks. While many credit al-Qaeda's 9/11 attacks with inspiring these affiliated organizations to continue bin Laden's war after the U.S. began its campaign against the core Afghan/Pakistan-based al-Qaeda organization,\textsuperscript{64} many fail to recognize the role Palestinians played in highlighting the \textit{shahid}/suicide-homicide bomber's various utilities.

Without the precedents set by Palestinians, al-Qaeda's global \textit{istishhad}-based \textit{jihad} would have required much more preparation. Palestinian organizations perfected the process of deploying suicide-homicide bombers, as they went from recruiting to selecting \textit{shahid} candidates within a decade. Palestinian organizations convinced not only Palestinian society, but also large portions of the greater

\textsuperscript{63} See Appendix A; and Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, Anti-Israeli Terrorism, 2006: Data, Analysis and Trends (March 2007): 51-55; accessed at <www.terrorism-info.org.il>; see also Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 327, note 33; Hafez, Suicide Bombers in Iraq, 3.

\textsuperscript{64} Pedahzur, Suicide Terrorism, 116.
Sunni world, that suicide-homicide attackers truly embody "martyrs" and thus suicide-homicide attacks are really "martyrdom operations." Similarly, Palestinians garnered international support from prestigious Islamic authorities—ultimately, leading to the Sunni legitimization of suicide-homicide attacks against civilians, i.e. suicide terrorism. Furthermore, by demonizing Israelis and Jews, Palestinian society helped foster conspiracy theories, and other forms of conflict framing, that encouraged Muslims' violent response.

In formulating a unique *modus operandi*, al-Qaeda synthesized Hezbollah's symbolic and simultaneous targeting with the Palestinians' mass targeting of civilians. However, one finds it highly unlikely that Hezbollah has functioned as the primary organizational inspiration for Sunni suicide terrorists, considering the great disdain such individuals regularly have for Shi'a Islam—particularly the followers of al-Qaeda's movement in Iraq. Characterized by suicide-homicide bombers attacking Israeli-civilian buses, cafes, malls and other pedestrian targets, the Palestinian *shahid* became a premier icon in the Sunni world. The Palestinian *shahid*, ingrained in the mind of anyone who viewed Arabic-language satellite
television, particularly during al-Aqsa intifada (2000-2005), surely offered an important inspiration on its own. Additionally, the 9/11 attacks, which did not involve suicide-homicide bombers, but rather suicidal hijackers and suicide-terror pilots,\(^\text{65}\) exemplify the grandiose-jihadi terror attack. But, for the smaller, localized groups that carried out most of al-Qaeda’s post-9/11 operations, the Palestinian shahid offered a more tenable model.

Ultimately, the Palestinian suicide-homicide bomber, as the icon of al-Aqsa intifada, symbolized the Palestinian cause and people, and in doing so produced a micro-scale prototype for terrorist organizations such as those within al-Qaeda’s international network. Thus, the triumph of Palestinian suicide-homicide bombers has had anything but an isolated effect. Terrorism, and particularly suicide-homicide attacks, stand as continuous learning processes for the global-terror community. Accordingly, since the early Palestinian suicide-terror campaigns in the mid-1990s, popular Islamic concepts of martyrdom and jihadi suicide terrorism have maintained a continuous escalation toward a marriage of the synonymous. Already, al-Qaeda has

\(^{65}\) One could argue that only the pilots committed suicide during the 9/11 attacks.
adopted the socio-cultural and religious lessons put into practice by Palestinians (e.g. fard ayn, conflict framing, etc.) and merged them with bin Laden’s universal message, which has rapidly disseminated across the um’ma via satellite television, the internet and other means of contemporary mass communication. Al-Qaeda’s shift in focus from jihad to istishhad represents a Palestinianization of the international jihadi-Salafi movement. Moreover, it signals that the advancements in suicide terrorism made by the Palestinian shahid/suicide-homicide bomber and its complementary culture of martyrdom will likely continue to inspire and foment imitation and therefore remain having reverberating effects for years to come.
Through its reemergence as a significant force in the Islamic world, political Islam returned various concepts to the forefront of social discourse and practice, including violent ones like jihad, fard ayn and istishhad. These notions have notably produced violent phenomena such as suicide-homicide bombings, suicidal hijackings and beheadings. While Shi’a-Muslims initially developed the suicide-homicide modus operandi, and some nominally secular organizations have employed such attacks,¹ nearly forty Sunni-Muslim organizations have used suicide-homicide attacks since the Palestinians started doing so in 1993.² Moreover, following the precedents set by Palestinian

¹ The Shi’a Muslim employers of suicide-homicide attacks include Iranian soldiers, the Iraqi Da’awa 17 and Hezbollah and Amal in Lebanon. The “secular” employers of suicide-homicide attacks include the Syrian Socialist-National Party, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK), Fatah, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine; one should note, however, all of these organizations have employed some kind of religious or cultic symbolism in attracting individuals to carry out attacks. Fatah and PFLP even set up new Islamist “brigades,” to launch suicide-homicide attacks on their behalves.
² For a comprehensive list of suicide-homicide attacks worldwide from December 1981 to June 2005, see Ami Pedahzur, Suicide Terrorism (Malden, Mass.: Polity Press, 2005), 241-253.
organizations, Sunni militants and terrorists today carry out the overwhelming majority of suicide-homicide attacks in an increasing number of locations and with a decreasing level of targeting discrimination. That suicide-homicide attacks originated with Shi’a Muslims and currently the Shi’a in Iraq have not resorted to suicide terrorism further demonstrates that the *modus operandi* has nearly become an exclusively Sunni phenomenon.

Indeed, without Sunni organizations, suicide terrorism would probably arouse minimal international concern. The Palestinians’ al-Aqsa intifada would not have had the impact that it did; the wall separating Israel from the disputed territories surely would not stand, and Hamas would not enjoy the popular support that it currently does among Palestinians and other Arabs and Muslims. Al-Qaeda’s embassy, USS Cole and 9/11 attacks would not have happened in the manner that they did, if at all. Iraq’s reconstruction would not face the severe challenges that it does, as Sunni suicide-terror attacks (e.g. Golden-Dome Mosque attack and Ashura festival attack) have led to major sectarian clashes. The United Kingdom (UK) would not have faced the horror of British citizens killing themselves in order to murder fellows Britons. Seemingly endless, one
could go on with scores of examples, as Sunni organizations have launched numerous attacks in Indonesia, Russia, Egypt, Jordan, Turkey, Morocco, Spain, Tunisia, India, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the Philippines, Singapore, Croatia and elsewhere. Disregarding the work of Sunni organizations over the last 15 years, suicide-homicide attacks have struck only in Lebanon, Kuwait, Sri Lanka, India, Argentina and on the battlefields of the Iran-Iraq War. With an international-Sunni culture of martyrdom shadowing the dispersal of suicide terrorism across the globe, a high likelihood exists that the modus operandi will continue to play a part in Islamist behavior in the foreseeable future. The Palestinian shahid's suicide terror 'MO' has made its mark, and al-Qaeda intends to duplicate it across the globe. Countering suicide terrorism therefore will require well thought-out strategies that employ a collection of responses that correspond to the varying facilitators and perpetrators of the modus operandi.

3 One can add Turkey to the list if one counts the PKK as secular, despite its solely Sunni membership.
The Three Pillars of Suicide Terrorism: Individuals' Ends as Organizations' Means to Collective Goals

Recently on February 4, 2008, two Palestinian suicide-homicide bombers launched an attack on a small shopping center in Dimona, Israel, killing a woman and wounding 40. A day later, *al-Hayat al-Jadida* (The New Life), the official newspaper of Palestinian Authority (PA) praised the terrorists, stating: "The perpetrators of the operation died as shahids." The two other newspapers under PA control similarly hailed the suicide terrorists as shahids, publicly bestowing upon them Islam's highest honor.4 Considering that proponents of "peace" regularly deem PA President Mahmoud Abbas and his Fatah party the "moderates" within the Palestinian political arena, one should not expect popular Palestinian support for suicide terrorism to decrease anytime in the near future. Accordingly, Israel, like the United States (U.S.) in its fight against global jihadis, ought not patiently wait on "moderates" to correct the ills of "extremists," particularly when the two are oftentimes indistinguishable.

Nations-states targeted by suicide terrorism must work proactively to disable the utility of such attacks. Israel has sought to geographically disconnect itself from potential threats, yet it has done so at the cost of territory and principle, which in the long-run could have unimaginable consequences. Rather, Israel’s “pre-separation Wall” counter-terrorism strategy represents a more strategically geared response to suicide terrorism: targeted assassinations of organizational leaders, dispatchers and bombmakers, demolition of the homes of suicide-terror perpetrators, and measures aimed at hindering collective support for terrorism in general and shahids/suicide-homicide bombers in particular.

Regarding the suicide-terror phenomenon, organizations function as the serial killer, individuals act as the killing instrument, and the sanctioning society/collective as the little voice that sounds off in both of their heads—encouraging them to go through with their murderous intentions. The shahid stands as a product of Palestinian collective identity/society, organizations/social networks, and individuals all which seek at various levels to pursue the goals of Palestinian sammud—namely, the destruction of the state of Israel via the return of “refugees” and the
"liberation" of the Dome of the Rock and al-Aqsa Mosque. Similarly, international jihadis work under leadership and with the support of a transnational community. Not unlike Palestinian fanatics, international jihadis desire a complete retreat of infidel-states that "occupy" dar al-Islam. They too refuse to moderate their goals even slightly, instead choosing to "resist." Palestinian shahids, in a sense, do their "death work" as performance artists in the presentation of sammud. Al-Qaeda-affiliated shahids do theirs in a macro-version of the same signaling game--pursuing political extortion via a war of attrition.

Employing suicide terrorism entails three imperative components: organizational strategic necessity, motivated individuals and a complementary culture of martyrdom. These multiple forces behind suicide terrorism accordingly necessitate distinct responses. Disabling the three pillars of suicide terror, both at the localized an international levels, thus requires deterring the collective, preempting organizations and preventing individuals from carrying out their distinct roles.
Countering Pillar One: Preempting Terror Organizations

When dealing with terrorist organizations, negotiation never represents a forward-looking counterstrategy. Caving to terrorists' demands only "invites more attacks."\(^5\) Furthermore, negotiating with organizations that once employed, but no longer use or advocate, terror tactics similarly sends a message that terrorism can one day provide profitable gains for those who use it. Negotiation therefore cannot exist with organizations that either currently, previously or prospectively might use terror tactics to advance their strategy. Rather, nation-states afflicted by terror tactics need a proactive preemption policy that promises to either capture or kill terror leaders prior to or directly after a terror attack. Hafez notes:

> Given that suicide bombings are a strategic choice by militant organizations aiming to coerce opponents into making concessions, it would be a mistake to grant major political concessions during a campaign of suicide attacks. Such compromise confirms the viability of this strategy... Only after Israel refused to make major concessions and escalated its counterinsurgency against the militants did

Palestinian factions begin talking about a cease-fire.\textsuperscript{6}

But, even if a nation-state seeks a "cease-fire," any truce should not mark recognition or the initiation of normalization. Nation-states that recognize organizations that have once employed terrorism will do so only to their detriment, as well as to the disservice of other states in similar positions.

Countering Pillar Two: Deterring Collective Support for Suicide Terrorism

As demonstrated by the Palestinians, terror organizations often work as the voice of a people. Accordingly, terror organizations rely on the support of the population in order to function. Thus, if the costs put on the sanctioning society/collective reach a high enough point to remove support for organizations that use suicide-terror attacks, then it will force organizations to recalculate the value of launching such operations. Because organizations rely on domestic support, counter-terrorism strategists need to direct deterrence policy against the accommodating population rather than the specific terror organization, whose members should be marked for termination or capture anyhow. In Maoian terms, the goal

\textsuperscript{6} Hafez, \textit{Manufacturing Human Bombs}, 70.
here is to make the "sea" an unwelcome environment for the "fish," while counter-terrorists simultaneously fish for the fish.

A collective punishment policy does not have to suffocate a population, but it surely needs to send a message, as well as work toward a functional goal. In the disputed territories for example, Israel usually increases security at times of heightened alert or during an ongoing suicide-homicide bombing campaign; this commonly results in added roadblocks and checkpoints that slow the daily functions of Palestinian society. A more severe punishment, and pointed message, might include measures like the cutting off of power or wide scale searches—both of which a nation-state can pointedly execute in problematic areas—implementing a targeted collective punishment. A disclaimer of exactly why the society has to pay the costs of an organization’s actions, however, must accompany any collective punishment, so as to prevent the loss of its message.

Nevertheless, many nation-states’ security circumstances do not mirror those of Israel, which has brought suicide terrorism to near cessation by physically separating itself from the population deploying suicide-
homicide bombers. Indeed, as demonstrated by the UK’s 7/7 and 7/21 bombers, sometimes a nation-state’s suicidal enemy comes from its own citizenry. Various attacks in Jordan, Spain, Turkey, North Africa and elsewhere demonstrate similar instances. In such cases, nation-states should make a concerted effort with local communities to expose exactly who and what social-networking institutions may or may not have accommodated specific individuals in not only launching terror attacks but also supporting them. For example, accommodating behavior includes the glorification of suicide terrorists as “shahids” or heroes, and nation-states should afford individuals and institutions that participate in such behavior zero tolerance. Nation-states should make the monitoring of social networks likely associated with Islamic fanaticism of utmost concern to domestic security agencies.

**Countering Pillar Three: Un-Motivating Individuals to Commit Suicide Terrorism**

Verifying one’s existential worth requires the ability to make an impact. Individuals accordingly look for any number of ways to affect the world before them. Given the right circumstances, terror campaigns provide individuals with an outlet to channel their desires ‘to make a
difference.' Suicide terrorists participate in terrorism for reasons identical to other terrorists: political ones; but, they commit suicide for a variety of reasons, often unrelated and customized, if not completely personal. Palestinian shahids usually seek to kill Israelis out of vengeance and a sense of religious and cultural duty, yet they kill themselves for a number of reasons, both externally and domestically provoked. For many, participation in a greater cause assuages the individual’s desire to “contribute” and thus “confirms” the importance of one’s existence. But, beyond pursuing glory, fame or mere recognition, adherence to Islamic duties can also obscure the betrayal of Arab social norms. Sometimes suicide terrorists just want to die, yet need a “legitimate” way to do so. Murdering others in the name of the cause, while killing oneself provides this socio-religious legitimacy. Whether for Allah, “Palestine,” the um’ma or all three, individuals can rationalize and legitimize their escape from society via vengeance.

Thus, counter-terrorism strategies need to look at the bigger picture and attach themselves to larger foreign and domestic policies. Quelling not only the individual’s motivation to kill, but also the motivation to kill oneself
over social discontentment suggests that vast social reforms need to occur in the locales that produce suicide terrorists. That most suicide terrorists come from societies under the rule of authoritarian leaders or live as second or third generation Muslim-immigrants in Western Europe indicates that both environments require vast reform. Un-motivating individuals to commit suicide-terror attacks means thorough democratic reform in the greater Arab and Islamic worlds, and concerted integration and acculturation of Muslim immigrants into Western societies. In recent years giant leaps have been made in the former, and many have awakened to the necessity of the latter; however, both problems lie far from resolution, and awareness of the problems does not always translate to progress in the right direction. Nevertheless, Western policymakers need to remain focused on democratic reformation in the Islamic world and acculturation of Muslim immigrants living in Western societies.

Undercutting Istishhad with Individuality

An Old West/gunslinger adage suggests that when signs of the end of the world appear, men react in three different ways. The first man seeks all the worldly joy he
can muster--whiskey, prostitutes, etc. The second man heads to the mission and prays with the priest. The third man, however, gathers his resolve and revolvers and looks for the way to finish the game--that is, on some suicidal mission, he seeks to do his part in one last effort for a greater cause. Political Islam's promoters of martyrdom have converged the paths of these men into one; taking the holy man, the egotistical man, and the resolute man and synthesizing them into the perfect conqueror of the world's end--thereby optimizing the capacity to produce vast numbers of apocalyptic perpetrators of violence. Ultimately, without access to alternative belief systems, and deprived of the opportunity to participate within a modern society based on the tenet of individuality, the apocalyptic istishhadi ideologies will continue attracting marginalized Muslim subjects and disaffected Muslim immigrants. However, ideologies such as those that promote istishhad never self-correct. Like with Nazism and Soviet Marxist-Leninism, freedom will have to push them out of existence.

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7 Paraphrased from an explanation in Young Guns II, prod. Paul Schiff and Irby Smith, dir. by Geoff Murphy, 1 hr. 43 min., Morgan Creek/Warner Bros., 1990, DVD.
Thus, acquiescing to suicide terrorism, or any form of terrorism, for that matter, represents the most lethal mistake any nation-state could make. Acquiescence extends legitimacy to those who employ terrorism—granting their causes and ideologies justifications for continued violence and setting precedents for others to mimic. The U.S. pullout from Lebanon in 1984, Israel’s 2000 withdrawal from its buffer zone in Southern Lebanon and its 2005 unilateral disengagement from Gaza, all established significant victories for the strategies of guerrilla warfare and terrorism. Furthermore, these retreats verified the strategic utility of suicide-homicide attacks, and encouraged their continued utilization. More importantly, however, the continued recognition by international powers, including the U.S., of such organizations as the Palestinian Fatah legitimate the terror tactics and strategies that they have employed over the years. The U.S. makes serious contradictions when it condemns al-Qaeda in Iraq yet continues to fund and buttress Fatah’s position within Palestinian politics, as both organizations continue to launch suicide-homicide attacks against civilians. Neither the Palestinian nor the jihadi-Salafi facilitators of suicide-terror attacks will decide to end their
campaigns in the foreseeable future, primarily because their goals, which define their existence, remain untenable. Organizations usually pursue their end-goals as best to their capabilities—therefore demonstrating rational behavior. Analysts and policymakers, however, should not assume this rationality would transmit to these actors moderating their end-goals. Why would they, particularly if they refuse to even "moderate" their means? How much reliance then can targeted nation-states put on their enemies' more "moderate" constituencies and representative bodies? When innocent lives are at stake, the answer should always be "zero." It rests then on targeted nation-states to abrasively end their foes' suicide-terror campaigns and provide them with nothing less than a Carthaginian peace.
APPENDIX A

PALESTINIAN SUICIDE-HOMICIDE ATTACKS IN ISRAEL

(APRIL 1993 TO APRIL 2008)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>ORG</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>TARGET</th>
<th>MURDERED/ WOUNDED</th>
<th>BOMB TYPE</th>
<th>BOMBERS (HOMETOWN) [Occupation]</th>
<th>AGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>04/16/1993</td>
<td>Hamas</td>
<td>Mekhola junction (Jordan Valley)</td>
<td>Two buses/ Moshav Mekhola cafeteria</td>
<td>1/8</td>
<td>Van bomb*</td>
<td>Sahar Tamam Nebulasi n/a</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09/12/1993</td>
<td>Hamas/PIJ</td>
<td>Gaza</td>
<td>Prisons Service bus</td>
<td>0/2</td>
<td>Car bomb*</td>
<td>Aymen Attalla n/a</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09/14/1993</td>
<td>Hamas</td>
<td>Gaza</td>
<td>Police station</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>Belt bomb*</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09/26/1993</td>
<td>Hamas/PIJ</td>
<td>Beit El/ Jerusalem-Shilo road</td>
<td>Bus/ Beit El headquarters</td>
<td>0/31</td>
<td>Car bomb</td>
<td>Ashraf Mahadi 19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/25/1993</td>
<td>Hamas/PIJ</td>
<td>Gaza</td>
<td>Civil administration convoy</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>Car bomb*</td>
<td>Suliman Zadan n/a</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/02/1993</td>
<td>Hamas</td>
<td>Singil/ Jerusalem-Shilo road</td>
<td>Bus</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>Car bomb</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/13/1993</td>
<td>PIJ</td>
<td>Sejaya intersection</td>
<td>IDF jeep</td>
<td>0/3</td>
<td>Red Crescent ambulance bomb</td>
<td>Anwar Aziz n/a</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/06/1994</td>
<td>Hamas</td>
<td>Afula, Israel</td>
<td>Bus</td>
<td>8/51</td>
<td>Car bomb</td>
<td>Ra'id Abdallah Zakarna 19</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/13/1994</td>
<td>Hamas</td>
<td>Hadera, Israel</td>
<td>Bus</td>
<td>5/30</td>
<td>Belt bomb</td>
<td>Ammar Amarna n/a</td>
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<tr>
<td>10/19/1994</td>
<td>Hamas</td>
<td>Tel Aviv, Israel</td>
<td>Bus</td>
<td>22/48</td>
<td>Belt bomb</td>
<td>Hassan Abd al-Rahman al-Suweh 27</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/11/1994</td>
<td>PIJ</td>
<td>Netzarim junction (Gaza)</td>
<td>IDF officers/ Border police</td>
<td>3/12</td>
<td>Bicycle/ belt bomb</td>
<td>Hisham Ismail Abd al-Rahman Hamad 21</td>
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<tr>
<td>12/04/1994</td>
<td>Hamas/PIJ</td>
<td>Erez crossing (Gaza-Southern Israel)</td>
<td>IDF patrol</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>Backpack bomb*</td>
<td>Mahmoud Shariff 26</td>
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<tr>
<td>12/25/1994</td>
<td>Hamas</td>
<td>Jerusalem, Israel</td>
<td>Bus</td>
<td>0/13</td>
<td>Belt bomb</td>
<td>Ayman Kamal Rada (Khan Yunis, Gaza) 21</td>
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<tr>
<td>01/22/1995</td>
<td>PIJ</td>
<td>Beit Lid junction (near Netanya, Israel)</td>
<td>Bus</td>
<td>19/69</td>
<td>Belt bombs</td>
<td>Anwar Sukkar; Salah Shaktir n/a; Khaled Khatib 29</td>
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<tr>
<td>04/09/1995</td>
<td>PIJ</td>
<td>Kfar Darom, Gaza</td>
<td>Bus</td>
<td>8/36</td>
<td>Car bomb</td>
<td>Khaled Khatib n/a</td>
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<tr>
<td>04/09/1995</td>
<td>Hamas</td>
<td>Netzarim junction (Gaza)</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>0/3</td>
<td>Some</td>
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<td>06/25/1995</td>
<td>Hamas/PIJ</td>
<td>Gaza</td>
<td>IDF Outpost</td>
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<td>Donkey bomb</td>
<td>Mu'awiyya Roka 22</td>
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<td>07/24/1995</td>
<td>Hamas</td>
<td>Ramat Gan, Israel</td>
<td>Bus</td>
<td>6/32</td>
<td>Belt bomb</td>
<td>Labib Anwar Azem 23</td>
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<td>08/21/1995</td>
<td>Hamas</td>
<td>Jerusalem, Israel</td>
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<td>Belt bomb</td>
<td>Sufian Sheib Jabarin 26</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/02/1995</td>
<td>PIJ</td>
<td>Geffen checkpoint/ Kasufim crossing (Gush Katif, Gaza)</td>
<td>Bus</td>
<td>0/11</td>
<td>Car bombs</td>
<td>Rubhi Kahliou; Mohammed Abu Hashem 22;</td>
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<td>Hamas</td>
<td>Jerusalem, Israel</td>
<td>Bus</td>
<td>26/80</td>
<td>Belt bomb</td>
<td>Majdi Abu Wardah [student] 19</td>
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<td>Hamas</td>
<td>Beit Lid junction (Askelon, Israel)</td>
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<td>Ibrahim Sarahnej 26</td>
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<td>Hamas</td>
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<td>Tel Aviv, Israel</td>
<td>Cafe Apropos (military)</td>
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<td>Musa Ghneimat 28</td>
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<td>n/a</td>
<td>Abdullah al-Madhoun or Anwar al-Shabrawi n/a</td>
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226
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<th>DATE</th>
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<th>BOMBER/S (HOMETOWN)</th>
<th>AGE</th>
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<td>07/30/1997</td>
<td>Hamas</td>
<td>Jerusalem, Israel</td>
<td>Mahane Yehuda (marketplace)</td>
<td>16/178</td>
<td>Belt bomb</td>
<td>Mu'awiya Jarara;</td>
<td>23;</td>
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<td>Bashar Sawalha (both from Assira al-Shamalna, Nablus area)</td>
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<td>09/04/1997</td>
<td>Hamas</td>
<td>Jerusalem, Israel</td>
<td>Ben Yehuda/Midnahov (pedestrian mall)</td>
<td>8/181-210</td>
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<td>Tawfiq Yassin; Yousef Shouli; (from Assira al-Shamalna, Nablus area)</td>
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<td>Hamas</td>
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<td>0/1</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>Suhib Timraz</td>
<td>n/a</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>IDF jeep (schoolbus escort)</td>
<td>1/8</td>
<td>Belt bomb</td>
<td>Yousef Zughayer (Anata); Suleiman Dahayne (Silat al-Harithiyye, Jenin area)</td>
<td>21;</td>
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<tr>
<td>10/26/2000</td>
<td>PIJ</td>
<td>Gush Katif, Gaza</td>
<td>IDF outpost</td>
<td>0/1</td>
<td>Bicycle/ backpack bomb</td>
<td>Nabil Aair</td>
<td>24</td>
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<tr>
<td>11/06/2000</td>
<td>Hamas</td>
<td>Rafah, Gaza</td>
<td>Israeli Navy vessel</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>Raft bomb</td>
<td>Hisham Abdallah Najar al-Falaji</td>
<td>24</td>
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<td>12/15/2000</td>
<td>Hamas</td>
<td>Erez crossing (Gaza-Southern Israel)</td>
<td>Security outpost</td>
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<td>Belt bomb</td>
<td>Hamed Saleh Abu Hajile</td>
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<td>12/22/2000</td>
<td>Hamas/</td>
<td>Mekhola, Jordan Valley</td>
<td>Kiosk</td>
<td>0/3</td>
<td>Belt bomb</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
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<td>Fatah</td>
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<td>01/01/2001</td>
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<td>Netanya, Israel</td>
<td>Bus</td>
<td>0/35-60</td>
<td>Car bomb</td>
<td>Hisham Abdallah Najar al-Falaji</td>
<td>24</td>
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<tr>
<td>03/01/2001</td>
<td>Hamas</td>
<td>Mei-Ami junction (Wadi Ara)</td>
<td>Taxi</td>
<td>1/10</td>
<td>Bag bomb</td>
<td>n/a</td>
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<tr>
<td>03/04/2001</td>
<td>Hamas</td>
<td>Netanya, Israel</td>
<td>Street</td>
<td>3/53-60</td>
<td>Bag bomb</td>
<td>Ahmadi Alayyan (Nur al-Shams) (mosque muezzin)</td>
<td>23</td>
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<td>03/27/2001</td>
<td>Hamas</td>
<td>Jerusalem, Israel</td>
<td>Bus/French Hill intersection</td>
<td>0/28</td>
<td>Backpack bomb</td>
<td>Dia'a Mohammad Hussejn al-Tawil</td>
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<td>03/28/2001</td>
<td>Hamas</td>
<td>Neve Yamina-Kfar Saba, Israel</td>
<td>Gas station</td>
<td>2/4</td>
<td>Belt bomb</td>
<td>Fadi Atollah Yousef 'Amer Omar Salem</td>
<td>23</td>
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<td>04/22/2001</td>
<td>Hamas</td>
<td>Shavei Shomron, Samaria</td>
<td>Bus stop</td>
<td>1/45-60</td>
<td>Belt bomb</td>
<td>Jamal Abd al-Ghani Nasser (Nablus) (engineer)</td>
<td>23</td>
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<tr>
<td>04/29/2001</td>
<td>Hamas</td>
<td></td>
<td>School bus/Tsir Sharif</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>Car bomb</td>
<td>Maimoud Ahmad Marmash (Tulkarem) (carpenter)</td>
<td>20</td>
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<td></td>
<td>intersection</td>
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<td>05/18/2001</td>
<td>Hamas</td>
<td>Netanya, Israel</td>
<td>HaSharon (mall)</td>
<td>5/86-105</td>
<td>Belt bomb</td>
<td>Ala Hilal Abd al-Sater 19; Sabbah; Osama Nimer Darwis</td>
<td>21</td>
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<td>05/25/2001</td>
<td>Hamas</td>
<td>Netzarim junction (Gaza)</td>
<td>Bus</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>Truck bomb</td>
<td>Yousef Suyay; Nidal Jibali (both from Jenin) (both PA police officers)</td>
<td>n/a</td>
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<tr>
<td>05/25/2001</td>
<td>PIJ</td>
<td>Hadera, Israel</td>
<td>Central bus station</td>
<td>0/66</td>
<td>Car bomb</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
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<td>05/29/2001</td>
<td>Hamas</td>
<td>Tapuach checkpoint (Khan Yunis, Gaza)</td>
<td>IDF outpost</td>
<td>0/2</td>
<td>Belt bomb</td>
<td>Sayyed al-Hotari</td>
<td>21</td>
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<td>06/01/2001</td>
<td>Hamas/</td>
<td>Tel Aviv, Israel</td>
<td>Delphinarium (nightclub)</td>
<td>22/83-120</td>
<td>Belt bomb</td>
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<td>PIJ</td>
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<td>DATE</td>
<td>ORG</td>
<td>LOCATION</td>
<td>TARGET</td>
<td>MURDERED/ WOUNDED</td>
<td>BOMB TYPE</td>
<td>BOMBER/S (HOMETOWN)</td>
<td>AGE</td>
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<tr>
<td>06/17/2001</td>
<td>PIJ</td>
<td>Badananiyye, Gaza</td>
<td>IDF outpost</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>Donkey-cart bomb</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
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<tr>
<td>06/22/2001</td>
<td>Hamas</td>
<td>Alei Sinai, Gush Katif, Gaza</td>
<td>IDF patrol</td>
<td>2/1</td>
<td>Car bomb</td>
<td>Ismail al-Masoubi</td>
<td>27</td>
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<tr>
<td>07/09/2001</td>
<td>Hamas</td>
<td>Kissufim crossing (Gush Katif, Gaza)</td>
<td>IDF vehicle</td>
<td>0/1</td>
<td>Car bomb</td>
<td>Nafez Ayesh al-Nader (Jubalya) or n/a</td>
<td>26</td>
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<tr>
<td>07/11/2001</td>
<td>PIJ</td>
<td>Afula, Israel</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>Bag bomb*</td>
<td>Nafez Ayesh al-Nader (Jubalya) or n/a</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07/16/2001</td>
<td>PIJ</td>
<td>Binyamina, Israel</td>
<td>Bus stop/ train station (military)</td>
<td>2/11</td>
<td>Belt bomb</td>
<td>Nidal Mustafa Ibrahim (Jenin)</td>
<td>20</td>
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<td>07/22/2001</td>
<td>PIJ</td>
<td>Haifa, Israel</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>Belt bomb*</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
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<tr>
<td>08/02/2001</td>
<td>Hamas/ PIJ</td>
<td>Beit Shean, Israel</td>
<td>Bus</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>Belt bomb*</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
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<tr>
<td>08/04/2001</td>
<td>Hamas</td>
<td>Moschav Bekaot, Jordan Valley</td>
<td>IDF outpost/ checkpoint Sharro (restaurant)</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
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<tr>
<td>08/08/2001</td>
<td>Hamas</td>
<td>Jerusalem, Israel</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
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<tr>
<td>08/12/2001</td>
<td>PIJ</td>
<td>Kiryat Mozkin, Haifa, Israel</td>
<td>Wall Stree Café</td>
<td>0/21</td>
<td>Belt bomb</td>
<td>Mahmoud Baker Nasser (Jenin) [PA police officer]</td>
<td>27</td>
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<tr>
<td>09/04/2001</td>
<td>Hamas</td>
<td>Jerusalem, Israel</td>
<td>Pedestrians on Nevi'im Street (military)</td>
<td>0/13-20</td>
<td>Bag bomb</td>
<td>Ra'id Nabil al-Barghouti Ahd al-Fatah Mohammed Muslah Rashid</td>
<td>26</td>
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<tr>
<td>09/09/2001</td>
<td>PIJ</td>
<td>Beit Lid junction (near Netanya, Israel)</td>
<td>IDF jeep</td>
<td>0/2</td>
<td>Bag bomb</td>
<td>Ahd al-Fatah Mohammed Muslah Rashid</td>
<td>25</td>
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<tr>
<td>09/09/2001</td>
<td>Hamas</td>
<td>Nahariya, Israel</td>
<td>Train station</td>
<td>3/46-95</td>
<td>Bag bomb</td>
<td>Mohammed al-Nabashi(Israeli-Arab citizen)</td>
<td>48</td>
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<td>10/07/2001</td>
<td>PIJ</td>
<td>Kibbutz Shiuhot, Beit Shean Valley, Israel</td>
<td>Kibbutz entrance</td>
<td>1/5</td>
<td>Belt/car bomb</td>
<td>Ahmad Abd al-Mun'em Ahmad Duragime</td>
<td>17</td>
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<td>10/17/2001</td>
<td>Hamas/ PIJ</td>
<td>Karni crossing (Nahalor, Gaza)</td>
<td>IDF jeep</td>
<td>0/2</td>
<td>Bag bomb</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
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<tr>
<td>11/08/2001</td>
<td>Hamas</td>
<td>Baka al-Sharkiye</td>
<td>Border police</td>
<td>0/2</td>
<td>Bag bomb</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
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<tr>
<td>11/26/2001</td>
<td>Hamas</td>
<td>Erez crossing (Gaza-Southern Israel)</td>
<td>Border police</td>
<td>0/2</td>
<td>Belt bomb</td>
<td>Tayser Ahmad Ajami</td>
<td>26</td>
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<tr>
<td>11/29/2001</td>
<td>Fatah/ PIJ</td>
<td>Hadera, Israel</td>
<td>Bus</td>
<td>3/9</td>
<td>Belt bombs</td>
<td>Abd al-Karim Abu Nafa [Jericho] [PA police officer]; Mustafa Abu Smyye</td>
<td>n/a;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/02/2001</td>
<td>Hamas</td>
<td>Haifa, Israel</td>
<td>Bus</td>
<td>15/40-61</td>
<td>Belt bomb</td>
<td>Abd al-Karim Abu Nafa [Jericho] [PA police officer]; Mustafa Abu Smyye</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/05/2001</td>
<td>PIJ</td>
<td>Jerusalem, Israel</td>
<td>Jaffa Gate area in Old City</td>
<td>0/8</td>
<td>Backpack bomb</td>
<td>Maher Habashi</td>
<td>21</td>
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<tr>
<td>12/09/2001</td>
<td>PIJ</td>
<td>Haifa, Israel</td>
<td>Bus stop/ hitchhiking post Two civilian vehicles (military)</td>
<td>0/30</td>
<td>Belt bomb</td>
<td>Nimer Youssef</td>
<td>20</td>
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<td>12/12/2001</td>
<td>Hamas</td>
<td>Neve Dekalim/Ganei Tal/Gush Katif, Gaza</td>
<td>Border police</td>
<td>0/4</td>
<td>Bag bombs/ road bomb</td>
<td>Abd al-Karim Abu Nafa [Jericho] [PA police officer]; Mustafa Abu Smyye</td>
<td>n/a;</td>
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<tr>
<td>12/15/2001</td>
<td>Fatah/ PIJ</td>
<td>Tulkarm, Samaria</td>
<td>Public hall</td>
<td>6/some</td>
<td>Belt bomb</td>
<td>Maher Habashi</td>
<td>43</td>
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<tr>
<td>01/17/2002</td>
<td>Fatah</td>
<td>Hadera, Israel</td>
<td>Public hall</td>
<td>0/23-33</td>
<td>Belt bomb</td>
<td>Wafa Idris, Safwat Abd al-Rahman Khalil</td>
<td>n/a</td>
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<tr>
<td>01/25/2002</td>
<td>PIJ</td>
<td>Tel Aviv, Israel</td>
<td>Cafe</td>
<td>1/127-150</td>
<td>Explosives bag**</td>
<td>Wafa Idris, Safwat Abd al-Rahman Khalil</td>
<td>31</td>
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<tr>
<td>01/27/2002</td>
<td>Fatah</td>
<td>Jerusalem, Israel</td>
<td>Mail entrance/ street</td>
<td>1/127-150</td>
<td>Explosives bag**</td>
<td>Wafa Idris, Safwat Abd al-Rahman Khalil</td>
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<td>DATE</td>
<td>ORG</td>
<td>LOCATION</td>
<td>TARGET</td>
<td>MURDERED/ WOUNDED</td>
<td>BOMB TYPE</td>
<td>TYPE</td>
<td>BOMBER/S (HOMETOWN)</td>
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<td>01/30/2002</td>
<td>Fatah</td>
<td>Tulkarm, Samaria</td>
<td>(military)</td>
<td>0/2</td>
<td>Belt bomb</td>
<td>Belt</td>
<td>Murad Abu Asal</td>
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<tr>
<td>02/06/2002</td>
<td>Hamas</td>
<td>Ma'ale Adumim, Judea</td>
<td>Bus</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>Belt bomb*</td>
<td>Belt</td>
<td>n/a</td>
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<tr>
<td>02/16/2002</td>
<td>PIJ</td>
<td>Karnei Shomron, Samaria</td>
<td>Pizzeria in shopping center</td>
<td>3/22-30</td>
<td>Belt bomb</td>
<td>Belt</td>
<td>Sadat Ahmad Abd al-Haq</td>
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<td>02/17/2002</td>
<td>Fatah</td>
<td>Hadera, Israel</td>
<td>(military)</td>
<td>0/2</td>
<td>Bomb belts</td>
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<td>02/18/2002</td>
<td>Fatah</td>
<td>Ma'ale Adumim, Judea</td>
<td>Police</td>
<td>1/2</td>
<td>Car bomb</td>
<td>Belt</td>
<td>Mohammed Hamouda</td>
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<td>02/19/2002</td>
<td>Fatah</td>
<td>Mekhola junction</td>
<td>Bus</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>Belt bomb</td>
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<td>02/22/2002</td>
<td>Fatah</td>
<td>Efrat, Gush Etzion, Judea</td>
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<td>Belt bomb</td>
<td>Belt</td>
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<td>Fatah</td>
<td>Maccabim junction (Jerusalem-Modi'in highway)</td>
<td>Police</td>
<td>0/5</td>
<td>Belt bomb</td>
<td>Belt</td>
<td>Darine Abu Aisha^</td>
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<td>Jerusalem, Israel</td>
<td>Yeshiva/Synagogue</td>
<td>11/46-55</td>
<td>Belt bomb</td>
<td>Belt</td>
<td>Mohammed Daraghme (Bethlehem)</td>
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<td>PIJ</td>
<td>Afula, Israel</td>
<td>Bus/bus station</td>
<td>1/20</td>
<td>Belt bomb</td>
<td>Belt</td>
<td>Karim Takhtaina</td>
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<td>03/07/2002</td>
<td>PFLP</td>
<td>Ariel, Samaria</td>
<td>Estel HaShomron (hotel)</td>
<td>0/15</td>
<td>Belt bomb</td>
<td>Belt</td>
<td>Shadi Nasser</td>
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<td>03/07/2002</td>
<td>Hamas/Fatah</td>
<td>Jerusalem, Israel</td>
<td>Kaff (café)</td>
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<td>Backpack</td>
<td>Belt</td>
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<td>or</td>
<td>or 0/0</td>
<td>Belt bomb</td>
<td>Belt</td>
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<td>Hamas</td>
<td>Jerusalem, Israel</td>
<td>Moment (café)</td>
<td>11/58</td>
<td>Belt bomb</td>
<td>Belt</td>
<td>Fouda Ismail al-Hourani</td>
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<td>03/17/2002</td>
<td>PIJ</td>
<td>Jerusalem, Israel</td>
<td>Bus/French Hill intersection</td>
<td>0/25</td>
<td>Belt bomb</td>
<td>Belt</td>
<td>Akram Nabatiti</td>
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<td>03/20/2002</td>
<td>PIJ</td>
<td>Wadi Ara (near Afula, Israel)</td>
<td>Bus</td>
<td>7/28-42</td>
<td>Belt bomb</td>
<td>Belt</td>
<td>Ra'aefat Tahsin Slim</td>
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<td>03/21/2002</td>
<td>Fatah</td>
<td>Jerusalem, Israel</td>
<td>Cafe/ pedestrians</td>
<td>3/86</td>
<td>Belt bomb</td>
<td>Belt</td>
<td>Dyab Mohammed Hashaika</td>
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<td>03/22/2002</td>
<td>Fatah</td>
<td>Salem/Zebub checkpoint, Jenin, Samaria</td>
<td>IDF checkpoint</td>
<td>0/1</td>
<td>Belt bomb</td>
<td>Belt</td>
<td>Imad Shakirat</td>
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<td>03/26/2002</td>
<td>PFLP/Fatah</td>
<td>Qalqilye, Samaria</td>
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<td>Belt bomb</td>
<td>Belt</td>
<td>Shadi Shaker</td>
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<td>03/27/2002</td>
<td>Hamas</td>
<td>Netanya, Israel</td>
<td>Park Hotel (Passover party)</td>
<td>29/144</td>
<td>Belt bomb</td>
<td>Belt</td>
<td>Khaled Yousef Dabash</td>
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<td>Fatah</td>
<td>Jerusalem, Israel</td>
<td>Supermarket</td>
<td>2/22-30</td>
<td>Belt bomb</td>
<td>Belt</td>
<td>Abd al-Basat Ode</td>
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<td>Fatah</td>
<td>Tel Aviv, Israel</td>
<td>My Coffe Shop Cafe</td>
<td>1/29</td>
<td>Belt bomb</td>
<td>Belt</td>
<td>Ayat al-Akhras^</td>
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<td>Fatah</td>
<td>Baka al-Garbiayeeye, Nazlat Issa, Samaria</td>
<td>Border police</td>
<td>1/1</td>
<td>Belt bomb</td>
<td>Belt</td>
<td>Muhanad Salahat</td>
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<td>03/31/2002</td>
<td>Hamas</td>
<td>Haifa, Israel</td>
<td>Matzah (restaurant)/gas station</td>
<td>15/45</td>
<td>Belt bomb</td>
<td>Belt</td>
<td>Shadi al-Tubas</td>
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<td>Efrat, Judea</td>
<td>Medical center</td>
<td>0/6</td>
<td>Belt bomb</td>
<td>Belt</td>
<td>Jamil Khalaf Hamid</td>
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<td>04/01/2002</td>
<td>Fatah</td>
<td>Jerusalem, Israel</td>
<td>Police roadblock</td>
<td>1/2</td>
<td>Belt bomb</td>
<td>Belt</td>
<td>Rami Mohammad Issa</td>
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<td>04/02/2002</td>
<td>Hamas/PIJ</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>Belt bomb</td>
<td>Belt</td>
<td>Akram Khalifa</td>
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<tr>
<td>04/04/2002</td>
<td>Fatah</td>
<td>Haifa, Israel</td>
<td>Bus</td>
<td>8/22</td>
<td>Belt bomb</td>
<td>Belt</td>
<td>Aymen Abu Hajah</td>
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<tr>
<td>04/10/2002</td>
<td>Hamas/PIJ</td>
<td>Samaria</td>
<td>Bus</td>
<td>7/several</td>
<td>Belt bomb</td>
<td>Belt</td>
<td>Andalib Takatake^</td>
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<td>04/11/2002</td>
<td>Fatah</td>
<td>Jerusalem, Israel</td>
<td>Mahane Yehuda (marketplace)</td>
<td>6/104</td>
<td>Belt bomb</td>
<td>Belt</td>
<td>(Beit Fajar) [student]</td>
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<td>04/12/2002</td>
<td>Fatah</td>
<td>Jerusalem, Israel</td>
<td>IDF outpost</td>
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<td>Car bomb*</td>
<td>Belt</td>
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<td>04/19/2002</td>
<td>PIJ</td>
<td>Gush Katif, Gaza</td>
<td>(military)</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>Belt bomb</td>
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<td>04/20/2002</td>
<td>Hamas</td>
<td>108 Qalqilye checkpoint (Qalqilye, Samaria)</td>
<td>(military)</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>Belt bomb</td>
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<td>BOMB TYPE</td>
<td>BOMBER/S (HOMETOWN)</td>
<td>AGE</td>
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<td>05/07/2002</td>
<td>Hamas</td>
<td>Rishon Lesion, Israel</td>
<td>Spiel (Billiard club)</td>
<td>16/51-55</td>
<td>Belt and suitcase bomb</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
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<td>05/08/2002</td>
<td>PIJ</td>
<td>Megiddo junction, Netanya, Israel</td>
<td>Bus stop</td>
<td>0/3</td>
<td>Belt bomb</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
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<td>05/09/2002</td>
<td>Hamas/PFLP</td>
<td>Tel Aviv, Israel</td>
<td>Open air market</td>
<td>3/60</td>
<td>Backpack bomb</td>
<td>Usama Boshkar</td>
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<td>05/20/2002</td>
<td>PIJ</td>
<td>Ta'ansachim checkpoint, (Afula, Israel)</td>
<td>Border police/ bus stop</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>Belt bomb</td>
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<td>n/a</td>
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<td>05/22/2002</td>
<td>Fatah</td>
<td>Rishon Lesion, Israel</td>
<td>Chess Café at Rothschild Street (pedestrian mall)</td>
<td>2/36-41</td>
<td>Bag bomb</td>
<td>Issa Bdeir</td>
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<td>05/24/2002</td>
<td>Fatah</td>
<td>Tel Aviv, Israel</td>
<td>Studio 49 Disco (nightclub)</td>
<td>0/7</td>
<td>Car bomb</td>
<td>Amar Skukani</td>
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<td>Petach Tikva, Israel</td>
<td>Bravissimo (ice cream parlor)</td>
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<td>Bag bomb</td>
<td>Jihad Titi</td>
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<td>06/05/2002</td>
<td>PIJ</td>
<td>Megiddo junction, (near Afula, Israel)</td>
<td>Bus/intersection</td>
<td>17/42</td>
<td>Car bomb</td>
<td>Samudi</td>
<td>18</td>
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<td>06/11/2002</td>
<td>Fatah</td>
<td>Jerusalem, Israel</td>
<td>Bus</td>
<td>5/33-45</td>
<td>Bag bombs</td>
<td>Mohammed Attalas;</td>
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<td>06/17/2002</td>
<td>Fatah</td>
<td>Kfar Salem, (near Telkarm, Samaria)</td>
<td>Bus</td>
<td>0/5</td>
<td>Belt bomb</td>
<td>Ibrahim Najie (both from Balata)</td>
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<td>06/18/2002</td>
<td>Hamas</td>
<td>Jerusalem, Israel</td>
<td>Bus</td>
<td>9/48</td>
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<td>18</td>
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<td>06/19/2002</td>
<td>Fatah/DFLP</td>
<td>Jerusalem, Israel</td>
<td>Bus stop/ hichhiking post/ French Hill intersection</td>
<td>7/39-50</td>
<td>Belt bomb</td>
<td>Sayyed Awadi</td>
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<td>07/17/2002</td>
<td>Fatah</td>
<td>Tel Aviv, Israel</td>
<td>Theatre at Neve Sha'anan (pedestrian mall)</td>
<td>5/33-45</td>
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<td>18</td>
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<td>07/30/2002</td>
<td>Fatah</td>
<td>Jerusalem, Israel</td>
<td>Felafel stand</td>
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<td>Mt. Meron junction, (Tsafet, Israel)</td>
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<td>9/48</td>
<td>Belt bomb</td>
<td>Mahsin Atta (Belt Jala)</td>
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<td>Fatah</td>
<td>Umman al-Fahm junction, (Northern Israel)</td>
<td>Civilian car</td>
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<td>09/18/2002</td>
<td>PIJ</td>
<td>Wadi Ara/ Umman al-Fahm junction, Tel Aviv, Israel</td>
<td>Bus</td>
<td>1/3</td>
<td>Belt bomb</td>
<td>18</td>
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<tr>
<td>09/19/2002</td>
<td>Hamas</td>
<td>Ramat Gan, Israel</td>
<td>Bus</td>
<td>6/58-66</td>
<td>Bag bomb</td>
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<td>10/10/2002</td>
<td>Hamas</td>
<td>Kibbutz Netzer, Samaria</td>
<td>Bus</td>
<td>1/30-35</td>
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<td>31</td>
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<td>Hamas</td>
<td>Tel Aviv, Israel</td>
<td>Bus</td>
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<td>Car bomb</td>
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<td>PIJ</td>
<td>Karkur junction, (Pardes Hannah, Israel)</td>
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<td>10/27/2002</td>
<td>Hamas/PFLP</td>
<td>Ariel, Samaria</td>
<td>Gas station</td>
<td>3/18</td>
<td>Belt bomb</td>
<td>18</td>
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<td>11/04/2002</td>
<td>Fatah/PFLP</td>
<td>Kfar Saba, Israel</td>
<td>Arim (mall)</td>
<td>2/37-69</td>
<td>Belt bomb</td>
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<td>11/11/2002</td>
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<td>Erez crossing, (Gaza-Southern Israel)</td>
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<td>Hamas</td>
<td>Jerusalem, Israel</td>
<td>Bus</td>
<td>11/51</td>
<td>Belt bomb</td>
<td>18</td>
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<tr>
<td>11/22/2002</td>
<td>PIJ</td>
<td>Dabur (Gaza)</td>
<td>Israeli navy</td>
<td>0/4</td>
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<td>18</td>
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<td>PFLP</td>
<td>Erez crossing, (Gaza-Southern Israel)</td>
<td>DCO office</td>
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<td>Car bomb</td>
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<td>12/28/2002</td>
<td>Hamas</td>
<td>Jerusalem, Israel</td>
<td>Russian Compound (pedestrian area)</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>Car bomb</td>
<td>18</td>
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<td>DATE</td>
<td>ORG</td>
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<td>BOMB TYPE</td>
<td>BOMBER/S (HOMETOWN)</td>
<td>AGE</td>
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<tr>
<td>01/06/2003</td>
<td>Fatah/PIJ</td>
<td>Tel Aviv, Israel</td>
<td>Neveh Sha'anan (pedestrian mall)</td>
<td>23/</td>
<td>Belt bombs</td>
<td>Samer Nouri; Barak Khelfi</td>
<td>19;</td>
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<tr>
<td>01/17/2003</td>
<td>Hamas</td>
<td>Offshore 4 km from Dagit, Gaza</td>
<td>Israeli naval vessel</td>
<td>106-120</td>
<td>Explosives-laden raft</td>
<td>n/a; n/a</td>
<td>20</td>
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<tr>
<td>02/09/2003</td>
<td>PIJ</td>
<td>Gush Katif, Gaza</td>
<td>Orhan outpost</td>
<td>3/4</td>
<td>Belt bomb</td>
<td>n/a</td>
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<tr>
<td>02/19/2003</td>
<td>Hamas</td>
<td>Haifa, Israel</td>
<td>Bus</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>Belt bomb</td>
<td>Karim Batron</td>
<td>18</td>
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<td>03/05/2003</td>
<td>Hamas</td>
<td>Haifa, Israel</td>
<td>Bus</td>
<td>17/42-60</td>
<td>Belt bomb</td>
<td>Mahmoud al-Qawasme (Hebron)</td>
<td>27</td>
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<td>03/30/2003</td>
<td>PIJ</td>
<td>Netanya, Israel</td>
<td>London Café</td>
<td>0/58</td>
<td>Belt bomb</td>
<td>Rami al-Jemeel Ram</td>
<td>19</td>
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<td>04/24/2003</td>
<td>PIJ/PIJ</td>
<td>Kfar Saba, Israel</td>
<td>Train station</td>
<td>1/15</td>
<td>Belt bomb</td>
<td>Ahmed Khaled Khattib</td>
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<td>04/30/2003</td>
<td>Hamas</td>
<td>Tel Aviv, Israel</td>
<td>Mike's Place (pub)</td>
<td>3/62</td>
<td>Belt bomb</td>
<td>Asif Mohammed Hanif (Darby, England)</td>
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<td>Fatah</td>
<td>Gaza</td>
<td>IDF tank</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>Car bomb</td>
<td>Faud al-Qawasme (Hebron)</td>
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<td>05/18/2003</td>
<td>Hamas</td>
<td>Jerusalem, Israel</td>
<td>Gross Square</td>
<td>2/0</td>
<td>Belt bomb</td>
<td>Bassam Taruri</td>
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<td>05/18/2003</td>
<td>Hamas</td>
<td>Jerusalem, Israel</td>
<td>Bus/French Hill intersection</td>
<td>9/20</td>
<td>Belt bomb</td>
<td>Ahmed Abuhre</td>
<td>20</td>
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<td>Jerusalem, Israel</td>
<td>IDF jeep</td>
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<td>Bag bomb</td>
<td>Shadi al-Nabhan</td>
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<td>PIJ/PIJ</td>
<td>Jerusalem, Israel</td>
<td>Amakim Mall</td>
<td>3/52-70</td>
<td>Bag bomb</td>
<td>Hiba Azam</td>
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<td>06/01/2003</td>
<td>Hamas</td>
<td>Jerusalem, Israel</td>
<td>Bus</td>
<td>17/104</td>
<td>Belt bomb</td>
<td>Daraghme^</td>
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<td>PIJ</td>
<td>Moskov Sde Trumot, Israel</td>
<td>Grocery store</td>
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<td>Belt bomb</td>
<td>Abd al-Muti Shaban</td>
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<td>PIJ</td>
<td>Moskov Kfar Ya'avitz, Israel</td>
<td>Civilian home</td>
<td>1/6</td>
<td>Belt bomb</td>
<td>Ahmed Yehiye</td>
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<td>Fatah</td>
<td>Ariel, Samaria</td>
<td>Store at Mall</td>
<td>1/10-10</td>
<td>Belt bomb</td>
<td>Islam Yousef Oteishat</td>
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<td>08/12/2003</td>
<td>Hamas</td>
<td>Jerusalem, Israel</td>
<td>Bus stop</td>
<td>2/2-4</td>
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<td>Khamis Ghazi Gerwan</td>
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<td>Hamas</td>
<td>Tsrifin Army Base</td>
<td>Bus stop/Bne-Barak intersection</td>
<td>104-128</td>
<td>Belt bomb</td>
<td>Ra'id Abd'al-Hamid Masq</td>
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<td>Jerusalem, Israel</td>
<td>Hillel Café</td>
<td>8/40-70</td>
<td>Belt bomb</td>
<td>Iyhab Abu Salim OR Ramiz Abu Salim</td>
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<td>Azun village, Samaria</td>
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<td>Sa'ad Hanani</td>
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<td>Tulkaram, Samaria</td>
<td>Bus stop/Bne-Barak intersection</td>
<td>0/3</td>
<td>Belt bomb</td>
<td>Iyad al-Masri</td>
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<td>PIJ/PIJ</td>
<td>Tulkaram, Samaria</td>
<td>Workers' terminal</td>
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<td>Belt bomb</td>
<td>Rim Salah al-Riyashi OR Ali Yusuf Jaara (Bethlehem)</td>
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<td>Belt bomb</td>
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<td>4/12</td>
<td>Belt bomb</td>
<td>Mohammed Za'ul (Bethlehem)</td>
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<td>03/06/2004</td>
<td>Fatah/ PIJ/</td>
<td>Erez crossing (Gaza-Southern</td>
<td>Police/ IDF outpost</td>
<td>2/15 Car bombs</td>
<td>3 Belt</td>
<td>Nabil Ibrahim Masoud;</td>
<td>n/a</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Hamas</td>
<td>Israel)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(camouflaged IDF</td>
<td>bomb; Bag</td>
<td>Mohammed Zahil Salem</td>
<td>n/a</td>
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<td>03/14/2004</td>
<td>Hamas/ Fatah</td>
<td>Ashdod, Israel</td>
<td>Port</td>
<td>11/18 Belt bomb;</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>Fadi al-Amoudi</td>
<td>22</td>
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<td>-04/17/2004</td>
<td>Hamas/ Fatah</td>
<td>Erez crossing (Gaza-Southern</td>
<td>Border police</td>
<td>1/3 Belt bomb;</td>
<td>n/a</td>
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<td>Kfar Darom, Gaza</td>
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<td>Erez checkpoint (Northern</td>
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<td>PIJ</td>
<td>Tel Aviv, Israel</td>
<td>Bus stop</td>
<td>1/40 Belt bomb</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>Iyad al-Masri</td>
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<td>Hamas</td>
<td>Be’er-Sheva, Israel</td>
<td>Two buses</td>
<td>16/100 Belt bombs</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>Ahmed al-Qawasme;</td>
<td>26</td>
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<td>Baka al-Sharkiye checkpoint</td>
<td>Israeli security</td>
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<td>Nassim Subhi Ja’abari</td>
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<td>Qalqilya, Samaria</td>
<td>IDF personnel</td>
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<td>n/a</td>
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<td>Jerusalem, Israel</td>
<td>French Hill</td>
<td>2/17 n/a</td>
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<td>Tel Aviv, Israel</td>
<td>Carmel Market</td>
<td>3/32 n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>Ali Amar Alfar</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01/06/2005</td>
<td>Hamas</td>
<td>Ganei Tal, Gush Katif, Gaza</td>
<td>Civilian</td>
<td>1/0 n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>(Asfar, Nablus)</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01/13/2005</td>
<td>Hamas/ PRC/</td>
<td>Erez crossing (Gaza)</td>
<td>(military)</td>
<td>6/15 n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hamas/ Fatah</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td></td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01/18/2005</td>
<td>Hamas</td>
<td>Gush Katif, Gaza</td>
<td>ISA/IDF investigators</td>
<td>2/7 Belt bomb</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>Omar Tabash</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02/25/2005</td>
<td>PIJ</td>
<td>Tel Aviv, Israel</td>
<td>Stage Club</td>
<td>5/53 Belt bomb</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>Abdallah Badran</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07/12/2005</td>
<td>PIJ</td>
<td>Netanya, Israel</td>
<td>HaSharon Mall</td>
<td>5/90 Belt bomb</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>Ahmad Abu Kha’alil</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08/28/2005</td>
<td>Hamas</td>
<td>Be’er-Sheva, Israel</td>
<td>Central bus station</td>
<td>0/52 Belt bomb</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>Hassan Abu Zeid</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/26/2005</td>
<td>PIJ</td>
<td>Hadera, Israel</td>
<td>Felsafel stand at</td>
<td>6/55 Belt bomb</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>Lutfi Amin</td>
<td>20s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>marketplace</td>
<td>HaSharon Mall</td>
<td>5/50 Bag bomb</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>(Kfar Rai)</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/29/2005</td>
<td>PIJ</td>
<td>Tulkarem, Samaria</td>
<td>Roadblock/taxi</td>
<td>2/10 Belt bomb</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>Ala al-Sadi</td>
<td>(Jenin)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01/12/2006</td>
<td>PIJ</td>
<td>Jenin, Samaria</td>
<td>Security forces</td>
<td>0/0 Belt bomb</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>[PA police officer]</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01/19/2006</td>
<td>PIJ</td>
<td>Tel Aviv, Israel</td>
<td>Rosh Ha’ir</td>
<td>0/31 Belt bomb*</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>Mutasr Khalil</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(restaurant)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sami Abd al-Hafez</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Antar [student at al-Najah University]</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03/30/2006</td>
<td>Fatah/ PIJ/</td>
<td>Kedumim, Samaria</td>
<td>Civilian</td>
<td>4/0 Belt bomb</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>Ahammad Masharka</td>
<td>21</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hezbollah</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(Hebron)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>04/17/2006</td>
<td>PIJ</td>
<td>Tel Aviv, Israel</td>
<td>Rosh Ha’ir</td>
<td>11/65-80 Belt bomb</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>Sami Hamad</td>
<td>(al-Gharakah village, Jenin)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(restaurant)</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>10/06/2006</td>
<td>PIJ</td>
<td>Beit Hanoun area, Gaza</td>
<td>IDF soldiers</td>
<td>0/1 Belt bomb</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>Mirfat Amin Masoud</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/23/2006</td>
<td>Hamas</td>
<td>Jabaliyye, Gaza</td>
<td>IDF soldiers</td>
<td>0/4 Belt bomb</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>Fatima Omar al-Najar</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01/29/2007</td>
<td>PIJ/ Fatah</td>
<td>Eilat, Israel</td>
<td>Bakery</td>
<td>3/0 Belt bomb</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>Mohammed Faisal</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Saksak (Gaza City)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DATE</td>
<td>ORG</td>
<td>LOCATION</td>
<td>TARGET</td>
<td>MURDERED/ WOUNDED</td>
<td>BOMB TYPE</td>
<td>BOMBER/S (HOMETOWN)</td>
<td>AGE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>---------------------------</td>
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<td>-------------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02/04/2008</td>
<td>Fatah/ PFLP</td>
<td>Dimona, Israel</td>
<td>Shopping center</td>
<td>1/40</td>
<td>Belt bomb; Belt bomb*</td>
<td>Luwi Luwani (Gaza); Mousa Arafat (Khan Younis, Gaza)</td>
<td>n/a; n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/19/2008</td>
<td>Hamas</td>
<td>Kerem Shalom crossing (Gaza-Southern Israel)</td>
<td>IDF soldiers</td>
<td>0/8</td>
<td>Jeep bombs</td>
<td>n/a; n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Indicates that explosives did not detonate as intended
**Indicates explosives detonated in transit

Sources: MFA, ICT, Jerusalem Post, Ha’aretz, Deutsche Presse-Agentur

APPENDIX B

SNAPSHOTs OF THE PALESTINIAN

CULTURE OF MARTYRDOM
"The Grand Commander Martyr Usama al-'As'as (from) the Islamic Jihad Movement in Palestine"
A Bethlehem street dedicated to the memory of a PIJ shahid, as well as Fatah's former leader Yasser Arafat
“Martyrs Street/Shaar‘a al-Shuhada’ in Bethlehem

Shahid poster from “the Islamic Jihad Movement”
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Oppel Jr., Richard A. “Foreign Fighters in Iraq Are Tied to

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