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ZAPATISTAS: THE SHIFTING RHETORIC OF A
MODERN REVOLUTION

A Thesis
Presented to the
Faculty of
California State University,
San Bernardino

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts
in
Communication Studies


by
Ofelia Morales Bejar
December 2004

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December 2004

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ABSTRACT

The Zapatista Revolution that begun in January 1, 1994, led by the Ejercito Zapatista de Liberación Nacional, is the most recent resurgence of an age-old conflict in Mexico: indigenous and poor people's struggle against Mexico's powerful elite. The Zapatista rebels have been notable for their excellent media management skills and their use of new technology to disseminate their message.

This thesis will study the rhetoric of this contemporary revolution-turned-social movement, by using cluster analysis. It explores the use of rhetoric of confrontation and rhetoric of peace to further the Zapatista cause, seeking to identify any changes in their message during the last ten years of the revolution.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER

Introduction to Topic

On January 1, 1994, the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) formally declared war against Mexican president Carlos Salinas de Gortari and the Federal Government, demanding "work, land, housing, food, health, education, independence, freedom, democracy, justice and peace" (Comandancia General del EZLN, 1994, translation mine). Before the Mexican Government could begin operations to crush the rebel forces, the Zapatista declaration of war had circled the globe via the Internet, and the word focused on Chiapas through the eyes of the countless journalists, activists, and international organizations that wrote the stories of this uprising in articles and emails, and who introduced Subcomandante Marcos, a new revolutionary icon and first spokesperson for the EZLN.

Since the EZLN's formal declaration of war, the Mexican government, the Mexican people, and others all over the world have speculated as to the origins of the

EZLN and the identities of the revolutionaries. Who are the masked women and men who call themselves Zapatistas? "The men and women of the EZLN, the faceless ones, the ones who walk in the night and who belong to the mountains, have sought words that other men and women could understand" (Harvey, 1998, p. 6). The EZLN has never given specifics about how their Army originated. When masked Zapatistas are asked their names, they give their Zapatista name, names adopted in the Lacandona jungle. When asked their age, they respond with the number of years of exploitation of the indigenous people, land and resources of Chiapas by the ruling class, over 500 years (García Márquez, 2001). The Zapatista message may come from the Comandancia General del EZLN, from the first and primary spokesperson Subcomandante Marcos, or from the Comandante Susana, Comandante David, Comandante Tacho, or Comandante Esther, all leaders in the Zapatista Army who were a part of the Zapatista March to Mexico City, March 2001 (Ejercito Zapatista de Liberacion Nacional, 2001). Marcos explains why the Zapatista message should be delivered by so many voices: "So the one

who speaks is a more collective heart, not a single leader, or *caudillo*" (Harvey, 1998, p. 7).

In the first hours of the new year, the Zapatista Army took control of the Chiapas towns of Altamirano, Chanal, Huixtan, Las Margaritas, Ocosingo, Oxchuc, and San Cristobal de las Casas, where tourists, both Mexican and foreign, were celebrating the beginning of a new year. The new-year celebrations were cut short by the occupation of the Zapatista Forces and the destabilization of the municipal governments. Top politicians were arrested by the revolutionaries, rich and powerful landowners were kidnapped, police officers were disarmed, Mexican citizens and the international community were shocked by the news of this uprising. This was a very untimely event for the Mexican Federal Government given that January 1, 1994 was the day the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was to take effect.

This is not the first time Mexico has experienced a revolution. There has been protest and dissent in Chiapas since its colonialization by the Spanish conquerors, more than 500 years of opposition from indigenous peoples and peasants. Likewise, there has been torture and death for

millions of peasants and indigenous people that have dared to speak out against the abuses of the ruling class. This conflict between the ruling class and the indigenous and peasant poor has had a long life. Revolutionary fire has been extinguished time and time again, only to resurge decades later with renewed commitment. January 1, 1994 marked the most resounding resurgence of this conflict.

A Different Revolution

There are several factors that mark the difference between past revolutions and the revolution led by the Ejercito Zapatista de Liberacion Nacional. These differences make of the EZLN a very unique phenomenon as far as armed revolutions go, they blur the line between what we recognize as a revolutionary force and what we recognize to be a social movement. First, the Zapatista message differs in significant ways from those of past revolutionaries: there is no implied or overtly expressed intent to overthrow the Mexican government through armed conflict in order to take power; there is no implied or overtly expressed intent to obtain, through force or democratic election, political positions for the Zapatista

leaders within the government; their message is broad enough to include the struggle of many other oppressed groups; and their call to action does not urge violence against the government from supporters, but, instead, advocates for political and social action from the Mexican people as well as international groups in support of the oppressed in Chiapas. The Zapatistas speak of the extreme poverty much of Mexico's indigenous and peasant population live in and demand justice and respect for all indigenous people, however Subcomandante Marcos has made it a point to clarify that the group does not claim to represent all indigenous people of Mexico, though all oppressed people are invited and encouraged to join the Zapatistas, whether indigenous or non-indigenous, or create their own revolutions.

Second, the Zapatistas effectively used, and continue to use, the media to force on the international public accountability for any additional atrocities we may permit the Mexican government to commit against Zapatista Chiapanecos. Especially, but not exclusively, the use of the Internet, to disseminate the message and continue communicating the Zapatista side of the story to the

Mexican and international public considerably increased the EZLN's chances for survival and decreased the likelihood of mass murders of rebel troops and their supporters by the Mexican Military. The speed in the delivery of the Zapatista messages through the Internet was crucial to the survival of the revolutionary group in the sense that it acted as the switch to the spotlight on Chiapas. Upon learning of the events unfolding in Chiapas, media, international organizations, and many students and activists focused immediately on monitoring all sides of the conflict. The military could not have openly massacred Zapatista supporters or people suspected of being Zapatista rebels without intensifying significantly the crisis already being faced by the government (Ortiz, 2001, p. 12).

Third, the fact that Mexico was a part of NAFTA assured ample coverage of the Zapatista uprising by American journalists. After all, anything that threatened to destabilize Mexico and undermine the effectiveness of NAFTA was a threat to American interests, a promise of future larger challenges of various types and, most certainly, economic troubles of global ramifications.

NAFTA had a highly controversial path to passage in the United States. It was feared that the treaty would threaten American jobs, threaten the environment, depress wages, and further widen the gap between the rich and poor, in the United States and in Mexico (Brecher, 1993). Armed conflict in Mexican soil on the first day of NAFTA operation, January 1, 1994, was very bad news for both, the Salinas and the Clinton administrations.

Fourth, the Zapatista Army used military action only as a tool for calling attention to the plight of the indigenous and peasant Chiapanecos. In many statements and interviews given by Zapatista leaders, they have stated that the Zapatistas do not want to remain an army. Rhetorical strategies of violence is what attracted the attention of the Mexican people and the people of the world. It has served its purpose and continuing on the path of violence would hurt the cause. It is through this fourth distinction that the image of the EZLN has managed to evolve from revolutionary army to social movement.

The Federal Government and the state government in Chiapas have made declarations to discredit the Zapatistas and the cause they espouse. The language and tone of the

government's story was forced to change, as the Zapatista stories became the most talked about, written about, and read about indigenous stories in the world. It was exceptional and effective media management by the Zapatista spokespersons that made the difference in the government's ability, or rather inability, to vilify the EZLN and Subcomandante Marcos.

Justification for the Study

The story of how the Zapatista Army came into existence, the make up of the revolutionary group, how the Zapatista occupation of the seven municipalities was conducted, and the Zapatistas' true goals, is different depending on whom the questions are directed to. While there are many stories that attempt to answer the above questions, I will limit my analysis to addressing the following questions: 1) How do the Zapatistas use a rhetoric of violence in their literature? 2) How do the Zapatistas use a rhetoric of peace? 3) How do they justify the use of violence to promote and/or defend the Zapatista cause? Only the texts originated and distributed by Zapatistas will be used for this analysis.

I will analyze the official comunicados of the Zapatistas using cluster criticism. Cluster criticism is a study method that involves the identification and charting of key terms within a selected text and the identification and charting of terms clustering around the selected key terms. The cluster terms and the layers of meaning, or the power, they add to the key terms are then studied and the relationship between key terms and cluster terms is defined. Through this method, we can obtain a deeper understanding of the worldviews that are behind the stories presented by the text being analyzed. "A cluster analysis, then, provides 'a survey of the hills and valleys' of the rhetor's mind, resulting in insights into the meanings of key terms and thus a worldview that may not be known to the rhetor" (Foss, 2004). I will analyze the text of the Zapatista comunicados and identify the key terms that appear in the justifications the EZLN has for initiating armed conflict. Cluster criticism will help me explore and identify those key terms that shape the justifications the EZLN has for engaging in violence and how these justifications have evolved in the ten years that have passed since their first military action. Two

questions will guide my evaluation of the Zapatista justifications for violence and the evolution of these justifications: 1) Do the Zapatista justifications contain elements of truth? Meaning, are their arguments based on undeniable facts and information that is known to be true by those directly involved in the conflict as well as other publics? And 2) Considering the results of Zapatista actions, was it ethical of the revolutionary group to even attempt to justify confronting the Mexican government and their military?

One important detail must be taken into account when attempting to identify and understand the worldview of the entity originating the story from the perspective of the Zapatistas, it cannot be assumed that the story is coming from one specific individual or rhetor. The messages that shape the Zapatista story have been delivered by different representatives, through different media channels, under various circumstances and, in some cases, the author is not identified or a group of people is identified as the originator of the message, not an individual. For this reason, the worldview identified through this analysis

will be attributed to the organizational entity called the Ejercito Zapatista de Liberacion Nacional.

Thesis Overview

This thesis will contain a total of five chapters. Chapter two will include a literature review that will contain the base of knowledge from which this study is departing. It will provide readers with background and historical information relevant to the subject of this study. Chapter three will discuss cluster criticism in detail and explain its usefulness in this study. Chapter three will also describe the process of clustering key terms surrounding violence and the Zapatista justification for it. Chapter four will be the analysis chapter which will discuss the relevance of the results yielded by the clustering and charting of key terms. Lastly, chapter five will explore the use of the rhetoric of violence and the rhetoric of peace in social movements and compare whatever findings cluster criticism has helped identify in the Zapatista texts with what is known about other social movements.

CHAPTER TWO

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT

Introduction

In order to begin to understand the complexities of the context in which the Zapatista uprising develops, we need to have some basic knowledge about Mexico's political and socio-political history. This chapter will provide a brief historical background on Mexico, briefly touching on Mexico's colonial past and focusing in on Emiliano Zapata, whose name the current revolutionaries borrow; the Mexican Revolution of 1910, which the current Zapatista revolution echoes, and some background on more recent history.

Mexico-Historical Background

Mexico is a nation with a rich indigenous past that is remembered and lionized when it can attract tourism or provide low-cost labor alternatives for US multinational corporations, and is ignored and neglected the rest of the time. Since the arrival of the Spanish conquerors, the indigenous people of Mexico have been resisting and struggling against disease, torture, enslavement,

oppression and death. Millions of Mexican natives died or were murdered during the conquest. The exploitation and abuse of those who survived helped support Nueva España. The country was ruled by Spain for centuries before the war for Mexican independence in 1821. The "Guerra de Independencia" may have meant independence for Mexico as a country but it did not mean independence or a better life for the indigenous people of Mexico. "The war for independence was, in essence, a struggle between the economic interests of the Creoles--the Spanish families that had settled in the New World--and the Peninsular--the Spanish people sent from Madrid to govern the colony" (Riding, 1985).

Mexico experienced much unrest after the war for independence. Several wars were fought on Mexican soil and uprisings continued to occur in various places of the nation every so often. Porfirio Diaz, a veteran of a few of Mexico's wars, led an armed uprising to take over the presidency after losing twice to Benito Juarez, the first indigenous president of Mexico. Diaz took the presidency from Sebastiano Lerdo de Tejada and ruled a total of 31

years, one term of 4 years and a dictatorship of 37 years, through fraud and force.

The Porfiriato, how the times of Porfirio Diaz are known, did little to help the rural families of Mexico, which are primarily indigenous. Diaz industrialized Mexico but led a corrupt government that not only allowed but welcomed foreign interests into Mexico to exploit its resources and its people. During his time, most of Mexico's wealth was in the hands of a handful of elites. The middle class was hurting and encountering challenges when attempting to access funding for small businesses and other entrepreneurial activities. The rural poor were being robbed of their land and exploited by the rich landowners they worked for; the poor had no legal recourse to protect them so there was nothing they could do about the abuse. The urban poor were exploited in the factories and other businesses, many times being paid less than a foreign worker (Riding, 1985).

The majority of the problems I just outlined remain true today, and they are not exclusive to Mexico or to developing countries. We can see some of these same problems in the United States if we pay attention to what

goes on around us: legal cases against Wal-Mart, luxury vehicles and limousines running on traffic-packed Hollywood freeways and, just under or to the side of the freeway, a homeless family and a grocery store cart containing their belongings.

Social discontent grew and the Revolution of 1910 erupted. One revolutionary leader, Emiliano Zapata, was a strong protagonist of the national drama. He was and still is a revered national hero for his important role as a revolutionary, fighting against the Diaz dictatorship. The Ejercito Zapatista de Liberación Nacional adopted his name; they too fought against a dictatorship.

The Mexican Revolution forced Diaz into exile and brought in reforms that were aimed at helping the rural poor. There was to be a redistribution of land and the return of the stolen lands to their rightful owners but, not much happened until much later, when President Lazaro Cardenas took office. He is known for following through with the redistribution of land that had been promised by the Revolution.

It is difficult to pinpoint when or where it was that the Revolution reform was lost or pushed aside and the

leaders in Mexican government fell back into corruption and protecting the economic interests of the rich and powerful. Perhaps, once revolutionary leaders and their allies came into power, they saw the need to protect themselves and their status. The case is that revolutionary ideals became only political campaign material, to be used and abused passionately while addressing the masses but never implemented or enacted. Much like the concepts of freedom, equality and democracy are used today by many of the political elite in our own country, while they push the Patriot Act, do away with Affirmative Action, and adopt policies that curtail our rights and freedoms.

Recent History--Rebirth of Zapatistas

The Ejercito Zapatista de Liberacion Nacional, as a group, takes its first revolutionary action in Chiapas. Chiapas, more than any other state in Mexico, has a population that is deeply impoverished though they live and work in one of the states that is richest in natural resources. The living conditions of the majority of Chiapanecos, mestizo and indigenous, continue to be the

worst in the nation. While all indigenous groups in Mexico suffer poverty, discrimination and marginalization, those living in Chiapas suffer some of the most severe conditions. "Approximately 41% of children in this region suffer from malnutrition and about 45% of men and 54% of women have not completed primary school" (IDEX, 2004). Meanwhile, the state resources are bled for national use and for exports. Chiapas supplies the rest of the country with many important resources. "Today, Chiapas is almost an internal colony for the rest of Mexico, providing oil, electricity, timber, cattle, corn, sugar, coffee, and beans, but receiving very little in return" (Collier, 1994). This situation of extreme poverty is the basis for one of the key arguments of the Zapatista army in their declaration of war against the Mexican government. It is because their people have nothing to loose, no homes, no food, no schools, no hospitals, no future, that they, the EZLN, must rise up and take action. The reasoning is that, their people are dying without a fight, they might as well die fighting. The modern Zapatista revolutionaries are not the first to articulate their reasons for fighting in this way; Emiliano Zapata once

said "it is better to die on your feet than to continue living on your knees."

In Mexico's history we can also see that this is not the first time the Federal Government has encountered resistance from the citizens. This just happens to be the first time Government and Rebels have had use of the word and the communication channels on, almost, equally powerful terms, one through the use of the Internet and another through its continued use of Mexico's media. "The Zapatista rebellion can be seen as the latest in a long cycle of popular demands for dignity, voice, and autonomy. The novelty is to be found in the democratic discourse that articulates a broad range of demands, from access to land to peace, justice, and independence" (Harvey, 1998). The poor economic conditions that affect the indigenous people of Chiapas are not exclusive to this state. Indigenous groups from any region in Mexico find themselves in very similar circumstances.

Historically, to speak of the Mexican government is to speak of authoritarianism and a dictatorship led by a single political party, the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), instead of a single dictator. This

single-party dictatorship lasted for 71 years, from 1929 to 2000. Recent years have seen a dramatic political change, with the fall of the PRI and the entry of Vicente Fox Quezada, from the Partido de Accion Nacional (PAN), into the presidency.

During the 1960s and 1970s, Mexico experienced much political turmoil. Student activism was strong. Public demonstrations against the Federal Government strongly demanded social change. The Mexican Federal Government's response to citizen activism was swift and violent. The decades of the 60s, 70s and 80s were the dark years of what is known as the "dirty war," during which more than 500 Mexican student activists disappeared or were murdered. To this day, hundreds remain missing (Ortiz, 2001; Poniatowska, 1971).

The victory of Vicente Fox Quezada in the national elections of 2000 was supposed to mark a period of deep change in the federal government of Mexico and the country as a whole. For many, the entrance of Fox into office was seen as a positive event in Mexican politics. It brought people hope that democratic elections could actually take place in Mexico (Chacon, 2000). Fox's victory also

brought concern to those in the liberal side of the political spectrum. Fox is a man of socially conservative background and close ties to the Catholic Church. His political party, the Partido de Accion Nacional (PAN), is also known for being conservative.

Fox's entrance into the presidency presented a threat to the future of women and minorities, especially. The PAN has historically fought against left wing activism as it pertains to almost every issue: abortion, women's rights, indigenous rights, GLBT rights, environmental laws, etc.

The Mexican government, for centuries, has been a government that displays blatant authoritarianism and corruption. Until recently, Mexico was led by men who shamelessly claimed to have been elected through a democratic election process when it was evident that fraud had been involved in getting them into office. Keeping the illusion of a Mexican democracy alive has always been good for the interests of the ruling class. The message of a democratic Mexico was used abundantly and repeatedly during the 71 years of rule by the PRI. This political situation has been common in almost all sectors of the

Mexican government, from elections of government officials at the municipal level to elections of federal government officials, including, as mentioned, the elections for the Mexican presidency.

With this level of widespread corruption, it is no wonder that the PRI remained in Los Pinos, the official home of Mexican presidents, for 71 years. It is important to note that corruption and abuse of power has not been exclusive to the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI). More often than not, corruption has had a special place in all political parties, the institutions that finance these political parties, and the government-operated and government funded groups that support the political and financial system of the country. This discussion likely brings to mind memories of Enron and WorldCom, and, no doubt, the very serious problems of voter disenfranchisement and other forms of election manipulation and fraud in the state of Florida.

CHAPTER THREE

METHOD AND SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY

Introduction

Social movements and social protest cannot be conceived without consideration of the rhetorical dimensions involved in the growth, maintenance, and eventual decline or complete transformation and rebirth of a movement. It is through the effective use of rhetorical tactics that those struggles and ideals shared by individuals can find an echo in the consciousness of many others and move large numbers of people to action, transforming individuals into the driving force of change. As Andrews explains, "[t]he exciting, and frustrating, characteristic of a movement is that it *moves*, and what makes it move, in large measure, is the way language is manipulated to control or interpret events" (Andrews, 1980). It follows then, that the rhetorical competence or incompetence of those speaking in the name of, in support of, or against a given movement, can affect the direction this movement takes and/or its possibilities for growth.

Though the rhetorical tactics used for social protest are wide-ranging, this study will focus only on the use of confrontation and the justifications for the use of confrontational and/or violent tactics to further the cause of a social movement. Confrontation as a rhetorical form has traditionally been viewed as crude violence and coercion. As confrontational activities in social movements were studied further, some scholars have found that these so-called "violent and coercive" actions have been, at important points in history, very successful and crucial in bringing about the social change, at the local and national levels, being sought by a movement. Rhetorical tactics perceived to be violent or confrontational, at times created the contrast necessary to make peaceful rhetoric and peaceful action a much more attractive option for those involved in the conflict. Past research on confrontational rhetoric will be explored further later in the chapter.

The Zapatista revolutionaries have made use of confrontational rhetorical tactics that range from the written word to a very well-known, though single, military action. This study will focus on the written messages

created and distributed to the media by the Zapatistas. Specifically, it will focus on the sections of those messages that discuss confrontation with those in power and Zapatista participation in confrontational activities. Cluster analysis will be the method employed to identify key terms used by the Zapatistas in their confrontational rhetoric and the relevance of these key terms to the justifications the Zapatistas may have for the use of confrontational and violent tactics in their written messages, as well as confrontational activities outside the written word.

In this chapter, I will examine in further detail cluster criticism as a useful method for rhetorical analysis. I will also provide a base of scholarly knowledge about social movements and social protest, focusing on examples of the use of confrontation as a rhetorical form, and justifications for violence/confrontation given in the rhetoric of previous American social movement leaders. Though the Zapatista revolution originated in Mexico and has evolved in both a Mexican and an international context, American scholarly conceptualizations of social movements and confrontational

rhetoric can be applied to the Zapatista revolution because there are basic characteristics of social movements and confrontation that transcend cultural, ethnic, and national boundaries.

Cluster Criticism

Cluster criticism is a method used in rhetorical analysis that requires the following steps: First, the critic must select the text or artifact they will analyze. Second, the method requires that the critic identify and chart key terms within the selected text. Key terms are identifiable by, 1) how frequently they appear in the artifact or 2) their intensity and significance to the text. Intensity is determined by how essential the term is to the overall message or argument presented by the artifact. Once the key terms are identified, the critic must also identify and chart those terms that cluster around the previously selected key terms. It is assumed that the cluster terms appear in close proximity to key terms because they are related in some way to those key terms. The cluster terms add layers of meaning, or power, to key terms.

Based on the meaning added to key terms by the cluster terms, the critic can establish a relationship between key terms and cluster terms so as to arrive at an interpretation of the clusters found in the text. According to Reid (2004), "[t]his process of clustering ideas gives evidence of the communicator's motive for the rhetorical act or work" (Reid 2004, pp.81). The clusters will allow the critic to obtain a deeper understanding of the worldviews that are behind the stories presented by the text being analyzed. Cluster criticism can yield valuable information about the reasoning of the different entities that drive a social movement, taking us to a more profound level of understanding of leader-centered social movements.

Examples of Cluster Criticism

Cluster analysis has been used by rhetorical critics to study various types of artifacts. Kimberly Elliott (2004) analyzed Enron's *Code of Ethics* using this method. Elliott found that "[c]luster analysis of the *Code* reveals Enron's consistent equation of legal requirements and ethics" (Elliott, pp.94). She arrived at this conclusion by studying the clusters surrounding the following key

terms: ethics, laws, The Company, and employees. Elliott noted that the words (laws, regulations, policies, and guidelines) surrounding the key term "ethics" had more to do with the legality of employee activities than with any moral duty or obligation to "do the right thing." The key term "laws" was surrounded by cluster words that indicated a required acceptance of the "laws" (compliance, commitment, and faithfully) by employees and warned of possible consequences for failure to obey "laws" (violation, abuses, and consequences). The terms clustering around "The Company" were positive (respected, important, and excellence) while the terms surrounding "employees" placed employees in a context of possible misconduct (violate, illegal behavior, and failure to comply).

Kathaleen Reid (2004) also used this methodology to study a painting by Hieronymus Bosch. Reid focused her analysis on the design elements in the painting, including the artist's use of color, and used these design elements to conduct the clustering. Certain images surrounding those that had been identified as "key terms," were identified as cluster terms because of the frequency with

which they appeared in the painting or because of how central they were to the painting as a whole. This particular use of cluster analysis is not common, but Reid's analysis served to raise additional questions about the usefulness and applicability of cluster analysis when analyzing visual communication. This example is presented only for the purpose of showing different ways in which cluster criticism has been used in the past.

Cluster Criticism Applied to Zapatista Messages

My use of cluster criticism will be more along the lines of Elliott's (2004) analysis. I will analyze the text of the Zapatista *messages* and identify key terms relating to the rhetoric of confrontation used by the Zapatistas. Cluster criticism will help dissect the Zapatista texts and make sense of those key terms that define the confrontational nature of the relationship between the EZLN and the Federal Mexican Government, as presented by the Zapatistas. Confrontational rhetoric has played a key role in shaping the identity of the EZLN as an organization and also in facilitating the identification of members of the general public with a broader Zapatista social movement, a collective of

individuals which both supports the EZLN's push for change and brings to the table additional revolutionary fire that is specific to the oppression suffered within the communities of the members involved in the movement.

Throughout my analysis, I examined texts for any indications that confrontational rhetorical tactics and the justifications for their use may be different in a Mexican context as compared to the American context, since there are significant historical, socio-political and socio-economic differences between the two countries.

Introduction to Social Movement Studies

There are many layers of knowledge that make up current understanding of the phenomenon we call "social movement." In 1970, Herbert W. Simons combined concepts presented by others scholars to arrive at the following definition for what we label "social movement:" "an uninstitutionalized collectivity that mobilizes for action to implement a program for the reconstitution of social norms and values" (Simons, 1970). Though many of the most notable social movements (Civil Rights Movement, Student Movement, and Anti-war Movement) have been aimed at

achieving the goal outlined by Simons' definition, social movements may also mobilize to prevent others from effecting change in the established system.

Leader-centered Social Movements

In order to build a base of knowledge for understanding confrontation as a rhetorical form, I will present some important conceptualizations of social movements. Simons (1970) presented a leader-centered approach to understanding social movements. He understood movements to be made up of many leaders and, it follows, that these leaders would have their own separate followings, their own rhetorical tactics, their own understanding of the "movement," and their own choices of action, differing at various levels from each other. Simons explains that leaders of organizations, and also leaders that rise within social movements, have certain rhetorical requirements they must fulfill: 1) attract, maintain, and mold followers, 2) work to obtain acceptance of movement ideals by the larger structure, and 3) react effectively to resistance from the larger structure. Social movement leaders also face what Simons calls "rhetorical problems" that they must overcome. Of the six

problems Simons lists, the most important today, because of the potential to reach millions through media coverage and the internet, is the need for the leader to adapt to a wide range of audiences. The leader's words, though she may be addressing her group of followers, may now reach millions of other people she may not have intended to reach, thereby running the risk of positively or negatively affecting the environment in which her movement unfolds. Her words may serve as a wake-up call and set into motion the activism of the opposition much quicker than if she had only reached her supporters.

Identifying a Movement

Simons (1970) identifies three basic rhetorical strategies in social movements: moderate, which is sensitive to audience requirements, militant, which uses confrontational tactics to achieve goals based on the assumption that there is a "fundamental clash of interests" (Simons, 1970) between those in the social movement and those in power, and intermediate which blends both strategies as needed. Simons concludes that, "[t]he great leaders (and the great movements) seem capable of combining these seemingly antithetical strategies without

inconsistency by justifying their use with appeals to higher principles" (Simons, 1970). Based on Simons understanding of social movements, we can assume that militant and intermediate rhetorical strategies both use confrontational rhetorical tactics, while moderates may or may not use these tactics. Some scholars of confrontational rhetoric in social movements have studied whether confrontation only plays a limited role in social movements and whether it is only used as a tool by groups or leaders when and where it is needed. Their contribution to understanding confrontational rhetoric will be discussed in more detail in the next section.

Social movements identified as confrontational are identified as such because they are a force confronting the established societal structure, values and beliefs. Depending on the type of rhetorical tactics used and the level of change being sought, people, especially those in power, may perceive movements to be too radical and a threat to traditional values. In studying social movement rhetoric, Scott (1973) identified what he calls a "conservative" voice in the arguments presented by the leaders of some social movements. Scott understands the

rhetoric of social movements to arise from the following pattern: "people experience division as oppression, seek fresh identifications, find dominant groups hypocritical, and, in responding to hypocrisy, sound a conservative voice" (Scott, 1973). From Scott's perspective, what is radical about some social movements is not that they are confronting traditional values, it is that they are confronting society's hypocrisy. Scott uses the traditional value of self-determination and the rhetoric of Stokely Carmichael, which was viewed by many, including other civil rights leaders, to be too radical, to prove his point.

'We shall have to struggle for the right to create our own terms through which to define ourselves and our relationship to society, and to have these terms recognized,' Stokely Carmichael argued. Why should the Black define himself in terms of white values? Or the woman, in terms of male values? Or the homosexual, in terms of heterosexual values? (Scott, 1973)

Carmichael's words speak of the importance of self-determination and the struggle that lies ahead to define

the self and have this definition recognized by others. Scott identifies the concept of "self-determination" as a traditional value and, when defined as such, Carmichael is embracing a traditional value and the only radical thing he is doing is bringing society's hypocrisy out in the open. It is understood that Carmichael lived in a society that valued self-determination but only as it related to white males. Based on Scott's reasoning, Carmichael's rhetoric is conservative and the movement it represents is also a conservative movement.

Confrontation and Social Movements

Cathcart (1978) claims that: "movements are a kind of ritual conflict whose most distinguishing form is *confrontation*" [emphasis in original] (Cathcart, 1978). Confrontation is a defining factor in recognizing where a social movement exists. In Cathcart's conceptualization of social movements, if there is no confrontational rhetoric, there exists no movement at all. He identifies what he calls "two fundamentally different forms of rhetoric—one which [he] calls *managerial* and the other [he calls] *confrontational*" (Cathcart, 1978). The rhetoric of

true social movements falls under the "confrontational" category. Cathcart explains that rhetorical forms which only aim to adjust the existing order, not to reject it, are managerial and not confrontational. This reasoning supports his claim that "reform" movements cannot be considered true movements.

Some scholars agree that the rhetoric of confrontation is an integral part of a social movement (Andrews, 1980, Scott & Smith, 1969, Stewart, 1997, Tonn, 1996). Scott and Smith (1969) argue that it is the sense of division or "radical division" in society what makes confrontational tactics such an essential part of social movements. "Those on the "have-not" side of the division, or at least some of their theorists and leaders, no longer accept designation as an inert mass hoping to receive what they lack through action by the "haves" (Scott & Smith, 1969). This state of division is what eventually ignites the need to confront the established structure and those in power. From Scott and Smith's 1969 understanding of confrontation and its tie to social movements, we can deduce that social division is the source of the

discontent that gives rise to confrontation and, therefore, to social movements.

Confrontation and Its Uses

Scott and Smith believe that confrontation is used both as totalistic strategy and non-totalistic tactic. According to Scott and Smith, confrontation as a totalistic strategy provides radical activists with a strong sense of success because, in their understanding of the world, "one has no where to go but up... after having suffered for so long, he deserves to move up" (Scott and Smith, 1969, p30). Confrontation as a non-totalistic rhetorical tactic does not go as far as advocating for radical measures or complete dismantling of the established system. The rhetors and followers involved recognize the usefulness of confrontation and try to use it only as far as it helps further their cause, careful not to abuse confrontational tactics and kill all possibilities for reaching at least some of the goals being sought by the movement. The level of division that is perceived by the individuals involved in the movement seems to affect whether confrontation will be a totalistic strategy or a non-totalistic tactic for the group.

Radical activists expressing a need for more violent or forceful confrontation to bring about social change tend to see a more "radical division" in their world and typically use confrontation as a totalistic strategy.

Scott and Smith (1969) discuss confrontation and social movements in a similar light as Gregg (1971). They concur that the social movements are rhetorical exchanges different from any other and confrontational rhetoric can include various types of communication and actions, including those that some critics discount as violence and coercion: massive marches and rallies, media/speech campaigns attacking, ridiculing and embarrassing those in power, sit-ins, and other acts directly challenging the establishment. The authors of both articles examine the deeper personal meaning and effect that the use of confrontational tactics has on activists. Scott and Smith devote a significant space to analyzing what they call the symbolic "rite of the kill," which, the authors claim, serves activists primarily as a way to release a psychological burden carried as a part of their oppression. "To satisfy the rite that destroys the evil self in the act of destroying the enemy that has made the

self evil, the radical may work out the rite of kill symbolically" (Scott and Smith, 1969, p29).

Confrontational forms that ridicule, embarrass or otherwise damage the enemy's image, symbolically kill the perceived enemy.

Scott and Smith also direct attention to what may attract activists to confrontation: "Part of the attraction of confrontation is the strong sense of success, so strong that it may be a can't-lose strategy" (Scott & Smith, 1969, p30). Logically, having a strong sense of success fulfills an activist's personal need and is bound to encourage individuals to be stronger participants in a movement. Similarly, Richard Gregg sees confrontation as a strategy that can fulfill certain psychological needs of those involved in a social movement. According to Gregg, confrontational or protest rhetoric has an ego-function. He affirms the view that this rhetoric is primarily directed to the activists themselves. Gregg adds that protestors "feel the need for psychological refurbishment and affirmation" (Gregg, 1971, p47), which is obtained through the use of confrontational tactics that damage the enemy and the system. Gregg

suggests that the position of oppression from which social movement activists unleash their protest rhetoric, provides them with four advantages: 1) helps the movement maintain its distance from the enemy since the rhetoric makes clear who is a part of the oppressed class and who is a part of the oppressor class 2) facilitates symbolic control for the activist, it is the activist who defines the situation, 3) generates attention or fear from the enemy, Gregg goes as far as to suggest that some level of respect can also be gained by the activist, and 4) the confrontational qualities of the activist rhetoric can provoke a reaction from those in power that, though it may be ugly, can also be "ego-gratifying" to some (Gregg, 1971).

Confrontational Rhetoric in Action

In the last century we have seen several social movements that have had a tremendous impact on the nation as a whole. One of the most momentous of the movements of this century has been the Civil Rights Movement. The Civil Rights Movement made invaluable contributions to our country and to our culture, no doubt, but in terms of confrontational rhetoric and rhetoric of protest, "[t]he

civil rights movement has generated perhaps the widest range of new forms [of protest]" (Haiman, 1967, p11). Haiman highlights the extension of protest rhetoric to other, non-traditional arenas, by the Civil Rights Movement, to support his assertion.

During this era of American history, the Civil Rights Movement was not the only source of creative confrontational tactics. The Anti-War Movement and the Student Movement were also rich sources of new confrontational forms of action. "With respect to the Vietnam war, we have witnessed everything from vigils, to sit-ins at draft boards, and picket signs accusing the president of murder, to the burning of draft cards and self-immolation" (Haiman, 1967, p11). The Student Movement activists also conducted their share of sit-ins, marches, rallies and the like. Andrews (1980) presents his analysis on the confrontational rhetoric used by Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), a student organization at Columbia University, where SDS organized a radical student voice to speak out on two issues: 1) the construction of a gymnasium and 2) the future of the University's relationship with the Institute for Defense

Analysis. Andrews presents SDS and their actions in a very negative light, in part because of the polarized meaning he has given to the two types of rhetorical strategies he identifies: coercive and persuasive. It is clear in Andrews' writing that coercive rhetoric is perceived as negative while persuasive is perceived as positive. The incidents at Columbia University involved demonstrations, sit-ins and ample use of attacks against those in power at the university, amongst other activities.

Unique Example of Confrontational Rhetoric

The next example of confrontational rhetoric in action is interesting and very significant because of the gender of the leader and the status of women at the time when she took on the leadership role. Pre-women's suffrage and Women's Liberation, one particular female social activist did a phenomenal job at leading male, and a few female, coal mine workers in their fight for fair wages, and improved working conditions. Her name was Mary Harris "Mother" Jones and her effective use of symbolic motherhood granted her the absolute license to agitate and

lead in the labor movement at a time when women in general were outright rejected by labor unions.

Tonn (1996) claims that what made "Mother" Jones so successful and well accepted by the men she was leading was her ability to convincingly perform her part as symbolic mother and juggle all of the contradictions of "motherhood":

Indeed, Jones' embodiment of motherhood reveals that caregiving and its "ethic" is always a complex *balance* of multiple polarities: authority and independence, holding and letting go, tenderness and fierce protection, mercy and justice, emotion and intellect, expressiveness and instrumentality, tolerance and tough-mindedness, and so on (Bernard 348-365; Dow and Tonn 297, Ruddick 108). (Tonn, 1996, p423)

Most social movement studies and theory I reviewed was been leader-centered. This is probably because the majority of social movements have had easily identifiable, predominantly male, leaders. Campbell (1973) makes some key points about the twist Women's Liberation rhetoric brings to our understanding of social movement rhetoric.

In the case of Women's Liberation, finding a male leader would have been a challenge. As a matter of fact, finding any leader, female or male, was a challenge. Women's Liberation is unique and positively untraditional in many ways. Campbell (1973) analyzes the rhetoric of Women's Liberation as a rhetorical genre not as a movement. She asserts that Women's Liberation is not a movement and her observations on the uniqueness of Women's Lib rhetoric is valuable and insightful.

The Women's Lib rhetoric is confrontational by definition: one cannot be accepted as a woman and seek liberation from societal norms. Women involved in Women's Liberation seek to be something other than what their role as "women" prescribes "they attack the fundamental values underlying this culture" (Campbell, 1973). These circumstances consequentially make of the rhetoric of Women's Liberation a radical rhetoric, with no choice to be otherwise. According to Campbell, the most distinctive stylistic features of Women's Liberation are: 1) having an "anti-rhetorical" style of communicating, in other words, the rhetoric displays tentativeness or utter refusal to anoint a specific leader for women's causes, it exhibits

no intention of finding a single path for furthering women's many causes nor is there an organized push to obtain a commitment for Women's Lib actions, and 2) having a general preference for conducting "consciousness raising" meetings as a communication strategy. These meetings are markedly different from the typical meetings held by social activists of other movements in that there are no leaders of the discussion and there is a high interest in each participant's personal experience, these meetings are more individual-focused than they are movement-focused. The importance of Campbell's piece to this study on Zapatista rhetoric lies in the absolute confrontational quality of Women's Lib rhetoric. Women's Lib rhetoric is highly confrontational because of the nature of the struggle. Every argument and demand for change brought about by Women's Lib went directly against an oppressive system, a culture, and a society that defends this oppressive system and culture.

Effects of Confrontational Rhetoric

Rhetoric scholars agree that confrontational rhetoric is not always successful and, in fact, many times it is damaging to a movement (Andrews, 1980; Cathcart, 1978;

Gregg, 1971; Haiman, 1967; Scott, 1973; Scott & Smith, 1969; Stewart, 1997). Burgchardt (1980) presents us with an example of how damaging confrontational rhetoric can be to a group advocating for change: the rhetoric of those involved in American communism of the early 1930s and their attempt to make significant changes to their rhetoric later that same decade. So confrontational was the communist rhetoric of the early 1930s, Burgchardt claims, that it alienated many possible supporters of it. According to Burgchardt (1980), when American communists attempted to tone down the confrontational aspect of their message, they found it very difficult to undo the damage they had done in earlier, more confrontational years. Nevertheless, confrontational rhetoric was used by American communist leaders to attempt to persuade others to join their political party because they, like many other movement leaders, had strong reasons to do so.

It is clear from past research that confrontational tactics are very risky and even dangerous because of the potential for damage they entail. Yet, they have been used very successfully by some groups within the Civil Rights Movement, the Labor Movement and other movements.

All movements that use confrontational rhetoric have their own, identity and situation specific, justifications for using it. Amongst these justifications we can find some commonalities. There are feelings on the part of the activists that arise from having been subjected to oppression, abuse, disrespect, and degradation by the established system and/or those in power. These feelings alone may justify confronting the enemy, whether it is through rhetorical acts or direct violence. "Enough!" seems to be what confrontational rhetoric shouts at the enemy.

Conclusion

The pieces reviewed for this chapter were chosen for their relevance to Zapatistas as a revolutionary group turned social movement and to their use of confrontational rhetoric in their literature. As risky and dangerous as confrontation may be, it has served, and continues to serve, social movements in various ways. Confrontational rhetoric:

- 1) serves to create identification within the members of the movement by clearly defining who the "we" is.

2) it serves to mark the difference between movement members from the enemy by enumerating his various flaws and exposing his evilness.

3) it provides a feeling of empowerment and success, whatever the response from the enemy may be. If change is achieved, it was through the movement's power, strength and worthiness. If the enemy responds with direct violence, the enemy has been unmasked and his violence is evidence of his evil nature.

Confrontational tactics are meant to cause a strong effect on people, whether they are activists of the movement, neutral parties, or those in power. These rhetorical forms are generally offensive to someone, deemed too violent by some, or dismissed as too radical or militant by others. The movements mentioned in this chapter have used a wide variety of tactics, confrontational and non-confrontational, to achieve their goals. At times, it has appeared to be that confrontational tactics are the only form of interaction with those in power that will actually yield some results acceptable to those pursuing social change. As the ruling

class resists social change, confrontational rhetoric
seems to be indispensable to social movements.

CHAPTER FOUR

ANALYSIS

Introduction

A decade has passed since the Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (EZLN) carried out their military operation. This study is aimed at exploring these ten years of revolution through the literature released by the revolutionary organization EZLN, with the purpose of answering the following questions: 1) How do the Zapatistas use the rhetoric of violence or confrontational rhetoric in their literature? 2) How do the Zapatistas use the rhetoric of peace? 3) What justifies the use of armed force to promote and/or defend the Zapatista cause? In order to fully address these questions, I have used cluster criticism as a method for identifying key themes within the Zapatista messages.

Representatives of the Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (EZLN), including Subcomandante Marcos, other individual Comandantes, and the Comité Clandestino Revolucionario Indígena—General Command of the EZLN, have collectively released over 450 documents and

comunicados since January 1, 1994, the date they officially made their presence known to Mexico and the world. The documents and communiqués of the EZLN, both original and translated versions, have been compiled and reprinted in books or re-posted on-line by writers in Mexico and the United States. These compilations, whether in hard copy or on-line, are important pieces because they document the vision, purpose and goals of the EZLN and their armed uprising in the exact or translated words of the Zapatistas themselves. Due to logistical limitations, I could not locate all Zapatista documents and comunicados, nor could I verify the exact number of documents released by the Zapatistas.

After extensive research, I located several hundred of these documents, more than 430, some reproduced in English, Portuguese, German, French, Italian, and Dutch. The majority of the documents are available in Spanish, their original language, though there are some that are only available in English. Most of the 1994 documents found in the unofficial EZLN website "Ya Basta!," for example, were only available in English but documents of later years are available in various languages, including

Spanish. The webmaster, Justin Paulson, of "Ya Basta!" explains that:

[T]he page began as a resource primarily for those outside of Mexico, and in English; only in 1995 did the webmaster realize how much it was being used from within Mexico itself, and since that time the dominant language of the page has gradually shifted to Spanish. (Paulson, 2001)

This may likely be the case of other websites too. While there have been many studies using translated versions of Zapatista documents and comunicados, I find that much can be lost in the translation, potentially affecting the conclusions of the analysis of these documents. In order to avoid the potential effect inaccurate translations may have on a rhetorical analysis, I intend to conduct a comprehensive examination of selected Zapatista documents and comunicados in their original language, Spanish. I will provide my own translations of the sections of text selected for the analysis as needed.

Due to these and other limitations in my research, I selected the Zapatista texts to be used in this study based on:

- 1) Their availability in their original language, Spanish, for consistency.
- 2) Their intended audiences, focusing on those comunicados addressed to the Mexican people, international publics, and specific organizations, national or international.
- 3) Their exclusion of fictional stories and stories involving the fictitious characters created by Subcomandante Marcos, such as Durito, a beetle named "Nabucodonosor," who is well versed in politics and economy.

I elected to exclude documents and comunicados containing fictitious stories and characters in order to avoid confusing "Zapatista facts" with "Zapatista fiction." Though facts and fiction may be blended in some Zapatista documents, there are those documents that are unmistakably short-stories (cuentos) or other works of fiction and are treated as such by the Zapatistas. Those works of fiction are the ones that will be excluded.

From the hundreds of Zapatista documents found throughout my research, I limited my analysis to fifty-four (54) documents (see Appendix A for list of texts by

calendar year). The EZLN has not been consistent in the release of their comunicados, some years they have released no more than a few, some years they have released over seventy (70). During my review of these documents, I found they are very repetitive, repeating, rephrasing, and repackaging the same messages time and time again, and saw it fit to narrow down my study by selecting only 5 or 6 documents per calendar year, with the exception of 2002 and 2004, and applying the three additional criteria, mentioned earlier, to my selection process. An exception in quantity of documents was made for 2002 (four documents) and 2004 (one document) due to limited document availability. All translations of Zapatista text used in this chapter are my own (see Appendix B for the original text, in Spanish, of Zapatista quotes).

This chapter contains the analysis and discussion of the results yielded by the cluster analysis. I will present my findings and explicate the relevance of these findings in providing answers to my research questions. The research tool I used, cluster analysis, assisted in the identification of key themes in the Zapatista documents selected for this study. I have identified six

key themes that appear throughout the Zapatista documents of the last decade, 1994 to 2004. These themes are:

1. The theme of an "unjustified" or "unjust war," the war being waged by the Mexican Federal Government and the powerful against the indigenous and poor people of Mexico.
2. The theme of an "honorable" or "just war," the war effort of the Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (EZLN).
3. The concept of an "unnecessary" or "pointless death," the type of death being suffered by the indigenous and poor people of Mexico at the hands of the powerful.
4. The concept of a "dignified" or "honorable death," the type of death preferred by the Zapatistas.
5. The theme of a "false peace," the "peace" being enforced by the Mexican army by order of those in power.
6. The theme of a "dignified peace," the type of peace being sought by the EZLN.

As the messages build these six themes, I have found that the Zapatistas use terms that assign certain character traits to the parties mentioned in their comunicados. To validate their assignments of character traits, the Zapatistas include terms that describe or name specific actions taken by the parties discussed in their documents. For the remainder of this chapter, I will present my findings in further detail, breaking them down into the six themes listed above and then expanding on the Zapatista use of character trait terms and actions terms to support their claims.

Unjust War

The "First Declaration from the Lacandona Jungle" was the first Zapatista document released to the world on the night of December 31, 2003. It was a formal declaration of war from the EZLN to the Mexican federal government. This document established the basic arguments, claims and demands set by the Zapatista revolutionaries. One of the key claims presented to the Mexican people, and the world, through this document was that of the existence of an "unjust war" taking place in Chiapas and throughout

Mexico, in many indigenous and poor communities. The "unjust war" theme is constructed through the many comunicados released between 1994 and 2004. The Zapatistas claimed then, and continue to claim in later documents, that this war is being waged by the Mexican federal government and the powerful upper-class in Mexico.

It is a war that has "not been formally declared" but, according to the Zapatista messages, has continued through many years despite the absence of a formal declaration from the Mexican government (Comandancia General del EZLN, 1994, Ponce de León (Ed.), p. 15). The war coming from the Mexican government is different from that being declared by the Zapatistas on January 1, 1994. The government's war is an "unjust war." It is "genocidal" (Comandancia General del EZLN, Ponce de León (Ed.), 1994, p. 15), it is "mass murder" (Subcomandante Marcos, 1995, p. 215), it is "ethnocide" (CCRI-Comandancia General del EZLN, Ponce de León (Ed.), 1995, p. 86). This "unjust war" is carried out by the Mexican government against the "Zapatistas" and the "Zapatista communities," terms that are surrounded by character trait terms that identify them as "the smallest, the always forgotten, the

meat destined yesterday to die a death by diarrhea, malnutrition, being forgotten, in the coffee fields, properties/lands owned by the rich, the streets, the mountain" (Subcomandante Marcos, 1995, p. 217), in other words, the Zapatistas and the families in communities are innocent victims of a war that is unjustifiable.

The terms that cluster and help develop the concept of an "unjust war" involve character trait terms that define the Mexican government as the ruthless aggressor that rules with "bloody hands" (Subcomandante Insurgente Marcos, 1996, Ponce de León (Ed.), 2001, p. 133, December 26, 1997, ¶19). The Zapatistas speak of "criminals" and "government" as being one and the same (see Subcomandante Insurgente Marcos, 1996, Ponce de León (Ed.), 2001, p. 132). It would be difficult for a reader to imagine that a government, like the one described by the Zapatistas in their documents, could conduct anything other than a criminal and "unjust war."

The "unjust war" the Zapatistas inform the Mexican people and the world about is carried out by the government through various actions, including but not limited to "harassment," "persecution," (CCRI-Comandancia

General del EZLN, Internet, February 14, 1997) and "massacres" (CCRI-Comandancia General del EZLN, Internet, January 10, 1994, December 26, 1997) conducted, the Zapatistas claim, by both the Mexican military and, much more frequently as time passed, by paramilitary groups paid, trained, armed and protected by the Mexican Federal government (see Subcomandante Marcos, Internet, January 1, 1999). We can identify in Zapatista documents a marked increase in concerns posed by paramilitary groups from 1996 on. Though the concerns with the Mexican military are not reduced, Zapatista texts notify the Mexican people and international publics that poor communities in Chiapas are being frequently, if not constantly, harassed, threatened and/or attacked by these paramilitary groups made up of locals recruited by the federal government (see Subcomandante Marcos, Internet, Noviembre 7, 1997, Diciembre 26, 1997, January 1998, January 1, 1999, May 10, 2000). The way in which the Zapatistas present their conceptualization of the Mexican federal government's behavior toward the indigenous and poor communities in Chiapas, and go on to extend their claim to include situations occurring nationwide as additional examples of

the "unjust war," creates the sense that defensive action, armed or otherwise, from those under attack is not only justified, it is imperative for survival.

Just War

The concept of an "unjust war" is markedly contrasted with the concept of a "just war". In Zapatista ideology, a just war is one that is fought in self-defense or in defense of those who are defenseless in the face of injustice and aggression. It is also a war that is not fought unless it is absolutely unavoidable, a "last resort." Zapatistas explain:

We, free men and women of integrity, are aware that the war we declare is a last resort but a just measure. The dictators have been waging an undeclared genocidal war against our peoples/villages for many years, because of this, we ask for your resolute participation supporting this plan of the Mexican people that fight for work, land, housing, food, education, independence, freedom, democracy, justice and peace (Comandancia General del EZLN, 1994, Ponce de León (Ed.), p. 15).

The Zapatistas claim they had no choice but to respond to the aggressions their communities have been suffering for years. They responded by using both, words and guns, taking military action against those in power and ensuring the dissemination of their message. It is important to note that the initial imagery used by the EZLN to conceptualize their "just war" changes with time and, we can infer from Zapatista texts, with influence from the responses given by national and international organizations, Mexican civil society and international publics to Zapatista messages. Throughout the Zapatista documents we can find that, in the early stages (1994), "just war" is discussed in terms of "armed struggle," "firearms" and "combat operations" (Comandancia General del EZLN, 1994, 2001, p. 15; CCRI-Comandancia General del EZLN, 1994, p.47) gradually shifting to an "armed but non-violent struggle" and an "effort" to reach the same goals they were attempting to reach, but now through dialogue and peace talks: "a just and new Mexico," "dignified and true peace," "respect for people's dignity," and "a new way of doing politics with people," (Comandancia General del EZLN, 1996; Subcomandante Insurgente Marcos, 1997;

CCRI-Comandancia General del EZLN, 1999, Subcomandante Insurgente Marcos, 2000). Words gradually became their primary weapon for waging their war against their enemy, not because the Zapatistas gave up their firearms but, because, according to the EZLN, the strong response from Mexican civil society and international publics asking for a non-violent approach needed to be listened to and obeyed. The Zapatistas remained armed for their own protection but remained militarily inactive. By 1998-99, the Zapatistas had added a new weapon to their arsenal for making "just war," silence. Zapatistas claim that the power of their silence and its usefulness as a weapon of war was discovered in much the same way as the power of words was discovered in January 1994 (Subcomandante Marcos, 1998). The key to understanding the value of silence as a tool for combating the enemy lies in that, according to the Zapatistas, the enemy being fought is powerful but his cause is not supported by reason or justice (Subcomandante Marcos, 1998). Reason and justice are highly valued by the Zapatistas so, it is no surprise that they would believe that the absence of these two in the arguments and actions of the powerful is so glaringly

obvious that they need not speak or point anything out to the Mexican people. Throughout this decade of revolution and war in Chiapas, the Zapatistas have used words and silence as their primary weapons of war.

The terms surrounding the "just war" theme, place the Zapatistas as polar opposites of the Mexican federal government and the powerful elite of Mexico. The Zapatistas affirm: "On our side is moral authority and historical reason. On the government's side is only the military might and the lies that some media disseminate" (CCRI-Comandancia General del EZLN, 1995, p.337). While the powerful are criminals and murderers, Zapatistas are victims, the forgotten children of Mexico and Mexico's defenders, the new heroes. The Ejercito Zapatista de Liberación Nacional announced to the world that theirs is a war that is, not only just but, it is patriotic and indisputably necessary for the good of Mexico. Love of country, protection of the national flag, upholding of the Mexican Constitution, and the invocation of national heroes like Zapata, Villa and others, provide a romantic touch to the image-building of the comunicados for the Zapatista revolutionaries and their struggle. To continue

along these lines, the Zapatistas affirm that their war is supported by Article 39 of the Mexican Constitution, which gives the Mexican people absolute ownership and control of their country, as well as the right to choose who governs Mexico and the inalienable right to change or modify their government (see Comandancia General del EZLN, 1994, Ponce de León (Ed.), p. 14). The promise that Zapatistas are willing to make the maximum sacrifice for the ideals and values most Mexicans hold, sweetens the cluster of positive character traits of the Zapatista even more.

Terms like "constitutional rights," "justice," "equality," are integral part of the Zapatista's "just war" concept, whether the war is fought with fire arms or words and political actions. The words "democracy," "justice" and "liberty" are the Zapatista signature and a reminder of their demands. Those three ideals are mentioned in relation to the Zapatista struggle in virtually every Zapatista document I reviewed, whether released in 1994 or 2004.

It is interesting to observe how what begun as a declaration of war and an execution of a military operation, eventually evolved into a unilateral non-

violent struggle to obtain the same original demands. The Zapatista revolution is what sounds like an oxymoron, the "non-violent war" against a historically repressive and oppressive government. Peace tactics are also tools of war, a just and non-violent war.

Pointless Death

Death is discussed often in Zapatista comunicados and it should be no surprise; with war and armed conflict comes death. The EZLN chooses to acknowledge and speak of many losses of lives, including the loss of those who have died fighting for the Zapatista cause and those who have died without fighting. Zapatistas discuss death in two ways: 1) as a result of distinct circumstances and specific actions, and 2) in spiritual terms, as a transition into another form of life. Death for the Zapatistas and their communities has been common place for so long that their literature describes an interesting relationship with death. They speak of a "death" that is with the indigenous and poor communities as if part of the family by using the imagery of death "visiting" their villages, "sitting" at their tables, "staying" on their

land, and lying in their beds with them (CCRI-Comandancia General del EZLN, 1994, p.53; Subcomandante Insurgente Marcos, 1994, p.40). The Zapatistas link death to government and power when describing the relationship between the indigenous and poor communities of Chiapas and the state and federal governments. They claim that state and federal governments have delivered an unjust and "pointless death" to their communities, for the benefit of Mexico's powerful elite (see Subcomandante Insurgente Marcos, 1994 and Subcomandante Insurgente Marcos, 1994, p. 40).

Terms like "hunger" and "curable disease" appear frequently when Zapatistas discuss "pointless death" (CCRI-Comandancia General del EZLN, 1994; Subcomandante Insurgente Marcos, 1994). This type of death is perceived as "shameful," "undignified" and "senseless," according to the Zapatistas, for being so unnecessary and preventable, and yet so ignored by those who govern and society at large (CCRI-CG del EZLN, 1995, p.190; Subcomandante Insurgente Marcos, 1994, p.18; Subcomandante Insurgente Marcos, 1994, p.40).

The "pointless death" theme supports the character traits the Zapatistas have assigned to themselves as victims and Mexico's forgotten children. It appears that their actions as an armed revolutionary group are justified because it is in defense of the lives of innocent people.

Honorable Death

To Zapatistas and their communities, dying quietly is pointless and undignified, dying valiantly while fighting for a better life is honorable and preferred.

We saw that it was wrong to die of grief and pain, and we saw that it is wrong to die without fighting, we saw that we had to earn a dignified death so everyone could live, one day, with good and reason. (Subcomandante Marcos, 1994, p.43)

Words that speak of "life," "dignity," "honor," a "willingness to sacrifice" for the good of others, and examples of these concepts, cluster around the theme "honorable death." This theme goes hand-in-hand with the "just war" Zapatistas are fighting.

The EZLN presents the reader with a story about the life and death of poor and indigenous in Chiapas, under a government that seeks to exterminate them and a society that paid no attention for a long time. From the Zapatista perspective, responding to an "unjust war" with a "just war" and refusing a quiet and fruitless death to die a death that will bring about a new way of life is unquestionably honorable. Other revolutionaries have died honorable deaths throughout history (Emiliano Zapata, Francisco Villa, etc.) and the Zapatistas identify themselves with these heroes to support and promote the acceptance of their "honorable death" theme.

False Peace

Peace is a condition that is difficult to define because of its complexity. Understanding of peace can range from a simple absence of disturbance to a condition that would require the absence of all forms of violence and proactive community-building and development of cooperative relations between individuals and groups of people. In the case of the Zapatistas, the peace they demand is one of high complexity. Their peace requires

"democracy, liberty and justice," nothing less (CCRI-CG del EZLN, 1995, p. 193). "We cannot accept a peace without dignity" (CCRI-CG del EZLN, 1994). The federal government, entity that the Zapatistas have already branded as being "criminal," delivers mixed messages about peace. When observing what the federal government says about "peace" and the actions that follow, it is clear that the Zapatistas and the Mexican government are looking for two very different forms of peace. Every Zapatista document that discusses the Chiapas peace process, presents the Mexican federal government as a liar and a fraud that "speaks of a political and legal solution [to the Chiapas conflict], while their armies continue to advance into the Lacandona jungle" (Subcomandante Insurgente Marcos, Et. al., 1995).

The Zapatistas declare that the Mexican government's interest in a real and dignified peace is false (see Comandante David, Comandante Felipe, Comandante Javier, Subcomandante Insurgente Marcos & Mayor Ana María, 1995). They present their perspective on the "good intentions" of the Mexican government and the peace the government is looking for in terms of "lies," "acting as if" they want

peace, "intention to trick," "intention to misguide," "intention to cover up" the war and destruction that the government continues to take into the communities.

To the indications given by the Ejercito Zapatista de Liberación Nacional of their disposition to find a political resolution to the conflict, the federal government gave a two-faced response: while speaking of peace and dialogue, they prepared a brutal military strike. (C. David, C. Javier, Subcomandante Insurgente Marcos & M. Ana María, 1995)

Thus, we have the theme of "false peace," which is the Zapatista name for the type of peace offered by the Mexican government to the poor people of Chiapas. This theme serves to support the character traits already assigned to the federal government by the Zapatistas. It fits well with the image of a "criminal" and "illegitimate" government. In addition to other destructive activities, countless unresolved "assassinations," "assassination attempts," "disappearances" and "massacres" are just some of the actions attributed to the Mexican government, while they

claim to conduct thorough investigations and to continue to seek peace (see C. David, C. Javier, Subcomandante Insurgente Marcos & M. Ana María, 1995; Comandante David, Comandante Felipe, Comandante Javier, Subcomandante Insurgente Marcos, Mayor Ana María, 1995; Subcomandante Marcos, 1998; Subcomandante Insurgente Marcos, 2001; Comandante David, 2001; Subcomandante Insurgente Marcos, 2004). The Zapatistas remind civil society that "the government has the money and the power to make lots of 'peace' noise to drown out the sounds of war" (Subcomandante Insurgente Marcos, 2001, p.229).

Dignified Peace

For the Zapatista, peace is linked to "dignity," "justice," "democracy," and "liberty" (CCRI-CG del EZLN, 1995). "Dignified peace" is a theme that permeates every discussion about giving up their weapons and their "just war." Ensuring a "dignified peace" for the Zapatista communities, the indigenous and poor people of Chiapas is one of the conditions that must be met before the Zapatistas will consider leaving their armed rebellion. The Zapatista's choice to put their life on the line in

order to achieve this peace was made before they came out of the Lacandona jungle in 1994. This decision is made clear in the majority of the early comunicados. The Zapatistas acknowledge the support they have received from others for their struggle for a "dignified peace." They report that: "All who approached us came to offer help for peace, for a peace that would not be like the one we had before, for a new peace, like our comandante David says" (Subcomandante Insurgente Marcos, 1995).

The complexity of a "dignified peace" in Zapatista lands makes ultimate success almost unachievable in the minds of the cynics. For others, the possibility, slim as it may be, of achieving a "dignified peace" is enough to commit to a lifetime of work for: "housing, land, work, food, health, education, justice, independence, liberty, democracy and peace" for the indigenous and poor people of Mexico (CCRI-CG del EZLN, 1995).

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUDING CHAPTER

Introduction

I embarked on this project with three questions to answer: 1) How does the Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional use the rhetoric of violence or confrontation? 2) How do they use the rhetoric of peace? 3) How do they justify the use of armed force to promote or defend the Zapatista cause? My research yielded six basic themes used in Zapatista rhetoric: "unjust war," "just war," "pointless death," "honorable death," "false peace" and "dignified peace." Through understanding what these six themes mean to the EZLN and observing their construction and use of these themes and how they were communicated to their various publics, in terms of language and imagery used, answers to my research questions began to surface. In addition to understanding these themes and the Zapatista messages, evaluation is also necessary. Two most important measures of the quality of revolutionary group the Zapatistas are, relate to the elements of truth found in their literature and also to the ethics behind

their choice to carry forward an armed rebellion against a much more powerful armed organization, the Mexican military. This chapter is the final part of this thesis. It will include a discussion about the answers to my research questions, evaluative analysis on the Zapatista revolution, and teachings of this study. It will also present the limitations of my research and ideas for future research on this topic.

Answers and Teachings

The Ejercito Zapatista de Liberación Nacional makes ample use of the rhetoric of violence or confrontational rhetoric throughout their documentos and comunicados. They have used confrontational tactics at almost every step of the way, conducting an aggressive media and speech campaign to ensure their message was heard and acknowledged at all levels of government and civil society. This media and speech campaign fluctuated from one year to the next, some years releasing under 30 documents, others releasing over 70. Through excellent media relations, the Zapatista's effectiveness at attacking and ridiculing the government, as well as

denouncing most current crimes and aggressions suffered by Zapatista communities, grew to impressive proportions.

In recent years, the Zapatistas have had longer periods of silence than in others. In the first half of 2004, only one document has been released addressing civil society and international publics. This year's silence is not surprising since silence has been used as a confrontational tactic by the Zapatistas in the past; refusing to participate in a peacemaking dialogue they considered unproductive. For the EZLN, silence has been a useful weapon in their "just war," though words have been the primary and most powerful weapon of all. According to the Zapatistas, the peace process has been stalled for several years now because the Mexican government has not fulfilled the three conditions for dialogue outlined by the revolutionaries and agreed upon by the government since before Vicente Fox Quezada entered the presidency.

The frequency with which the Zapatistas attended to their media campaign against the Mexican government has varied recently. Still, confrontational rhetoric remains present in their comunicados: 1) reminding Mexican civil society of their existence and their struggle and 2)

reinforcing the image and character traits of the Mexican government by denouncing criminal actions committed by the government and/or the powerful of Chiapas, and by reminding civil society of the inaction or lack of interest of government officials in fully addressing the conflict.

The Shift in Rhetoric

The rhetoric of peace became present very early in the conflict. Within the first year, 1994, the tone of the Zapatista revolutionary spokespeople went from talking about their revolution in active, "armed fighting" terms to include emphasis on the need for dignified peace and encouraging active participation of the Mexican people and concerned international publics. The goals of this rhetoric remained the same as those of the rhetoric of confrontation but, this change only added a different course by which to reach their audiences. Ultimately, what rhetoric aims to do is connect the rhetor with others so as to establish what Kenneth Burke calls a "consubstantial" relationship.

A is not identical with his colleague, B. But insofar as their interests are joined, A is

identified with B... In being identified with B, A is 'substantially one' with a person other than himself. Yet, at the same time he remains unique, an individual locus of motives. Thus, he is both joined and separate, at once a distinct substance and consubstantial with another. (Burke, 1969, p. 20-1)

Carefully blended rhetoric of confrontation and rhetoric of peace achieves a balance in message that can be much more palatable to the general public than an exclusively confrontational rhetoric or exclusively peaceful one. An exclusively confrontational approach would have caused the Zapatista uprising to be regarded as extremist or terrorist, and would not have afforded them the protection Mexican civil society and international publics provided with their activism and their presence. An exclusively peaceful approach would not have had the booming effect that confrontation and direct action had in Mexico and around the world; it would not have attracted the attention of the revolutionary activists already tired of facing death, even when working within Mexican law and attempting to affect change through peaceful means. In

Mexico, peaceful demonstrations have led to just as much death as armed uprisings. For evidence of this, we need only look back at the Tlatelolco massacre of 1968, where hundreds of peaceful demonstrators, mostly students, were murdered by order of the government. By using this blended approach in the creation of their message, the Zapatistas achieved consubstantiality with a wider range of publics, both national and international, and even those who did not agree that firearms were necessary to create change, sympathized with the Zapatista struggle. The transition from justifying armed struggle to justifying non-violent tactics occurred between 1994 and 1995, helping them expand their reach sooner. Note that this transition took place early in the uprising and, in large part, due to the tremendous involvement of civil society and international support. The rhetoric of the rebellion shifted from promises of violent response to government attacks, to emphasizing Zapatista commitment to a peace process and dialogue.

As the rhetoric of peace permeated more and more into the Zapatista messages, justifications for the use of armed force to promote or defend the Zapatistas became

obsolete. It was clear that a large portion of Mexican civil society was willing to consider the ideas presented by the Zapatistas and even support those ideas and advocate for their demands but, joining an armed revolution and throwing the country into civil war was likely not an option the masses were willing to take. The Zapatista revolution, though armed, had become a non-violent revolution within just a few months of public existence. A reader can find plenty of justifications for the use of armed force by the Zapatistas in their texts but, direct justifications for their initial military operation were given only in the early part of the uprising. After that point, their reasons for taking up arms were well known and, most importantly, with no Zapatista combat operations to speak of, the justifications for direct violence were expected much more often from state and federal governments, who were engaging in direct violence, than from the revolutionaries. The state and federal government sometimes attempted to justify the violent actions perpetrated against Zapatista communities, and sometimes attempted to deny that they had any involvement in them.

Whether the government justified or not the direct violence against Zapatista and indigenous communities, the involvement of the government and/or their military in those operations was evident.

Uniqueness of Ejercito Zapatista de

Liberacion Nacional

The EZLN is unique in many ways but, one of the most noteworthy of all is their effectiveness at blending the rhetoric of violence and the rhetoric of peace. This skill is one of the reasons for their successes. Amongst these accomplishments are, having been the only armed revolutionary movement in Latin American history to 1) sit down at the negotiation table with governmental representatives that called them terrorists and "professionals of violence," 2) be the first revolutionary group to tour their country under the protection of national and international groups and the Mexican people, while remaining in defiance of the government, and 3) be the first armed revolutionary group to address the Congress of a nation while masked and in rebellion. Subcomandante Marcos of the EZLN, who presents the Zapatista blend of confrontational rhetoric and rhetoric

of peace, is an example of what Simons (1970) would call a "great leader." His skills in blending and alternating these rhetorical tactics make Marcos one of the best, when applying Simons' (1970) reasoning.

Another remarkable trait of the Zapatista revolution is the observable commitment of the leadership committee to act within the guiding principles they espouse and advocate for. There is harmony between what they say and what they chose to do or not do. Their willingness to listen to civil society and supporters, and to apply the feedback they receive to their messages and actions, has been a display of good will toward those that have shown them good will. For example, "mandar obedeciendo" is one of the concepts the Zapatistas talk about when describing the type of leadership Mexico needs. "Mandar obedeciendo" translates as "to command obeying" which means to assume command, to create laws and policies, but the commander must do so while obeying the will of the people. In other words, the people will tell you how you should govern, and you, as a leader, must obey. By applying this same concept and expectation to themselves, the Zapatistas

retain a level of credibility and clearly mark the difference between their enemy and themselves.

The shift in Zapatista rhetoric from advocating for armed struggle to primarily advocating for social activism and direct peaceful action, indisputably worked to the advantage of the Zapatistas. This shift in their rhetoric is another unique characteristic of the Zapatista revolution. It not only made them different from other revolutionary groups in that they chose not to insist on remaining engaged in armed conflict, it also helped them increase their base of support, both nationally and internationally. The Zapatista success cannot be measured by the growth of their numbers because it is nearly impossible to know for sure how many Zapatistas there really are in Mexico and other parts of the world. Their presence or absence from the media says nothing about the activism and outreach being engaged in by Zapatista supporters. Zapatista success cannot be measured by how many hospitals, pharmacies, and schools have been opened in Chiapas since their uprising, or how many lives have been saved, or how many more people are literate now than there were before, because Zapatistas do not control all

of Chiapas. Considering the Mexico's history involving revolutionary groups, their success can be measured, first of all, by their effectiveness in ensuring their own survival as a revolutionary group, secondly, by their positive effect in the areas of Chiapas where they do retain control, and thirdly, by their willingness to acknowledge their shortcomings and their commitment to continue working toward Zapatista ideals.

Based on the criteria outlined here, the Zapatista revolutionaries have been and continue to be very successful. They are alive and working. They have had an overwhelmingly positive effect on the autonomous communities that are run by committees made up of indigenous leaders: building new schools, increasing the number of female students in their schools, creating awareness in the community about the importance of female involvement in civic life, amongst other things. Key goals have not been achieved and Zapatistas and members of the governing councils are the first to admit that things are not where they intended for them to be, that equality and justice has not yet been reached.

We have not fulfilled all of the works we were responsible for," one of [the members of the governing council] apologized. "We did not know, we were learning." One by one, the ten members of the council who were leaving and the ten that were preparing to take their places spoke, the majority Tzetzal, and spoke of their responsibilities to health, education, justice, etcetera. (Bellinghausen, 2004)

Yet, there is still the strong sense of commitment and the will to continue to move forward with their ideals.

Evaluative Analysis

Confrontational rhetoric in Zapatista messages and comunicados served its purpose: to clearly identify the revolutionaries, to mark the differences between these revolutionaries and their enemy, and, lastly, to provide a sense of empowerment to revolutionaries and their supporters. Even when integrating rhetoric of peace and advocating for peace talks and peaceful resolution to the conflict, the Zapatista messages retained their confrontational quality. The decade that has passed since the Zapatista uprising has seen significant successes for

the revolutionary group: a surge of national and international attention and support, the creation of a new revolutionary icon in Subcomandante Marcos, the well-publicized Zapatour of 2001, the unprecedented address to the Mexican congress, and the creation of the Caracoles (autonomous, indigenous-run communities) in Zapatista territory. Still, indigenous people continue to die the same types of deaths as before. Indigenous and poor people, especially the women, suffer the attacks supported by the local and federal governments and perpetrated by the military or paramilitary groups in the area (Amnesty International, 2002; Various Organizations, 2004). Families continue being displaced from their lands and forced to take refuge in the jungle or migrate to other towns. Communities are denied clean drinking water and medications are not readily available for many. The list goes on and on but it would be grossly unfair to expect a small group of revolutionaries leading a twenty year old revolution to right the endless wrongs that have been committed and replace a system of oppression that has been in place for more than 500 years. The powerful have had the opportunity to perfect their system while the great

majority of the poor and the indigenous have only had the opportunity to die while serving it.

Preventable death has been ever present in indigenous and poor Mexican communities for centuries and this has not been by the choice of those affected. When the Zapatistas describe the reality of their people, the malnutrition, the lack of educational opportunities, the absence of medical care, the childhood deaths, the childbirth deaths, the limited opportunities to life, they speak with truth supporting their claims. The facts Zapatistas present about the problems their communities face every day and the extreme levels of poverty they suffer, can be found in reports prepared by organizations like Amnesty International and even those prepared by the very government that does very little to address these issues.

There is no question that the Zapatista cause is legitimate. The arguments and the evidence they present to support their decision to take up arms is compelling. However, their enemy has a fully operating, well-armed and trained military at their disposal and Zapatistas were entering armed conflict with limitations that the Mexican

military did not have. Many would question how ethical it was for Zapatista revolutionaries to recruit young indigenous people, men and women, to join a fight that, for at least some Zapatista soldiers, ended up being an offer to face a canon with only a rock to defend yourself with. An armed uprising in Mexico would appear to be nothing more than an open invitation for the military to commit mass murder. In spite of the risks mentioned, young Chiapaneco men and women joined the ranks. Though deeply impoverished, their families helped feed their Zapatista friends with what little they had. These same families risked their lives to help protect the Zapatista soldiers during their first decade of existence and, much more so, during the decade after. The only conclusion I can draw from this discussion is that, death does not discourage people from doing something if they've already seen death up-close and personal throughout their lives. Indigenous and poor Chiapaneco families were no strangers to death. It may not have been ethical for Zapatista revolutionaries to recruit local youth to risk their lives in a revolution that would face such a powerful enemy, but it would not have been any more ethical for these young

women and men to have died of curable disease, of childbirth at age 15, nor of a gunshot wound during a drunken fight or during a domestic abuse incident. The Zapatista soldier's "honorable death" can seem much more attractive than any other type of death. There is no correct answer to the question of Zapatista ethics in this revolution. To ask someone to take a peaceful approach to stopping injustice when peaceful tactics have been met with bullets in the past, is asking them to take a risk equal to taking a weapon and fighting against injustice in an armed rebellion.

Conclusion

This study of Zapatista literature contributes new knowledge to social movement theory by studying the literature of a modern revolution-turned-social movement, in its original language, Spanish, to prevent losing parts of their message in the translation and misunderstanding the message. It is a study that looks at the birth and rhetorical evolution of a social movement that takes place in a different cultural and social context than the majority of social movement studies, which have focused on

the American context and on the social movements of the 1960s and 1970s.

Limitations of Study

There are three important limitations to this study. First, this study only focuses on a fraction of the available Zapatista texts. Documents that would, or would not, have provided additional insight were excluded because they did not fit the guidelines created for this study, i.e. they were not available in Spanish or they were works of fiction written by the Subcomandante Marcos. Second, time constraints and travel impediments did not allow for more extensive research. I would have liked additional time to find documents and video or sound clips that were of interest to me, like the transcripts of Zapatista speeches or the sound clips of the Zapatista radio programs and interviews, but were unavailable for review or difficult to access. Third, this study is limited to messages that are externally directed so, the messages are not analyzed from a perspective that takes into account what the Zapatista communities or Zapatista army may have thought of the messages being disseminated on their behalf. I conclude that these messages are

mainly for external use because Indigenous Chiapanecos belong to cultures that rely on oral transmission of messages in the form of stories. Many indigenous Chiapanecos have limited knowledge of the Spanish language and depend on Zapatista translators to communicate messages in their native tongue. In addition to the language differences, it is highly unlikely that a message to indigenous communities would be distributed in writing since much of the indigenous population has had no access to education and, as a result, is illiterate. For these reasons, friends and neighbors are probably a much more widely accepted source of news.

Future research should explore Zapatista short stories. It is in these stories that many sensitive and controversial subjects, like feminism, homosexuality and identity conflicts, are presented. It would be fascinating to learn more about the use of these short stories within the EZLN and their communities, considering that Mexican culture is very conservative and machista, and indigenous cultures are even more so.

APPENDIX A

DOCUMENTOS AND COMUNICADOS: 1994 TO 2004

Appendix A
Documents and Comunicados: 1994 to 2004

1994

1. Primera Declaracion de la Selva Lacandona (January 1, 1994)-nuestra arma es nuestra palabra
2. Muriendo Para Vivir (January 6, 1994)-nuestra arma es nuestra palabra
3. Quien debe pedir perdon y quien debe otorgar? (January 18, 1994)-nuestra arma es nuestra palabra
4. 500 Años de Resistencia (February 1, 1994)-nuestra arma es nuestra palabra
5. Segunda Declaracion de la Selva Lacandona (June 10, 1994)-nuestra arma es nuestra palabra
6. La Guerra Viene Tras la Mentira (September 4, 1994)-EZLN Documentos y Comunicados 2

1995

1. Tercera Declaracion de la Selva Lacandona (January 1, 1995)-EZLN Documentos y Comunicados 2
2. Carta de Marcos Sobre el Avance del Ejercito Mexicano y Descubrimientos de la PGR (February 13, 1994)-EZLN Documentos y Comunicados 2
3. Comunicado de Marcos firmado por Ana María, David y Javier (February 17, 1995) EZLN Documentos y Comunicados 2
4. Pide no cejar en las movilizaciones por la paz (February 27, 1995)-EZLN Documentos y Comunicados 2
5. Factores Verde Olivo Motivaron Mi Ausencia (May 11, 1995)-EZLN Documentos y Comunicados 2
6. La Palabra y el Silencio (October 12, 1995)-nuestra arma es nuestra palabra

1996

1. Cuarta Declaracion de la Selva Lacandona (January 1, 1996)-nuestra arma es nuestra palabra
2. La Guerra contra el pueblo no es la paz que buscamos (March 7, 1996)-Ya Basta! Website
3. Hoy, Ochenta y cinco anos más tarde, la historia se repite (April 4, 1996)-nuestra arma es nuestra palabra
4. Se retira el EZLN del dialogo... (August 29, 1996)-Ya Basta! Website
5. Miente el Gobierno (September 17, 1996)-Ya Basta! Web

6. La sociedad civil, el concepto incomodo y la realidad molesta (October 23, 1996)-nuestra arma es nuestra palabra

1997

1. En el tercer aniversario del alzamiento (January 1, 1997)-Ya Basta! Website
2. A un año de la firma de los acuerdos de San Andres y dos de la traicion del supreme gobierno (February 14, 1997)-Ya Basta! Website
3. Carta al Jefe Zapata (April 10, 1997)-Ya Basta! Website
4. Se prepara la solucion militar al conflicto chiapaneco (November 7, 1997)-Ya Basta! Website
5. Conclusiones del EZLN sobre la masacre (December 26, 1994)-Ya Basta! Website

1998

1. Saludos a las movilizaciones (January 1998)-Ya Basta! Website
2. Mienten las fotos? (January 5, 1998)-nuestra arma es nuestra palabra
3. Para aquellos que protestan con nosotros despues de Acteal (January 21, 1998)-nuestra arma es nuestra palabra
4. Quinta Declaracion de la Selva Lacandona (July 1998)-Ya Basta! Website
5. Acá sigue lloviendo (September 8, 1998)-nuestra arma es nuestra palabra
6. Provocaciones militares ante el dialogo (October 27, 1998)-Ya Basta! Website

1999

1. Con motivo del Quinto Aniversario del Levantamiento Zapatista (January 1, 1999)-Ya Basta! Website
2. Convocatoria del EZLN a la Consulta Internacional por el Reconocimiento de los Derechos de los Pueblos Indios y por el fin de la guerra del exterminio (January 17, 1999)-Ya Basta! Website
3. Comunicado con motivo del 80 aniversario de la muerte del Gral. Emiliano Zapata (April 10, 1999)-Ya Basta! Website
4. La digna resistencia de Amador Hernandez (August 1999)-nuestra arma es nuestra palabra

5. Chiapas: la Guerra (II) la maquina del etnocidio (Carta 5.2) (November 1999)-Ya Basta! Website

2000

1. Comunicado del CCRI-CG del EZLN sobre las nuevas provocaciones de guerra en la zona de los Altos (May 10, 2000)-Ya Basta! Website
2. A Zedillo, seis años después (November 2000)-nuestra arma es nuestra palabra
3. Fox, usted debe saber (December 2, 2000)-nuestra arma es nuestra palabra
4. Comunicado sobre el posible reinicio de negociaciones con el gobierno (December 2, 2000)-Ya Basta! Website
5. Comunicado sobre el retiro del Ejercito de Amador Hernandez (December 22, 2000)-Ya Basta! Website

2001

1. Celebrando el septimo aniversario del alzamiento Zapatista (January 1, 2001)-Ya Basta! Website
2. Nos estamos manifestando (January 12, 2001)-nuestra arma es nuestra palabra
3. Aclarando dudas sobre la marcha al DF y las tres condiciones para el dialogo (January 27, 2001)-Ya Basta! Website
4. Palabras de la delegacion Zapatista en San Cristobal de las Casas, Chiapas, en el arranque de la marcha por la dignidad (February 24, 2001)-Ya Basta! Website
5. Comunicado del CCRI-CG del EZLN rechazando la mutilacion de la "ley indigena" en el congreso (April 29, 2001)-Ya Basta! Website

2002

1. Marcos Saluda a la revista Zapatista Rebeldia y afirma que la practica politica y cultural esta plagada de mitos (September 2002)-Ya Basta! Website
2. Marcos pide a ETA tregua unilateral (December 7, 2002)-Ya Basta! Website
3. Carta del EZLN a la sociedad civil Espanola y Vasca; aclaracion de la carta leida en noviembre (December 7, 2002)-Ya Basta! Website
4. En el caso de los pueblos Zapatistas no Habra "desalojo pacifico" (December 29, 2002)-Ya Basta! Website

2003

1. Otro Calendario: el de la resistencia (January 2003)–Ya Basta! Website
2. Respuesta del EZLN a ETA (January 9, 2003)–Ya Basta! Website
3. Comunicado al pueblo de Mexico y a los pueblos del mundo (April 4, 2003)–Ya Basta! Website
4. Mundo: Siete Pensamientos en Mayo del 2003 (May 2003)–Frente Zapatista de Liberacion Nacional (FZLN) On-line
5. Comunicado del CCRI-CG del EZLN: Cambios en funcionamiento interno y en la relacion con la Sociedad Civil (July 19, 2003)–Ya Basta! Website

2004

1. En memoria de los Zapatistas caidos (February 14, 2004)–Ya Basta! Website

APPENDIX B

ZAPATISTA QUOTES: ORIGINAL SPANISH TEXT

Appendix B
Zapatista Quotes: Original Spanish Text

1. "Los dictadores están aplicando una Guerra genocida no declarada contra nuestros pueblos desde hace muchos años, por lo que pedimos tu participación decidida apoyando este plan del pueblo mexicano que lucha por trabajo, tierra, techo, alimentación, salud, educación, independencia, libertad, democracia, justicia y paz" (Comandancia General del EZLN, 1994, Ponce de León (Ed.), p. 15).
2. "Saben que sus ejércitos privados no tienen pantalones para enfrentarse a los Zapatistas; ahora esperan que el Ejército federal les haga el trabajo que antes hacían ellos sin tanta prensa encima: el asesinato masivo" (Subcomandante Marcos, 1995, p. 215).
3. "Ya antes han intentado exterminarnos. Diversas doctrinas, ideas diferentes han sido usadas para cubrir de racionalidad el etnocidio" (CCRI-Comandancia General del EZLN, Ponce de León (Ed.), 1995, p. 86).
4. "A los Zapatistas, los más pequeños, los siempre olvidados, la carne destinada ayer a la muerte por diarrea, desnutrición, olvido, en los campos cafetaleros, las fincas, las calles, la montaña" (Subcomandante Marcos, 1995, p. 217).
5. "El proyecto de país que el poder enarbola con las manos ensangrentadas, y con la ley y la legitimidad manchadas por la corrupción y el crimen. El proyecto de nación que significa destrucción, miseria y muerte, guerra en todas partes y a todos los niveles" (Subcomandante Insurgente Marcos, 1996, Ponce de León (Ed.), 2001, p. 133).
6. "Y a Tlatelolco 68 no solo lo hermana con Acteal 97 la sangre inocente derramada. También entonces, como ahora, el gobierno hablaba de diálogo y de paz con las manos llenas de muerte" (CCRI-Comandancia General del EZLN, Internet, December 26, 1997, ¶19).

7. "Mientras ellos, los que en el poder se esconden, expropián la libertad de disidentes e inconformes y obsequian impunidad a los verdaderos criminales, los que ayer y hoy fueron y son gobierno" (Subcomandante Insurgente Marcos, 1996, Ponce de León (Ed.), 2001, p. 132)
8. "Mientras se faltaba a la palabra empanada, decenas de miles de soldados continuaron cercando, hostigando y persiguiendo a las comunidades indígenas" (CCRI-Comandancia General del EZLN, Internet, February 14, 1997).
9. "Los paramilitares obtienen su armamento y equipo por suministro directo de oficiales del Ejército federal, policías judiciales y, principalmente, por la denominada "Seguridad Pública del Estado", el gobierno del estado de Chiapas..." (CCRI-Comandancia General del EZLN, Internet, December 26, 1997).
10. "La masacre de Acteal fue una matanza y fue realizada con alevosía, premeditación y ventaja" (CCRI-Comandancia General del EZLN, Internet, December 26, 1997).
11. "No se trata sólo de comprar lealtades, es un verdadero reclutamiento, una "leva: para hacer la guerra gubernamental contra los indígenas... con indígenas" (CCRI-Comandancia General del EZLN, Internet, December 26, 1997, ¶6).
12. "Nosotros, hombres y mujeres íntegros y libres, estamos conscientes de que la guerra que declaramos es una medida última pero justa. Los dictadores están aplicando una Guerra genocida no declarada contra nuestros pueblos desde hace muchos años, por lo que pedimos tu participación decidida apoyando este plan del pueblo mexicano que lucha por trabajo, tierra, techo, alimentación, salud, educación, independencia, libertad, democracia, justicia y paz" (Comandancia General del EZLN, 1994, Ponce de León (Ed.), p. 15).

13. "Por tanto, en apego a nuestra Constintución, emitimos la presente al ejército federal mexicano, pilar básico de la dictadura que padecemos, monopolizada por el partido en el poder y encabezada por el ejecutivo federal que hoy detenta su jefe máximo e ilegítimo, Carlos Salinas de Gortari" (Comandancia General del EZLN, 1994, Ponce de León (Ed.), p. 15).
14. "Pedir la rendición incondicional de los cuarteles enemigos antes de entablar los combates" (Comandancia General del EZLN, 1994, Ponce de León (Ed.), 2001, p. 15).
15. "Somos mexicanos y no depondremos ni nuestras demandas ni nuestras armas si no son resueltas la Democracia, la Libertad y la Justicia para todos" (CCRI-Comandancia General del EZLN, 1994, p.47).
16. "Todos estos hermanos nos piden seguir adelante en esta lucha y en este esfuerzo de diálogo para tartar de construir un país pusto y Nuevo" (Comandancia General del EZLN, 1996)
17. "De nuestro lado están la autoridad moral y la razón historica. Del lado del gobierno solo están la fuerza militar y las mentiras de difunden algunos medios de comunicacion" (CCRI-Comandancia General del EZLN, 1995, p.337)
18. "... [S]e nos ha negado la preparación más elemental para así poder utilizarnos como carne de cañón y saquear las riquezas de nuestra patria sin importarles que estemos muriendo de hambre y enfermedades curables..." (Comandancia General del EZLN, 1994).
19. "Pore so pensamos que ya no, que ya basta de morir de muerte inutil, por eso mayor pelear para cambiar" (Subcomandante Insurgente Marcos, 1994).
20. Si morimos, ya no será con vergüenza sino con dignidad, como nuestros antepasados" (Subcomandante Insurgente Marcos, 1994, p.18).

21. "Y vimos que es malo morir de pena y dolor, y vimos que es malo morir sin haber luchado, vimos que teníamos que ganar una muerte digna para que todos vivieran, un día, con bien y razón" (Subcomandante Marcos, 1994, p.43).
22. "Mientras habla de una solución política y legal, sus ejércitos continúan avanzando en la selva Lacandona..." (Comandante David, Comandante Felipe, Comandante Javier, Subcomandante Insurgente Marcos, Mayor Ana María, 1995).
23. "A las muestras del Ejercito Zapatista de Liberación Nacional de su disposición a una salida política al conflicto, el gobierno federal respondió con una doble cara: mientras hablaba de paz y diálogo, preparaba el brutal golpe military" (C. David, C. Javier, Subcomandante Insurgente Marcos, M. Ana María, 1995).
24. "La paz vendrá de la mano de la democracia, la libertad y la justicia para todos los mexicanos" (CCRI-CG del EZLN, 1995).
25. "El gobierno tiene el dinero y el poder para que haya mucho ruido de paz y el sonido de la Guerra no se escuche" (Subcomandante Insurgente Marcos, 2001, p.229).
26. "Once puntos de nuestro programa de lucha: vivienda, tierra, trabajo, alimentación, salud, educación, justicia, independencia, libertad, democracia y paz" (CCRI-CG del EZLN, 1995, p. 188).
27. " 'No cumplimos con todos los los trabajos que nos correspondieron', se disculpo unos de ellos. 'No sabíamos, estábamos aprendiendo'. Uno por uno, los diez consejales salientes y los diez entrants tomaron la palabra, la mayoría en tzetzal, y se refirieron a sus cargos de salud, educacion, justicia, etcetera" (Bellinghausen, 2004).

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