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## Holy war as an instrument of theocratic and social ideology in Judaic, Christian, and Islamic history

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HOLY WAR AS AN INSTRUMENT OF THEOCRATIC AND SOCIAL IDEOLOGY  
IN JUDAIC, CHRISTIAN, AND ISLAMIC HISTORY

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A Thesis  
Presented to the  
Faculty of  
California State University,  
San Bernardino

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In Partial Fulfillment  
of the Requirements for the Degree  
Master of Arts  
in  
Interdisciplinary Studies

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by  
Robert Bruce Brown

June 1997

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by  
Robert Bruce Brown

June 1997


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## ABSTRACT

Social theorists have generally classified the phenomenon of holy war in one of two ways. One school, comprised mainly of secular scholars, has regarded religious rhetoric at face value, assuming that because Jews, Christians and Muslims share a history of holy war advocacy in the development of their respective traditions, holy war is the inevitable consequence of recurring religious fanaticism. The other school, in an attempt to fashion a more spiritually minded discourse, portrays it as an imperfect human attempt to aspire to a nobler ethic, an actualization of the struggle between good and evil in the physical environment of competition. Both approaches are fundamentally flawed. The first does not adequately apply self-defined social scientific methodology to the study of holy war, both in the examination of its latent and manifest functions, or in its relative value as an instrument of ideology. The second is but a thinly disguised attempt to defend the concept of religious militancy and to effectively canonize its various practitioners. Using the following methodology, I will demonstrate how holy war was waged as a particular strategy of theocratic ideology and facilitated the cooperation of various constituencies in pursuit of

specific political and social agendas:

(1) Discussion of the socio-political environments in which theocracies (and then social movements) developed and advocated holy war concepts in Judaic, Christian, and Islamic history.

(2) Examination of holy war advocacy and its related political agenda, vis-a-vis, the use of religion as ideology and propaganda in Judaic, Christian, and Islamic theocracies and social movements.

(3) Analysis of holy war's theoretical development and philosophical approach in Judaic, Christian, and Islamic tradition.

(4) Consideration of Holy Scripture's role in justifying and explaining an accepted context of holy war in Judaic, Christian, and Islamic culture.

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank my graduate committee members, Drs. Cheryl Riggs (Chair), Ralph Salmi and Peter Robertshaw, for their support and encouragement; without their guidance, this project would have proved nearly impossible. I wish to extend a special thanks to my wife, Anna, and my children (all seven) for their patience and understanding and to Julius Kaplan, Dean of Graduate Studies, who gave me this opportunity to contribute something valuable to the body of research on this topic. I also owe a debt of gratitude to Stacey Poffek, History Department Secretary, whose help was indispensable.

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## INTRODUCTION

It is the purpose of this thesis project to illustrate how holy war concepts, particularly in the Judaic, Christian and Islamic traditions, were instruments of religious ideology formulated by theocratic states in an attempt to promote a sense of cultural and political unity in times of crisis. Additionally, it will be demonstrated that once these concepts were legitimized through state sanction they were effectively absorbed into the prevalent social environment, becoming effectual activist ideologies. The holy war mentality, therefore, appealed to a variety of socio-political movements in pursuit of credibility and political cohesion. At both the state and activist level, religion performed two functions. First, it served as a comprehensive ideology from which a common culture could be proselytized. Secondly, it acted as a propagandistic instrument, providing justification for the relevant political agenda and giving the average foot-soldier (or activist) a compelling, if uncomplicated, reason to fight. It is the intent of this thesis project to de-mystify the process by which holy war has been waged throughout history and to dispel the notion that the so-called "religious wars" of the past were the mere results of human fanaticism and

spiritual excess.

To facilitate a discussion in which holy war is seen as an element of political strategy that has historically utilized religion both as ideology and propaganda, consideration must be given to the definition of terms.

Webster's New Lexicon refers to *theocracy* as "government by priests or men claiming to know the will of God".<sup>1</sup> This definition, in a general sense, ignores the symbiotic relationship between religion and politics and, more specifically, eludes the process by which religious concepts are expropriated, even mis-applied, by the power structure and utilized to their ultimate political advantage. This ambiguity of terms belies a larger academic malaise concerning the general topic of religion, one which perpetuates the unfortunate prejudices of centuries past.

If the social sciences can do no better than to suggest that theocracies necessarily react to crises with an appeal to fanaticism, then to what extent may we say that the principles of objective science have been applied at all?

The ultimate ethic of science is objectivity. It seems the study of religion has been infected with a secular bias to the extent that a meaningful definition of holy war has been replaced with the simplistic formula of fanaticism. Surely science can do better.

By definition, a theocracy is a type of government. Governments are involved in the struggle for power, both externally through foreign policies and diplomatic relations, and internally as they interact with various demographic groups within their own populations. This attempt to consolidate power results in actual, not phantasmic or ethereal, conflicts that, in turn, demand practical solutions. Despite the nature of theocratic power, and its origins in the development of spiritual charisma (and, consequently, privileged status), the political realities of government, theocratic or otherwise, always necessitate a political, perhaps even worldly, response. In the absence of any pre-existing political ideology (which is really a phenomenon of the last few centuries), theocracies may appeal to sentiments that reflect the broadest cross-section of their populations and that help to provide the very basis of their legitimacy and access to power: i.e., religious beliefs. This does not presume that any given population is unified in a common political or religious struggle; rather, religious ideology appears during periods of intense crisis, when the socio-economic and political environment is threatened by *disunity*, precisely as a method by which a particular constituency may prevail and lead the community in a



decisive fashion. Thus, within middle-eastern Judaism there were indigenous Canaanite populations to contend with, among Christians warring nobles hampered unity, and in the Arab world powerful inter-tribal rivalries threatened to extinguish the young Islamic nation.

A word must be said here concerning the use of the term "nation" in the body of this paper. It is commonly held that nation-states are a product of the modern political era. It is certainly true that modern states possess more complex political ideologies and maintain more highly developed economic systems than did ancient societies. Borders are better established and national identity secured in a more methodical fashion than in the past. But surely, there are exceptions to this rule; witness the birth pangs of nationhood in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the struggle for ethnic identity in government. Additionally, ancient societies were possessed of fully operational (if not complex) economic systems; they maintained long distance trade with other states, enforced well-established geographic borders, and developed cultural ties that held their people together in times of crisis. This latter characteristic may be viewed as a primitive "nationalism" precisely because it performed the same function during the creation of states in the modern era. As a method of

creating this nationalism, theocratic states utilized the ideology of religion just as surely as modern states utilize political ideology in the pursuit of legitimacy. For this reason I used the terms *nation*, *state* and *kingdom* interchangeably within the body of this text.

The commonly held definition of ideology is profoundly vague. Once again, Webster's New Lexicon secondarily refers to *ideology* as "the way of thinking of a class, culture or individual", and this seems to be the commonly accepted definition of the word.<sup>2</sup> The primary definition, however, is "a body of ideas *used in support* of an economic, political or social theory [italics added]." The difference between the two definitions, in fact, highlights the central issues involving theocratic power. The more common, secondary definition suggests that ideology is a separate phenomenon contingent only upon the whims of aggregate groups. The primary, or more accurate, definition ties ideology to the implementation of specific "economic, political or social" agendas. Ideologies, then, are responses to real issues and not the residual consequence of human passion. Religion, as an ideology, can be said to possess a practical dimension that eschews fanaticism, but will avail itself of demagoguery when impending crises preclude

satisfactory explanations.

The Institute for Propaganda Analysis has defined *propaganda* as "The expression of opinions or actions carried out deliberately by individuals or groups with a view to influencing the opinions or actions of other individuals or groups for predetermined ends and through psychological manipulations."<sup>3</sup> The "predetermined ends" of theocratic government differ little from those of other states: political stability, economic viability and territorial integrity.

In each chapter, I attempted to define terms specific to the topic discussed. For example, in the chapter dealing with Islamic holy war (which is an institutional and political reality), I was mindful of the distinguishing characteristics of jihad as a religious concept that actually mitigated against its inclusion as a holy war theory at all. Initially, it was enough to have working definitions of the main ideas central to this thesis, namely: theocracy, ideology, and propaganda. It is hoped that through the process of academic discussion concerning this topic, a consensus may be achieved for a clear definition of holy war, unhindered by the biases of the past. For purposes of clarity I chose to utilize the term "Middle East" to describe the geographic location of

Mesopotamia, Arabia, Egypt, and the Levant. The term "southwest asia" seems vague and non-specific.

In order to emphasize the connection between theocracies and holy war concepts, I arbitrarily chose to end discussion of its development at specific intervals in Judaic, Christian and Islamic history. For obvious reasons (chiefly, the absence of an Israelite kingdom after the Jewish diaspora of the first century B.C.E.), the topic of Judaic holy war can be seriously entertained only up until the period of Roman occupation in Palestine (and certainly no further than the Bar Kokhba rebellion of 132-135 C.E.). In the case of Christianity, I regarded the Crusades as the quintessential expression of Christian holy war, and so I stopped there. One could argue that the religious wars of Europe possessed an element of religious sanction, but if they did, the extent of that sanction certainly paled in comparison to that of the medieval Crusades. In many ways, the warring constituencies of the Reformation and Counter-Reformation represented social movements that derived their holy war mentality and religious ideology from the theocratic kings and popes of the Middle Ages. Similarly, I assigned the period of Ottoman hegemony to represent the apex of Islamic holy war concepts in the east.

Originally, it was my intent to discuss modern

extremist groups and their utilization of holy war as an ideological instrument. In fact, all the requisite elements of the historical period apply to the modern era. Zionism began as a socio-political movement, utilizing holy war themes that had remained dormant since the Jewish Diaspora. These themes were easily transferrable to the establishment of the Israeli state, which, in many respects, resembles a modern theocracy. Similarly, many modern Christian and Islamic political movements have expropriated holy war themes in pursuit of their immediate agendas simply because concepts of holy war have been accepted socially and culturally in their respective religious traditions for centuries. If the socio-political conditions that precipitated the advent of these modern extremist groups were adequately analyzed, they would confirm the basic contention of my thesis: that governments or groups, in the absence of an alternative ideology, will avail themselves of the cohesive properties of religion in response to specific social or political crises. Unfortunately, due to the length and breadth of the historical period, and given the restrictions governing the size of this thesis project, I relegated discussion of the modern era to future research.

## A Survey of the Literature

### Primary Sources:

To a certain extent, I regarded Judaic, Christian, and Islamic Holy Scriptures as valuable first-hand accounts; throughout my research, I used reliable translations for these and other primary sources. Both the New Testament and the Qur'an were produced rather early on in the development of their respective faiths. Hebrew worship of YHWH, on the other hand, preceded the formulation of Scripture by nearly seven hundred years. Therefore, I found it necessary to distinguish Judaic perceptions of history from that which could be independently verified through the modern social sciences, especially given the paucity of contemporaneous corroborative sources and the ever increasing importance of archaeological contributions to the study of ancient Judaic culture. With respect to the scriptural literature of each faith, I attempted to use a several translations for semantic reasons. For example, when discussing Tanak (or Old Testament) literature, I relied on both the definitive Masoretic text and the Peshitta (Aramaic) version. I did this for comparative reasons, the LXX (Septuagint) translation being excluded for its questionable reliability

in the crucial area of ancient epic poetry. For Qur'anic citations I relied on Pickthall's translation, although I augmented his work with other selections, including Dawood's (whose work I consider to be inferior) in an attempt to indicate the problems that have plagued Qur'anic studies in the west.

Early Christian sources include Tertullian, Ignatius of Antioch, St. Justin Martyr, Hippolytus, St. Vincent of Lerin, Orusius, Sculpus Severus, St. Augustine, Eusebius and Leo the Great. Most of these sources I found translated in edited compilations by Anne Fremantle (A Treasury of Early Christianity), Edwin A. Quain (The Fathers of the Church), Philip Schaff (The Nicene and Post Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church), or Jean Comby (How to Read Church History). The complete works I cited for early Christianity were Eusebius' History of the Church and St. Augustine's City of God (upon which I relied extensively). An excellent primary Medieval source, one which illustrates the extent to which Charlemagne was committed to St. Augustine's ideal, can be found in Einhard's Life of Charlemagne, included in Two Lives of Charlemagne (Lewis Thorpe, translator). Other primary sources for the Medieval period have been collected and edited by scholars such as Brian Tierney (The Middle Ages, Sources of Medieval History) and Patrick Geary

(Readings in Medieval History). A veritable wealth of holy war rhetoric may be gleaned from the letters of Gregory VII. These have been translated by Ephraim Emerton in a collection entitled The Correspondence of Pope Gregory VII. I found several first hand accounts of the Crusades in the memoirs of Raymond IV (Count of Toulouse) and Geoffrey of Villehardouin to be helpful as background information, although I did not rely upon them for content; a slightly less contemporary account is that of Joinville's.

Primary Islamic sources, at least those translations interpretive of jihad, are expressed in the body of Hadith literature bequeathed to the Muslim communities throughout the world. These sources rely almost exclusively on the value of interpretation of ideas and are to be distinguished from historical sources that are more relevant to the process by which holy war became an accepted institutional response in Islam. Hadith is likely to stress the "proper" interpretation of jihad as a concept of personal struggle against sin and a political struggle for the independence of the Islamic community. Because it is couched in such hyperbole, however, it appears to preach war. For the purposes of this project, I deferred to sources utilizing the definitive interpretations of al-Bukhari. Contemporary Arab accounts of the Crusades, although I did not consider



them entirely relevant to the specific topic, abound in Amin Maalouf's The Crusades Through Arab Eyes and Francesco Gabrieli's Arab Historians of the Crusades.

## **Secondary sources**

Because the topic of ancient Israelite history is dependent on scriptural considerations, it was necessary to spend some time evaluating interpretive sources. In this regard, I normally deferred to the expertise of established Biblical scholarship. I did, on occasion, disagree with the consensus on some issues; however, in the body of the paper I emphasized whose scholarship I consider authoritative. The scholarship I consulted included Moshe Weinfeld (Deuteronomy and the Deuteronomistic School), Julius Beyer (The Literature of the Old Testament), Richard Elliott Friedman (Who Wrote the Bible?), James D. Martin (The Book of Judges) and Robert Polzin (Moses and the Deuteronomist). Several edited volumes containing the works of J.M. Miller ("Israelite History")<sup>4</sup>, Peter Ackroyd ("The Historical Literature")<sup>5</sup>, Keith Whitlam ("The Former Prophets")<sup>6</sup> and A. Graeme Auld ("Prophecy and the Prophets")<sup>7</sup> were used extensively.

For the vast majority of the material that became, in

effect, a structural model in ancient Israelite history for this work, I consulted six texts. Among these, perhaps the most valuable were Paul Johnson's History of the Jews, the admirable (if somewhat controversial) archaeological analysis of William Stiebing's Out of the Desert?, and the concise yet surprisingly complete information obtained from the Dictionary of Bible and Religion, edited by William H. Gentz. A seminal work by Barnabas Lindars entitled Judges 1-5, A New Translation and Commentary provided me with the most current research concerning the Deuteronomic authorship of "Judges" and was absolutely central to my contention that holy war themes in Israelite history appeared for the first time in the early monarchic period. Several other works, such as Susan Niditch's War in the Hebrew Bible and T.R. Hobbs' A Time for War: A Study of Warfare in the Old Testament, effectively dealt with the general theme of Judaic warfare. Journal articles on the topic of Judaic holy war that I utilized were: Reuven Firestone's "Conceptions of Holy War in Biblical and Qur'anic Tradition" (Journal of Religious Ethics, Spr.'96, 24:99-123) and Michael Walzer's "The Idea of Holy War in Ancient Israel" (Journal of Religious Ethics, Fall'92, 20:215-235).

Given the tendency of western historians to categorize Christian concepts of war within the Augustinian "just war"

model, I had to re-interpret much of the existing historical literature. I do not think that secularism has been uncritical of Christian warfare; I simply believe that for cultural reasons western warfare has been favorably contrasted to that of the Islamic east. Thus, "just war" has been viewed as a Christian concept, "holy war" as an Islamic feature.<sup>8</sup> There are, however, exceptions to this rule. Several scholars, including Runciman and Armstrong, have effectively challenged this notion (unfortunately, they do not apply an operational definition of holy war in the process). As will be seen, I attempt to prove a definitional model of Christian holy war based on Augustine's works.

The most noteworthy attempt to define Christian concepts of war, to date, is that of John Kelsay and James Turner Johnson, who effectively draw appropriate parallels between Christian just war and Islamic holy war and explain their expropriation by modern political ideologies.<sup>9</sup> This explains their reliance on variant *sunni* and *shi'i* traditions involving theories of war; it is essential to a modern understanding of holy war, given the advent of Islamic revival and the impact of the Iranian revolution on extremist movements.<sup>10</sup> I, on the other hand, have sought to establish the religious ideological roots from which holy

war theories emerged, not the modern political ideologies that expropriate them (although I entirely agree with Kelsay and Johnson that religion and political ideology are complimentary of one another). Kelsay and Johnson have also worked hard to establish a Christian *theoretical* model of just war. In this regard, however, I believe that Augustine articulated two separate and distinct theories of war: the just war and the holy war.<sup>11</sup> Established texts of Medieval ecclesiastical history include Henry Chadwick's The Early Church, Thomas Bokenkotter's A Concise History of the Catholic Church, Arnold Harris Matthew's The Life and Times of Hildebrand and a multi-volumed work entitled The History of the Christian Church, edited by Anselm Biggs.

Because the idea of holy war *as an ideology* became the primary focus for this thesis project, the particulars of crusading warfare were of little interest. What mattered was the agenda of the theocratic leaders of the Crusades, i.e., kings and popes. Histories tracing the evolution of the crusading ideal were of particular importance in this regard. Aside from consulting Runciman, whose multi-volumed work represents the authoritative text on the Crusades, I also utilized Jonathan Riley-Smith's The First Crusade and the Idea of Crusading, Carl Erdman's The Origin of the Idea of Crusade and Ronald C. Finucane's Soldiers of the Faith.

Upon undertaking the necessary research for the chapter on Islam, I was cognizant of the fact that very few, if any, western sources have treated the Islamic concept of jihad with the objectivity it deserves. Works such as Dilip Hiro's Holy Wars, The Rise of Islamic Fundamentalism, and G.H. Hansen's Militant Islam, although they provided some valuable basic history, tended to perpetuate the western stereotype of Islam as a militant faith. Other sources, such as Hazrat Mizra Tahir Ahmad's Murder in the Name of Allah provided balance, however, and articulated the notion that, among the three monotheistic traditions, theoretical Islam imposed a greater number of restrictions on the ability to wage war than either Judaism or Christianity. The research of Ralph Salmi, Cesar Adib, and George K. Tanham (Islam and Conflict Resolution, Theories and Practices) served as valuable background information.

Seminal research into the period of early Islamic conquest has been conducted by John W. Jandora (The March From Medina: A Revisionist Study of the Arab Conquests) and Fred McGraw Donner (The Early Islamic Conquests), for purposes of this paper, I relied on Donner's work. For Qur'anic exegesis and interpretation, I consulted John Burton's The Collection of the Qur'an, Kenneth Cragg's The Event of the Qur'an, and Helmut Gatje's The Qur'an and its

Exegesis. I utilized the historical information contained in al-Tabari's histories, translated by Philip Fields, the excellent work of Elias Shoufani (Al-Riddah and the Muslim Conquest of Arabia), The Cambridge History of Islam edited by Holt, Lambton and Lewis, R. Stephen Humphreys' Islamic History: A Framework for Inquiry, Sydney Nettleton Fisher's and William Oschenwald's The Middle East: A History, Albert Hourani's A History of the Arab Peoples, Arthur Goldschmidt's A Concise History of the Middle East, M. Fuad Korpulu's The origins of the Ottoman Empire, and Ira Lapidus' A History of Islamic Societies. I relied upon these historical texts extensively.

Utilizing these sources, it was possible to adequately investigate the sources of holy war theory in monotheistic tradition. It does seem interesting that religious ideology operates so well within the framework of a monotheistic culture. Perhaps this is due to the fact that central theocratic governments are enhanced by development of the notion that one god, supreme and all-powerful, rules the physical environment of humanity. To be sure, the ancient Egyptians had advanced the idea that their rulers were semi-divine within the context of a polytheistic society. In fact, it would be difficult not to regard theirs as a theocratic state. The sheer multiplicity of gods, however,

made it hard to mandate a national will as local dieties were arguably symbolic representatives of various Egyptian sub-regions and their particular political agendas. Until Akhenaten's attempt to unify the two kingdoms under one god, there had been no effort to exercise the influence of one constituency over the other in ancient Egypt. Once the ascendancy of a particular constituency was achieved, a single, directed effort at creating a "national" unity became possible. Despite the polytheism of Mesopotamia, various sky gods achieved dominance in Sumerian, Akkadian, Assyrian, and Babylonian pantheons, each exercising a particular influence on their respective communities' will to wage war. The success of these "dominant gods" and their intimate relationship to the state and its leaders served as a model for ancient Middle-Eastern societies in pursuit of cultural and political cohesion. In the region of Canaan, a small ethnic community, centered on the growing influence of one of these militant gods, effectively united the concepts of divine will and nationhood and defined (perhaps for the first time) the relevancy of holy war.

While Western historians have adequately explained the rational expropriation of religious themes for purposes of war in ancient polytheistic societies, they remain obstinant in their unwillingness to discuss the same process occurring

in the monotheistic tradition. Monotheism has seemingly cornered the market on fanaticism. It is the purpose of this thesis project to address this misunderstanding.



## CHAPTER ONE: JUDAIC NATIONALISM

The eventual success of YHWH in achieving singular devotion among the Israelite tribes developed slowly and methodically. At first, the ancient Jews entertained a pantheon of gods similar to that of various semitic peoples inhabiting the Arabian, Mesopotamian, and Canaanite regions. Gradually, the notion that one God held sway over all creation took hold and flourished in the nomadic environment of early Israelite culture. In a similar fashion, both Judaic history and Jewish religious ideology developed over time. This chapter will critically analyze the sources of Judaic history in an attempt to piece together the process by which holy war gained political, social, and scriptural approval. It will be demonstrated that religious ideology emerged during specific periods of social and political crisis in the Israelite community, most notably in the monarchic period, occasionally re-emerging as an effective tool of political opposition in the world of Hellenistic imperialism. Crucial to this task is the subjection of Biblical sources to the rigors of textual analysis.

Western scholarship has inherited a rich and venerable tradition of textual analysis and criticism from the humanists of the Renaissance period. Since Lorenzo Valla's

exposure of Constantine's "Donatio" as a forgery, efforts have been made to regard religious and ecclesiastical literature with some measure of objectivity. Even the Bible has come to be seen as a historical source of arguable integrity; reliant, to a certain extent, on whatever corroboration may be achieved through the application of modern social sciences.

That is not to say that Biblical historicism is not without its defenders; indeed, in recent years there has emerged a "revival" of scriptural literalism that has helped to invigorate the Christian apologetic movement. Still, if the Bible's champions demand that it be treated as serious history, then it should be subjected to all the tests that a true historical document requires. Surprisingly, there are those who still attempt to date the exodus based upon the eruption of Thera, simply because this catastrophic event helps to explain the parting of the Red Sea; an event we accept as history only because the Bible mentions it. Scholarship, however, demands more than a faithful acceptance of time-honored geneologies and mythic events in order to render a reasonable verdict concerning the accuracy of the historical record contained in the Bible. With a prudent and discriminating use of external sources and internal textual analysis, however, one may reliably piece

together the essential elements of ancient Judaic history.

For the present moment, it will be sufficient to compare what we know about the ancient Judaic period from Biblical sources with the contemporary historical record and the discoveries made available through the archaeological sciences. The Bible indicates twelve main periods preceding the Diaspora that are relevant to my research:

- (1) The Patriarchal Age
- (2) Slavery (in Egypt)
- (3) Exodus
- (4) Conquest of Canaan
- (5) Judges (Confederation of Tribes)
- (6) Monarchy
  - (A) United
  - (B) Divided
- (7) Earlier Prophets
- (8) Assyrian Conquest
- (9) Babylonian Exile
- (10) Return to Palestine
- (11) Seleucid Domination
- (12) Roman Occupation

This outline serves as both an aid and a critical tool with which to compare the information extrapolated by historians and textual critics concerning the socio-political environments of the ancient Judaic state with the stated Biblical interpretation of history. In the attempt to reconstruct Judaic history and the scriptural acceptance of a holy war ideology, it seems reasonable to begin with the conquest of Canaan.

## Conquest of Canaan (1258-1220 B.C.E.)

The discussion of events surrounding the supposed conquest of Canaan by the Israelites is crucial, for it was precisely during this period that Moses was credited with perhaps the first expression of the Judaic holy war ethic in Biblical tradition.<sup>12</sup> If the conquest narratives cannot be trusted as historical, however, it is clear that the idea of Judaic holy war must be re-assigned to a later period in Judaic history.

According to the Biblical account, the Israelites wandered for forty years in the wilderness surrounding the area of Kadesh-Barnea, before entering Canaan (Num.20:14).<sup>13</sup> From there they launched an invasion of Canaanite territory, that traversed the regions of the Negeb and either skirted or passed through Edom, in an attempt to conquer the cities of the north.<sup>14</sup> Specific mention is made of locations such as Beer-sheba and Hormah, in the Negeb, as urban centers contemporaneous with this invasion by the Bible.<sup>15</sup> The kingdoms and/or cities of Trans-Jordan listed are: Moab, Edom, Punon, Obeth, Dibon, Jericho and Ai.<sup>16</sup>

There are immediate problems in ascribing historical accuracy to the conquest narratives of the Old Testament. According the "terminus ante quem" provided to us by the

Merneptah stele, the Israelite exodus may be dated to the period preceding the reign of its author (1224-1214 B.C.E.).<sup>17</sup> Biblical genealogies, used by literalists as a dating method for the exodus, are absolutely unreliable given the exaggerated life spans of the central characters. Thus, we are left with the compelling evidence of Ex.1:11 (corroborated with archaeological data) that places the Israelite captivity within the reign of Ramses II, just before that of Merneptah.<sup>18</sup> Recent attempts to redate the exodus to the fifteenth century B.C.E. have been largely unsuccessful.<sup>19</sup> We can be reasonably assured, therefore, that if the exodus occurred at all, it took place some time in the thirteenth century B.C.E. According to traditional dating methods, this means that any invasion of Canaanite lands must have occurred during the Late Bronze Age (1500-1200 B.C.E). Unfortunately, the archaeological record confirms nothing of the sort.

Interestingly, the absence of identifiable artifacts indicates that there were no Late Bronze Age settlements, either in the Negeb, corresponding to the supposed locations of Beer-sheba and Hormah, or in Trans-Jordan, in the areas of Hesbon, Aroer, Punon, Obboth, Dibon, Jericho or Ai.<sup>20</sup> This problem has led some to question the archaeological dating system that places the end of the Middle Bronze Age

shortly before the fifteenth century B.C.E.

Correspondingly, such critics as John Bimson theorize that this allows for a much earlier exodus, which would potentially explain the absence of Late Bronze Age artifacts at specific locations traditionally associated with the conquest.<sup>21</sup> In actuality, Bimson's theory poses more problems than it pretends to solve. For one thing, it places the period of conquest and Hebrew Judges concurrent with a well documented Egyptian presence in Canaan.<sup>22</sup> The fourteenth century Amarna tablets' reference to "Hapiru" insurrections are only tenuously connected to the Israelite community, due to the probability that the term was descriptive of social status rather than ethnicity.<sup>23</sup> Seemingly, we are presented with a historical paradox: a thirteenth century invasion of Canaan for which there is no corroborative archaeological evidence. This problem has resulted in a number of attempts to construct alternative "models" for the Israelite occupation of Canaan. Among these are the: (1) Settlement and (2) Internal-Revolt hypotheses. The Internal-Revolt model depends almost exclusively on social theory and has been regarded as suspect. For purposes of this thesis project, the Settlement model was used, because it allows for some moderation. Regardless of the method of occupation, it is

clear, the Israelites settled in Canaan. A reasonable assumption, given the absence of evidence for wholesale destruction, is that they probably migrated there in small numbers some time in the thirteenth century B.C.E. Despite this, the fact remains that if the Biblical record cannot be trusted as a reliable historical source, then we may assume that the "conquest" of Canaan represents nothing less than an invention of later authors intended as an explanation of the Israelite presence there. The holy war themes expressed in conquest stories, therefore, may also be seen as subsequent additions. There is concrete evidence that they were inserted into the books of Joshua and Judges by an author of the monarchic period.<sup>24</sup>

#### **The Period of Judges (1200-1000 B.C.E.)**

The evidence suggests that by the twelfth and eleventh centuries B.C.E. an Israelite community existed within the territorial boundaries of Canaan. During this period, a loose confederation of tribes ruled by charismatic "judges", or military chieftans, fought occasional battles with the surrounding ethnic groups indigenous to the region. In no sense could this confederation have been construed as a mechanism for a unified response to the external crises of

the period.<sup>25</sup> It is clear, in fact, that the tribes under the authority of the judges reacted only defensively to the various threats to Israelite security, and not aggressively as some have thought.<sup>26</sup>

It was at this time, the scholarly consensus maintains, that the oldest Judaic war hymn, the "Song of Deborah", was composed.<sup>27</sup> This poem exemplifies the very essence of an ancient Israelite holy war mentality. The practice of consulting with God before battle is clearly demonstrated in the actions of Deborah, and the language of Judges 6:13 and 6:31 hints of God's endorsement of war.<sup>28</sup> If these themes are accurate indications of Israelite culture in the confederacy period, then, it must be surmised, a holy war mentality preceded the monarchy by at least two hundred years.

There are problems, however, with the credibility of the consensus on this issue. Many of the scholars who champion the antiquity and accuracy of this poem actually take a literalist approach in their methodology. A considerable lack of attention is paid to the *historical* consensus, in this regard. For example, there is considerable evidence that the practice of divine consultation before battle was an ancient and venerable Middle-Eastern tradition designed to invoke God's



protection, not his approval, in war.<sup>29</sup> This practice had arguably become a ritual observance devoid of any profound significance for the Israelite community.<sup>30</sup> Recent research has tended to throw doubt on the supposed antiquity of the poem in question, as well. It would not be an overstatement to conclude that the "unanimous" consensus on the issue has been effectively shattered. A comprehensive study of "Deborah's Song" was completed in 1995 by Barnabas Lindars. This seminal work represents the current scholarly research concerning the pre-monarchic period of Judaic literature and may form the basis for a new consensus.<sup>31</sup> Lindars' position, based on an almost line-by-line assessment of "Deborah's Song", is that the poem was probably composed sometime during the early monarchy and is singularly out of place in the period of judges.<sup>32</sup>

### **The Monarchic Period (1020-597 B.C.E.)**

In discussing the Israelite monarchy, one must be cognizant of the various stages through which it passed. For example, upon examining the early monarchy, a serious scholar should not expect to find mature, fully formed expressions of the holy war ethic. Instead, scholarly

analysis might detect indications of an emerging agenda that necessitated such expressions. Realistically, it would be naive to classify the early period as part of the *united monarchy* at all, given the hesitancy with which many sectors of the Israelite community surrendered autonomy. Only after the considerable military successes of David could it be truly said that the Israelite kingdom was, in any sense, united geographically.

If we are to impute some credibility to the research of Lindars (and others who comprise the new consensus), then it would be reasonable to expect that holy war themes like those expressed in the book of Judges were the product of a later author. Arguably, this author operated sometime in the monarchic period. As will be demonstrated, oral history, Yahwistic, Elohist, and Deuteronomistic literary composition converged in the monarchic period to produce a Judaic model for holy war. The periods assigned to each of these literary traditions are as follows: early monarchy (oral histories), united monarchy (Yahwistic sources) and divided monarchy (Elohist and Deuteronomistic sources). It would be the task of the Deuteronomistic historian(s) to essentially reconstruct Judaic history in the books of Deuteronomy, Joshua, Judges, I and II Kings, I and II Chronicles, and Samuel.<sup>33</sup>

As previously noted, the reign of Saul can be placed in the period of the early monarchy, even though he did nominally rule over a unified kingdom. Until David's successful campaign against the Philistines, the Israelite kingdom would remain geographically small. David's reign(1000-961 B.C.E.) does, in fact, straddle the periods of early and united monarchy; and although he began the trend of centralization typical of the united monarchy, the period of true unification belongs to Solomon's reign (961-922 B.C.E.), when state-implemented policies and the nationalistic ideology of religion complimented each other. That is not to say that the task of creating a unified ideology was completed under Solomon; in fact, precisely because there were no external crises during this period, the issue remained relatively dormant. It would not be until the catastrophic Assyrian invasions of the seventh century B.C.E. that the dire necessity for a nationalism would emerge, producing the work of the Deuteronomic school of history (it was during the reign of Josiah that a fragment of the Deuteronomic law code was "discovered" in the Jerusalem temple).<sup>34</sup>

## **The Early Monarchy (1020-1000 B.C.E.)**

The initial causes that produced the institution of the monarchy and resulted, almost four hundred years later, in the extreme nationalism of Josiah's reign could be found at the end of the period of judges. The confederation found it increasingly difficult to survive the highly competitive environment of the ancient Middle-East as the Israelite tribes had many adversaries with which to contend for resources.<sup>35</sup> A decisive moment had arrived in Israelite history. The need for a strong, unified government that could foster and protect a cultural identity, and thereby insure the survival of the Israelite community, now worked to produce the institution of the monarchy. In addition, this monarchy would marry the secular prerogatives of military defense and economic policy with the unique attributes of religious authority. In short, Israel developed as a theocracy.<sup>36</sup>

Initially, this fledgling monarchy suffered under the inconsistent leadership of Saul, who fought tirelessly against the external threats to Israel but offended the general population with his volatile personality.<sup>37</sup> The Israelites had been hesitant to hand over such authority to a single individual; the very notion seemed to violate their

sense of independence and autonomy. This wariness of central authority was typical of the prophetic community. The prophets, who had wielded considerable charismatic power in the early Israelite communities, feared an erosion of their power base, once the king was appointed. The popular cry for political cohesion was too insistent, however, and the prophet Samuel relented, placing Saul on the throne of Israel. Although he blessed the new king, Samuel performed the ritual with a warning:

"This will be the manner of the king that shall reign over you: he will take your sons and appoint them unto him...and he will take your daughters to be performers and to be cooks and to be bakers. And he will take your fields, and your vineyards, and your olive yards, even the best of them to his servants...He will take a tenth of your flocks and ye shall be his servants."<sup>38</sup>

These words were especially meaningful to the tribal leaders who, for their own reasons, resented any circumvention of their independent political status. As the power of this monarchy grew, eclipsing the influence of both prophet and patriarch, so did rural opposition to the policies of centralized government.<sup>39</sup> The task facing the monarchy was to effectively counter these rural concerns with an appeal

to a greater concept: namely, the notion of Israel as a nation under the protection of Yahweh. It is no accident of history that in the subsequent environment of the united monarchy the "Song of Deborah", with its nationalistic themes, was most probably composed.

### **Scriptural Developments**

As the need for political centralization and militarization increased, there emerged a genre of propaganda that expropriated traditional devices (Judaic verse) in an attempt to construct a national polity, based on the unitive properties of religious culture. At first, it comprised only an awkward attempt to place nationalistic motifs in the chaotic years of confederacy. As the integrity of this propaganda developed, Yahweh became the symbol of divine leadership and would be increasingly perceived as the agent who shared His salvific properties with the King. It was, arguably, in the time of David's reign (certainly by the end of Solomon's) that another nationalistic poem, "The Song of the Sea" would find its way into the Israelite vocabulary. "The Song of the Sea" was a significant piece of Judaic verse, most notably for its reference (the first one of its kind in history) to Yahweh

as a God of war, who protected and nurtured the Israelite community.<sup>40</sup> Although Biblical "purists" argue that ample evidence exists elsewhere in scripture for a God of retribution, it becomes essential to determine when these specific elements of Scripture were developed, either verbally or in their final written form.

Biblical narrative is largely the product of four interwoven sources: The J (Yahwist, 10-9th centuries B.C.E.), E (Elohist, 9-8th centuries B.C.E.), D (Deuteronomist, 8-7th centuries B.C.E.), and P (Priestly, 6th century B.C.E.) schools of literary tradition.<sup>41</sup> The Bible, therefore, cannot be read as a chronological document due to the ideological and social agendas that obtained at the various times of composition, requiring the creation of history (as oral verse and written prose) long after the events it describes occurred. Thus, although the Exodus most probably took place in the thirteenth century B.C. and was rendered verbally into the collective Israelite consciousness, it was not until the tenth and ninth centuries that specific elements of that story, contained in such poems as "The Song of the Sea", were recorded in written form by the Yahwist source.<sup>42</sup> Additionally, much of scripture did not appear in its final written form until after the influence of the Priestly source who, operating in exilic times, edited and

redacted the poems, folk-tales, and fragmentary accounts that eventually comprised the Pentateuch.

The initial task of the scriptural scholar, then, is to determine which books of the Bible were more heavily influenced by one school or another, and when they were written. The following table depicts the current consensus concerning Biblical authorship relevant to this thesis project<sup>43</sup>:

|                       |            |
|-----------------------|------------|
| Genesis               | J, E, P    |
| Exodus                | J, E, D, P |
| Leviticus             | P          |
| Numbers               | J, E, P    |
| Deuteronomy           | E, D       |
| Joshua                | D          |
| Judges                | D          |
| I Samuel<br>II Samuel | D<br>D     |

Note the prominence of the Deuteronomic historian in the creation of early texts, particularly those whose subject matter pertains to the conquest narratives (Deuteronomy, Joshua, Judges and I and II Samuel). The socio-political agenda of this Deuteronomic historian(s) will be subsequently discussed at length in an analysis of the



divided monarchy.

The table also helps to illustrate that the J, or Yahwist, literary tradition was instrumental in the early construction of exodus texts, at precisely the same time that nationalistic poems such as "The Song of Deborah" and "The Song of the Sea" (in their pristine oral renditions) were emerging as monarchical propaganda for centralization. This represents nothing less than "polemic history", in which the alienation of indigenous cultures was achieved through the sanction of holy war. In their scholarly analysis of the Yahwist source, David Rosenberg and Harold Bloom have observed that the self-defined "jealousy" of the Israelite God reflects, in essence, the "zeal of the divine warrior."<sup>44</sup> Additionally, Rosenberg and Bloom have found that the exodus represented, for the Yahwist author, not a liberation from bondage so much as the beginning of a "new exile" (forty years of wandering and the uncertainty of the confederation period).<sup>45</sup> The Yahwist author, then, probably regarded the establishment of an Israelite kingdom as a type of political and social renewal for the community. In this context, even the prohibition of images was an expression of Yahweh's "dynamism", a dimension that contributed to the Davidic notion that "everything that matters is perpetually new."<sup>46</sup> The two nationalistic poems of the period were expressions of this renewal in which a new nationalism,

centered on faith in Yahweh and his representative the King, was emerging. This process would come to fruition during the reign of Solomon, when the Yahwist author refined and institutionalized the concept of theocracy in scripture.<sup>47</sup>

### **The United Monarchy (1000-922 B.C.E.)**

What did this "renewal" of Israelite culture entail? For one thing, it resulted in the establishment of political and religious authority in Jerusalem. The relocation of the Ark of the Covenant there by David set the stage for portentous political and religious reforms that would further sabotage the autonomy of rural constituencies.<sup>48</sup> Significantly, it was David who finally subdued the Philistine armies, utilizing, no doubt, the impressive "warrior zeal" the Yahwist author had toiled so tirelessly to produce. Given the reasons for centralization, the emphasis on "renewal" in this period, and the developing propagandistic tools utilized to pursue nationalistic goals, a national ideology now began to emerge. In this regard, the "blessings of Yahweh" on the nation entailed nothing less than Ellul's "predetermined ends" of government: political stability, economic prosperity, and territorial integrity.

As the military stature of Israel improved, political

and religious reforms were pursued vigorously. Under Solomon, the institution of the monarchy became synonymous with religious authority and the temple in Jerusalem emerged as the effective royal dynastic chapel of the the King.<sup>49</sup>

The course pursued by Solomon provoked considerable opposition to his policies, expectedly from those traditional pockets of disaffected constituencies that continued to suffer from diminished status: tribal leadership and the prophetic schools. Although prophetic opposition to state policies dared not raise its voice too loudly in the Solomonic period, an anti-monarchic sentiment, born of dissatisfaction with the corvee began to emerge. This political feeling would express itself in subsequent movements as a loyal Yahwistic critique of royal "orientalism".<sup>50</sup> Just as the pro-monarchic Yahwistic authors of scriptural tradition were helping to create a religious propaganda for the state, prophetic social movements were beginning to incorporate holy war motifs into their own agendas. It was the specific intent of the Yahwistic author, who reinterpreted the period of exodus and conquest in nationalistic and theocratic terms, to delegitimize the opposition both with "historical" proofs and theological statements based on Scripture.

### **The Divided Monarchy (922-597 B.C.E.)**

When the social tensions of unification became too much for the disparate tribes to bear, the kingdom ruptured in 922 B.C.E, leaving Jeroboam in the north to rule over the larger kingdom of Israel and Rehoboam in the south to administer Judah. Throughout the period of divided monarchy, the northern and southern kingdoms continued the process of centralization but with varying reactions from their respective opposition movements.

In a way, the northern kingdom contained the seeds of its own destruction. It had been the northern rural tribes, suffering under the yoke of forced labor in the south, that had rebelled against Jerusalem. The most virulent anti-government forces, then, were concentrated in the kingdom of Israel. In an attempt to subvert any invasion plans from the south, however, Israel embarked on the same centralization policies that had proven to be the downfall of the unified kingdom. Within fifty years of its inception, the Israelite kingdom, led by the powerful Omri dynasty, located its religious and political authority in the urban centers of Bethel and Samaria.<sup>51</sup> This resulted in a great chasm between the cities and the rural poor that might have provoked tribal opposition were it not for the

state's accomodation of local cultic traditions and practices. To a certain extent, the royal patronage of indigenous Baal cults and the erection of the golden calf at Bethel mollified local opposition to royal policies. Unfortunately, these attempts at synchrotism only angered the prophetic community, which now positioned itself as God's scourge on the monarchy.

Increasingly, the prophets of Israel had witnessed the erosion of their political and moral authority in society. Now, they could only watch as in the north they were replaced with "court prophets", who were nothing more than royal sycophants.<sup>52</sup> Such men comforted the apostate Ahab in his campaigns against Ben-Hadad (Kings 20:13).<sup>53</sup> This obvious circumvention of proper authority offended the sense of moral conscience and orthodoxy of the prophets. In the north, their outrage would vent itself in aggressive, anti-monarchical outbursts tinged with the moral imperatives of holy war.<sup>54</sup>

In Judah, to the south, criticism was much less harsh, partly because the most violent opposition to monarchy had always been in the north, but also, because the southern kingdom was much smaller and the burden of administration was less severe.<sup>55</sup> Additionally, Judaeen Kings like Jehosophat (873-840 B.C.E.), rather than capitulate to local

politics by assimilating indigenous Canaanite culture, chose to utilize the religious community of Jerusalem to enforce cultural unity throughout the rural areas of Judah.<sup>56</sup> This did not always work, however, and occasionally the need arose to repair the damage done by someone like Athalia (Ahab's sister), who had attempted to "Canaanize" Judah.<sup>57</sup> Interestingly, the first of the great southern prophets, Isaiah, began chastizing King Uzziah for his apostasy directly after the destructive influence of Athaliah's reign. Still, the southern prophets always ended their discourses with messianic references, promising the future glory of Judah under the restoration of the Davidic line.<sup>58</sup> This stood apart from the gloomy themes expressed by critics of the northern kingdom, as exemplified in the discourses of Amos and Hosea. Perhaps sensing the tenuous existence of Israel, which found itself assailed by prophets and menaced by emerging Aramaean and Assyrian hegemony, the Elohist author emerged. The Elohist attempted, in ways startlingly similar to the Yahwist of the United Monarchy, to craft a northern nationalism.<sup>59</sup> Although it ultimately failed in convincing the north to unite, the Elohist literature would become another of the great "schools" on which later scripture based its authority.

Sufficient diversity among the Judaeen tribes, coupled

with the mild, yet persistent, prophetic criticism of Isaiah and the heterodoxy of the north, produced a need for a southern rearticulation of the Yahwistic nationalism so recently abandoned. Indeed, the climate had become almost desperate after the fall of Israel to the armies of Assyria in 720 B.C.E., a blow that shook the Judaeen kingdom to its very core.<sup>60</sup> The combined forces of state and religious authority, in the south, had to somehow reproduce a sense of cultural identity and military resolve unequalled since the era of David and Solomon. The united monarchy had successfully created Israel's Warrior-God, now the Judaeen kingdom had to resurrect him in an effort to convince the people to fight unceasingly and unmercifully against the powerful forces amassing outside the Judaeen borders.

As fortune would have it, the timely "discovery" of the Deuteronomic Law occurred at precisely this juncture in Judaic history, providing the Judaeen king Josiah (622 B.C.E.) with the framework from which a new theocratic nationalism could be constructed.<sup>61</sup> The chapters of Deuteronomy included in this fragment, among other things, expounded upon the events surrounding the Joshuan campaign in Canaan immediately following the migration of Israelite tribes from Egypt in the thirteenth century B.C.E. Given the lack of archaeological evidence to support the existence

of this campaign, it can be surmised that the Deuteronomic author responsible for the Temple Scroll created this story for reasons comprehensible only to the intended audience of his day. What was the underlying political and social environment that determined the views of that audience, then?

In 622 B.C.E., during the reign of Josiah, the southern kingdom still reeled from the paralyzing shock of the eighth century Assyrian invasion of Israel. The northern kingdom withered under this fierce assault, and its people's political and religious institutions were subsequently assimilated into Assyrian and Aramaic culture.<sup>62</sup> Ominous signs in the east indicated the growing power of Babylon; at best, survival for the tiny Judaeen kingdom seemed tenuous. The example of northern absorption into Aramaic culture must have convinced the Deuteronomist of the absolute necessity for unity and unquestioning loyalty and sacrifice. It was no time for scruples in the conduct of war; the situation called for ruthless defense of the nation, lest the fate of the north (the annihilation of Judaic culture) should befall the south.

Interestingly, when one really examines the holy war exhortations traditionally associated with the discourses of Moses in Deuteronomy, there appears to be a considerable



emphasis placed on the uniqueness of Judaic culture and the danger of its possible "contamination" by Canaanite influences. The charismatic liberator of Israel was portrayed as having urged the Israelites, when engaging Hittites, Amorites, Canaanites, Perizzites, Hivites or Jebusites in battle to:

"...save alive nothing that breatheth,  
that *they teach you not to do after all  
their abominations*, which they have done  
unto their gods." [Italics added].<sup>63</sup>

This reference to *alien* culture is strangely out of context in an environment of diverse Israelite interests, especially given the autonomy of the tribal unit. Simply put, a unified Israelite culture did not exist in the post-exodus period of migration; therefore, it could hardly have been in imminent danger of corruption. The cultural environment of the Judaeen kingdom in 622 B.C.E., however, inherited the themes of unification and nationhood so adequately crafted by the early monarchical and Yahwistic authors, despite the stresses they had endured after the fragmentation of the kingdom. The words of Moses, and many of the "historical" figures contained in the books of Joshua, Judges, I Samuel and I and II Kings, arguably belong to Judaic society as it existed in Josiah's reign and reflected the influence of a new author, the Deuteronomist, and his political agenda.<sup>64</sup>

This agenda included the insertion of holy war themes in conquest narratives that possessed great propagandistic value in the effort to invent a contemporary nationalism.<sup>65</sup>

There is currently a lively discussion among scholars with regards to determining the period in which the Deuteronomic Historian actually exerted his influence on the scriptural literature of his day. Martin Noth has concluded that the entire Deuteronomic History must be the work of a single individual, operating in post-exilic Palestine.<sup>66</sup> Cross and Nelson, however, are of the mind that an original body of Deuteronomic writings were completed in the Josian kingdom and redacted, or edited, during the Babylonian exile.<sup>67</sup> It seems, given the connection to its discovery in the Temple, that this latter view concerning Deuteronomy is the more reasonable assertion.<sup>68</sup> Despite disagreement upon the exact date of composition, it is clear that the speeches of Deuteronomical characters are *orations*, at variance with other historical sources, and intended to sway the audience of a later period.<sup>69</sup> In this way, the period of confederacy portrayed in the Deuteronomic Book of Judges was *transformed* into a mythic era of unification and nationalistic resolve more typical of the Monarchic period to come.<sup>70</sup>

Although the theocratic nationalism that placed the appropriate political and religious capitol in Jerusalem was

overthrown in 597 B.C.E. by the Babylonian invasion of Judah, the stature of the Deuteronomist's work was assured. The official orthodoxy concerning Judaic prescriptions for holy war and the future revival of the Jerusalem monarchy (as exemplified in messianic literature) was firmly established in the contributions of the Deuteronomic author.<sup>71</sup> What made the ideas of the Deuteronomist "holy", especially those defining the Judaic concept of war, was their association with the "social values and ideology of the Israelite monarchy."<sup>72</sup> The problem of anti-monarchic sentiment was effectively dealt with through the creation of myths that portrayed the positive contributions of "historical" figures (in spite of their character flaws).<sup>73</sup> In this way, even the negative influence of Solomon could be construed as harmonious with general messianic and nationalistic themes.

The reforms undertaken by Josiah in 622 B.C.E., although they stressed the themes that would become future orthodoxy, were entirely too superficial to be of any use to the Judaeen kingdom of the seventh century. In an attempt to create cultural unity, the misguided king plunged his nation headlong into a bloodbath. Heretic priests and native Canaanite religious figures were massacred as Josiah became obsessed with the unification of society under the

powerful influence of Israelite nationalism.<sup>74</sup> The ineffectiveness of Josian reforms influenced the prophet Isaiah who saw the danger to Judaic culture in spiritual and ethical terms. Thus, the efforts of Josiah were received with some trepidation by the nation and lacked the vitality to unite the kingdom in the face of Babylonian aggression. Jerusalem would fall to the conquering armies in 597 B.C.E.<sup>75</sup>

In retrospect, the holy war themes that emerged during the Period of Monarchy represented only a *theoretical* model for Judaic warfare, in that they were never provided with the opportunity for full implementation.<sup>76</sup> The conquest of Canaan was a mythic event, invented for the purposes of later monarchic propaganda. David's exploits did utilize the crude theocratic nationalism of the day but the model of the Joshuan campaigns had not been invented yet and by the time Josiah reigned in Jerusalem it was too late to stem the tide of Babylonian hegemony. The Period of Exile was spent largely reinterpreting the failures of the past and integrating prophetic themes into scripture. In this way, the Priestly Authors explained that had God withdrawn his protection of Israel, in response to heresy and neglect of his worship.

As the Assyrian Empire came under the domination of

the Persians, the desire for Israelite repatriation increased. In 538 B.C.E., the Israelites were given permission to return to their lands; an event which influenced the Priestly Authors to "rewrite" parts of the Deuteronomic History in I and II Chronicles. This was accomplished for the purpose of providing a political model for the re-establishment of a Davidic kingdom in Jerusalem.<sup>77</sup> The restored monarchy was seriously weakened, however, by a lack of Persian support; it was perceived as a rallying point around which nationalists would cause considerable trouble for the Empire.<sup>78</sup> The fracturing of Judaic politics resulted, in 322 B.C.E., in the absorption of Palestine (re-settled Canaan) into the Empire of Alexander, and hence, into the Hellenistic sphere of Graeco-Roman culture.<sup>79</sup>

#### **Seleucid Domination (201-141 B.C.E)**

After the disintegration of Alexander's empire in 305 B.C.E., when administration of the various satrapies was contested within the upper echelons of Macedonian leadership, Palestine found itself at the center of a geopolitical struggle.<sup>80</sup> The Ptolemaic Dynasty in Egypt initially supported the Seleucid cause against Antigonos,

who had seized the reigns of power in Babylon in 315 B.C.E. After a decisive victory at Gaza, in 312, Seleucus laid claim to all the lands west of Babylon, including Syria and Palestine. Although Antigonus would try to re-establish his influence in the region on several different occasions, he ultimately failed, leaving Seleucid and Ptolemaic interests to contend for political domination. For a considerable length of time, Palestine was to be administered under Ptolemaic rule; however, in 201 B.C.E., Antiochus III took advantage of the chaotic situation after the death of Ptolomy IV Philopator and re-exerted Seleucid control over the Levant.<sup>81</sup>

The process of Hellenization was well under way and culturally, at least, had achieved some success. A class of Hellenized Jews asserted their social and economic influence in Palestine, complimenting the policies of Antiochus IV Epiphanes, who now ruled as the Seleucid king.<sup>82</sup> That is not to say that there was full compliance with Seleucid interests; the traditionally held view that Jewish opposition to Antiochus' policies was based upon religious principle, however, has been largely overstated. In fact, Antiochus' agenda was surprisingly liberal, resembling nothing less than a re-articulation of Alexander's cultural universalism. Antiochus' goals were mainly political and he saw in the promulgation of the Zeus Olympius cult an

opportunity for national and social unity rather than religious persecution.<sup>83</sup> Similarly, the intrigues which resulted in the removal of Onias as High Priest in Jerusalem can be interpreted as the result of *political* power struggles between wealthy Jewish families for prominence in the community and were not indicative of any particular religious agenda.<sup>84</sup> The proposed restructuring of political power, that would establish Jerusalem as a *polis* in the Hellenistic scheme, galvanized the opposition into an organized nationalistic movement.<sup>85</sup>

In the effort to gain popular support, this movement utilized a historical holy war propaganda as a type of unitive methodology. By this time, however, the political struggle for independence was indistinguishable from the ideology it employed. Whereas ancient theocratic government had first employed religious ideology, socio-political independence movements now expropriated it with a devotion deepened by time and tradition. Thus, it seems, Antiochus was entirely justified in equating Jewish religion with Jewish nationalism, as the armies of Judas Maccabeus expropriated orthodox theocratic nationalism from the Deuteronomic literature in the struggle for an independent Judaea.<sup>86</sup> Indeed, the rebuilt Temple was the central symbol of opposition in this nationalistic movement, as the

Maccabean leaders became increasingly obsessed with Seleucid sabotage of legitimate priestly authority (as evidenced by the usurpation of Onias).<sup>87</sup>

The "Hasmonean revolt", as it has been called by historians, must be adequately examined in social scientific terms. To begin with, the word "revolt" is singularly vague and self-defeating; it implies something between a revolution and a rebellion. The nationalistic movement under the Maccabees was in no sense a revolution. It neither advocated nor achieved any *structural change* in the administration of Judaic government, religious law, or cultural institutions. It merely re-articulated the demand for an autonomous Jewish state with a recognized central government in Jerusalem. Additionally, it sought to reverse some of the innovations (especially religious) that had been introduced by the Seleucids in an attempt to foster ecumenism. Antiochus, as determined as he was to introduce Hellenistic religious forms, did not propose the destruction of Jerusalem or the influence of the ruling elite there. He was merely interested in the subversion of Jewish authority to his own purposes; in short, he utilized *existing Jewish institutions* in pursuit of the Hellenistic cause. The nationalistic agenda, in turn, focused on removal of the Seleucids from power and the restoration of a Jewish state.



This fact firmly establishes the "Hasmonean revolt" as nothing more than an uprising, or rebellion, with limited objectives.

Were these objectives indicative of a spiritual agenda, as traditional sources have so insistently maintained? There is evidence to suggest that the Hellenistic reform of Temple worship threatened the political interests of Jerusalem more than it did the spirituality of its inhabitants. If the Judaeen population recognized their monotheism as an object that had withstood incredible odds and countless threats to its existence, then the Hellenistic reforms represented merely another temporary burden that the Jewish nation would have to endure. There were political reasons, however, for opposition to Seleucid policies. Chief among them was the notion that growing dissatisfaction with the Judaic temple cult (indeed, the entire Jerusalem bureaucracy) was increasing among the native (Palestinian) population. This translated as increased support for the policies of Antiochus. Since the re-establishment of an Israelite kingdom in Palestine, the centralization of political and religious authority in Jerusalem had achieved unprecedented levels. The temple sacrifice and laws of ritual observance, as well as staggering taxes in support of the bureaucracy in Jerusalem, produced an increasingly

hostile underclass, known as the *am ha-arez*, who saw the Hellenistic reforms as a welcome respite from the economic and ritualistic burdens placed on them.<sup>88</sup>

Ultimately, however, the theocratic nationalism of scripture was too compelling to ignore and the exhortations to action, which were now laced with the religious fervor of the mythic kingdoms of David and Solomon, began to fall on interested ears.<sup>89</sup> Holy War, in its final incarnation as a Judaic nationalistic instrument, was finally being waged against the Hellenistic unbeliever. In this environment of religious nationalism, the propaganda of the political opposition expropriated the apocalyptic terminology (usually reserved for messianic literature) that defined their enemies as "abominations" in the eyes of the Lord.<sup>90</sup>

#### **Roman Occupation of Palestine (62 B.C.E.-135 C.E.)**

By 142 B.C.E., the Seleucids had succumbed to Jewish nationalist demands, exempting Judah from taxation and allowing the emergence of Simon Maccabeus "great high-priest, military commissioner, and leader of the Jews" to assume the mantle of theocratic power and authority in Jerusalem.<sup>91</sup> With the advent of Roman political influence in the region, Judah's brief attempt to reassert the

theocratic principle of government abruptly ended.<sup>92</sup> If religious objections to Hellenistic assimilationist policies had been the decisive factor in the popularity of Maccabean holy war, then one would expect to find a decrease of nationalistic tendencies in the period of Roman Occupation of Palestine. The Romans, unlike the Seleucids, saw no compulsion to force an ecumenism on the native peoples they conquered, especially if those peoples possessed the historical and scriptural tradition that typified the religion of the ancient Jews. If an ecumenism developed on its own, so much the better; however, the Romans perceived the safest road to political stability to be paved with accomodation and protection of indigenous culture.<sup>93</sup> Despite this, a vibrant nationalism emerged in Roman Palestine that claimed its inheritance from the Maccabean (Hasmonean) uprising of the second century B.C.E.<sup>94</sup>

Given the absence of a threat to religious authority, there arose two separate and distinct Judaic "attitudes" during this period. The "universalistic" attitude tended to focus on religious themes and largely avoided contemporary political reality (consequently surviving well into the period of diaspora). The "particularistic" attitude was a political manifestation of nationalistic trends and represented a continuation of the Maccabean struggle.<sup>95</sup>

Additionally, several groups existed in Judaic society that advocated a variety of responses to the imperialism of Rome: assimilationists, isolationists, and nationalists. The assimilationists saw no disadvantage in the marriage between Judaic and Roman culture; consequently, they cooperated fully with Roman political authority. This group was comprised of wealthy individuals, many of whom occupied high priestly office.<sup>96</sup> Isolationists were apathetic to foreign domination as long as they were left alone to their intellectual and spiritual pursuits. Nationalists, of course, would countenance no toleration of any alien government of Palestine, let alone the presence of the arrogant Romans.

It was indeed the case that Roman government of Palestine was especially cruel, and was demonstrated by the lack of character and foresight of several governors.<sup>97</sup> Increasingly, the Judaeian "monarchy", which was revived by the Roman triumvirate's endorsement of the Edomite Herod, was regarded as an instrument of apostasy and betrayal. The final insult to Judaic nationalists was the partition of Palestine in 57 B.C.E. by Gabinius. This act effectively shattered any political cohesion that had tenuously existed in the province. A testimony to the strength and durability of nationalism in Judaic society exists in the fact that no

amount of public deference to the institution of the temple (as exhibited by Herod's construction) could sway the zealots from their cause: political independence for Jerusalem. By now, because of a Roman policy of accomodation, the cause had been stripped of its religious trappings. Spiritually minded Jews busied themselves with the ritual observance allowed by the Romans and their own intellectual pursuits. Realistically, then, the zealots (and those who would come after them during the Bar Kokhba rebellion) were political agitators, not holy warriors.

For almost fourteen hundred years, Judaic nationalism, founded on the principles of theocratic government and centralization of authority in Jerusalem, had worked with sporadic success to rid the Jewish people of unwanted foreign domination. The rhetoric of holy war had helped to formulate the groundswell of support that made these principles attainable. In the attempts of the Deuteronomist to construct a national past, we can see how, in scripture, "history" became "rhetoric".<sup>98</sup> The strongest theocratic and holy war concepts emerged from periods in which Judaic society experienced great turmoil and social upheaval: The periods of confederacy, Solomonic government, Assyrian conquest, Seleucid domination, and Roman occupation. It would only be the Hasmonean rulers of the second century

B.C.E., however, who would actually enjoy the fruits of total theocratic power. It has been argued by some that Judaic holy war, precisely because it was fashioned in periods of crisis when Israelite political power was weak, was never implemented at all.<sup>99</sup> Given the current research regarding the episode at Masada, it seems premature to deny that a committed Jewish nationalism (translated into holy war rhetoric) existed, at least in Roman Palestine, perhaps even before then. Perhaps it is true that even the monarchic rulers of Israel had been too weak to wage holy war; however, the Hasmonean revolt and subsequent opposition to Roman authority in Palestine certainly took on the aspects of a holy struggle.<sup>100</sup>

The nationalism of theocracy was born of necessity. All around the fledgling Israelite kingdoms larger, more dominating powers existed. For the Jews of the Exodus, God had provided them with the stability they needed. Eventually, as rulers sought to create the sense of national and cultural identity so essential for a united people, they relied on the powerful forces of spirituality. A holy war mentality was seen as a vital component of that effort. In the effort to understand the human proclivity for war, we must acknowledge that religion is often *expropriated* as an ideology. That is not to say that religion has no

culpability in the ability to arouse fervor and conviction; however, if one were to eliminate the *political* motivations for war that typify theocratic government and social activism, then it might well prove that the essential conditions for "religious war" have diminished. Such was the case in Roman Palestine. When the religious agenda was removed from the political struggle for independence, the zealots were left with a rhetoric devoid of spiritual exhortation. After the fall of Jerusalem, the political motives that inspired Judaic holy war would remain dormant until the emergence of the Zionist movement and the establishment of the modern Israeli state.

## CHAPTER TWO: THE CHRISTIAN SWORD

Judaic holy war developed as a propagandistic tool of theocratic government with a means for unifying and coordinating national sentiment in a highly competitive environment. Unlike ancient Judaism, Christianity did not emerge as a faith defined by land covenant. That is to say, although Jesus proclaimed the establishment of a "new covenant" between God and His people, the contract was understood in *spiritual* terms and gradually assumed universal applications. While God's first covenant had promised land (thereby inferring nationhood) to the Hebrew tribes, it was unclear if the new relationship recognized the necessity for a theocratic nation at all, especially given the fact that the "New Jerusalem" was seen as a heavenly city, opened to all who believed. In this sense, the focus of Christianity was not to conquer so much as it was to proclaim the message, attract converts, and endure persecution. Eventually, the Christian Church would develop *alongside* secular institutions (like the imperium and local kingship) that would challenge its status as a theocracy throughout the Medieval Period. In a way, Christian theocracy was a three-headed hydra, each head representing the competing agendas of imperial expansion, papal reform



and local kingship. Initially, like the Israelites of the Ancient Period, the Christians found themselves in a chaotic and competitive environment fighting for their very survival in an empire in which they were regarded as political and religious dissidents. It seemed reasonable, then, that this new faith would develop some justification for conflict, especially given the challenges it faced. After the conversion of Constantine in 312 C.E., it became clear that a national Christian ideology was imminent. Thus began the development of Christian holy war.

It is true that the development of Christian scripture was a product of its time, just as the books of the Torah were of theirs; but, because of the immediacy of the events that it purported to describe, the New Testament's agenda was more rigid than that of the Old Testament. To a large extent, Judaic holy war benefitted from the utilitarian approach of the Israelite community regarding scripture; essentially, scripture was molded in Israel to fit the designs of its theocratic leaders. While Judaic holy war themes advanced, receded, and re-emerged over a period of nearly a thousand years of scriptural development, Christian holy war emerged *independent* of any comparatively long scriptural history, relying instead on the initial Gospel formulated in the first three centuries of Christian

thought. Deprived of a fluid scriptural tradition, the medieval Church found it necessary to interpret this Gospel loosely in an attempt to establish a Christian prerogative for defense. Although, in this sense, scripture was utilized as propaganda, Christians often found New Testament references ambiguous and misleading. For this reason, the Church augmented its defense of Christian warfare with Old Testament verses. With a "deadline" proposed for the acceptance of public revelation after the codification of scripture in 397 C.E., the historical development of Christian holy war themes, based on interpretive elements, became even more apparent.

Briefly outlined, the major trends in Christian history, philosophy, and culture that contributed to the concept of holy war, culminating in the Crusades, were as follows:

- (1) Initial toleration of baptism for those serving in the military.
- (2) A "hostile" reaction to persecution and a negative view of military service (reliance on "pacifistic" teachings of Christ).
- (3) Conversion of Constantine and an acceptance of military service in the defense of a "Christian Empire" (a permanent fixture in the east).
- (4) A theoretical justification for war

against "injustice" and an articulation of holy war as the prerogative of Christian rulers by Augustine (reliance on O.T. and ambiguous N.T. texts).

- (5) Decline of the Western Imperium. German Commanders defending remnants of a Western "Christian Empire".
- (6) A resurgence of "anti-militancy" among Christian writers and Arian kings (in the west), Papal defense of military service as a "lesser virtue".
- (7) Imperial power re-asserted in the west (Justinian's conquests).
- (8) Western suspicion of Byzantine motives. Cautious Papal contacts and eventual alliance with Germanic military powers.
- (9) Islamic expansion in the east. Implementation of Augustine's holy war model by a secular ruler (Charlemagne). Wars fought to defend and extend the faith. Papal objections.
- (10) Ninth century invasions from Muslim, Viking, and Magyar armies. Increasing dependence on military force for survival. Bishops become vassals in the feudal system.
- (11) Emergence of the Pope as a military leader. Papal campaigns against the Normans and Henry IV. Rise in the "ethos of knighthood" and the holy wars of the "reconquista" in Spain.
- (12) Crusade.

## The First Two Centuries of Christianity

Amid the earliest Apostolic contacts with the west, both Peter and Paul attracted a small segment of the Jewish population in Rome. Christianity's reputation as a messianic "mystery cult" inevitably grew, appealing to another, much larger, constituency: the Roman army. Pre-occupied as they were with concepts such as death, resurrection, and personal salvation, Roman soldiers (who retained the western prejudice for tangible philosophies) welcomed a religion whose saviour's existence was well established in the historical record. The best evidence suggesting a sizable Christian presence in the army of Rome comes from Tertullian (200 C.E.) in his attempt to quiet suspicions concerning the popularity of the new faith.<sup>101</sup> Tertullian, of course, would reverse himself and argue passionately against military service when Christian attitudes, fueled by persecution, hardened and he drifted inexorably toward Montanist heresy.

These persecutions would have a profound effect upon later generations of Christians and their participation (or criticism) of military service. The first century persecutions under Nero and Domitian tended to be sporadic, local affairs, unremarkable in their lack of breadth and

zeal. The second century persecution orchestrated during the reign of Marcus Aurelius, however, produced a pervasive anti-militancy in the Christian body.<sup>102</sup> The dual nature of the Roman state as a pagan entity and political oppressor only exacerbated this process. Throughout the first two hundred years of Christianity, however, there seemed to be considerable confusion regarding the proper Christian response to war.

Interestingly, first century Christians borrowed heavily from the militaristic vocabulary (bequeathed to them by the Deuteronomic author of the Torah) in an attempt to convey a sense of spiritual warfare.<sup>103</sup> Although this language was largely metaphorical, it belied a lack of consensus either *for* or *against* military service, even as late as the second century C.E. Certainly, Paul's opinions regarding obedience to civil authority stood in stark contrast to the second century idealism of St. Justin Martyr.<sup>104</sup> St. Justin's intriguing reference to "every other kind of iniquity" suggests that opposition to military service may, at least in part, have been motivated by anti-pagan rather than pacifistic tendencies. Many more Christians heeded the words of Jesus and rendered "to Caesar what belonged to Caesar".<sup>105</sup>

### Third Century Christianity

However Christians defined their duties to the state in these first critical years, by the third century, largely attributable to the cult of martyrdom and a growing resentment of Roman political authority, perceptions were clearly changing. Tertullian, who had boasted of Christian service in the armies of Rome, now in 210 C.E. completely a Montanist, bitterly railed against Christian hypocrites who betrayed their faith by enlistment.<sup>106</sup> His arguments were coherent, although regrettably tainted by his fierce anti-pagan agenda.<sup>107</sup> Others, like Hippolytus, embraced a genuine pacifism.<sup>108</sup> These third century Christian pacifists selectively utilized the various teachings of Jesus that complimented their agenda (Mt.5:9, 26:52; Lk.6:27-28 and Jn.18:36).<sup>109</sup> It must be remembered that, although these teachings carried considerable authority, they had not yet reached the status of canonical scripture. Consequently, it was easy for pacifists to circumvent the more ambiguous, less friendly references to militancy in the teachings of their master (Mt.8:5-13, 10:34-36, Lk.14:23, 22:36 and Jn.2:15).<sup>110</sup> The pacifistic school ignored the Old Testament altogether, not only because of its Warrior-God, but also because there was a growing sense among all Christians that

the old covenant was now superceded by the new.<sup>111</sup>

At the same time that pacifism was beginning to emerge as a Christian ethic, another perspective was being developed that also found its inspiration in the sufferings of the martyrs. In short, the suffering endured by the persecuted Christians of the second century was increasingly seen as having *cleansing* or *purgative* properties.<sup>112</sup> As the purgative effect of martyrdom was acknowledged, Christians began to see the efficacy of sharing the blessings derived from suffering with those misdirected individuals who espoused heresy. Just as faith in suffering was proclaimed a victory in the war against personal sin, so would the application of suffering be proclaimed a valid weapon in the war against heresy. As will be seen, this constituted the first expression of a militant attitude in Christian culture; one which would eventually be directed at the heretic population with purgative measures intended to cleanse them of their perceived iniquities. In a sense, Christian warfare developed from *within*, as a response to those in Christian society who threatened its unity. In the third century, however, there was no recognizable Christian society to speak of; consequently, the "positive" attributes of suffering remained an element of mythic martyrdom. As the fourth century approached, the cultural environment of

the Roman empire was to undergo a fundamental alteration.

#### **Fourth Century Christianity**

Amid the chaotic disintegration of the Roman Tetrarchy in 312 C.E., the ambitious general Constantine achieved a significant military victory at the Milvian bridge just outside of Rome.<sup>113</sup> By itself, this battle would have hardly mattered; the events that subsequently transpired constituted nothing less than a revolution in the way Christians viewed the world around them. Constantine, the Christians insisted, had received a sign from God. There was some initial confusion, however, regarding the proper interpretation of this sign. While some claimed it was the symbol of "Sol Invictus" (the Unconquered Sun), others, especially those who kept the general's confidence, identified it as the "Chi-Ro" of Christian symbology. What is clear is that Constantine regarded Christianity in a much more favorable light after his victory. Specifically, Constantine's so-called conversion to Christianity would have a significant impact on the Christian concept of war throughout the medieval period.

The Edict of Milan produced a surge of mass conversions to the Christian faith, the extent of which has never been



duplicated in history. These new Christians were fundamentally committed to the preservation of the empire. The myth of the Milvian bridge loomed large, convincing many that the empire enjoyed the blessings of God; consequently, it now deserved their protection. In a move startlingly similar to Josiah's purge of the Judaeian Kingdom in 622 B.C.E., Constantine attempted to unify Roman society under the banner of Christianity. Although he remained somewhat tolerant of traditional Roman religion at first, Constantine was eventually swayed by Christian sentiment to deny access to the ancient cultic temples.<sup>114</sup> In this way, Constantine sought to establish the "peace of the church" throughout his empire.<sup>115</sup>

The language of this attempt at theocratic nationalism echoed the extreme lessons of martyrdom; *purgation, chastisement, salvation*. It was theocratic all the more because the emperor now regarded himself as *Isapostolos*, or equal in stature to the original apostles. Church and state were intimate partners in this endeavor, striving to rediscover a national purpose under the auspices of Christian unity. Constantine adopted a strinkingly severe policy in regard to pagans and heretics; he soon enacted legislation that would punish those who disobeyed Imperial decrees with death.<sup>116</sup> It is difficult to ignore the

connections between this policy and the contemporary acknowledgment of martyrdom's efficacy. Additionally, this strident attitude was influencing Christian attitudes toward war. War in the service of a Christian empire, like capital punishment as a means of Christian unity, was increasingly seen as a positive good. Thus, it is apparent that a militant response was developing, throughout the duration of Constantine's reign, as a means of achieving the "pre-determined ends" of Roman government: territorial integrity and social stability.

### **Fifth Century Christianity**

The militancy of Christian society would be codified in theory by the chief theologian of the next generation, Augustine of Hippo (354-430 C.E.). Influenced by the harshness of the Theodosian Code and the increasing instability of the western empire in the late fourth and early fifth centuries, Augustine articulated a coherent philosophy designed to justify the use of force from a Christian perspective. For Augustine, the problem was essential: how may Christians defend empire and faith without violation of the gospel message? The military threats were predominantly from Germanic tribes to the north.

who pressed in on the Roman frontier with uncomfortable regularity. Domestically, Christianity was besieged by a heretical fringe that threatened to splinter the fragile unity of the theocratic state. In regard to heresy, Augustine, at first optimistic about the church's prospects for establishing a constructive dialogue, urged restraint.<sup>117</sup> After his episcopate at Hippo (and the protracted conflict with the Donatist heresy), however, Augustine would become considerably disillusioned.

In actuality, largely due to the deterioration of the western empire (which had been hastened by the demise of the last effective emperor in Rome) Christians increasingly found themselves adrift in a sea of conflicting loyalties. Some still held out hope that with such able commanders as Stilicho and Aetius holding the Vandals and Burgundians in check, there was still a western Christian empire worth defending. Others, surrounded by the reality of imperial decay, acknowledged that the mantle of defense had been inherited by the institutional Church. To a very large extent, Augustine belonged to this group. He had always been critical of Rome from a cultural and spiritual perspective. The idea of Roman culture in decline delighted him; indeed, when Rome was besieged in 410 he refused to mourn its passing. The concept of *theocracy*, however,

intrigued him and he increasingly urged the state to take repressive measures in the war against heresy.

Interestingly, Augustine seemed at home in both camps, weaving his theory of militancy deep within the fabric of Christian society.

There were some in the Church, however, for whom the mantle of defense was an unwelcome burden. These dissenters issued a renewal of third century pacifism that stood in opposition to the "disturbing innovations" of Augustinian theory.<sup>118</sup> For one thing, Augustine had compromised his early views on heresy, taking a much harder line in his opposition to the heretical agenda. By 417 C.E., he was convinced that "righteous persecution" was an indispensable weapon in the Christian arsenal, to be used against heretics with "the spirit of love".<sup>119</sup> The principal opponents of Augustine's new found fervor included such respected Christian figures as Socrates Scholasticus, Sulpicus Severus, and Vincent of Lerins. All articulated the traditional third century response to crisis within the Church; to paraphrase St. Vincent: "to cleave to antiquity, leaving the impious crowd to its own madness."<sup>120</sup>

Applying this same sense of urgency to the problem of national defense, Augustine established the rule by which Christians could effectively measure the efficacy of a

potential war. Specific conditions were rendered for the waging of "just wars" utilizing Constantine's "peace of the church" as a model. Far from the third century Christian ethic, Augustine now regarded military service as nothing less than a charism.<sup>121</sup> The single requirement for the waging of just war, however, was clearly articulated, "A just war", Augustine asserted, "is justified *only by the injustice of the aggressor.*"<sup>122</sup> Augustine did not stop there, however. A true creature of the Constantinian Age, the north African bishop proceeded to develop a theory by which a Christian ruler could wage "holy war", with considerably less restrictions than those imposed on just war.<sup>123</sup> The Christian ethic, according to Augustine, should always be guided by "rational justice". It should be noted, that there is a noticable lack of recourse to "injustice" as a pre-condition for holy war in Augustine's appeal. By the fifth century, war could be waged "at God's bidding" and heresy exterminated by God's authorization of a "general law", allowing "certain exceptions." There is an obvious influence of Old Testament kingship in Augustine's writings on the subject of holy war. In the final analysis, Augustine acknowledged that the "writings of Moses" did indeed bear relevancy to the fifth century Christian world.

There was, of course, disagreement with Augustine's

theories on the matter. Orusius, for one, saw evidence of God's hand even in the threatening advance of the Germanic tribes into Roman territory.<sup>124</sup> Interestingly, it was in the quasi-heretical world of secular authority that some of the most moderate voices were heard. At the very end of the fifth century, long after the seizure of Ravenna by Odoacer and the disappearance of the western imperium, Theodoric (an Arian Ostrogoth) called for the establishment of toleration and restraint.<sup>125</sup> Theodoric's "enlightened" views, however, were ultimately tainted by his heretical stance, as he could hardly argue for militancy in the face of his own opposition to Christian orthodoxy. Additionally, the necessities of territorial integrity were too immediate for the Christian world to ignore, and, despite differing views on the Empire's value vis-a-vis the Christian Society, Augustine's views increased in popularity.

At the center of this fifth century controversy stood the papacy. Increasingly, ever since the power vacuum left by the death of Valentinian I in 375 and the sack of Rome by Alaric in 410, the bishop of Rome had gradually accrued secular authority to himself, having been left in charge of the defenses of both Rome and its surrounding Italian lands. He realized only too well the necessities of civil defense, and yet, he still considered it his prime duty to preserve

the "purity" of the Gospel message. Leo the Great, who ascended to the papacy in 440 C.E., accepted Augustine's premise that force should be used to defend the Christian society. That force, in Leo's view, should have been the imperial army; as a practical matter, it was not. The very idea of Christians themselves fighting and killing in wars horrified Leo. Soldiers, he could theorize, at least were capable of delaying baptism until the distasteful work of military service was completed. For baptised Christians, it was unthinkable to even contemplate returning to military service after "having done penance".<sup>126</sup> Leo also compared military service unfavorably to the vocations of monastic life, establishing it as a "lesser virtue".<sup>127</sup>

Ironically, the answer to the pope's dilemma lay in compromise with the Arian Germanic tribes. Theodoric, although his Arianism would not allow him to defend the Church per se, still saw ample reason to defend the borders of what had been the old Christian Empire. The Church, of course, realized that this included the lands under its authority. This effectively relieved the papacy (which had been occupied since 482 C.E. by Felix II) of the responsibility of Christian defense; for the present moment, Arian armies would secure western lands and provide some political stability for the Church to attend to liturgical,

doctrinal, and bureaucratic matters.

### **The Myth of the Monolithic Church**

Historians since the Enlightenment have painted a gloomy picture of the Middle Ages, often contrasting the perceived brilliance of their own age with the environment of the "Dark Ages". The terminology itself ("Enlightenment" vs. "Dark" Ages) belies a conscious attempt to interpret history. The most enduring stereotype of medieval Europe is that of the "monolithic Church". As the chaotic events of the fifth century unfolded, the western Church emerged as a political, bureaucratic, and administrative institution that worked to build a foundation of Christian culture in post-imperial Europe. The power this Church wielded, however, was largely symbolic and indirect. That is to say, that whenever moral or doctrinal questions were addressed, secular authority normally deferred to the prestige of the Roman pontiff; political matters were often considered the prerogative of kings. Popes could advise, cajole, even threaten monarchs; without the resolve to militarize and raise armies, the fifth century Church was a mere paper tiger.

In the absence of any real power, papal statements



often utilized a high degree of hyperbole, claiming authority in matters usually considered the domain of secular rulers.<sup>128</sup> Whereas the Constantinian model of theocracy provided for the administration of Church affairs by the state, the Church now attempted, with modest success, to construct a theocracy in which the state was administered by the ecclesiastical bureaucracy. Consequently, the Church extended its secular authority to the lands surrounding Rome and central Italy (a development hardly surprising, given the emerging Papal role in civic defense), in addition to the larger imperial claims it was making in the west. Indeed, the self-defined mission of the Church had changed much since the reign of Valentinian I, when the bishops could say, "The state is not in the Church, but the Church is in the state."<sup>129</sup> In this regard, the chair of Peter was engaged in a risky enterprise; the Germanic kings saw little reason to respect the territorial claims of a Papacy that had denounced their own Arian faith. What the Church needed, and spent considerable time nurturing, was a core of Germanic support for *Latin* Christianity.

### Sixth Century Christianity

Perhaps the most timely conversion in Christian history

occurred in 500 C.E. as Clovis, a Frankish king, accepted the Latin faith. Much more than Theodoric, Clovis was the living embodiment of fierce Germanic kingship; and now, fortunately for the Church, he was orthodox. Even during the years preceding his conversion, the Church recognized a quality in Clovis that made him a desirable asset.

Ecclesiastical leaders tried to moderate his intemperate personality, often advising him in secular affairs.<sup>130</sup> A theme of divine providence permeated the story of his conversion, perhaps an apocryphal attempt to illustrate the importance of the event by comparing it to Constantine's experience in 312. Significantly, this myth contained an action of God on behalf of Clovis' army, much like that performed at the Milvian Bridge.<sup>131</sup> Clovis' conversion paved the way for the inclusion of many Germanic, previously Arian, tribes (like the Burgundians) in the communion of Latin Christianity.<sup>132</sup> Politically, there would be no immediate solutions for the papacy; parochial issues still impeded the progress of a unified Christian culture.<sup>133</sup>

Concurrent to this period of gradual Frankish hegemony, there occurred a general "Germanization" of the episcopate in response to Church decrees forbidding the clergy from bearing arms in defense of the Merovingian state.<sup>134</sup> This was typified by the institutionalization of Germanic

cultural norms regarding warfare within the philosophy of western Christendom. Although the Church still chafed at the prospect of Christians fighting wars, the growing intimacy with Clovis would have profound consequences for Medieval political history; particularly, that pertaining to the *methods* employed by the Church for its very survival. The notorious "blood-feuds" of the Franks, for example, and the influence they wielded on an increasingly German episcopate would hamper papal attempts to restrict warfare to the unbaptised secular world.<sup>135</sup>

Similarly, Germanic laws governing the brutal institution of trial by ordeal helped to shape a western European culture that was heir to this Germanic/Classical Christian synthesis. In the attempt to effectively Christianize the various elements of Frankish culture, Martin of Tours would go so far as to expropriate *all secular functions*, even those traditionally associated with militarism, and absorb them into the heirarchical structure of the Church.<sup>136</sup> Christianization was an intricate process, given the resiliency of native culture; a militant approach only made it even more difficult.<sup>137</sup>

Adding to the turmoil of this chaotic environment was an effort to reconquer western lands by the Emperor Justinian in Byzantium. In response to an increasingly

hostile Arian presence in Europe, Justinian attempted to reunite the last vestiges of Constantine's Christian Empire; unfortunately for imperial interests, he was only partly successful. Although many lands were recovered, they soon reverted to Arian control after the eventual retreat of Byzantine forces. What was far more significant about the Justinian conquests was the role it played in resurrecting ideas of empire, especially in western minds.

Additionally, the unsolicited presence of Byzantine armies in the west only fueled suspicion of Imperial motives, thereby strengthening papal resolve to pursue alternative options for political stability and survival. These included the forging of closer ties with Frankish kingdoms. By 579, Pope Gelasius II, recognizing the vulnerability of the Church in the west, entertained thoughts of a formal alliance with the Franks.<sup>138</sup> Interestingly, it was Gelasius who would develop the popular "two swords" philosophy of Medieval Christianity. Briefly put, this theory argued that there were two sources of authority in a Christian society, spiritual and secular, and that the spiritual authority always eclipsed that of the secular domain. This principle applied not only in Roman civil affairs, but those involving the larger Christian community. It is hard not to acknowledge the parallels

between Gelasius' and Martin of Tours' concepts of Christian authority.

As the Lombard threat in Italy increased, a man of exceptional political talents ascended to the chair of St. Peter. Gregory the Great clearly recognized the nature of the Church's dilemma and strengthened diplomatic ties with the Merovingian dynasty of the Franks. For the first time in the short history of the Church, a pope now openly embraced Christian militarism. In a bold move intended to distance the political objectives of the west from those of the east, Gregory rebuked the emperor in Byzantium for his support of legislation prohibiting soldiers from pursuing monastic vocations upon retirement.<sup>139</sup> Certainly, military service was still regarded as a "lesser virtue"; however, Christians were no longer prohibited from taking an active role in the defense of Christian society.

How much did these changing attitudes change practice in the sixth century Church? For one thing, it is difficult to believe that the ancient custom of withholding baptism for those in military service was enforced any longer. In essence, monastic life had replaced baptism as the Christian object denied the soldier. No one was allowed to leave the monastery for the army. Still, even as an imperfect vocation, military service would become an integral part of

western Christendom.

The Church now bent itself to the task of forging alliances. Gregory ordered missionaries like Augustine on ambitious trips deep into the heart of Germanic and British territory in an attempt to spread the Gospel, standardize liturgical forms, initiate Latin reforms, and establish political alliances with many of the powerful kingdoms of the west. As an increasing number of rulers came under the banner of Latin Christendom (now an emerging concept), Rome enjoyed a new status as an administrative, legal and political center. Many of the newly Christianized kingdoms would look to Rome for guidance in the areas of legal structure, religious orthodoxy, political stability (through divine sanction) and morality. This misled the Church into thinking that secular rulers had abdicated political control to the ecclesiastical government of a Christian Europe. Increasingly, disobedience to religious authority was perceived as treason to the state. This perspective was not shared by secular rulers. Cultural influences, the political necessities of local rule, and the development of common law all influenced the actions of kings far more than papal decrees from Rome; still, deference was paid, at least superficially, to the structure that made it all possible: the institutional Church.

## Seventh and Eighth Century Christianity

Papal-Frankish relations grew at an astonishing pace throughout the seventh and well into the eighth century C.E. Gregory II, ascending to the Papacy in 715, utilized the talents of St. Boniface to reform the Frankish church and lay the groundwork for official alliance. In 726, these efforts seemed inspired when the Emperor in Byzantium, Leo III (Isaurian) broke with orthodoxy on the issue of icons. No longer could the western Church rely upon the rhetoric of "empire" to summon aid from the east. In 726, Pope Gregory III appealed to the Carolingian chieftan Charles Martel for aid against the Lombards in northern Italy and was refused. Undaunted, the succeeding Pontiff (Stephen II) turned to Charles' son, who desperately wanted papal sanction for usurpation of the Frankish throne, with the same appeal. In this way, all the efforts to build an alliance bore fruit. In 754 C.E., Pepin recieved the blessings of the papacy in his attempt to establish a Carolingian hegemony and the Frankish-Papal Alliance was sealed.<sup>140</sup>

The Church now had its defender; however, this arrangement would prove to be disasterous for ecclesiastical authority. At first, events seemed to favor the pope. In his first impressive show of military force, Pepin subdued

the Lombard advance and claimed extensive territories for the Frankish dominion. Upon regarding the Italian lands that had become the secular domain of the Church since the collapse of the western Empire, Pepin was presented with the tradition of Constantine's "Donatio" and relented, establishing the Church's secular authority over these territories in perpetuity.<sup>141</sup> Although Pepin deferred to the authority to the Church, his son, Charles "the Great", would make it absolutely clear by whose authority the papacy possessed Italian lands.<sup>142</sup>

#### **Charlemagne (768-814 C.E.)**

Amid the confusion of eighth century Roman politics, the reigning pope found himself besieged by powerful patrician families. These families brought serious charges against Leo III, fanning the flames of popular sentiment and threatening his very life with mob defiance. Charles the Great in his Carolingian lands to the north, witnessed these events with some discomfort. After receiving and absolving the embattled pope (through traditional German ritual) the Carolingian monarch was crowned Holy Roman Emperor by Leo.<sup>143</sup> Some have seen this interchange as a complex power play by secular and religious authorities: Charles by his absolution



of the Pope establishing his dominance in the relationship; Leo by his crowning of Charles proclaiming the pre-eminence of Papal authority. What is clear is that Charles now saw himself as the divinely appointed ruler of a new Christian empire. He quickly began work on establishing a secular administration that would rival the institutional Church's. To some degree, Charles' was the only true theocratic administration of the early Medieval period, in that it was realized rather than theoretically proclaimed. Church prelates were constantly preaching the superiority of ecclesiastical authority from a position of weakness; Charles, meanwhile, was making good on his promises of absolute and complete power. Charles, blessed by the presence of learned Celtic monks in his realm, also witnessed the initial stages of a "Carolingian renaissance." One of the Classical texts available to the emperor, indeed his favorite work of Christian philosophy, was Augustine's City of God.<sup>144</sup>

It was no coincidence, then, that Charlemagne was the first theocratic ruler to put into practice the more radical Augustinian theories of Christian warfare, including that which articulated a holy war ethic. Regarding himself as Augustine's "sword in the hand" of God, Charlemagne proceeded to expand the Carolingian hegemony over vast

expanses of what had once been the western Roman empire. He fought against Islamic armies in the southwest, invaded Bavaria, defeated Avars and forcibly converted the Saxons in the east.<sup>145</sup> Assuredly, most of this conquest was an effort to extend Charles' own political power and secular influence throughout Europe; however, he used the nationalism of religious ideology to achieve his objectives.<sup>146</sup> Clearly, Charles saw religious authority as a method by which to further his own territorial and imperial ambitions. Despite Papal objections, the art of Christian warfare so amply cultivated by centuries of political necessity, finally blossomed under the secular influence of a fierce Frankish king.

### **Ninth Century Christianity**

Unfortunately for the Church, matters only got worse. After the death of Charles, his empire was divided into two principal regions: east and west Frankia. In 863, as heir to the eastern throne, Lothar II found himself in confrontation with Pope Nicholas I. By the time Nicholas and Lothar died, leaving the entire issue of Theutaberga's restoration and Waldrada's excommunication unresolved, western imperial armies had marched on Rome and collusion

between east and west Frankia had resulted in the partitioning of Italian lands between the two monarchs.<sup>147</sup> It was during this time that the Asturians, inspired by the martyrs of Cordoba in 859, began a long struggle against the Umayyad emirate for political control of Spain. These wars of "reconquista", although they did not receive Frankish support (Charles the Bald had maintained friendly relations with the Umayyads), were significant for their holy war rhetoric. It seems that when two faiths are at war, the nationalism of religious ideology becomes all too necessary. Significantly, the reconquista effort would eventually capture the attention of imperial interests, providing a model for the crusading armies to come.

For the moment, the Christians of Europe found themselves under siege on several fronts simultaneously. From the mid-ninth century on, waves of Viking invasions devastated west Frankia, taking the imperial capitol of Aachen and destroying Cologne, Andernach, and Koblenz.<sup>148</sup> These Viking incursions met the rapidly moving armies of Islam in the Mediterranean. Muslim invasions of Italy, although not terribly effective, had progressed as far as Rome on two separate occasions (846 and 849 C.E.).

The flurry of military activity during this period of European history hampered the ability of Rome to act as the

"nerve center" of Christendom, directing the secular body into action in times of diminished imperial power. Secular lords were left to their own particular defensive strategies, faced as they were with their own unique military threats. In Charlemagne's empire the necessities of defense had been relinquished to a secular megalomaniac; now they were surrendered to local rulers overwhelmed by the force of Viking invasion. This general environment of chaos did not prevent the occasional emperor from intervening, with regularity, in church affairs. Finally, the spectacle of Emperor Louis II manipulating papal elections in 855 was too much to bear.<sup>149</sup> After the death of Louis, imperial and papal power waned, leaving the Church vulnerable to the warring nobility of the Italian cities. Increasingly, many in the Church began to develop a taste for militancy, in response to the sorry state of ecclesiastical affairs.

During this period as local kings began investing their own candidates with the symbols of religious authority, many local bishops became royal vassals, placing their secular loyalties before their religious obligations to the papacy. Thus, the "feudalization of the Church" took place; a process by which war could be effectively preached at the local level as a *religious affair*. As a concession to traditional Christian exhortations to non-violence, bishops

would fulfill their feudal obligations by funding armies through Church coffers rather than fighting; this tended to put an even greater strain on a centralized bureaucracy in Rome that, as yet, was still in its infancy and would not reach its full potential until the reforms of Leo IX in 1052. Thus, an opportunity for further imperial control over the Church presented itself.

### **Tenth and Eleventh Century Christianity**

The tenth century would prove to be a period of recovery for the western imperium as Henry I ascended to the throne in 919 C.E. Henry regarded himself as the heir of Pepin in that he vigorously pursued the conquest of Lombard lands in Italy and the further "Germanization" of the Church in imperial territories.<sup>150</sup> After the intense challenges to Christian survival in the ninth century and having survived the incursions of Vikings, Muslims, and Magyars, Europe welcomed Henry's "holy" mission. Increasingly, weapons of war became "holy objects" in this evolving culture of theocratic nationalism. Henry's acquisition of the holy lance from Rudolf II of Burgundy in anticipation of his campaign against the Lombards was a testament to the resiliency of Augustine's holy war ideal.

After Henry's son, Otto I, consolidated power by reserving for himself the authority to confirm papal elections in 963, the stage was set for a monumental confrontation with the papacy. Still, there was a fair degree of cooperation between the two rulers. Ecclesiastical support for imperial resurgence brought about, for the first time, an explicit acceptance of militarism in the Church. By 1052, the odd spectacle of an imperial army led by a reigning pope (Leo IX), marching to engage the troublesome Normans of southern Italy, outraged no one. The political necessities of the day required such action. The theocratic structure of European Christendom, divided as it was between competing notions of secular vs. religious authority, was threatened by Norman economic and political interests. It responded in a way any government might be expected to respond.

Half-hearted attempts at establishing "the peace of God" throughout the Christian domain were nothing more than policies intended to bring about social stability, rather than Christian brotherhood. No sooner had the peace of God been proclaimed in 1063 when papal blessings were sent to William the Bastard in his military campaign against Anglo-Saxon Britain. Significantly, William rode into battle armed with religious relics and a papal banner as symbols

of his right cause.

European civilization in the eleventh century had reached a critical point in its history. Crisis and conflict now defined the "call to arms" as sacred. How else to explain the savagery with which emperor and pope waged war against one another in the years to come? The issue of investiture would produce a tension between the emperor, Henry V, and Pope Gregory VII that would result in the actual preaching of a holy war by the pope himself. Historically, popes had always reserved for themselves the authority to urge others to action for the defense of the Christian community. Leo IX had taken the extraordinary step of actual command, and now, Gregory would preach a war intended to enforce the orthodoxy of the Church against an imperial renegade. Significantly, disobedience to ecclesiastical decrees passed in Rome was by this time regarded by the papacy as nothing less than spiritual heresy. The motive for war was self-evident: the establishment of proper authority in a Christian society. The methods utilized by Gregory in convincing the German nobility to oppose Henry, however, were couched in religious propaganda.<sup>151</sup> Gregory would eventually devise "ways under divine inspiration" to wage an effective holy war against Henry.<sup>152</sup>

Culturally, as well, European civilization had produced the chivalric ideal in which the knight was sworn to defend his lord and Church.<sup>153</sup> In the highly competitive environment of knighthood, religion, feudal obligations, and violence blended perfectly to produce the fearsome fighting machine of the Crusades, the Medieval knight. Also, by the eleventh century, the reinvigorated reconquista effort convinced many of the holiness of the political and military struggle against Islam.<sup>154</sup> The combination of feudal politics (in which even vassal bishops preached and funded holy wars), political struggles between popes and emperors, systematic invasion, inter-faith conflicts (such as the reconquista in Spain), and the emerging culture of chivalry, all converged to produce the appropriate environment for Urban's preaching of the ultimate Christian holy war in 1095 C.E.

#### **The First Crusade (1095-1099 C.E.)**

Karen Armstrong, in her work entitled Holy War, The Crusades and Their Impact on Today's World, accurately portrays the excesses of European militarism and its impact on Islamic perceptions of western culture, including that of Zionism. While it is entirely true that Zionism was



regarded by the Muslims in Palestine as just another manifestation of European imperialism, Armstrong tends to emphasize the excesses of the Crusades, painting them as *irrational* wars of spiritual conquest. While she should be applauded for applying holy war themes to the Christian tradition, Armstrong's definition of holy war negates rational intent and imputes a fanatical component to the medieval Crusades. In actuality, rationality was always the motivating factor in the implementation of holy war, whether waged by Jews, Christians, or Muslims. The very fact that theocracies must utilize relevant ideologies in times of crisis necessitates the definition of holy war as a rational concept, utilized by intelligent men. The Crusades, then must be viewed through the eyes of political and economic expediency in order to discuss their true impact on European Christendom.

From the beginning, political and economic motives lurked behind the decision to preach the First Crusade. Urban, of course, was responding to Alexius Comnenus' request for aid in the east; indeed, the idea of a unified Christian empire had not quite become extinct. Politically, defense of the Christian realm was a consideration. Although relations with the Fatimids, who controlled access to many of the holy sites of Palestine, were amiable,

Turkish migrations resulted in considerable disruption of the pilgrimage routes and interfered with the avenues of trade that linked Europe with the Middle East.<sup>155</sup> Thus, economic concerns were prominent in the decision to intervene militarily. Fatimid cooperation with Christian interests was extensive, effectively proving the weakness of the religious motive so often associated with the Crusades. Additionally, the chaotic state of affairs in western Europe with lords waging war against each other necessitated some policy by which the carnage and destruction could be limited.<sup>156</sup> Barring an act of God, the only reasonable solution seemed to be the removal of such elements from society in the service of a cause deemed vital to the survival of the Christian society. Finally, the base motive of economic gain and plunder attracted the voracious appetite of the western lords.

All of these themes: Byzantine vulnerability, disruption of pilgrimage routes, feudal competition and violence in Europe, and economic advantage, were essential elements in Urban's address at Claremont.<sup>157</sup> Of course, racial invective and religious rhetoric were also part of Urban's speech; however, these were *techniques* intended to produce the desired result: a unified European army ready to defend the interests of state. These interests, it must be

reiterated, were no different than those of any modern state: political cohesion, social stability, economic prosperity and territorial integrity. These are rational objectives that the Church pursued as a self-perceived theocratic institution of government. Other researchers have clearly recognized this.<sup>158</sup> Although followers such as Peter the Hermit were convinced of the holiness of their mission, there remained a small core of leaders committed to the achievement of specific objectives in the war effort. For these men, fanciful ideas of holy war were subordinated to the political and economic agenda; indeed, many of them forged lasting ties with their Islamic adversaries once the political realities of occupation became apparent.<sup>159</sup> The excesses of the Crusades, however, were severe. The physical punishment of transport alone rendered many in the army incapable of even a minimal humanity.<sup>160</sup> Unfortunately, this has tended to place the Crusades in a particular category of fanatical warfare. It is hopeful that the actions that were the result of deprivation and very real human suffering on the road to Jerusalem will someday be balanced with a consideration of the state interests that propelled the entire crusading effort.

## The Social Impact of the Crusades

As was mentioned before, the militant attitude of Augustine's Christianity had found its counterpart earlier in an evolving attitude concerning the efficacy of martyrdom. Increasingly, Christians saw the "purgative" qualities of suffering and began to apply it to those who they perceived as needing it the most: heretics. As Christian orthodoxy became ever more imperative in a theocratic environment (at both the ecclesiastical, imperial, and local level), stringent measures to enforce the rightness of belief increased. The Crusading spirit was effectively absorbed into the social environment of Christendom, stressing the need for a "reformation of life."<sup>161</sup> By 1140, Gratian, in his *Decretum* (Quaestio 1), asserted that Christian prerogatives for war were expressed early on in the Gospels (Lk 3:14).<sup>162</sup> As various problems arose in the medieval Christian community, heretics became easy scapegoats for their non-conformity, refusals to take oaths, and hyper-ascetic lifestyles. It was not surprising, then, that the instrument of crusade was turned against the Albigensians in 1208 C.E.<sup>163</sup> In a similar fashion to the emergence of Judaic prophets after the establishment of the Israelite theocratic state, religious ideology (and its holy

war component) in the Medieval Period became a *social phenomenon* in Christendom. Each time this ideology was transferred from the realm of the political state to the social environment, the rational basis for its implementation was somewhat diminished. That is to say, popular culture would manipulate religious ideology in a much more capricious, arbitrary manner. The believers, as opposed to the designers of religious ideology, were the true fanatics. In this way, the multiplicity of religious issues regarding orthodoxy that developed within Christian society throughout the late medieval and Renaissance periods, necessitating the emergence of Inquisitorial courts and expanded ecclesiastical legal protections, can be seen as aspects of a true religious war. As always, the theocratic state found a way to institutionalize this, mitigating the harsh realities of the Inquisition until the spiritual rebellions of the Reformation.

Circumscribed as it was by the Gospel of the first two centuries, Christian holy war could only develop so far. Unlike Judaic holy war, that had developed *alongside* scripture, and the fluidity that would typify Islamic perspectives concerning war, the Church was bound by the sanctity it had imparted to the writings of a limited number of apostles in the early Christian community. Constantine

pushed at the boundaries of the tradition that the Church had received since apostolic times. Augustine introduced innovative and controversial theoretical concepts into the Christian vocabulary regarding the efficacy of war. Based on these innovations (none of which were ever promulgated as doctrines) many in the Church, from Charlemagne to Urban, advocated an occasionally arbitrary reason for fighting. Although there were some who espoused the more limited idea of just war in a Christian society (a concept arguably allowed by New Testament scripture), there were those who ignored the practical reasoning of Urban, responding at Claremont to the call to arms articulated by Augustine, "God wills it!"

### CHAPTER THREE: THE THEOCRACY OF ISLAM

As the concept is understood by a very large sector of the Muslim population throughout the world, jihad is a defensive struggle possessed of two dimensions: spiritual and political. By far the most noble expression of jihad is found in the spiritual realm, as it encompasses the inner struggle of humanity to overcome the oppression of sin and the influence of evil in the world. This struggle is perceived as essential to the purpose of every human being's life: to draw ever closer to the compassionate embrace of God. "Lesser jihad", on the other hand, involves the political struggle for the survival of the Islamic community in a world perceived as hostile to its existence.<sup>164</sup> This admittedly pessimistic view was indicative of the competitive social environment of pre-Islamic Arab culture. As a means of liberation from oppression, this view of jihad is entirely reactive in the environment in which it operates. This does not negate its nature as a product of theocratic government; in fact, it may be observed that jihad truly blossomed as an instrument of political ideology *subsequent to* the time of Muhhamad's flight from Mecca and his eventual establishment of the Medinan *umma*, or Muslim community, there. In the academic community, however,

several equally inaccurate interpretations of jihad have emerged.

Two of these prevailing views, orientalist and apologetic, respectively seek to portray Islam as either a militaristic faith of prosyletization or a prophetic message of supreme pacifism.<sup>165</sup> The orientalist perspective, promulgated by Western sources, is hampered by a notable lack of objectivity. Indeed, until very recently, the very idea of holy war was perceived in the west as having originated exclusively in the Islamic tradition. This approach, however, does not allow for consideration of both the Deuteronomic and Augustinian models of warfare and their impact on Muslim populations in the Middle East. While it is true that social conditions in Pre-Islamic Arabia necessitated a religious justification for war, Islam (incumbent as it was to the Judaeo-Christian heritage for various components of its theology) was influenced by the theocratic glory of Jerusalem and the militant posture of eastern Christians in defense of orthodoxy. Consequently, even the apologist perspective fails as it is clear that Islam espouses no such supreme pacifism.

To the contrary, Islam developed in a highly competitive social environment that necessitated a mechanism of political conflict-resolution. The surprising aspect of



this mechanism, however, especially given the brutal realities of pre-Islamic tribal culture that helped to create it, is how moderate an ideological weapon it actually was in the hands of the Prophet and his community.

Pertinent to any discussion of jihad and its early application is the following criteria:

- (1) Discussion of problems concerning Qur'anic citation and interpretation.
- (2) Consideration of the tribal conflicts that typified pre-Islamic Arab culture and, to some extent, influenced the development of jihad.
- (3) Clarification of the origins of jihad (historically and Scripturally), observing the development of theoretical models and the applications of actual strategies in the course of early Islamic history. This will entail a discussion of how jihad developed after the Aqaba Oath, Hijra (flight from Mecca) and the establishment of the Medinan Umma as a defensive strategy, in response to perceived oppression under Quraysh hegemony. Any exhortation to violence, it will be shown, involved an implicit context of oppression, tribal disunity or treason; in essence, it always pursued an obvious and self-evident political agenda.

### **Qur'anic Sources**

The immediate problem concerning Qur'anic citation and interpretation lies in translation. It has long been

argued, quite convincingly, that the Qur'an, as a translated document, is vastly inferior to its original renditions in Arabic. In particular, English translations lack the idioms, nuances, and meaningful inflections that enrich the Qur'an in its mother tongue. Compounding the problem, many western scholars have relied on translations that fit their preconceptions of Islam, many of which are grounded in empirical observation rather than Scriptural analysis. That is to say, rather than deriving a viable concept of jihad from comprehensive Qur'anic texts, many have instead looked to the past to see how Muslims themselves have corrupted the ideal and applied this corruption to their translations of the corresponding Qur'anic verses, or ayats. This trend is exemplified in N.J. Dawood's translation of the Qur'an, especially when compared to the vastly superior work of Mohammed Marmaduke Pickthall.<sup>166</sup>

In the introduction to his translation, Dawood candidly admits, "In adhering to a rigidly literal rendering of Arabic idioms, previous translations have, in my opinion, practically failed to convey both the meaning and the rhetorical grandeur of the original."<sup>167</sup> By whose criteria? Ultimately, one must rely on Dawood's interpretation of crucial ayats and the words he decides best convey their purported meaning. Despite Dawood's assurance that he has

"taken pains to reproduce ...ambiguities wherever they occur and...provided explanatory footnotes in order to avoid turning the text into an interpretation", one is impressed by the fact that, compared to Pickthall's translation, Dawood's commentary is scant and the footnoting, in most places, relegated to a word or two.<sup>168</sup> For these and other reasons, Pickthall's translation is the preferred text.

There is an additional challenge in Qur'anic citation represented by the fact that orthodoxy in the early Islamic community was maintained with some degree of fluidity. The apocryphal story of Umar, as he attempted to contest the orthodoxy of Hisam's Qur'anic recitations, is illustrative of the utilitarian purpose with which even Muhammad regarded his own revelations.<sup>169</sup> This fluidity is not to be confused with a casualness or disregard for truth; rather, it should be acknowledged that the Prophet intended both an "exterior" and an "interior" meaning for the content of his revelation.<sup>170</sup> The "interior" interpretations of Islam would become especially relevant to Shi'ite Muslims.

Additionally, Hadith literature suggests that the Prophet relied on spontaneous recollection in recovering much of the oral recitation of the Qur'an.<sup>171</sup> Of course, this was a technique singularly reserved for the person of Muhammad and only extended to the following generations of religious

theorists in the collection of Hadith, not Scriptural sources. This duality of meaning presents a problem for the modern interpreter of the Qur'an, however, as the attempt to restrict scriptural references to jihad to a single interpretation fall short. Some argued (in later treatises) that Hadith literature was the definitive source for the interpretation of jihad; for these sources, scriptural justification played only a minor role.<sup>172</sup> For all its pretensions of objectivity, Dawood's translation itself offers little in the way of alternative interpretations. Pickthall, in his dedication to the original Arabic, actually allows for a freer recitation of verses, and consequently, the ease of use so desired by the Prophet. This flexibility became a fundamental component of the attempt to exploit the concept of jihad in an evolving Islamic tradition that necessitated the development of an offensive war strategy in the service of the theocratic state.

### **Pre-Islamic Arabia**

To demonstrate how jihad emerged as a defensive strategy of Arab "real-politik", one must first cast a glance backward into the pre-Islamic environment from which

it sprang. Even Western historians do not deny that competition for natural and economic resources in Arabia has always been fierce.<sup>173</sup> A minor feature of this intensely competitive environment, one that offered little other than sport to the surrounding tribes competing for legitimacy and status, was the *razzia*, or caravan raid.<sup>174</sup> A far more integral component of the pre-Islamic Arabian economy was the establishment of urban cultic centers and pilgrimage routes administered by the dominant tribal interests of any given geographic location. This was certainly the case in Mecca, as it was the nerve center of Quraysh economic activity in western Arabia. It was thus the very survival of the Quraysh tribe that Muhammad threatened when he directed his prophetic message toward Mecca, heaping scorn on the pagan cults entertained there. The Quraysh recognized the nature of this threat and took extreme measures to ensure its timely demise. The enforcement of traditional Meccan orthodoxy was pursued through a combined mixture of harassment, religious ridicule, and economic boycott of Muhammad's sympathizers.<sup>175</sup>

Politically, tribal confederations were a source of momentary power consolidation; more frequently, they represented a divisive element in the Arabian socio-political environment as they rarely held together the

various economic interests involved. More often than not, tribes would establish truces with one another on an *ad-hoc* basis, breaking the terms of such agreements when their economic interests dictated other courses of action.<sup>176</sup>

### Jihad in the Time of the Prophet

Faced with violent opposition, boycott, and the treacherous waters of tribal politics, it is hardly suprising that Muhammad was preoccupied with issues of conflict, political administration, and loyalty in his prophetic message. It might even be said that Muhammad, in the early days of Meccan opposition, already perceived his modest following to be under attack and, consequently, in a state of war with Quraysh interests. Some have deduced from this that Muhammad clearly favored all-out war rather than the state of "permanent disunity" created by the fragmented coalitions typical of Arabian politics.<sup>177</sup> Despite these reservations, it is entirely possible that Islamic militarism was a logical development, given the conditions of extreme persecution experienced by the Muslim population of Mecca.<sup>178</sup>

It was under such pressure that the oath at Aqaba was entered into, in 622 C.E., by parties loyal to the Prophet

and by those who had requested his mediation in Yathrib (Medina). Indeed, the Hijra (flight from Mecca) that occurred later that same year, itself has been seen by some as the first expression of the Aqaba ideal in a defensive action against the Quraysh.<sup>179</sup> If this were so, then Muhammad's subsequent use of the *razzia* against Quraysh caravans merely represented another defensive tactic of war against an aggressor. Still, little about the *razzias* resembled a holy struggle; indeed, they assumed the minor function of status competition typical of the traditional Arabian political and economic environment. Although much has been made of Muhammad's interception of the caravan at Nakhla, it seems little if any violence occurred as a result of his decision to proceed with this policy.<sup>180</sup> Those who maintain that the Nakhla raid presaged a period of conquest and aggressive conversion allow themselves to be swayed by the history of subsequent dynasties in their assessment of Muhammad's motives. Similarly, apologists find themselves vulnerable to the charge that Muhammad was the supreme pacifist. Indeed, many Qur'anic verses were "remembered" by the Prophet precisely at this period in time, justifying *razzia* activity during generally acknowledged sacred months of the year.<sup>181</sup> These verses, however, were arguably intended to excuse the *violation of tradition*, not to preach

the efficacy of holy war. Far more important for the development of a holy war ideal were the events surrounding the battle of Badr, fought in 624 C.E.<sup>182</sup>

Some have maintained that the skirmish at Badr represented an expression of Muhammad's developing offensive strategy. Others, more inclined to interpret the ongoing struggle against the Quraysh as a *de facto* war, see Badr as a response to Quraysh aggression. An alternate view regards Badr as just another *razzia* gone awry.<sup>183</sup> Despite these differing interpretations of the event, one thing remains clear: Muhammad and his followers won a convincing and significant victory against overwhelming odds and they attributed this to the *intervention of God*.<sup>184</sup>

It is no coincidence, then, that the sanctification of war in Islam occurred at precisely the moment when Muhammad had established the first significant *umma* (Islamic community) in Medina. Upon his arrival in Medina, Muhammad had been hailed by Arab and Jew alike as a mediating influence in the fierce tribal wars that had punctuated the city's existence. Indeed, many had seen Islam as a unifying ideal; one which could bring the disparate parties together under a single political/religious banner.<sup>185</sup> When the new "ruling elite" was established in Medina, the foundations of the first Islamic theocratic state were formed.<sup>186</sup>



This infant state had immediate internal problems to attend to. Among the original Jewish tribes that had welcomed the Prophet into the Medinan community, were those who now recognized the glaring differences between Judaism and Islam. These differences had, of course, been exacerbated by Arabs still contemplating conversion to Islam, only half weaned from the cultic practices of their pagan heritage. Such Arabs prevailed upon Muhammad to change the direction of prayer (Qiblah) from Jerusalem to Mecca, thereby incurring the mistrust of the previously complacent Jewish community. When several of the Jewish tribes (the Qurayzah and Nadir) attempted to aid the Meccan army during its siege of Medina (the Battle of the Trench) in 627 C.E., Muhammad responded harshly.<sup>187</sup>

The Medinan *umma* and Jewish tribes both comprehended the ideological value of religion to the state; consequently, it was hardly surprising that Muhammad condemned the Nadir to exile and the Qurayzah to extinction for their treason.<sup>188</sup> These punishments, Draconian as they were, were prescribed by Judaic law itself and were in no way indicative of Islamic "fanaticism". Western assurances that Muhammad's treatment of the Jews was indicative of jihad theory (or even hostility to Judaism) fall short; the Prophet's actions reflected not so much the Islamic ethic of

war as they did traditional precepts of justice, and a preoccupation with the political survival of the Islamic state.

Religion, however, was an acceptable and well-understood concept of unitive ideology in Arabian politics, tied as it was to the cultic economy of tribal interests; and, after Badr, the idea of holy warfare increasingly became an indispensable propagandistic tool in the pursuit of the "pre-determined ends" of Islamic government. Despite the religious propaganda of the emerging theocratic state, the issues driving Islamic policies during this period were as practical as any of the Modern Era. Despite the prevailing view in the west that Arabia subsequently succumbed to the sword of Islam, the evidence seems to suggest that the Prophet's *political* prestige proceeded far in advance of his religious reform.

After the Meccan refusal to finish the offensive at Uhud (625 C.E.), the Ummayyad general, Abu Sufyan, had become increasingly suspicious of his own allies.<sup>189</sup> When the battle of the Trench (a Quraysh offensive intended to crush the infant Islamic state) resulted in the collapse of the attacking army, Sufyan subsequently entered into secret negotiations with Muhammad for the capitulation of Mecca.<sup>190</sup> Thus, the conquest of Mecca was accomplished without

recourse to the sword. As Sufyan and the Quraysh elite converted *en masse* to the religion of the Prophet, they were increasingly rewarded with generous treatment and access to power.<sup>191</sup>

The mass conversion of the Quraysh to Islam was to result in two significant developments in Islamic politics. First, it effectively tied Quraysh interests and influence irrevocably to Islamic policies. Second, it aroused the ire of the Medinan population, among whom existed an impoverished fighting class (*ashab al-suffah*). This class depended, to a large extent, on confiscated booty for their very survival and had anticipated, among other things, the confiscation of Quraysh wealth.<sup>192</sup> The practical effect of Quraysh influence was to direct Ummayyad expansion toward mercantile centers, like Ta'if, vital to the Meccan economy.<sup>193</sup> The mounting prestige of figures like Sufyan (an Umayyad) and Abu Bakr (a converted Ta'ifan bedouin) presaged an imposition of parochial economic and political interests upon the policies of Islamic government.

When expansion took place, it did so at the direction of Meccan interests. The impact of the Medinan community was such that it influenced only the *direction* in which that expansion took place. As a concession to the economic interests of the Medinan community (nominally responsible

for the upkeep of the *ashab al-suffah* underclass), Muhammad directed expeditions and raids into Byzantine territory to the north (the Muthah campaign) in the hopes that Syrian Arabs possessed the kind of moveable wealth so crucial to his Medinan agenda. These raids, it should be noted, were conspicuously lacking in religious exhortation. When these raids failed to produce the expected economic benefits, the Prophet, it is purported, devised the system of taxation (replete with Qur'anic revelation as justification) which defined the Islamic relationship with its allies and minority populations (the *jizyah* tax).<sup>194</sup> Later forays, such as the Tabuk campaign, were precipitated by Syrian and Byzantine military threats, provoking a defensive response from Mecca.

In short, by the time of Muhammad's supposed "conquest" of Arabia, issues of war and peace were largely decided by economic self-interest and political necessity, not religious zeal or missionary fervor.<sup>195</sup> If religion was the deciding factor, why did interior tribes of the Najd and the coastal regions (Yemen, Bahrayn and Oman) remain untouched? While Islam appealed as a unifying principle to the Medinans, it remained the task of the "ruling elite" established by the Prophet to bring the remaining tribes under their jurisdiction.

### War Policies of the Rashidun (623-661 C.E.)

Upon the death of Muhammad in 632, there was considerable confusion in Mecca pertaining to the right of succession.<sup>196</sup> The eventual election of Abu Bakr to the Caliphate initiated the reign of the *rashidun*, considered by Sunni Muslims to be the first four "rightly guided" rulers of the Islamic state subsequent to the Prophet. According to the Sunni tradition, Muhammad himself had left no clear indication that he favored anyone for the position of leadership in the Islamic state. Among the varying interests competing for the Caliphate were the *Muhajjarun*, (these were the original Meccan followers of Muhammad who followed him to Medina), the *Ansar* (the Medinan converts), and the newly converted Quraysh in Mecca. Both *Muhajjarun* and *Ansar* distrusted one another, but not nearly as much as they resented the power and influence wielded by those who had so recently been their oppressors. Factions in the *Muhajjarun* camp either favored Abu Ubaydah (Umar ibn al-Khattab's faction), Ali ibn Abi Talib (the Prophet's cousin) or Abu Bakr.<sup>197</sup> The *Ansar* clearly opposed the militaristic agenda of the Meccans and would continue to do so under the Caliphate of Abu Bakr (623-624 C.E.), gradually forming ties

to the supporters of Ali.

Umar himself voiced criticism of the wars of the *Riddah*, which effectively united the tribes of Arabia under the banner of Islam. Additionally, several prominent Umayyad leaders (Abu Sufyan and Khalid b. Sa'id) represented Quraysh opposition to Abu Bakr. Nonetheless, Abu Bakr enjoyed the powerful support of other members of the Quraysh aristocracy, such as Khalid b. Al-Walid, Amr ibn Al-as, Ikrimah ibn Abi Jahl, al-Ala ibn Al-Hadrami, and Yazid ibn Abi Sufyan (the latter being the son of Abu Sufyan and opposed to his preferences for Caliph).<sup>198</sup> With such support, and the eventual capitulation of Umar, Abu Bakr was easily elected to the Caliphate and implemented a policy of militarism unheard of in the Prophet's time.

#### **Abu Bakr and the Wars of the Riddah**

It has been acknowledged that the wars of the *riddah* were attempts to consolidate the political power of the Islamic state in Arabia.<sup>199</sup> They were necessary, from a political perspective, because of the various opposition movements that had emerged during Muhammad's rise to power. In a similar phenomenon resembling that of the prophetic expropriation of Judaic holy war themes during the divided

kingdom (Chapter 2), Arab opponents of the Islamic state masqueraded as prophets arguing their own rival ideologies.<sup>200</sup> Not only did these opponents advocate opposition, they preached open insurrection. The religious exhortations of various "prophets" led to several rebellions.<sup>201</sup> Thus, it seems, the theocratic ideology of holy war, once codified and institutionalized by the state, became an instrument of popular resistance and social change. Of course, these movements gave Abu Bakr all the justification he needed to proceed with a policy of pacification. Muhammad's policy on militancy had moved gradually from a policy of non-aggression to one which allowed Muslims to respond militarily even in sacred months, eventually proclaiming the state's right to war against those opposing the poll tax levied on non-Muslims (*jizyah*). Abu Bakr's position was a radical departure from orthodoxy in that he favored a clear policy of expansion. It is clear that he moved forcefully against the movements that opposed him, including those that had not deemed it necessary to object on religious grounds.<sup>202</sup> In these cases, it seems, Abu Bakr was engaged in a blatant grab for political power, despite the questionable orthodoxy of his position.

Once the consolidation of power in Arabia was complete, Abu Bakr cast his gaze on Syria to the north. It is a

mistake to assume that Syria had always tempted the Muslims from the time of the Prophet; it is far more likely that Muhammad's ambitions in Syria never exceeded the bounds of mere appeasement of the Medinan economy. The initial Muthah campaign was ill-advised and intended only to bring back enough material to fulfill his obligations to the *ashab al-suffah*. Abu Bakr's appetite, however, was considerably larger.<sup>203</sup>

In a way, a Syrian campaign was unavoidable; since the flurry of military activity surrounding Muhammad's rise to power and the wars of the *riddah*, Byzantine interest had been drawn south and imperial armies sent to protect southern Palestine.<sup>204</sup> In 630 C.E., the Byzantines had recovered their Syrian lands from Sassanid control, although the effort had depleted imperial coffers to the extent that the armies of Constantinople would have been hard pressed to respond to any major military crisis.<sup>205</sup> Correspondingly, Byzantine policy pursued a course of alliance building among the Arab tribes of southern Syria, a development that threatened the security of Medina and the bedouins to its north.<sup>206</sup> Abu Bakr recognized the clear danger to the Islamic state that this policy represented and implemented a systematic "raiding campaign" in Syria in the hopes that it would prevent the northern tribes and imperial armies from



unifying against him.<sup>207</sup> In another of a remarkable string of improbable victories, the re-assigned general Khalid ibn al-Walid defeated the Byzantine army at Ajnadayn in 634 C.E., thereby facilitating the expansion of Islam into Palestine.<sup>208</sup>

Besides the obvious strategic reasons for a Syrian campaign, there were other criteria that motivated Abu Bakr to pursue his policy. First, the commercial contacts maintained between Meccan and Syrian merchants, and their respective markets, were extensive.<sup>209</sup> Also, there were political advantages to be gained in Palestine by a policy of conquest; specifically, the extension of an Islamic system of tribal alliances that would effectively counter the influence of Constantinople.<sup>210</sup>

Several key elements, however, offered Abu Bakr the chance to characterize this conflict as a holy war. Predominant among these elements was the concept of an Islamic presence in Al-Quds, or Jerusalem.<sup>211</sup> Given the prominence of Jerusalem in Islamic worship (due to a perceived shared history with the Judaic tradition), this seemed to be a religious ideal and, indeed, Abu Bakr used it as such in his attempt to unify the Arab armies. Even in the case of Jerusalem, however, there was a political purpose to Abu Bakr's agenda. If one understands religion

to be an *ideology* of the theocratic state, then it follows, that whatever strengthens that ideology also improves the stability of the state. Muhammad had clearly impressed upon the Arab population its historical ties to the geneology and faith of Abraham. In this regard, Jerusalem was as important an element of Islamic ideology as the concept of one God; indeed, Jerusalem indicated the historical presence of Allah in a community that had worshipped him long before the advent of His latest prophet. It also invoked the political idea of Davidic theocracy, a concept of supreme utilitarian advantage to Muhammad. An Islamic presence in this holy city could only reinforce the ideology that supported the Caliph's government and present the Arabs with a "manifest destiny", of sorts, in their efforts to expand geographically.

Another element in the development of the Syrian campaign as a holy struggle was the figure of Khalid ibn al-Walid himself. In the years directly preceding the Syrian campaign, Khalid had worked extensively to consolidate Islamic rule among the Arab tribes on the Iraqi border.<sup>212</sup> At times, his mission sent him across Sassanid borders as he sought to elist the loyalties of Arabs settled on the right bank of the Euphrates River. Khalid's actions resulted in Persian antagonism, but the ideology of Islam was an

efficient means of unifying these Arabs against Persian domination. The ensuing struggle against the Sassanids and, consequently, Khalid's own person, acquired and sustained an aura of "holiness". Upon Khalid's arrival in Syria, it was a simple task for Abu Bakr to transfer this sense of a holy mission to the general's campaign against the Byzantines. Thus, in the Syrian expansion of Islam, despite its political and economic basis, military aggression was regarded in the popular vocabulary as a war for the glory of God.<sup>213</sup>

Expansion into Mesopotamia (modern day Iraq) was also inspired by recognizable political and economic issues. The obvious threat of Sassanid invasion in the east (despite the weakened condition of the Persian army) necessitated a political presence there. The extension of tribal alliances and levying of taxes were another motivating factor. The profound economic significance of Mesopotamian agricultural regions was not lost upon the Islamic leadership (now exerted by Umar ibn al-Khattab after Abu Bakr's death in 634), and the victories at al-Qadisiyyah and Jalula in 637 C.E. ushered in an era of Islamic hegemony in Iraq.<sup>214</sup> Similar patterns of expansion, based on political and economic expediency, were followed in the subsequent invasions of Iran, Egypt, North Africa, and Spain.

All too often, in the west, these campaigns have been interpreted as expressions of jihad, because their Islamic practitioners availed themselves of the theocratic ideology of religion as a unifying principle and attracted converts along the way. It should be noted, that jihad was a Qur'anic concept of limited aggression, utilized in defense of the community and regulated by interpretation of Hadith. "Holy war", on the other hand, was a political instrument, soon to be a social institution, its practitioners expropriating jihad theory for the implementation of and as a justification for political violence and expansion.<sup>215</sup> In this sense, "holy war" did not fit the preconditions for jihad, nor did it strictly adhere to the understanding of the non-Islamic world as "the abode of war" (*dar al-harb*). The interpretation of *harb* as either "war" or "unrest" leaves open the possibility that peoples unapproached by Islam simply lacked the spiritual "peace" accomplished through submission to Allah. "Holy War", as a mutant aberration of Qur'anic jihad, actually achieved the more uninspired distinction of *qital*, or petty fighting. It has long been suspected by mainstream Sunni Muslims that Qur'anic citation itself could have been tainted by the influence of later political figures. Considerable debate continues to this day concerning the alleged "insertion" of

Qur'anic texts that support one sectarian group over another.<sup>216</sup>

Thus, it should come as no surprise that the policies of Abu Bakr, once initiated, were pursued with renewed vigor and determination by succeeding Caliphs. Umar oversaw the consolidation of Islamic power in Syria and Iraq, as Khalid won decisive battles at Damascus (635 C.E.) and Yarmuk (637 C.E.). The Sassanid capitol at Ctesiphon succumbed to the invading Islamic armies in 637 C.E., and Jerusalem fell in following year.<sup>217</sup> Exerting Islamic military power in another economically vital region, Amr ibn al-As led his armies into Egypt, conquering Pelusium, Heliopolis, Babylon, and Alexandria between the years 639 and 642 C.E.<sup>218</sup>

The election of Uthman ibn Affan to the Caliphate, in 644, signalled the rise of the Umayyad family and a period of intense conflict in Islamic politics. Although Uthman, third Caliph of the *rashidun*, was largely pre-occupied with political administration and consolidation of Islamic power in the new provinces, his supposed reversion to traditional familial politics and favoritism resulted in his assassination in 656. The short lived Caliphate of Ali, cherished by those who considered blood lines to the Prophet to be paramount, resulted in little but further animosity between Umayyad and *Muhajarun* interests. Despite efforts at

negotiation and an eventual stalemate at Siffin in 657, Ali refused to punish the murderers of Uthman and was himself assassinated by a disaffected Kufan in 661.<sup>219</sup> A subsequent agreement with Ali's son, Hasan, allowed Muawiyah ibn Abu Sufyan (Uthman's cousin) to re-establish Umayyad control over the Caliphate.

### Umayyad Expansion (661-750 C.E.)

Once elevated to the Caliphate (in 661 C.E.), Muawiyah, who shifted the political administration of the growing Islamic empire to Damascus, embarked upon an ambitious campaign that included: (1) a renewed attack upon Byzantium, (2) a policy of westward expansion that focused on North Africa and Spain, and (3) a policy of eastward expansion that focused on India and China.<sup>220</sup> Although these campaigns extended the hegemony of the faith, conversion was, as always, non-compulsory. The option afforded unbelievers opposed to conversion was the imposition of the *jizya*, or poll tax, as a means of support for the political administration of the Islamic state. This and the unrelenting moderation with which the Jewish and Christian minority populations were treated by the invading armies of Islam demonstrate the political and economic agendas that

drove Islamic expansionist policy forward.

Although "holy war" was occasionally preached in the heat of expansion, the religion of sound political administration was more frequently practiced. Thus, the issues that occupied the attentions of Muawiyah were those of "political and military affairs; tax collection; and religious administration, including courts and endowments."<sup>221</sup> Legal and judicial reform often took the guise of religious reform, especially given the nature of theocratic government (that is, the derivation of law from spiritual sources). An example of this was evident in Ziyad's (Muawiyah's half-brother) speech to his constituents in Basrah where he effectively wove the themes of God and respect for the law into a powerful diatribe against lawlessness.<sup>222</sup>

The single greatest effect Muawiyah had upon perceptions of conflict within the Islamic community, however, was in the appointment of his son, Yazid, as successor to the Caliphate. This set into motion a chain of events that would result in a centuries long debate concerning the legitimacy of Islamic leadership. Central to this conflict was the concept of martyrdom.

## A Brief Analysis of Martyrdom

Certainly, Muslims had witnessed the example of martyrdom from their Christian brethren; the model of the "soldier of Christ" defending Byzantine interests was well impressed on the collective consciousness of Islam. Despite this, martyrdom has often been associated with the concept of fanaticism in western secular thought. It was and is, however, an element of warfare no more dangerous than that of the decorated veteran acknowledged for his bravery and self-sacrifice in the field of battle. What is the difference between the Muslim who is convinced that his conduct in war will win for him a special reward in heaven and the patriotic soldier who, for love of God and country, throws himself on a live grenade in an attempt to save his companions? In fact, nothing distinguishes the two acts save *ideology*. As an ideology of the theocratic state, religion reduces the components of heroism to the concept of martyrdom and utilizes it as a model for exemplary conduct in war.

The difference lies in the conceptual definition of martyrdom, not so much in its *application* in war. As in martyrdom, the emotional component of heroism is much more dynamic than its theoretical expression. Thus, while it is



certainly true that the Qur'an articulated a cohesive theory of martyrdom for the Islamic armies of the *rashidun*, it would not be until the later events of the civil war that the intense emotions associated with its applications in war would assume mythic proportions. After the attempt of Husayn (Hasan's brother) to challenge Yazid for the Caliphate, and the massacre of his forces at Karbala in 680 C.E., the *Shi'at Ali* (party of Ali) imbued their struggle with the ethic of martyrdom, far surpassing the traditional *Sunni* understanding of the concept.

Following the death of Yazid (683), the Umayyad dynasty entered into a state of stagnation and eventual decline. No less than twelve Umayyad Caliphs reigned in a period of sixty-seven years; no more than three (abd al-Malik, al-Walid I, and Hisham) ever retained the office for more than four years.<sup>223</sup> In 747 C.E., various groups opposed to Umayyad rule banded together with the descendants of al-Abbas and challenged the ruling elite for the Caliphate. In this way, the focus of power shifted from Damascus to Baghdad.

### Abbasid "Jihad"

Precipitating the Abbasid revolt against the Umayyads

in 747 C.E., there was general unrest and dissatisfaction in the Islamic world regarding the policies of the Caliphate. The Kharajites of Khufa dissented based on issues involving strict observance of the Qur'an.<sup>224</sup> Many Muslims objected to corruption at the highest levels of Umayyad administration and disagreed on fundamental religious issues such as justification by faith and the efficacy of good works. As criticism of the Caliphate mounted, the Abbasids joined the chorus of dissent, accusing the Caliphate of "betraying the real Islam".<sup>225</sup> These calls for religious reform were, to a large extent, also indicative of a political dissatisfaction.<sup>226</sup> A financial crisis, it seems, had plagued the Caliphate of Hisham abd al-Malik (724-743 C.E.) and hampered the central administration's ability to effectively govern the frontiers.<sup>227</sup>

Additionally, there were concerns that the Umayyads had increasingly favored Arab constituencies in an expanded empire that included, among others, Greek, Persian, Indian, Egyptian and Berber populations.<sup>228</sup> Even among Arabs, support seemed to be waning; after the Caliphates of Abd al-Malik and al-Walid I (under whom Umayyad armies had conquered Algeria, Morocco and parts of Spain), Islamic expansion slowed considerably, leaving Arab trading interests dissatisfied.<sup>229</sup> Umayyad interests could have

potentially appealed to one sector of the population against the agendas of the others, so an effective ideology for the opposition movement now coalesced under Abbasid control. Perhaps this was why the Abbasids turned to the one available source that offered them an ideology from which they could "de-legitimize" Umayyad authority: Islam.<sup>230</sup>

The religious argument apparently worked; in 750 C.E., the first Abbasid Caliph ruled from Baghdad. A clear indication that religion facilitated the implementation of an Abbasid political agenda was demonstrated by the fate of the Shi'i general, Abu-Muslim, who was executed for "heresy", despite his contributions to the Abbasid cause.<sup>231</sup> Although Abbasid interests wooed Shi'i support with promises of power, once the Umayyads were defeated Abu-Muslim was seen as too great a threat and quickly eliminated. The pretense of "heresy" simply illustrated the Abbasid inclination toward opportunism. Similarly, the subsequent liquidation of all Umayyads under Abbasid rule demonstrated the new regime's utter disregard of Qur'anic prohibitions regarding inter-Islamic conflicts.<sup>232</sup>

Despite the Abbasid reliance on religion as an ideology of rebellion, the new dynasty was typified by a general lack of expansionist policy and military ambition.<sup>233</sup> Perhaps this was because of the fragmented state of the Islamic

community itself. Clearly, sectarian differences had increased since the unfortunate interlude at Karbala, in 680 C.E.; now political administration of the Islamic empire seemed almost impossible. Faced with political pressure from Shi'is and Isma'ilis, (a Shi'i splinter group who regarded Isma'il's son Muhammad as the seventh *imam*), the focus of Abbasid government shifted from militarism to the establishment of theological schools and an expression of Islamic art and philosophy.<sup>234</sup> This was done in effort to create a mainstream Islamic culture that could effectively marginalize the influence of the "heretical" cults; over time, this strategy was largely successful. For the moment, the Abbasids were less able to prevent the expropriation of religious ideology by their enemies.

#### **Political Upheaval in the Abbasid Empire (762-945 C.E.)**

As the Islamic empire expanded and then stagnated, various groups seeking the opportunity to create local hegemonies emerged, utilizing the ideology of religion as a unifying "nationalism". Shi'ite partisans staged a rebellion in Mecca and Basra in 762, followed by an uprising in Morocco by Shi'i led Berbers in 788.<sup>235</sup> Similarly, followers of Zayd, Ali's grandson, fermented unrest in

Tabaristan and Yemen. In the mid-ninth century C.E., Ismai'li opposition in Bahrain took shape in the form of a Qarmation independence movement.<sup>236</sup> An aura of religious charisma, approaching the political nature of a "cult of personality", surrounded the leader of the Qarmations.<sup>237</sup> In addition to Bahrain, Ismai'ilis maintained a strong presence in both Arabia and Syria, continuing political opposition to Sunni leadership well into the Modern Era. Similarly, the Zanj rebellion in lower Iraq (a component of the Samanid movement, 819-1005) featured charismatic figures (al-Husayn and al-Khujastani) who were jailed for "using the pulpits of Khurasan to exhort the population to give allegiance to Muhammad b. Tahir."<sup>238</sup>

Particularly in the eastern provinces, ruling elites replaced one another with astonishing rapidity. By 873, the Taharid government of Sijistan was removed by its Saffarid successors.<sup>239</sup> In the tenth century C.E., Ismail'is in Tunis and Egypt rebelled against Sunni leadership, resulting in the establishment of a Fatimid dynasty (909-1171 C.E.) that would eventually encompass parts of Syria and Palestine.<sup>240</sup> Consequently, the political situation of the Abbasids, from the ninth century on, was dire; in fact, the empire was in a state of absolute chaos, culminating in the fall of Baghdad to the Shi'ite Buyids in 945.<sup>241</sup> In many

places, Abbasid control was only nominal; the jurisdiction of the local dynasty took precedence over imperial objectives.<sup>242</sup> Despite the commotion caused by a plethora of local disturbances, uprisings, and dynastic changes, nothing shook the Abbasid government down to its very core as effectively as the arrival of the Turks.

### **The Ghazan Turks and the "Dar al-Harb"**

Originally from the borders of central Asia, the nomadic pastoral tribes that comprised the Turkish ethnic unit, initially came into contact with the Abbasid Empire in the ninth century C.E.<sup>243</sup> Surely, various Turkish groups had converted to Islam even as far back as during the Umayyad period, but it would be on Abbasid administrations that they exerted the strongest influence.<sup>244</sup> Initially, there was intense conflict, between the various Islamic dynasties that had achieved a great degree of political, philosophical and artistic sophistication and these rough, impulsive nomads from the northeast. Gradually, as Turks were captured in battle and tribute was taken in the form of child labor, a generation of indoctrinated youth, taught in the ways of Islam, emerged as a powerful influence in Turkish culture.<sup>245</sup> These new converts to Islam were utilized by the government

as "border soldiers", or *ghazis*, in the effort to create a buffer zone between the Abbasids and the still unconverted Turkish tribes.<sup>246</sup> Serving as they were in the army of Islam, these *ghazis* accepted the theocratic ideology of religion as it had developed in its purest form; namely, as a justification for the expansion and defense of Islam. This made obvious sense to them, for theirs was a culture centered about the reality of conflict and war. Increasingly, however, as the task of defending Islamic borders against pagan Turks became ever more crucial, a *ghazan* "us and them" mentality began to develop.

From the beginning, Islam had always incorporated the ideas of a "Dar al-Islam" (abode of peace) and a "Dar al-Harb" (abode of conflict). Normally, they had referred to the locations where the peace of God had been established and those where confusion and ignorance still reigned. Now, as *ghazan* Turks struggled to defend the borders of the "Dar al-Islam", it was easy to characterize the "Dar al-Harb" as a place where war *must be waged* in order to establish peace. As the militarism of *ghazis* increased, so their reliance on Islamic religious ideology as a unitive element intensified, resulting in a rearticulation of "Dar al-Harb" as the "abode of war" peopled by unbelievers.<sup>247</sup> This had certainly been the understanding of the non-Islamic world in centuries

past, but never with the same implications of organized militarism.<sup>248</sup>

The Seljuk Turks, converted in 960, were indispensable to the *ghazis* in the struggle for the border; consequently, they modeled their concepts of war based upon *ghazan* doctrines. By 1040, Seljuks had conquered Khurisan; in 1055, they sacked Baghdad and in short measure, they acquired Azerbaijan, Armenia and Anatolia (after the battle of Manzikert in 1071).<sup>249</sup> These campaigns often took on the aspect of a holy struggle, particularly those against the Byzantines of Anatolia. Holy war, as opposed to the original concept of jihad, had now become an unabashedly offensive strategy, wielded by a non-Arab power determined to expand geographically. In a way, the Seljuks resembled the Caliphs of the Rashidun and Umayyad dynasties as they tirelessly availed themselves of religious ideology in pursuit of economic and geographic integrity, despite Qur'anic regulations to the contrary.

This Seljuk domination would help to further institutionalize the idea of holy war as a concept eternally consistent with the ends of Islamic government. The establishment of *madrasas* (religious schools) as institutions of the state in which war propaganda was disseminated typified Turkish administration of the Islamic



*umma*.<sup>250</sup> These schools would become the instrument of leaders such as Nur al-Din Arslan Shah, or Nureddin, (r.1193-1211 C.E.) who elaborated upon the idea of holy war as a "complete theory, sketching out a precise political path" for Islam.<sup>251</sup> Motivated by obvious political motives, such as the exertion of his own influence upon the Abbasid Caliphate, the capture of Damascus and the re-union of Mosul and Aleppo, Nureddin refined the art of holy war to the level it enjoys in the Modern Era as an ideology for various political extremist groups.<sup>252</sup> Thus it was that, in addition to his titles as "guardian of Allah's land" and "conqueror of infidels and pagans", it could be said of Nureddin by his contemporaries:

"While all the other sovereigns think of nothing but their empty worldly goods, you [Nureddin] dedicate yourself to the defense of religion".<sup>253</sup>

As much could be said of his resolve to defend the Islamic state.

The institution of the *masdrasas* facilitated the easy dissemination of war rhetoric by succeeding dynasties. Salah al-Din Yusuf ibn Ayyub, or Saladin (1169-93 C.E.), perhaps the most stereotyped figure in Islamic history, became the inheritor of Nureddin's revival of holy war

themes. His success, coupled with the fall of Constantinople in 1453 to Mehmed the Conqueror, was instrumental in the negative view that has prevailed in the West regarding the Turks.<sup>254</sup> The period of Ottoman expansion that followed the Crusades only reinforced western views on the militancy of Islam, despite the socio-religious consciousness of the millet system that it introduced. It is a sad legacy that the fanaticism attributed to Islam was largely the product of the early conquests and the inability of the West to cope with the success of Turkish foreign policy.

Thus, it is clear that that apart from the theoretical development of jihad there existed an understanding of holy war themes in Islamic culture. These themes often strayed from the profound practicality of the Prophet who saw survival as the sole justification for his limited militarism. As the theory of jihad became the expedient instrument with which to pursue economic and geographic expansion for the Islamic theocratic state, holy wars were regularly preached. It should be noted, that the frequency of holy war exhortation increased with the development of theocratic institutions in Islamic culture. This was due largely to the increased pressures of political and economic competition among various states in the Middle East and the advent of European interests in the region. "Survival" was

translated into economic and political terms; consequently, holy war became effectively institutionalized by government interests. By strange coincidence, Islamic jihad was liberated from its Qur'anic limitations and inserted into the realities of imperial policy and expansionism. In this way, "holy war" became an image of jihad magnified by the successes of theocratic Islam.

## CONCLUSION

Throughout history, societies have wrestled with issues of conflict resolution. Political and economic agendas have determined how these societies pursued specific policies that occasionally breached the rights and obligations of other polities. When the normal procedures for negotiating disintegrated, war became, to paraphrase Isaac Asimov, the "last refuge" of the incompetent. At the same time, the formulation of society has remained, for the most part, an unconscious process. No one (save the behaviorists of the modern era) has attempted to consciously construct a community with pre-conceived or fabricated norms and values. In this regard, societies that have evolved into theocracies have possessed their own particular strategic perspectives in pursuit of the political and economic agendas essential to survival. Thus, when efforts to negotiate failed and war ensued, theocracies utilized the ideology that formed the very basis of their social system in order to foster a sense of cultural unity and "national" purpose.

As explained in my introduction, I use the term "nation" to define a society possessed of the following characteristics:

- (1) A highly centralized government,
- (2) a bureaucratic administration,
- (3) well defined geographic borders,
- (4) a complex economic system,
- (5) long distance trade, and
- (6) a state ideology

All of these characteristics typified some ancient societies and, I believe, qualified them as nations. Theocratic nations utilized religion as an ideology with as much effectiveness as modern states pursue the ideals of democracy, Marxism or absolutism. Democracy is a political system, Marxism an economic theory, absolutism a cultural norm. All have become state ideologies, however, and have developed a mythic history that borders on the religious. Pericles and the golden age of Athenian democracy still inspire many in the west with a religious devotion. The Marxist heroes of the past, until very recently, occupied their place in a community of saints whose earthly remains were venerated in communist capitols everywhere. Third world dictators are parental symbols in societies where obedience to authority is fearfully observed with a dedication usually reserved for father-god figures. In what way, then, may the theocratic ideology of religion be regarded as anything different?

The reasons for waging war in the modern era have seemed apparent. The rhetoric sounds reasonable, precisely

because all are children of a particular ideology that defines social purpose. The First World War was fought to "make the world safe for democracy". Westward expansion in the United States, and its devastating impact on native populations, was an essential component of "manifest destiny". The monstrous policies of Josef Stalin were intended to develop Russia as an industrialized economy (a necessary prerequisite for Marxist ideology). To the casual observer, the ideologies of democracy and Marxism might be regarded as having exercised a type of fanaticism in pursuit of their agendas. How and why did religion become the scapegoat for the fanaticism typical of many ideologies?

Perhaps it is because religion is more effective than political/economic ideologies at convincing people to make commitments to the ideological agenda; especially those that entail sacrifice of life and limb. All other ideologies are bound to the here and now, the physical plane that determines existence. Only religion can offer the hope of eternal reward and the solace of God's approval, but how much more fanatical is this concept than the typical American's faith in the U.S. Constitution? In a way, religion is the ultimate state ideology. History has indeed proved the efficacy of religious ideology as a instrument of theocratic rhetoric, especially in times of war.

Judaic holy war emerged as a concept that sought to reinterpret the past in such a way that it would inspire courage and conviction in crisis. It developed in times of extreme disunity, never fully realizing its potential as an ideology. Judaic holy war was almost entirely conceptual; the troubled monarchies that sought to utilize its value never achieved the unity of purpose they so desperately desired. As a conceptual device, however, it had fewer restrictions placed on its definitions or applications. God had promised the land of Canaan to the Israelites; it was the mission of every one of the faithful to kill, if necessary, to keep it. The deaths at Masada stand as a grim reminder of the legacy of Jewish nationalism. Judaic scripture was produced concurrent to the trends in theocratic ideology, mirroring and accentuating the themes of holy war and nationalism.

Christian holy war developed only after a body of scripture had been established. Because of this fact, Christian warfare was significantly restricted by the ambiguous statements attributed to Jesus. This did not prevent religious and secular leaders in Christian society from developing realistic strategies consistent with the ends of theocratic government. The loyalty professed by Roman Christians to the Empire of Constantine, the

innovations of Augustine (who articulated two theories of Christian warfare), as well as the expansionist policies of Charlemagne, clearly illustrate this point. That is not say that war waged by the Christian church was lacking in scriptural authority. Certainly, even the Crusades initially possessed an element of Christian self-sacrifice in the call to arms in defence of the Byzantines. Although the Crusades were arguably justifiable from a scriptural point of view, nothing could have vindicated the outcome. In the end, political/economic issues (the cessation of warring between western lords and the confiscation of booty) served as more compelling reasons to fight. It is perhaps fortunate that, although none of Augustine's theories ever achieved the status of doctrine, the clearest Christian traditions acknowledging the possibility of Christian war reflect his more moderate just war principle and eschew the idea of war "at God's bidding". This, of course, may be due to the sobering realities of crusading and the diminishing idealism that followed.

As a faith that stemmed from the revelations of one man, Islam enjoyed a flexibility without parallel in the Judaic or Christian tradition. Despite this, Qur'anic sources have imposed a greater number of restrictions on the waging of war than any of the other two monotheistic faiths. Although Judaic holy war has had only limited historical



application, theoretically it is unconstrained by restrictions. The Christian church, though it now acknowledges only one legitimate reason for war (i.e. fulfillment of the just war conditions), has occasionally allowed Augustine's less restrictive holy war theories to prevail.

Due to the harsh realities of survival that faced the early Islamic community, Muhammad was determined that politically feasible, yet ethically defensible, model for Islamic war be constructed. This meant that he could employ fluid methods in his recollection of Qur'anic revelation, but also, that after each recollection the revelation became more precise. Thus, although it is possible to trace a development in the Prophet's own thinking concerning Islamic war, by the time of his death, the limitation of Jihad was a clearly established concept in scripture. Orthodoxy among mainstream *sunni* Muslims still requires that defensive requirements be met, or that issues vital to the survival of the Islamic community (treason, non-compliance with taxation, and despotism) should be addressed in the application of jihad. Holy war, on the other hand, was developed as a political instrument throughout Islamic history, its practitioners seeking to expropriate jihad rhetoric but ignoring the scriptural justifications for its

existence. Because of the competitive environment in which Islamic political independence grew, and the increasingly hostile reaction directed toward Islam from the West, the causes for war are perhaps more imminent in the Arab world than anywhere else. In this regard, holy war could hardly have retained the limited definition of jihad for very long.

Holy war is with us today. As the political center evaporates, extremism avails itself of the spiritual absolutism of religious ideology. The modern state of Israel (whose established borders were determined by Ben-Gurion using Biblical criteria) represents nothing less than a modern example of theocratic government in operation. The claim to the land of Canaan by modern Israelis is still based on divine covenant. Similarly, so-called Christian militias and political activists rally around the concept of holy war in their respective struggles (witness the religious rhetoric used to mask the political issues in Northern Ireland). Extremist groups, as apparent as their political agendas are, still use religious ideology as a unitive force in an environment of ethnically fractured Islamic revival. Despite *Sunni* and *Shi'i*, Persian and Arab, North African and Asian cultural differences, Islamic revival remains an ethical challenge to assimilationist governments throughout the Muslim world. Politically, it is

perhaps the only hope for constituencies historically oppressed both by domestic and foreign enemies.

Despite the chauvinism of Twentieth Century theorists, it remains a sad fact that the modern age will be remembered not only for its accomplishments, but for its brutality. Recent studies have noted the rise in torture as a political technique and ethnic rivalries in Bosnia-Herzegovina have illustrated the durability of ancient conflicts. Religious ideology, with its holy war propaganda, should be placed in its proper context alongside political and economic ideologies as a force that has been implemented throughout history with realistic and practical objectives in mind. As social movements inherited holy war themes from traditions that had been founded on theocratic principles, religious ideology became ever more entrenched. Perhaps this has been interpreted as fanaticism. It is more probable that fanaticism exists as a universal human characteristic that lays dormant until the confluence of human events demands action. The survival of any human community depends on the emotional investment of its members. When that survival is threatened, humans will fight desperately for the continuation of a society in which they derive meaning. Whether the meaning is political, economic, or religious, matters little. They will determine the efficacy of their

struggle based on their respective traditions. They will fight the holy war.

## END NOTES

1. Doris E. Lechner, managing ed., The New Lexicon Webster's Dictionary of the English Language (New York: Lexicon Publications, 1989) p.1025. Hereafter cited as New Lexicon.
2. New Lexicon, p.481.
3. Jacques Ellul, Propaganda, The Formulation of Men's Attitudes (New York: Vintage Books, 1973) pgs.xi-xii.
4. Douglas A. Knight and Gene M. Tucker, The Hebrew Bible and its Modern Interpreters (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1985) pgs.1-30. Hereafter cited as Knight and Tucker.
5. Knight and Tucker, pgs.297-323.
6. Stephen Bigger, Creating the Old Testament, The Emergence of the Hebrew Bible (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1989) pgs.151-168. Hereafter cited as Bigger.
7. Bigger, pgs.203-226.
8. As in the case of Frederick Russell's Just War in the Middle Ages (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975). Although Russell's work perpetuates the myth of the single "just war" policy of Christian philosophy, it nonetheless provided me with valuable information concerning the developing militancy of Medieval Christendom.
9. Two works were consulted for the completion of this project: John Kelsay and James Turner Johnson's Cross, Crescent and Sword (New York: Greenwood Press, 1990) and Kelsay and Turner's Just War and Jihad: Historical and Theoretical Perspectives on War and Peace in the Western and Islamic Traditions (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991).
10. Kelsay and Johnson in Just War and Jihad, p.157, establish the importance of *sunni* and *shi'i* distinctions: "One cannot trace just war theory in an Islamic context without first delineating differences between *sunni* and *shi'i* norms." This is true, but much more so for the modern historian. The elements of martyrdom (usually associated with fanaticism) that were so prevalent in the modern revolutionary movement in Iran were noticeably absent, for example, in the rise to power of the Fatimids in Egypt. Both were *shi'i* movements utilizing Islamic revivalist themes, although one (the Fatimids) relied on more moderate means of

exhorting its followers to rebellion. Because of the brutal policies of the Shah's government in Iran, *shi'i* opposition there sustained a much more emotional appeal. Central to this appeal was the cult of martyrdom that had developed steadily (particularly in the east) since the massacre at Karbala. For purposes of this paper, I will restrict myself to *mainstream* western (although not exclusively *sunni*) notions of Islamic warfare.

11. Kelsay and Johnson, in Just War and Jihad, p.83, imply that Augustine's theory transcends the mere moral aspect of just war:

the key elements in Augustine's historical theodicy that allow for the inclusion of warfare within a moral and religious system that, like the ethos of the peace churches, is both highly demanding and *strongly otherworldly* can now be identified.

This view actually anticipates the conclusion that Augustine's war "at God's request" is nothing short of a Christian articulation of the holy war ethic.

12. The Holy Scriptures, Masoretic Text (Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1955) pgs.262-263, hereafter cited as The Masoretic Text, records in Deut.20:1-4 and 20:16-18 the supposed words of Moses as he addressed the Israelites:

When thou goest forth into battle against thine enemies, and seeist horses, and chariots, and a people more than thou, thou shalt not be afraid of them; for the Lord thy God is with thee...neither be ye afrighted at them, for the Lord your God is He that goeth with *you to fight for you* [italics added] against your enemies.

Howbeit of the cities of these peoples, that the Lord thy God giveth thee for an inheritance, thou shalt save alive nothing that breatheth, but thou shalt utterly *destroy them* [italics added]: the Hittite, and the Amorite, the Canaanite, and the Perrizite, the Hivite, and the Jebusite; as the Lord thy God hath commanded thee; that they teach you not to do after all their abominations.

13. The Masoretic Text, p.208.

14. William Stiebing, Out of the Desert: Archaeology and the Exodus/Conquest Narratives (New York: Prometheus Books, 1989) pgs.66-88.

15. Stiebing illustrates how Beer-sheba, although it is not included in the list of conquered cities, is referred to in Joshua 15:28 and 19:2 as a gift either to the tribe of Judah or Simeon (pgs.67-68). The reference to Hormah (previously the Canaanite city of Zephath) is in Num.21:1-3 and Judg.1:17-18 of the Masoretic Text (pgs.209 and 326, respectively).

16. Stiebing, pgs.72-88.

17. Ian Wilson, in The Exodus Enigma (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1985) p.25, establishes the value of the Merneptah stele in dating the Exodus:

The real interest of the stele is its reference to Israel, the first in all history. Although, in contrast to every other name mentioned, this is given the hieroglyphic symbol determining it as a people rather than a territory, the context makes clear that this was a people already so settled somewhere in Palestine that Merneptah, fictionalizing although he doubtedly was, felt obliged to single them out for special mention...The Merneptah stele provides, then, what historians call a terminus ante quem--an end point--requiring that whatever the date of the Exodus it must have been before Merneptah.

18. Wilson, p.20.

19. Stiebing, p.55, has strenuously objected to a fifteenth century B.C.E. Exodus, for various reasons, and has generally concluded:

...most scholars have rejected a fifteenth century B.C. date for the Exodus. Clearly, the picture of Palestine in the books of Joshua and Judges agrees much better with the chaotic situation at the end of the Bronze Age and the beginning of the Iron Age (c.1200-1050)--when "everyone did what was right in his own sight" (Judges 17:1)--than it does with the earlier era of Egyptian control over Canaan (55).

20. Stiebing, pgs.66-88.

21. Wilson, p.163.

22. Stiebing, p.53, insists that this was virtually impossible, given the fact that some mention would have been made in Scripture concerning the Egyptians, especially since the Israelite confederation had to contend with various other military threats:

How could the Israelites have destroyed cities in the fourteenth century B.C. without a major confrontation with the armies of Egypt? Why do accounts of the "judges" correctly preserve the descriptions of the various peoples of Syria-Palestine (Amorites, Canaanites, Hurrians, Ammonites and the Philistines, for example) yet totally ignore the Egyptians who controlled the major cities and roads throughout that area?

23. Stiebing, p.53.

24. Reuven Firestone, in an article entitled "Conceptions of Holy War in Biblical and Qur'anic Tradition" (Journal of Religious Ethics, Spr. '96, v.24) pgs.102-103, asserts that although "Biblical concepts of holy war evolved out of the earlier notion of a tribal god associated with one tribe or people and warring on behalf of its human followers against peoples and gods of foreign tribes", it appears that the holy war ethic of the conquest narratives "has the greatest likelihood of representing a consensus within the polity of Israel (in the case of Deuteronomy, late in the monarchic period)."

25. J.M. Miller's "Israelite History", p.14, included in the compilation edited by Knight and Tucker, states the following:

Scholars have overestimated the homogeneity of these tribal groups (religiously as well as politically) and a good case has not been made (on the basis of critical analysis of the narratives in Judges) that they were bound together by any sort of formal league.

26. The Dictionary of Bible and Religion, p.563, discusses the period of warfare during the period of Judges at length. Included is the observation that:

These heroes [the Judges] arose to meet specific threats from enemy peoples during the approximately two centuries from the tribal confederation that preceded the monarchy in Israel.

Also, Paul Johnson, History of the Jews (new York: Harper-



Perennial, 1987) p.45, attests to the informal manner in which these tribes reacted to external crises and military threats:

So every military coalition had to be negotiated on an ad hoc basis, summed up in the words of Barak, the chief of the Kadesh-Naphtali to Deborah the warrior-prophetess: "If thou wilt go with me, then I will go; but if thou wilt not go with me, then I will not go".

27. John L. McKenzie, p.126, in The World of the Judges (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1966) claims that:

Critics are unanimous in agreeing that the poem is contemporary to the event or very near it and it is generally held to be the oldest piece of Hebrew poetry extant.

See also: Julius Beyer, The Literature of the Old Testament, 3rd ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962) p.6, and Robert Boling, The Anchor Bible: Judges (New York: Doubleday, 1975) p.106. For a comprehensive list of scholars who represent the consensus (Albright, 1921; Crether, 1941; Sellin, 1934; Globe, 1974; Craigie, 1969; and Hauser, 1987) see Barnabas Lindars' Judges 1-5: A New Translation and Commentary (Edinburgh: T&T Clark LTD., 1995) pgs.166 and 215-216.

28. The Masoretic Text, pgs.332-333.

29. Paul Johnson, pgs.46-47, demonstrates that:

...the stories in Judges are never without unusual twists, and this passage is a fascinating glimpse into contemporary diplomatic-religious procedure--Jephthah swore a great oath to the Lord to solicit his help.

30. Boling, p.100, is convinced that, by the time of the Judges, the practice of divinization had already achieved an antiquated status:

In the last of these passages the practice of appealing to Yahweh the God is reduced to mere habit--as almost happened very early in the time of Deborah.

31. Lindars, pgs.214-216, lists Ahlstrom, Weiser, Blenkinsopp, Alter, Burney, Kugel and Garbini as scholars who disagree, in one fashion or another, with the previously mentioned consensus regarding the antiquity of "Deborah's Song".

32. Lindars, p.215, is very precise in his criticism of the poem's antiquity. Utilizing internal textual analysis, he asserts:

In my view, the references to the tribes provide the best indication of a date, suggesting a time well after the event (v.6), but early enough to be free from the rationalized tribal ideology which belongs to later literary strands. Some time in the early monarchy would be suitable.

Commenting on pgs. 214-215 about the dubious credibility such Biblical devices have as historical sources, Lindars further observes:

The poet's references to tribes or clans reflect the ideas about the past which obtained at the time when the poem was composed at any time before this, and do not necessarily correspond with real history.

Finally, Lindars, on p.164, concludes:

As far as the poem is concerned, there is virtually unanimous agreement that the Song of Deborah has been inserted into the Book at a very late stage.

Others, who agree that certain sections of Judges were later additions, are James D. Martin, The Book of Judges (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975) p.69:

We have already noticed in the book of Judges that the idea of "Israel" acting as a unit is the imprint of later editors of the book and that incidents may have involved one or, at least, two tribes.

William H. Gentz, ed., The Dictionary of Bible and Religion (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1986) p.259:

It has generally been assumed that the prose of Judges 4 is a more recent retelling of the story of the poetry of Judges 5, the latter being frequently described as one of the most ancient compositions preserved in the O.T. *This consensus has been challenged, however* [italics added]...The poetry celebrates a much more heroic exploit involving many more details, and much more drama, typical of later elaboration.

and Morton Smith and R. Joseph Hoffman, What The Bible Really Says (San Francisco: HarperCollins Publishers, 1993) p.151:

The theological overwriting in the Book of Judges (sometimes termed "Deuteronomistic" because of its similarity to the language and ideology of the Book of Deuteronomy) sets the narratives in an ideological framework that distorts the individual stories within the book.

33. Stiebing, p.24.

34. The Dictionary Bible and Religion, p.267, in discussing the origins of the book of Deuteronomy, determines that:

Since Josiah's reform was significantly informed by the discovery in 622 B.C. of "The Book of the Law" (II Kings:22-23), a document roughly equivalent with the Deuteronomic code, the legislation likely achieved its present shape not long before.

35. Johnson, p.45, briefly mentions the various ethnic groups which competed for natural and economic resources with the Israelites:

They [the Israelites] had a variety of enemies: Canaanite enclaves, incursive Bedouin tribes, the new menace of the Philistines pushing in from the coast.

36. Johnson, p.40, also reflects the accepted view of Israelite society at the time of the emerging monarchy:

Thus, the Israelites were creating a new kind of society. Josephus later used the term "theocracy". This he defined as placing all sovereignty in the hands of God.

37. Johnson, p.53.

38. Sam.8:11-17, The Masoretic Text, p.370.

39. Johnson, p.55, accurately describes the the popular sentiment of rural Israelite culture concerning emerging royal centralization:

These rural folk felt they had no share in the new style state and echoed the anguished cry of Sheba the Benjaminite who "blew the trumpet and said: We have no part in David, neither have we inheritance in the son of Jesse. Every man to his tents, O Israel!"

40. Stiebing, p.28. For the text of the poem, see Ex.15:3, The Masoretic Text, p.91.

41. Stiebing, p.22.

42. Patrick D. Miller, Jr.; Paul D. Hanson and S. Dean McBride, eds., Ancient Israelite Religion (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1987) p.327.

43. The Dictionary of Bible and Religion, in various entries, lists the influence of the schools on these particular books. The following is a sequence of pages in which each source is referenced: Genesis on p.384, Exodus on p.342, Leviticus on p.613, Numbers on p.748, Deuteronomy on p.267, Joshua on p.555, Judges on p.564, I and II Samuel on p.927, I and II Kings on pgs.583-584, and I and II Chron. on p.197.

44. David Rosenberg, trans. and Harold Bloom, interp., The Book of J (New York: Grove and Weidenfeld, 1990) p.311.

45. Rosenberg and Bloom, p.315.

46. Rosenberg and Bloom, p.315.

47. Eugene H. Maly, in The World of David and Solomon (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965) p.157, concludes:

This J document as it is called after the first letter of its German spelling, is important for reasons other than its cultural contribution. Its theology reflects a significant insight into the world of David and Solomon. The insight is that of a man who was convinced that God's mighty deeds in raising the young shephard of Judah to the kingship over all Israel and in choosing the tribe of Judah in preference to the longer established tribes of the north were the climax of a succession of saving acts in which the sons of Jacob had been chosen by Yahweh in the face of the superior power of Egypt at the time of the Exodus.

48. Johnson, p.57, clearly recognizes the impact that David's act of relocation had upon Israelite politics:

All these acts were to strengthen his [David's] personal position and to identify the national religion, the entire people and the crown with himself and his line.

49. Johnson's characterization of the politio-religious reforms of the Solomonic period, p.63, is as follows:

Solomon took advantage of this confusion to push forward his religious reform in the direction of *royal absolutism* [italics added], in which the King controlled the sole

shrine where God could be effectively worshipped.

Additionally, The Dictionary of Bible and Religion, p.50, indicates the complexity of Solomon's reforms and their effect upon the social environment:

By founding the Jerusalem temple to serve as *royal dynastic chapel* [italics added] as well as a national sanctuary, sponsoring courtly wisdom in imitation of imperialistic Egypt, maintaining a standing army and court harem, establishing an ambitious taxation program that consciously violated earlier tribal boundaries, using forced labor to implement his many building enterprises, and engaging enthusiastically in both overland and sea trade, Solomon ruled Israel with a heavy hand.

50. Maly, pgs.164-165.

51. Johnson, p.65.

52. Gene M. Tucker's contribution, entitled "Prophecy and the Prophetic Literature", included in Knight and Tucker's edited volume, p.349, documents the rise of cultic or "guild" prophets.

53. George M. Lamsa, trans., The Holy Bible from the Ancient Eastern Text (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1968) p.405.

54. Samuel Sandmel, in The Hebrew Scriptures (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978) p.66, demonstrates that, beginning with the prophet Amos, criticism of the northern kingdom threatened the violent intervention of God:

He [Amos] says in the Deity's name: "A foe will go all through the land; your very strength will be taken away from you, your palaces will be plundered. On the day I visit Israel's sin upon her, then I will visit Bethel, and the horns of the altar will be knocked off and fall to the ground. I will smite the winter home as well as the summer home; the houses of ivory will be destroyed; many houses will come to an end [3:11, 14-15].

55. Harry M. Orlinsky, Ancient Israel, 2nd ed. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1960) p.79.

56. Orlinsky, p.89.

57. J.A. Thompson, The Bible and Archaeology (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1962) p.139.

58. Irving M. Zeitlin, Ancient Judaism, Biblical Criticism from Max Weber to the Present (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1984) p.224.

59. Bewer, p.79.

60. Johnson, p.70.

61. E. John Hamlin, in At Risk in the Promised Land (Edinburgh: The Handsel Press, LTD, 1990) p.7, states the following:

Josiah turns to the Lord away from the corruptions of his royal grandfather Manasseh, to carry out a great reform movement in 622 inspired by the discovery of a book of the law in the temple (2Kgs.22:3-20; 23:1-22); the book referred to was probably the main part of Deuteronomy.

The discovery of the Deuteronomical fragment was perhaps one of the best documented developments in Biblical history. Others who allude to the event are: Chaim Potok, Wanderings (New York: Fawcett Crest, 1978) pgs.191-193, The Dictionary of Bible and Religion, p.267; Stiebing, pgs.21-22; and Johnson, p.73. Potok identifies the fragment with chapters 5-26 and 28 of Deuteronomy.

62. Johnson, p.70.

63. Deut.20:16-18, The Masoretic Text, p.263.

64. Bigger, p.155, references the impact of the Deuteronomic author in creating a nationalistic history, mentioning the important contributions of Noth in this regard:

The Deuteronomic historian was, however, much more than a mere collector of traditions. He compiled and rearranged his material, skillfully weaving together the traditions with speeches and editorial links. The speeches were *placed in the mouths* of central characters [italics added] --Joshua (Josh.1, 23), Samuel (I Sam.12), and Solomon (I Kgs.8). The editorial sections (e.g. Josh.12; Judg. 2:11-23; II Kgs.17:7-41) occur at crucial points in the history of the nation. According to Noth, the Deuteronomic history attempts to come to terms with the traumatic events of 587/6 B.C.E. when Judah and Jerusalem were humiliated at the hands of the Babylonians.

65. The Dictionary of Bible and Religion, p.564, has concluded on the issue:

Any recourse to "holy war" exhortations were, in all probability, inserted by the Deuteronomical authors of the

seventh and sixth centuries B.C.E.

66. Peter R. Ackroyd's contribution, entitled "The Historical Literature", contained in Knight and Tucker's edited compilation, p.303, states, however, that Noth's theory "has been seen to be too simplified."

67. Bigger, p.157.

68. Richard Elliott Friedman, Who Wrote the Bible? (New York: Summit Books, 1987) p.108.

69. First, the contention that the words of specific characters were intended as "orations" is referenced in Moshe Weinfeld's contribution to Alex Preminger's and Edward L. Greenstein's edited volume, entitled The Hebrew Bible in Literary Criticism (New York: The Ungar Publishing Co., 1986) p.331. Next, the idea that these orations were at variance with other Biblical sources is well documented in Moshe Weinfeld's Deuteronomy and the Deuteronomistic School (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972) p.47:

The epilogue of the Book of the Covenant makes almost no mention of the fact that it is *Israel* who will dispossess the Canaanites (vv.29 and 30). Consequently there is no particular need to encourage the people with rallying slogans. *Not so the Book of Deuteronomy* which places the task of dispossessing the Canaanite peoples directly upon the Israelites themselves, and thus finds it necessary to fortify the spirit of the people and eradicate their fear of waging war against the outnumbering enemy [italics added].

Corresponding verses in the Book of Joshua, involving the determinism of the Israelite people to possess the land of the Canaanites, are seen by J. Maxwell Miller and Gene M. Tucker, in The Book of Joshua (London: Cambridge University Press, 1974) pgs.21-22, as an indication that, although their words "concern Joshua and his generation":

...they are meant for the writer's own time. Though he never mentions his audience explicitly, he is aware of them. The past is not recounted here for its own sake, or out of an antiquarian curiosity, but for the sake of the present and the future. Each unit of this chapter is a sermon. Already the historian is laying the foundation for an understanding of why Israel succeeded where she succeeded and failed where she failed.

70. Robert Polzin, Moses and the Deuteronomist (New York: The Seabury Press, 1980) p.161.

71. P.R. Ackroyd and C.F. Evans eds., The Cambridge History of the Bible, Vol.1 (London: Cambridge University Press, 1970) p.121, assert:

Further, it is not unreasonable to suppose that the official acknowledgement of its [the Deuteronomic standard's] divine origin and normative authority had given to the document in the Temple an *unprecedented status* and permanence [italics added].

72. T.R. Hobbs, A Time For War: A Study of Warfare in the Old Testament (Wilmington, Delaware: Michael Glazier, 1989) p.206.

73. Johnson, p.47, illustrates the method with which even sinners were made to be national heroes by the Deuteronomic author(s) of Judges:

He [Samson] is the outstanding example of the point which the Book of Judges makes again and again, that the Lord and society [italics added] are often served by semi-criminal types, outlaws and misfits, who became by their exploits folk-heroes and then in time religious heroes.

74. Johnson, p.73.

75. Johnson, p.78.

76. Hobbs, p.202.

77. Susan Niditch, War in the Hebrew Bible: A Study in the Ethics of Violence (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993) p.132.

78. Niditch, p.132.

79. Abraham Schalit, ed.; The Hellenistic Age, vol.6: Political History Jewish Palestine From 322 B.C.E to 67 B.C.E. (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1972) p.5.

80. Schalit, p.17.

81. Edwyn Robert Bevan, The House of Seleucus. Vol.II (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1966) p.30.



82. Moshe Pearlman, in The Maccabees (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, Inc., 1973), p.27, illustrates the level to which this process of Hellenization had reached:

His [Onias III, the High Priest of Jerusalem] distant cousins, however, the descendants of the fashionable Joseph, were now very much assimilated, displaying an open admiration for the hellenistic mode of living and mingling mostly with Seleucid notables, officials, traders and agents, with whom they felt they had more in common than with their fellow Jews...Though removed from the ways of their own people, this group still wielded considerable economic influence in the Jewish community. Simon, indeed, even held the position of administrator of the Temple, much to the chagrin of the High Priest.

83. Schalit, p.123, has definitively redeemed the image of Antiochus III Epiphanes from the verdict of Jewish nationalist history:

Some modern scholars see Antiochus as a mad Hellenizer who would not shrink from any endeavor to spread his favorite culture among Eastern peoples. Yet historical research has revealed that nowhere except in Jerusalem did Antiochus abolish the prevailing customs and introduce Greek ones instead. Accordingly, it may be concluded that the notorious persecutions of Antiochus were not the result of his Hellenistic aspirations but had some other motivation... It would be more reasonable to suppose that neither religion nor culture mattered most in Antiochus Epiphanes' life, but that first place was reserved for his imperialistic policy; religion and culture being only the tools of this policy [italics added].

84. Schalit, p.118.

85. Doron Mendels, in The Rise Fall of Jewish Nationalism (New York: Doubleday, 1992) p.164, documents that:

Unlike the armies of the Hellenistic princes, but like the ones of the Nabataeans, the "army" created by Judas Maccabeus about 168 B.C.E. was unique in that it was a national army comprised of only Jewish soldiers, who fought for a clear *nationalistic* purpose with which they identified [italics added].

86. Mendels, p.124.

87. William Reuben Farmer, in Maccabees, Zealots and Josephus: An Inquiry into Jewish Nationalism in the Greco-Roman Period (New York: Columbia University Press, 1956) p.84, quotes Philo's testimony concerning the importance of the temple:

But all who attempt to violate their laws, or to turn them into ridicule, they detest as their bitterest enemies, and they look upon each separate one of the commandments with such reverence that, whether one ought to call it the invariable good fortune or the happiness of the nation, they have never been guilty of the violation of even the most insignificant of them; but above all other observances their zeal for their holy temple is the most prominent, and vehement, and universal feeling throughout the whole nation.

88. Johnson, pgs.103-104.

89. Mendels, pgs.58-60, records the political/religious nature of the Maccabean resistance:

Then the army (*parembole*) moved and encamped to the south of Emmaus. Judas encouraged his army, saying, "Gird yourselves like brave men...it is better for us to die in battle than to look upon the tragedies of *our nation* and our sanctuary. But whatever be the will in Heaven, thus shall he do".

90. Mendels, p.124.

91. Johnson, p.105.

92. Mendels, p.199.

93. Mendels, p.192, delineates the difference between religious/cultural and political domination:

Moreover, during the time under discussion Rome had no intention of uprooting the national identities of the peoples that it found in the East. Rome let them go on living their daily lives, but exploited them economically dominated them politically...Therefore the indigenous populations continued to hold onto many of their nationalistic traits such as language, temple territory, traditions, and history with practically no hindrance from Rome.

94. Farmer, p.104, is of the opinion that the Maccabees were a constant reminder of the struggle for *political* independence in the Judaic kingdom:

But if Antiochus Epiphanes was well-known in the Roman period, how can we doubt that the Jews who led Israel to ultimate victory over his armies were equally well-known? This is, of course, a point we shall seek to demonstrate in the following chapter, namely that the Maccabees were remembered in the Roman period.

95. Mendel, p.196.

96. Mendel, pgs.199-200, outlines the various groups that existed at the time of the Roman occupation and either cooperated with or opposed the regime:

During this period, within the Jewish society of Palestine, there were essentially three attitudes regarding Jewish nationalism...The first attitude was more open to Hellenistic influence. This group included the liberal element to be found in the higher classes of Jewish society and some of its intellectuals who favored Rome's rule in the ecumene. The high priestly houses should also be included in this group...The second attitude was held by all those religious Jews who did not interfere in the politics of their day, many of whom were Pharisees and Essenes, and who wished to go on peacefully with their studies...The third attitude was held by those Jews who were imbued with strong nationalistic feelings and who did not give up the desire for Jewish independence in Palestine.

97. Mendel, p.199.

98. Martin Warner, ed. The Bible as Rhetoric: Studies in Biblical Persuasion and Credibility (London: Routledge, 1990) p.197.

99. Firestone, p.104, asserts that "Because of its [holy war theory's] formulation long after the consolidation of the nation, fighting based on its specific formulation may have never actually taken place".

100. Michael Walzer, in an article entitled "The Idea of Holy War in Ancient Israel" (*Journal of Religious Ethics*, Fall '92 v.20) pgs.223-224, claims that the mercenary nature of Josiah's army prevented him from waging effective war against his neighbors. This cannot be entirely true, for Judah Maccabeus possessed a similar army and was able to prevail in his struggle against the Seleucids.

101. Tertullian in his "Apologia", a segment of which appears in Jean Comby's How to Read Church History, v.1 (New York: The

Crossroads Publishing Co., 1989) p.36, reminded Romans wary of the Christian menace: "We sail with you, we serve as soldiers with you and till the ground and engage in trade".

102. Henry Chadwick, The Early Church (London: Penguin Books, 1967) p.25-29.

103. St. Paul, in Eph 6:12-17 of the New American Bible, St. Joseph's edition, (New York: Catholic Publishing Co., 1970) exhorted Christians to:

Stand fast with truth as the belt around your waist, justice as your breastplate, and zeal to propagate the gospel of peace as your footgear.

St. Ignatius of Antioch, himself one of the second century martyrs, echoed this Pauline sentiment in his "Letter to Polycarp", included in Anne Fremantle's Treasury of Early Christianity (New York: Mentor Books, 1960) p.42:

Let your baptism abide with you as your shield; your faith as your helmet; your love as your spear; your patience as your body armour.

104. St. Paul, in Rm.13:1-3 of the New American Bible stated that it was the duty of every Christian to:

Obey the authorities that are over him, for there is no authority except from God, and all authority that exists is established by God.

St. Justin Martyr, on the other hand, in his "Dialogue with Trypho", referenced in a multi-volumed work entitled The Fathers of the Church, v.6 (Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America, 1965) p.318, articulated the second century Christian ideal:

And we who delighted in war, in the slaughter of one another, and in every other kind of iniquity, have in every part of the world converted our weapons into implements of peace.

105. The New American Bible, (Mt.22:21).

106. Terullian's "Chaplet", translated by Edwin A. Quain in The Fathers of the Church, v.40 (New York: Fathers of the Church Inc., 1959) p.257, discussed the plight of previously baptised Christians:

To leave the camp of light and enlist in the camp of darkness means going over to the enemy. To be sure, the case is different for those converted after they have been bound to the military.

On a theoretical note, Tertullian, p.256, appealed to Christian Scripture as well:

Is it likely we are permitted to carry a sword when our Lord said that he who takes the sword will perish by the sword? Will the son of peace who is forbidden to engage in a law-suit espouse the deeds of war?

107. Tertullian's opposition (referenced in Quain's translation) p.256, to military service based on anti-pagan sentiment rather than pacifistic commitment is only too apparent in his concluding remarks of the "Chaplet":

Will [the Christian] stand guard before temples that he has renounced? Will he eat at pagan banquets, which the Apostle forbids? Will he protect by night those very demons whom in daytime he has put to flight by his exorcisms; leaning on a lance such as pierced the side of Christ on the cross? Will he bear too a standard hostile to Christ?

108. Hippolytus, in his "Apostolic Tradition" (referenced in Comby) pgs.49-50, extended the restrictions of Christian service in the army to those baptised after their enlistment; urging such Christians to refrain from the taking of human life (37). In an epistle sent to Diognetus in 200 C.E. (referenced in Fremantle), an anonymous third century author concluded:

Force is not an attribute of God. He sent Him as summoning, not as persecuting; He sent Him as loving, not as Judging.

109. Mt.5:9 of the New American Bible lists among the beatitudes, "Blest too are the peacemakers, they shall be called sons of God." Mt.26:52 reads, "Those who use the sword are sooner or later destroyed by it." Lk.6:27-28 exhorts Christians to:

Love your enemies, do good to those who hate you; bless those who curse you and pray for those who maltreat you. When someone slaps you on one cheek, turn and give him the other.

Jn.18:36 recounts the words of Jesus as he was accused of political agitation:

My kingdom does not belong to this world. If my kingdom were of this world, my subjects *would be fighting* [italics added] to save me from being handed over to the Jews. As it is, my kingdom is not here.

110. Mt.8:5-13 of the New American Bible tells the story of the Roman centurion who asked Jesus to cure his servant. Jesus did not require the centurion to resign his post, rather, he commended him for his faith. In Mt.10:34-36, Jesus announces:

Do not suppose that my mission is to spread peace. My mission is to spread, not peace, but division. I have come to set a man at odds with his father, a daughter with her mother, a daughter-in-law with her mother-in-law: in short, to make a man's enemies those of his own household.

The parable contained in Lk.14:23 seems to suggest that the element of force was not eschewed by God:

The master then said to the servant "Go out into the highways and along the hedgerows and force them to come in. I want my house to be full."

In a very ambiguous discourse, contained in Lk.22:36, Jesus remarked:

Now, however, the man who has a purse must carry it; the same with the travelling bag. And the man without a sword must sell his coat and buy one.

The wrath of Jesus visited upon the money-changers in the temple, as discussed in Jn.2:15, was conveniently ignored by pacifist perhaps because of its violent themes.

111. Even as late as the fifth century C.E., Augustine, in his "Reply to Faustus the Manichaeon" contained in Philip Schaff's Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church, v.4 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1901) p.221, could claim:

Most Christian sects, and, is well known, the Catholics, pay no regard to what is prescribed in the writings of Moses.

112. Even as early as the first century, St. Ignatius of Antioch, in his "Letter to the Romans", recorded in Eusebius' The History of the Church, G.A. Williamson, trans. (London: Penguin Books, 1988) p.146, wrote:

Let fire and cross, encounters with wild animals, tearing

apart of bones, hacking of limbs, crushing of the whole body, tortures of the devil, come upon me if only I might attain to Jesus Christ.

By the second century C.E., the connection between suffering and Christian healing had become even more pronounced. In an anonymous account of the the martyrdoms at Vienne and Lyons, reproduced by Eusebius, pgs.196-197, the following descriptions of various martyrs served as a powerful example:

But the blessed woman, wrestling magnificently, grew in strength as she proclaimed her faith and found refreshment, rest and insensibility to her sufferings...Thus, through the grace of Christ, his second spell on the rack proved to be *not punishment but cure* [italics added]...On the rack she came to her senses and, so to speak, awoke out of a deep sleep, reminded by the brief chastisement of the eternal punishment in Hell...from then on she insisted *she was a Christian* [italics added].

113. Michael Grant, The History of Rome (United States: Michael Grant, 1978) p.405.

114. Comby, p.73.

115. The Chief historian of the period, Eusebius, p.414, relates:

Thus, all tyranny had been *purged away* [italics added] and the kingdom that was theirs was preserved securely and without question for Constantine and his sons alone. They, having made it their first task to wipe the world clear from hatred of God, rejoiced in the blessings that He had conferred upon them.

116. Comby, p.72.

117. From Augustine's "Letters", referenced in Comby, p.74, we have the following:

I do not propose to compel men to embrace the communion of any party, but desire the truth to be made known to persons who, in their search for it, are free from disquieting apprehensions.

118. Chadwick, p.233.

119. From Augustine's "Letters", referenced in Comby, p.74.

120. From St. Vincent of Lerins' "A Commonitory", included in Fremantle, pgs.321-323. Other sources critical of Christian militancy may be found in Fremantle's collection, pgs.317-319: Socrates Scholasticus, in his "Murder of Hypatia", asserted:

The professors of Christian religion should be no fighters, they ought to be far from committing murder and bloodshed with other such horrible offenses.

Anticipating the pleas for mercy typical of the Inquisitorial Courts of the Late Medieval period by almost eight hundred years, St. Martin (a prominent fifth century Christian) was said, by Sulpicius Severus in his "St. Martin and the Condemnation of Priscillan", p.319, to have: "Constantly pleaded with Maximus [a prosecutor of heresy] not to shed the blood of the unfortunate defendants."

121. In Augustine's "Letter to Publicola", referenced in Fremantle, pgs.124-125, the learned scholar of Late Antiquity maintained:

Everyone, as the Apostle says, hath his proper gift of God, one after this manner, and another after that. Some then, in praying for you, fight against your invisible enemies; you, in fighting for them, contend against the barbarians, their visible enemies.

122. Augustine's City of God, translated by Gerald G. Walsh, Demetrius B. Zema, Grace Monahan and Daniel Honan (New York: Image Books, 1958) p.447.

123. Although Augustine never used the term "holy war" in his writings, it is clear, on p.57 of The City of God, what was meant:

The same divine law which forbids the killing of a human being allows *certain exceptions* [italics added]. As when God authorizes killing by a general law or when he gives an explicit commission to an individual for a limited time. Since the agent of the authority is but a *sword in the hand* [italics added], and is is not responsible for the killing, it is in no way contrary to the commandment "Thou shalt not kill" to *wage war at God's bidding* [italics added] of for the representatives of the state's authority to put criminals to death, according to the law or rule of rational justice.

124. Orusius, in his "Seven Books of History Against the Pagans", referenced in Comby, p.119, was of the opinion:



It would seem that the mercy of God ought to be praised and glorified in that so many nations would be receiving, even at the cost of our own weakening, a knowledge of the truth which they never could have had but for this opportunity.

125. Theodoric, in his "Letter to Unigis the Sword Bearer", included in Brian Tierney's The Middle Ages: Sources of Medieval History, v.1 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1983) p.45, emphasized the greater accomplishments of a king:

Let other kings desire the glory of battles won, of cities taken, of ruins made; our purpose is, God helping us, so to rule that our subjects shall grieve that they did not earlier acquire the blessings of our dominion.

Regarding divergent views of religious ideas and principles, Theodoric (same page) even appeared "open minded":

We cannot command the religion of our subjects, since no one can be forced to believe against his will.

126. From the "Letters of Leo the Great", contained in The Fathers of the Church, v.34 (Washington D.C.: Fathers of the Church Inc., 1957) p.295.

127. Leo, in his "Letters", p.295, observed:

Although military service can be free from fault and marriage can be honorable, to have given up the choice of better things [italics added] is a sin.

128. Pope Felix II (482 C.E.) made the following claim in the face of the Byzantine Imperium:

The Emperor is a son of the Church. In matters of faith he must learn not teach. By God's will, the direction of the Church belongs to the bishops, not to the civil power.

Karl Baus, Hans-Georg Beck, Eugen Ewig and Josef Vogt, The Imperial Church from Constantine to the Early Middle Ages, contained in The History of the Church, v.2, Anselm Biggs, trans. (New York: The Seabury Press, 1980) p.616. Hereafter cited as Biggs, v.2.

129. Grant, p.454.

130. Nineteen years before his conversion, ecclesiastical advice to the Frankish king (referenced in Patrick Geary's Readings in Medieval History (Peterborough, Ontario: Broadview Press, 1989)

p.157, included the following:

Encourage your people, relieve the afflicted, protect widows, nourish orphans, so shine forth that all may love and fear you.

131. Tierney, pgs.45-46.

132. Biggs, v.2: p.527.

133. Biggs, v.2, p.528, offers ample evidence of the chaotic state of sixth century affairs, as, for example, when the Burgundians reversed themselves and supported Theodoric in his protection of Mediterranean lands from the emerging hegemony of the Franks.

134. Biggs, v.2, p.532.

135. The typical response to a perceived slight to Frankish interests was recorded by Gregory of Tours in his "History of the Franks", referenced in J.M. Wallace-Hadrill's The Long Haired Kings (New York: Barnes & Noble Inc., 1962) p.133:

But Guntramn's implacable hatred, it must be emphasized, had to do with avenging the death of Ingundis. He will not, he says, receive an embassy from the Visigoth Reccared "donec me Deus ulcisci iubeat de his inimicus" nether should his other niece, Chlodosind, go as bride to the land where her sister was slain--"I cannot tolerate it that my niece Ingundis should go unavenged".

136. Raymond Van Dam, in his authoritative work entitled, Leadership and Community in Late Antique Gaul (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985) p.127, claims that:

Martin's perspective on Christianity therefore not only provided a model that renewed and redirected traditional ideologies of authority onto himself, it also challenged the position of Christian bishops who had adopted a more accomodating attitude toward civil authority. Martin saw Christianity as a *military service of its own* competing with the military and civil authorities; other bishops in Gaul, who had always been civilians, were instead prepared to coexist with the military and civil authorities. In Martin's bishops could, and perhaps should, take over the functions of emperors and magistrates; in the alternative perspective, bishops only advised emperors. Not surprisingly, much of the opposition to him came from other bishops. Although Martin eventually decided to keep his

distance by claiming that association with other bishops diminished his spiritual power, his opponents in turn asserted that he had "defiled himself with his military actions"--an explicit comment on Martin's past but perhaps also an implicit evaluation of his idea of militant Christianity.

137. Edward James, in his The Franks (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988), p.125, asserts that:

The difficulty for the Church, and for us, is that of separating those customs which were genuinely non-Christian from those which were simply deep-rooted social habits or communal activities. Gregory reported that the Franks of his day referred to dies dominicus, the Lord's Day, dimanche, as dies solis, Sunday: he and many churchmen of his time regarded this as a shameful survival of pagan worship. And yet, Mercurii dies, mercredi, Woden's day, and Jovis dies, Jeudi, Thor's day, are still with us.

138. Biggs, v.2, p.629.

139. Gregory's correspondence with the Emperor, referenced in Tierney, p.65, demonstrates the emerging sense of "two armies" (similar to the "two swords" theory) typical of this period:

Let your piety, either by interpretation or alteration, modify the force of this law, since the army of my lords against their enemies increases the more when the army of God has been increased in prayer.

140. Tierney, p.99.

141. Tierney, p.100.

142. C. Warren Hollister, in his work entitled Medieval Europe, A Short History, 6th ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill Publishing Co., 1990) p.91, asserts:

But although Charlemagne respected the papacy, he was unwilling to cast himself in the subordinate role papal theory demanded of him. He was careful to retain the title "King of the Franks and the Lombards" alongside his new imperial title. When the time came to crown his son emperor, Charles excluded the pope from the ceremony and did the honors himself.

143. Norman F. Cantor, The Civilization of the Middle Ages (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1993) p.81.

144. Lewis Thorpe, trans., Einhard's "The Life of Charlemagne", contained in Two Lives of Charlemagne (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1983) p.78.

145. Thomas Bokenkotter, A Concise History of the Catholic Church (United States: Image Books, 1979) p.116.

146. A clear indication that Charles knew the value of religious ideology in the creation of a political state is contained in the Carolingian monarch's correspondence with Pope Leo. Upon hearing papal criticisms of his tactics, Charles sent Leo an angry letter, referenced in The Catholic Encyclopedia, v.3, Charles G. Herbermann, ed. (New York: The Encyclopedia Press, 1913) p.700:

My part is to defend the Church by force of arms from external attacks and to secure her internally through the establishment of the Catholic faith; your part is to render us the assistance of prayer.

147. Freiderich Kempf, Hans-Georg Beck, Eugen Ewig and Josef Adreas Jungman, The Church in the Age of Feudalism, translated by Anselm Biggs in The History of the Christian Church, v.3 (New York: Crossroads Publishing Co., 1982) pgs.131-132. Hereafter cited as Biggs, v.3.

148. Biggs, v.3, pgs.138-139.

149. Biggs, v.3, p.141.

150. Biggs, v.3, p.295.

151. The intensity of Gregory's rhetoric against Henry was evident in Paul of Bernried's account of the pope's interpretation of a miraculous sign, included in Arnold Harris Matthews' The Life and Times of Hildebrand (London: Francis Griffiths, 1910) p.109:

This was interpreted by the pope as follows: the egg was the Church; the serpent, the emblem of evil, stood for Henry.

Gregory, in his correspondences referenced in Ephraim Emerton's The Correspondence of Pope Gregory VII (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1960), p.101, would eventually appeal to Old Testament justifications for war in his attempts to galvanize support among the German nobles:

For as we are subject to the word of the prophet: "If thou speakest not to warn the wicked from his wicked way...his

soul will I require at thine hand"; and again, "Cursed be he that shall hold back his sword from blood", that is, shall hold back the sword of reproof from smiting those of evil life.

Finally, in his appeal to the German nobility as referenced in Emerton, p.101, Hildebrand declared:

But if he will not listen to you and shall choose to follow the Devil rather than Christ and shall prefer the counsel of those who have long been under excommunication for simoniacal heresy to yours then we shall find ways, under divine inspiration, to rescue the already declining Church Universal by serving God rather than man.

152. For an excellent appraisal of Gregory's struggle with Henry as a prototype of the holy war, or crusade, refer to the work of Carl Erdmann: The Origin of the Idea of Crusading (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977).

153. Biggs, v.3, p.445.

154. Biggs, v.3, p.445.

155. Steven Runciman, The First Crusade (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992) p.29.

156. Malcolm Billings, The Crusades (New York: Sterling Publishing Co., 1996) p.19.

157. The relevant sections of Urban's address, as referenced in Tierney, pgs.155-156, are as follows:

Now that you, O sons of God, have consecrated yourselves to God to maintain peace *among yourselves* more vigorously and to uphold the laws of the Church faithfully, there is work to do, for you must turn the strength of your sincerity, now that you are aroused by divine correction, to another affair that concerns you and God. Hastening to the way, you must *help your brothers living in the Orient*, who need your aid for which they have already cried out many times. For, as most of you have been told, the Turks, a race of Persians, who have penetrated within the boundaries of Romania even to the Mediterranean to that point which they call the Arm of Saint George, in occupying more and more of the lands of the Christians, have overcome them, already victims of seven battles, and have killed and captured them, have *overthrown churches*, and have laid waste God's kingdom...Let those who are accustomed to wage *private wars* wastefully, even against

believers, go forth against the infidels in a battle worthy to be undertaken now and to be finished in victory. Now, let those who until recently existed as plunderers, be soldiers of Christ; now let those who formerly *contended against brothers and relations*, rightly fight barbarians... Nay, more, the sorrowful here will be glad there, the poor here will be rich there.

158. R.C. Smail, in his Crusading Warfare (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967) p.18, declares the following:

It was Delbruck's opinion that the principles of strategy could not be applied to Crusading warfare, because the Crusades were born of mystical rather than political motives. Certainly, the preaching of the First Crusade appealed to Christian abhorrence of Islam; but from the first other motives were present [*italics added*], and the crusade included, beside Peter the Hermit, land hungry Normans and the Genoese, eager to exploit commercial opportunity.

159. Smail, p.18.

160. Jonathan Riley-Smith, The First Crusade and the Idea of Crusading (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1986) pgs.55 and 61.

161. James M. Powell, Anatomy of a Crusade: 1213-1221 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1986) p.53.

162. Frederick Russell, Just War in the Middle Ages (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975) p.61.

163. Hollister, p.196.

164. This is to be distinguished from the concept of *qital* (fighting) referenced in Kelsay and Johnson's Cross, Crescent and Sword, p.37.

165. For the typical orientalist perspective of early Islamic expansion, one need look no further than F.E. Peter's Muhammed and the Origins of Islam (New York: State University of New York Press, 1994) p.211: "Muhammed, with power now in his hands", Peters asserts, "set his community on the path of aggressive political violence." The apologetic view may be gleaned from such authors as Hazrat Mirza Tahir Ahmad who admirably, if somewhat naively, argues for Islamic pacifism in his work entitled Murder in the Name of Allah (Cambridge: Lutterworth Press, 1989) p.18: "It is amazing that a Muslim scholar could

even by implication suggest that the prophet was guilty of a Hitler-style invasion-*Naaudhu billah*. The Prophet was a prince of peace, not an invader."

166. N.J. Dawood, trans. The Koran (London: Penguin Books, 1994) and Mohhamed Marmaduke Pickthall, trans. and comm. The Glorious Koran (New York: Mentor Books, 1963). The following ayats, or verses, serve as a compelling example of the disparity between Dawood's and Pickthall's translations and indicate an apparent bias on the part of Dawood in his treatment of jihad: 2:191-193 and 2:216. In Dawood's translation, 2:191 reads as follows: "Idolatry is more grievous than bloodshed." This obviously infers that war may be waged (even offensively) against idolaters, especially those who "offend" Allah. Contrast this with Pickthall's translation of the same ayat: "Persecution is worse than slaughter." The latter translation evidently stresses violence as a response to oppression. Even Kenneth Cragg, in his Readings in the Our'an (London: Fount, 1988) p.229, admits an alternative interpretation of the verse: "subversion is worse than slaughter." Interestingly, both persecution and subversion are elements of *political environments*, removed somewhat from the religious agenda. Similarly, Dawood's translation of 1:93 reads: "Fight against them until Idolatry is no more and God's religion reigns supreme." Pickthall again delineates persecution, not idolatry, as the object of aggression and abjures Muslims to fight "until religion is for Allah", a much less severe qualification for the cessation of hostilities. In 2:216, Dawood's translation maintains: "warfare is obligatory for you", while Pickthall's affirms: "warfare is ordained for you." The first prescribes a clearly recognized duty of the Muslim to wage war on God's behalf, while the second merely suggests it may be one's fate, given the hostile environment of Quraysh oppression, to fight. These are but three examples of a consistent trend throughout Dawood's work in which variations in emphasis are created, a word is added here, a word omitted there, meanings are altered, thereby producing a sterotypical view of Islam in western academia.

167. Dawood, p.xi.

168. Dawood, p.xi.

169. John Burton. The Collection of the Our'an (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977) p.151. Burton relates that upon hearing Umar's and Hisam's conflicting recitations of Qur'anic verses, Muhammad is attributed to have said: "This Qur'an was revealed to me in seven forms, so recite what is

easiest." Burton, it must be remembered, relies upon perhaps the most widely regarded collection of Hadith (sayings of the Prophet) in existence, namely, that of al-Bukhari.

170. Thus, the Hadith of Ghazzali that admonishes, "Whoever interprets the Qur'an according to his own opinion (bi-ra'yih) is to receive his place in the hell-fire," referenced in Helmut Gatje's The Qur'an and its Exegesis (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976) pgs.228-229, is to be regarded as an expression of orthodoxy, within the dual context of Qur'anic meaning (also Gatje's conclusion).

171. Burton, p.129, again relates the story contained in al-Bukhari's Hadith, in which Muhammad was spurred to sudden recollection of a particular element of his revelation: "The Messenger of God heard a man recite by night and said, 'May God have mercy on that man! He has just reminded me of verse so-and-so that I had forgotten from Sura such-and-such."

172. John Wansbrough, Quranic Studies: Sources and Methods of Scriptural Interpretation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977) p.170.

173. Fred McGraw Donner, The Early Islamic Conquests (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981) p.209.

174. Albert Hourani, in his History of the Arab Peoples (New York: Warner Books, 1992) p.10, asserts that the razzia allowed Bedouins to "dominate the cultivators and craftsmen." The Cambridge History of Islam, edited by P.M. Holt, Ann K.S. Lambton and Bernard Lewis, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970) p.42, however, likens the razzia to "a kind of sport."

175. Ira M. Lapidus, A History of Islamic Societies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988) p.25.

176. Kenneth Cragg, The Event of the Qur'an (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1971) pgs.66-67.

177. Cragg, The Event of the Qur'an, p.67.

178. Firestone, p.112, in his assessment of Qur'anic sanction of political violence asserts:

It must be made clear, at this point, that while the increasingly military positions sanctioned through divine revelation correspond with the strength of the early Muslim community and its ability to wage war, an important



attendant development was the *increasingly aggressive* effort of the Meccan enemy to destroy the Muslims [*italics added*].

179. Cragg, in The Event of the Our'an, pgs.66, 131 and 134, suggests the Hijrah was the first of many tactics employed in a *pre-existing* state of war: "The hostility of Mecca to Muhammad, in the cause of the status quo, at length *precipitated* the train of events which turned impasse into encounter and encounter into triumph (*italics added*)...It was thus that the Hijrah was saved from being a mere exodus of protest and emerged into active measures against Mecca, in pursuance of the pledges of "Aqaba that had preceded it. The frequent Quranic phrase *hajaru wa jahadu*, 'they went out in emigration and they went forth in struggle', now comes into prominence...The move out of Mecca with the faith presages the move *against Mecca for the faith*."

180. The Cambridge History of Islam, v.1, pgs.42-43, asserts that during the normal activities of a *razzia*:

Severe fighting was ususally avioded, for the favorite tactic was to pounce unexpectedly on an isolated party of herdsmen with force so overwhelming that resistance was pointless...They [Muhammad's men] decided to act during the sacred month, and quickly overpowered the guards, killing one and taking two prisoners.

181. The Cambridge History of Islam, v.1, p.43 once more, indicates that:

A revelation was received (2.217/4) to the effect that, while fighting in the sacred month was sinful, the persecution of the Muslims by the pagan Meccans had been even more sinful. This was followed by a general acknowledgement of the raid to Nakhla, as it was called, together with readiness to accept the consequences.

182. Robert Mantran, Great Dates in Islamic History (New York: Facts on File Inc., 1996) p.5.

183. Elias Shoufani, in his Al-Riddah and the Muslim Conquest of Arabia (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973) pgs.17-18, identifies this perspective with that portion of the Medinan contingent that declined to participate.

184. Shoufani, p.17, in his treatment of the Islamic retrospective interpretation of the events at Badr, maintains that:

The Muslims saw the hand of God behind this victory. In

the Koran as well as in the tradition, the story of Gabriel at the head of an army of angels fighting on the Muslim side is ubiquitous.

185. Sydney Nettleton Fisher and William Ochsenswald, The Middle East, 4th ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill Publishing Company) p.31.

186. Donner, p.75.

187. The Cambridge History of Islam, v.1, p.49.

188. Caesar E. Farah, Islam (New York: Barron's 1994) p.52.

189. Shoufani, p.23.

190. Shoufani, p.24.

191. Shoufani, p.25.

192. Shoufani, p.40.

193. Shoufani, p.26.

194. Shoufani, p.43.

195. Shoufani, quoting Carl H. Becker's article in The Cambridge Medieval History, p.11, recounts:

In reality, Mahomet [Muhammad], at the time of his death, had by no means united Arabia, much less had he converted all the country to Islam. Not quite all of what today forms the Turkish province of Hijaz, that is the central portion of the west coast of Arabia with its corresponding back-country, was in reality politically joined with Medina and Mecca as a united power, and even this was held together more by interest than by religious brotherhood.

196. The Cambridge History of Islam, p.57, simplistically characterizes the conflicts following Muhammad's death as stemming from previous *ansar* (Medinan) and *Muhajjarun* (Meccan emigrant) animosities. In actuality, there is evidence that the *ansar* resented the power of the newly converted Quraysh in Mecca even more. Additionally, the strongest opposition to Abu Bakr's election came from the *Muhajjarun* as one faction (subsequently to be known as the *Shi'at Ali*) supported the claim of Ali to the Caliphate. This competing claim to the throne alone would provide the greatest challenge to Islamic orthodoxy and cohesion.

197. Shoufani, pgs.51-54.

198. Shoufani, pgs.61-62.

199. Donner, p.85.

200. Donner, p.85.

201. Donner, p.85, in his assessment of the "false" prophetic movement of this period, notes:

This category included the rebellion of B. Asad in the Najd, led by the "false prophet" Talha b. Khalid, the opposition of the B. Hanifah in al-Yamama, led by the "false prophet" Maslama b. Habib, the movement of parts of B. Tamim and B. Taghlib in northeastern Arabia, led by the "false prophetess" Sajah, who ultimately joined forces with Maslama and the B. Hanifah, and the rising of the B. Ans in the Yemen, led by al-Aswad al-Ansi, who also claimed prophethood.

202. Donner, pgs.85-86.

203. Friedrich Wilhelm Fernau, in his Moslems on the March (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1954) p.25, asserts that:

Within a few years Islam overcame the disunity and segregation of the Arab tribes, and, thanks to elements among which the economic needs of the Bedouin played no small part, the new united Arab community launched attacks against the realms of Byzantium and of the Great Kings of Persia [*italics added*].

204. Lapidus, p.39.

205. Donner, p.111, documents the date of Byzantine recovery of Syria, while Fisher and Ochsenswald, p.12, refer to the weakened condition of the empire after the campaign against the Sassanids.

206. Donner, p.111.

207. Fisher and Ochsenswald, p.38.

208. Fisher and Ochsenswald, p.39.

209. Donner, p.96.

210. Donner, p.98.

211. Donner, p.97.

212. Donner, p.174.

213. Several scholars have asserted that the Syrian campaign contained an element of holy warfare, among them: Georges Tate in his The Crusaders, Warriors of God (New York: Harry N. Abrams, Inc., 1996) p.78, and Fisher and Ochsenswald, p.38. This should not be interpreted to mean that Abu Bakr followed with any regularity the Qur'anic regulations concerning *jihad*, only that he used the idea to pursue his own state policies.

214. Donner, p.176.

215. Kelsay and Johnson, Cross, Crescent and Sword, p.37, conclude:

In the wake of the phenomenal conquests achieved by Muslims during the 1st (7th century), the scholars of Islam began to apply the term *jihad* to military action and to efforts to expand the sphere of Islam (*dar al-islam*) through the extension of the boundaries of the Islamic polity.

216. Hourani, p.21.

217. Fisher and Ochsenswald, pgs.39-41.

218. Fisher and Ochsenswald, pgs.41-42.

219. Arthur Goldschmidt Jr., A Concise History of the Middle East, 2nd ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1983) p.55.

220. Fisher and Ochsenswald, pgs.58-61.

221. Fisher and Ochsenswald, p.64.

222. Goldschmidt, p.57.

223. Hourani, p.487.

224. The Cambridge History of Islam, v.1, p.101.

225. The Cambridge History of Islam, v.1, p.101.

226. R. Stephen Humphreys, in his Islamic History, A Framework for Inquiry (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991) p.118, summarizes the conclusions of Julius Wellhausen in his work entitled Das arabische Reich und Sein Sturz (1902; trans. M.G. Weir as The Arab Kingdom and its Fall, 1927):

Many groups, not merely Iranian converts, had reason to feel

disgusted with Umayyad rule by the late 740's. Religion was the glue that held this motley coalition together--not some extravagant heresy, but a sober, catholic orientation which sought just government and *the equality of all Muslims* [italics added].

227. The Cambridge History of Islam, v.1, p.101.

228. The Cambridge History of Islam, v.1, p.102.

229. Temporary resumption of Umayyad expansion under the Caliphs Abd al-Malik and al-Walid is referenced by Goldschmidt, p.66. Goldschmidt also makes mention of anti-Umayyad Arab sentiment on p.53.

230. The Cambridge History of Islam, v.1, p.103.

231. Goldschmidt, pgs.70-71.

232. Goldschmidt, p.68.

233. In fact, as Kelsay and Johnson (Cross, Crescent and Sword) pgs.84-85, illustrate, the Abbasid theorist al-Farabi (870-950 C.E. articulated a moderate response to the surrounding chaotic environment of local rebellion. War was not justifiable for the following reasons: (1) the sake of a ruler's increased honor, (2) pure conquest, (3) venting of rage, or (4) over-reaction to an injustice committed by others.

234. The Cambridge History of Islam, v.1, p.143.

235. Goldschmidt, p.70.

236. Goldschmidt, p.70.

237. Philip M. Fields, trans. The History of al-Tabari, v.37 (New York: State University of New York Press, 1987) p.173. Al-Tabari relates that the Qarmatian leader led an "ascetic, pious life" and that reports circulated of his followers intent to "put Muhammad's people to the sword, all except those who [did] homage to their religion".

238. Fields, p.169.

239. The Cambridge History of Islam, v.1, p.144.

240. Goldschmidt, p.75.

241. Goldschmidt, p.75.
242. Hourani, p.38.
243. Hourani, p.35.
244. Goldschmidt, p.84.
245. Goldschmidt, p.84.
246. Goldschmidt, p.84.
247. M. Fuad Koprulu, The Origins of the Ottoman Empire (New York: State University of New York Press, 1992) p.90.
248. Kelsay and Johnson, Cross, Crescent and Sword, 37.
249. Goldschmidt, p.86.
250. Georges Tate, The Crusaders, Warriors of God (New York: Harry N. Abrams, Inc., 1996) p.89.
251. Tate, p.89.
252. Nureddin's motives are sufficiently discussed by Tate, p.82.
253. Tate, p.90.
254. Andrew Wheatcroft, The Ottomans (London: Viking, 1993) p.xxix.

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