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Individual differences in the tendency to fake good in personality assessment

Jennifer L. Mersman

INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN THE TENDENCY TO FAKE GOOD IN PERSONALITY ASSESSMENT

A Thesis

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in

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ABSTRACT

Faking good on personality measures has traditionally been conceptualized as a threat to validity. However, many have called for treating faking good as an individual difference variable that may be predictive in its own right. Faking good is conceptually related to Self-Monitoring, Social Desirability, and Impression Management. In the present study, it was hypothesized that the tendency to fake good on the Big Five personality dimensions would be correlated with higher scores on Self-Monitoring, Social Desirability, and Impression Management. The method involved a repeated measures design. Time one was the honest condition where subjects completed a measure of the Big Five personality dimensions with instructions to respond honestly. Time two was the fake condition where subject completed the same personality measure with instructions to respond as a job applicant attempting to give as good impression as possible in order to obtain the job. Results indicate that faking good, as measured by within-subject correlations between the honest and fake conditions, was not significantly correlated with the constructs of Self-Monitoring, Social Desirability, nor Impression Management. Problems associated with the current measures of faking, as well as implications for future research on the individual difference variable of faking good are discussed.

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Introduction

Human resource selection includes many potential methods of assessment. Personality assessment is one such method, and is a dynamic field of research. In past decades, the use of personality measures as selection instruments has been held in poor regard because of their questionable predictiveness of job related criteria (Guion & Gottier, 1966). This may have been due to the types of personality measures that were used to predict job performance. These measures were typically assessments of psychopathology (e.g., MMPI) rather than specific categories of personality traits that could be linked to specific work behaviors. However, researchers have switched from using psychopatholigcal measures of personality to measures of normal range personality traits (e.g., NEO PI); and more recently, the validity of personality measures for predicting a variety of job related outcomes has received empirical support (Barrick & Mount, 1991; Tett, Jackson, & Rothstein, 1991). Recent research indicates that the validity of personality measures is acceptable when the personality constructs assessed are part of a widely accepted, unified framework of traits.

Barrick and Mount (1991) conducted a meta-analysis in order to assess the validity of the Big Five personality dimensions (Extraversion, Emotional Stability, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, and Intellect) as predictors of job performance. The criteria of job performance included job proficiency, training proficiency, and personnel data (e.g., salary level and turnover). The results of their meta-analysis based on 117 studies and a total sample of 23,994 revealed that conscientiousness was a valid predictor for all criteria across all job categories (ρ ranges from .20 to .23). In addition, they found that

extraversion was a valid predictor for all performance criteria for two job types (managers and sales).

Tett, Jackson, and Rothstein (1991) found results similar to those of Barrick and Mount (1991). However, their findings suggested that Barrick and Mount's (1991) validities were underestimated. Tett, et al. conducted a meta-analysis on 97 studies with 13,521 subjects to determine the predictive validity of the Big Five personality dimensions, Type A personality, and Locus of Control for job performance. The overall validity coefficient for these personality measures combined for job performance was .22. This validity coefficient was larger than Barrick and Mount's (1991), who looked at the validity for each of the Big Five dimensions separately. Tett, et al. note that Barrick and Mount's overall corrected sample-weighted mean correlation was .11, while theirs was .24.

The results of these two meta-analytic studies provide support for Hogan's (1992) conclusion on the use of personality measurement: "Despite the pessimistic conclusions of reviews published in the 1960's, evidence gathered over the past three decades suggests that personality inventories can make valid contributions to personnel selection and assessment" (p.910). In fact, personality tests can be valuable for selection purposes because of their incremental validity over cognitive ability tests. Personality tests account for unique variance that is not accounted for by cognitive ability measures. Another positive aspect of personality tests is that they tend not to have adverse impact. That is, they do not impact protected groups under Title VII more harshly than majority groups. Thus, not only do personality tests add something unique to measures of cognitive ability, they also reduce adverse impact when used in combination with measures of cognitive ability (which do

tend to show adverse impact). However, one issue that has been viewed as potentially compromising this established validity of personality characteristics in predicting a variety of job relevant criteria is dissimulation.

Faking in Personality Inventories

There is little doubt that faking in personality measures is possible. Research has shown that subjects are capable of distorting their scores on personality inventories when instructed to give as good an impression as possible. Dicken (1960) investigated the susceptibility of the California Psychological Inventory (CPI) to response distortion. The CPI was administered to 100 introductory psychology students. One group of students was instructed to respond to the inventory in a manner that would give the most favorable impression of themselves. Scores on the CPI for students in the "good impression" condition were significantly higher than scores for subjects in the standard test taking condition.

Hinrichsen, Gryll, Bradley, and Katahn (1975) examined the extent to which the Fundamental Interpersonal Relations Orientation-Behavior test (FIRO-B) is susceptible to faking. This test was given to 60 undergraduate students. There were three groups of subjects, each with different instructions for taking the FIRO-B. The three instructional conditions were normal (respond honestly), fake good (role play a job applicant seeking to appear psychologically well-adjusted), and fake bad (give the impression of a maladjusted person). Results revealed that scores on the FIRO-B were higher for subjects in the fake good condition as compared to subjects in the normal and fake bad conditions. This indicates that faking is quite possible for the FIRO-B.

Hough, Eaton, Dunnette, Kamp, and McCloy (1990) also found that subjects are capable of distorting their responses to personality measures in the desired direction. These authors administered a temperament inventory called ABLE (Assessment of Background and Life Experiences) to over 9,000 military personnel. In one study, subjects were instructed to either fake good (describe yourself in a way that you think will ensure that the Army selects you), fake bad (describe yourself in a way that you think will ensure that the Army does not select you), or respond honestly (describe yourself as you really are). Results indicated that when instructed to do so, soldiers did significantly distort their responses. In a separate sample of applicants at the Military Entrance Processing Station, the authors identified those subjects who positively distorted their responses to ABLE through a Social Desirability scale. The authors concluded that the applicant sample did not significantly distort their responses since the mean score was not significantly different from the mean score of incumbents. Further, they concluded that response distortion did not attenuate correlations between ABLE and measures of job performance.

The preceding studies are representative of the research that has shown subjects are capable of positively distorting their scores on personality inventories when instructed to give as good an impression as possible. Because there is much evidence to show that faking in personality assessment can occur, a primary concern is that the information obtained from personality measures is invalid if faked. In personnel selection, distorted personality measures are viewed as false indicators of the traits that are supposed to predict job performance. As Hough, et al. (1990) note, "Indeed, the possibility of response distortion is often cited as one of the main arguments against the use

of personality measures to aid in selection decisions" (p. 581). One way in which this concern is addressed is by the detection of faked responses through social desirability scales.

Social Desirability and Impression Management

Socially desirable responding is probably the most extensively studied response bias, and refers to the tendency to respond in such a manner so as to make one's self look good (Paulhus, 1991). Researchers have shown that responding in order to give a good impression (or faking good) is related to the social desirability of the test items. Dunnett, Koun, and Barber (1981) examined the degree to which the social desirability of test items can distort the Eysenck Personality Inventory (EPI). These authors administered the EPI to British subjects (professionals as well as students) and instructed them to either present themselves in the best possible light, the worst possible light, or as honest as possible. A separate group of subjects was asked to rate each item on the EPI in terms of its social desirability (how acceptable and likable a person making such a statement would be viewed by society). Results indicated that subjects in the fake good condition scored significantly higher on the Extraversion scale of the EPI, and significantly lower on the Neuroticism scale than subjects in the honest condition. Moreover, "fake good" subjects tended to endorse items that correlated highly with the items the separate group of subjects rated as socially desirable. Therefore, this study provides evidence that the concepts of faking good to give a positive impression of oneself and socially desirable responding are related.

In studies that have examined the susceptibility of personality measures to faking, instructions to fake good include, "present yourself in the best possible light" (Dunnett, et al., 1981, p.20); "give the

most favorable possible impression of yourself" (Dicken, 1960, p. 25); "describe yourself in a way that will ensure that the Army selects you" (Hough, et al., 1990, p. 586). All of these descriptions instruct the subjects to engage in what is known as impression management. Impression management refers to the way in which people present a positive impression of themselves to others. Giacalone and Rosenfeld (1989) suggest that people are actors who take on many different roles. We attempt to please our audiences using various impression management tactics in order to avoid looking bad. Thus, we manage the impressions we give to others to convey ourselves in the best way possible.

The instructions to "fake good" in the susceptibility to faking studies cited above can be conceived of as impression management. In personality inventories, people who attempt to present themselves in the best possible light (fake good) may in fact be engaging in impression management tactics.

The issue of faking and impression management has been addressed directly by Paulhus (1984), who has shown that social desirability consists of two components - one of which is impression management. Paulhus (1984) proposes that there are two types of socially desirable response biases. He attempted to partition social desirability according to a two-factor model that consists of self deception and impression management. Self deception is where the respondent honestly believes his or her positive response distortion, and therefore it is not a conscious attempt to dissemble. Impression management, on the other hand, is where the respondent consciously distorts items in a positive direction. Paulhus tested this two-factor theory through an exploratory factor analysis of over 150 items from a battery of six social desirability scales. Results revealed the two major factors that

Paulhus defined as self deception and impression management. These results suggest that not only are impression management and social desirability related, but impression management is actually one component of a socially desirable response bias.

However, recent research by Shultz and Chávez (1994) suggests that this two factor structure of social desirability may not hold true for non Euro-American cultures. In their study, Shultz and Chávez compared a social desirability scale completed in English to the same scale completed in Spanish. Results indicated that while the two factors of social desirability (self deception and impression management) held true for the English-version sample, the pattern did not hold for the Spanish-version sample. Hence, researchers need to show caution in interpreting their results when translating scales into a non-English language.

Impression Management and Self Monitoring

Just as impression management has been found to be a component of social desirability, it has also been suggested to relate to self-monitoring. Snyder and Copeland (1989) propose that, " A greater understanding of the strategic dynamics involved in impression management in organizational contexts may be gained by a consideration of individuals' self-monitoring orientations" (p. 7). Snyder (1974) describes self-monitoring as a construct which refers to the control of self-presentational behaviors. People high in self-monitoring attend to situational cues that guide their self-presentation of what they believe to be appropriate behaviors. In contrast, low self-monitors only display behaviors consistent with their true feelings, regardless of situational cues.

It is reasonable to make the link between impression management and self-monitoring because they are both processes of self presentation. Arkin and Shepperd (1989) describe the prototypical impression manager as the individual who is high in self-monitoring. In order to know how and when to present the most favorable impression of oneself, one needs to have the skill to choose the self-presentation and social behavior appropriate to a variety of social situations (i.e., one needs to be a high self-monitor).

Caldwell and O'Reilly (1982) conducted a laboratory experiment to investigate whether high self-monitoring undergraduate business subjects would be more likely to engage in impression management tactics than low self-monitoring subjects. The procedure involved the subjects assuming the role of an administrative manager. Subjects had to prepare a report that explained their hiring decision (as manager) of an employee who subsequently was discharged because of ineptitude. Subjects were presented with a list of 34 items from which they were to select in order to prepare the report. Items were independently judged and categorized as reflecting either favorable or unfavorable information concerning the manager's decision. The degree of subjects' self-monitoring orientation was assessed by Snyder's (1974) self-monitoring scale. Results indicated that subjects who were high self-monitors were more likely to use items in the report that reflected favorably on their decision processes and outcomes. Thus, high self-monitors tended to endorse items that cast their decisions in a positive light - a tactic that can be perceived of as impression management.

The results of Caldwell and O'Reilly's study, in combination with Paulhus' work, suggest that it is reasonable to relate self-monitoring and social desirability to the tendency to fake good on personality

measures. Furthermore, Hogan (1992) states that impression management is a tendency or trait that can be assessed by Snyder's (1974) Self-Monitoring Scale; and Paulhus (1984) has developed a Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (BIDR) that contains an Impression Management subscale. Indeed, Merydith and Wallbrown (1991) assert that, "dissimulation of presenting oneself in a favorable light is part of social desirability" (p. 898). Hence, faking good is conceptually linked to impression management and social desirability (Paulhus, 1984; Merydith & Wallbrown, 1991) as well as self-monitoring (Snyder & Copeland, 1989).

While it is evident that these factors of social desirability, impression management, and self-monitoring are related to the tendency to fake good, this relationship as a whole has not been empirically tested. Moreover, the notion of faking good and its possible components has not been conceptualized within a larger framework of response bias.

Faking Good and Response Bias

Paulhus (1991) defines response bias as "a systematic tendency to respond to a range of questionnaire items on some bias other than the specific content (i.e., what the items were designed to measure)" (p. 17). Response bias is a broad term which includes an entire range of biases. Furnham (1986) lists some of these biases: socially desirable, faking good, faking bad, acquiescence, nay saying, and extremity. Depending on the consistency of the manner in which individuals respond, a response bias could be a response *set* (a temporary response bias or a reaction to situational demands), or a response *style* (a response bias that is consistently displayed across time and in various situations). That is, response styles represent consistent individual differences (Paulhus 1991) while response sets are un-enduring reactions.

Dissimulation refers to a specific kind of response bias where the respondent intentionally attempts to respond in a manner that will convey a certain impression (Furnham, 1986; Merydith & Wallbrown, 1991). Depending on one's motivation then, any type of response bias could be viewed as dissimulation. Furthermore, depending on one's motivation and intentions, dissimulation may be viewed as negative or natural. Elliott (1981) reviews different interpretations of conscious dissimulation. While some view it as lying, Cattel, Eber, and Tatsuoka (as cited in Elliott, 1981) view it as produced 'half-unconsciously' in selection contexts. Heilbrun (1964) asserts that responding in order to give a good impression or appear socially desirable is not necessarily deliberate dissimulation or lying. Responding in a socially desirable manner is the way normal, healthy people respond.

Elliott (1981) argues that putting one's best foot forward in a selection context is related to adaptiveness, " If people lack the ability to adapt or if they misperceive the appropriate norms and adapt to something else, they are likely to be rejected" (p. 14). Seisdedos (1993) is also a proponent of the predictive utility of the tendency to fake good. He views faking good as an intelligent form of adaptation, where individuals utilize all their capabilities to adapt to the surrounding demands. He suggests that intentionally giving a good impression is not a form of lying or deliberate faking: "It is not necessarily negative from the subject's viewpoint to show the best 'ego,' because, in some settings, that could be the way to adapt to the circumstances" (p. 91). Thumin and Barclay (1993) even propose that those individuals with the tendency to fake good may be brighter, more perceptive, and more insightful, and as such "are the same individuals who would perform particularly well on the job" (p. 15). Thus it would

appear that for some people, and in some circumstances, faking good is a natural response style rather than a conscious mis-presentation.

Faking good is a type of response bias or form of dissimulation. While some view it as false presentation, many view it as an adaptive ability (Seisdedos, 1993) that leads to positive outcomes (Thumin & Barclay, 1993). The tendency to fake good is also theoretically related to self-monitoring, social desirability, and impression management, as discussed above. However, there is no model of response bias which incorporates faking good and its possible components. In the present study, I attempt to develop and test such a model (see figure).

To the extent that there are reliable associations between faking good, self-monitoring, social desirability, and impression management, it is worthwhile to investigate how these factors may account for variance in individual differences in faking good.

Faking Good as an Individual Difference Variable Rather Than a Contaminant

Faking good on selection instruments has been viewed as a contaminant to the accuracy of self reports. People who score high on social desirability scales are assumed to be faking good (i.e., engaging in impression management). Consequently, the reports of these individuals are considered invalid, and are often rejected because they are viewed as not tapping the construct of interest (Zerbe & Paulhus, 1987). However, it is important to distinguish between spurious effects on personality scores and patterns of what may be personality structure. To the extent that the effects of positive response biases *are* spurious, validity is indeed threatened; but to the extent that there are consistent effects based on the tendency to fake good, then these effects are potential individual difference variables that may be

predictive in their own right. In reviewing Cronbach's assertions on response sets, Jackson and Messick (1958) suggest that the tendency to fake good may "not always be temporary and trivial, but may have a stable and valid component which reflects a consistent individual style or personality trait" (p. 244). Additionally, they suggest that for certain circumstances, personal response styles (which are consistent across time and situations) should be enhanced as opposed to being avoided or corrected.

Instead of conceptualizing faking good as a contaminant or something negative, the tendency to fake good can be conceived of as an individual difference variable. Indeed, Furnham (1986) supports this proposition: "Rather than considering social desirability a mere response artifact that threatens the validity of self-reports it should be seen as a substantive trait useful in predicting beaviour" (p. 398). In his review of issues of faking in personality inventories, Hogan (1992) states:

> ... it seems reasonable to conclude that the ability to enhance scores on a personality inventory is itself a personality variable ... In this light, dissimulation, when it exists, becomes less serious as a problem to overcome and instead becomes an important individual differences variable (p. 904).

Rynes (1993) likewise calls for further research on the "factors that underlie *individual* differences in 'fake good' abilities" (p. 265). Moreover, McCrae and Costa (1989) argue that faking good should be considered a substantive trait that may be predictive of important outcomes. Canter (1963) suggests that there is practical importance in the ability of subjects to present a good picture of themselves, ". . .

falsification of test scores and the capacity to do so may be a personality variable of considerable importance in its own right rather than merely an undesirable and incidental factor to be 'corrected for'" (p. 253).

Canter (1963) conducted a study comparing the CPI responses of a group of well-adjusted applicants to a group of presumably poorly adjusted, involuntarily admitted alcoholic patients. Both groups were encouraged to fake good in their responses by the instructions, "imagine you are applying for a job you really want and your employer will judge from this test whether to hire you or not. Answer the test in such a way as to give the best possible impression of yourself" (p. 254). Better adjusted subjects were able to increase their CPI scores more than poorly adjusted subjects. This suggests that some people can enhance their scores on personality tests more than others, and they are distinguishable by good adjustment. This further supports the notion that people differ in their tendency to fake good.

Summary

Taken together, these studies clearly support conceptualizing faking good as an individual difference variable. Moreover, many researchers have proposed the predictive utility of the tendency to fake good. There has been much research to support that faking good can happen; and there has been debate on whether or not, and to what extent it threatens validity. However, what has not been examined is how people differ in their tendency to fake good, and what factors can distinguish between those who possess this tendency and use it, from those who do not. Faking good is usually examined in terms of group differences, and it appears that no study has attempted to treat the tendency to fake good as a within-subject individual difference

variable. Previous research has shown that faking can happen (as detected through group comparisons of honest and fake conditions); however, there is still no indication of why people can fake good. The model tested in the present study will help illuminate the underlying reasons for why people can display this faking good tendency.

There is valuable information that can be gained from identifying the factors that account for variance in the tendency to fake good. Research indeed suggests that this tendency may be predictive of organizational outcomes such as job performance (Kriedt & Dawson, 1961; Kacmar, Delery, & Ferris, 1992; Ruch & Ruch, 1967; Wayne & Ferris, 1990). Yet before outcomes can be predicted from this tendency, it needs to be studied (1) within its framework of response bias; and (2) as it relates to and can be accounted for by other factors.

Implications

The present study will add important information to the research on personality assessment and response bias because it appears that no study has examined faking good as an individual difference variable, even though many have called for this treatment (Canter, 1963; Furnham, 1986; Hogan, 1992; Jackson & Messick, 1958; Rynes, 1993). Moreover, the present study puts a unique perspective on the tendency to fake good in that faking good is perceived as a positive, adaptive, and potentially predictive variable as opposed to its usual treatment as a threat to validity (Hough, et al., 1990). Rather than examining how faking good may or may not contaminate validity, we should investigate the constructs to which it is related.

Moreover, this study is one of few that have attempted to assess individual differences in faking good through a within-subject procedure. Previous research has detected the presence of faking good

through group differences. People are only identified as faking good when they are compared to the mean of the group in the honest condition. This between-subject method fails to detect any differences among individuals in the tendency to fake good. The present study not only attempts to detect individual differences in faking good, but also examines the potential factors that may explain variance in this tendency.

It is anticipated that the results of this study will support the hypothesis that SD, SM, and IM are all significantly related to the tendency to fake good, and account for variance in this individual difference variable. To the extent that this holds true, further study of faking good as a predictor of important organizational outcomes is warranted. Faking good may be related to job performance in certain positions and circumstances (Kriedt & Dawson, 1961; Kacmar, Delery, & Ferris, 1992; Ruch & Ruch, 1967; Wayne & Ferris, 1990). If these relations between faking good, SM, SD, and IM are found to be robust, and if the tendency to fake good is reliably predictive of job performance in certain circumstances, faking good should *not* be something in need of correction, but conceivably something for which can be tested.

Hypotheses

1) It is hypothesized that there will be significant correlations between the tendency to fake good on a personality inventory and the concepts of self-monitoring (SM), social desirability (SD), and impression management (IM). This model will be tested using structural equation analysis, where the latent variables of SM, SD, and IM are predicted to have positive paths to the latent variable of faking good (see figure 1). This model will be statistically tested for 'goodness

of fit' to the sample data, which will be comprised of the observed variables of faking good, SM, SD, and IM. These observed variables will be measured using their respective scales, while faking good will be assessed by a within-subject technique discussed below.

2) To the extent that the factors of SM, SD, and IM are empirically related to faking good, it is further hypothesized that those people who have the tendency to fake good on the personality inventory will be distinguished by higher scores on SM, SD, and IM, while those who do not exhibit the tendency to fake good will have lower scores on these scales. Thus, SM, SD, and IM will be multiple predictors of the tendency to fake good, and will account for the variance in this tendency.

Method

Subjects

323 subjects were recruited from undergraduate and graduate Psychology courses at CSUSB. Cohen's power table (Cohen, 1992) suggests that for three predictors and for medium power at $\alpha = .05$, 76 subjects per predictor should be used. Thus for the three predictors of SM, SD, and IM, 228 subjects were required for adequate power.

225 of the participants were female, 92 were male, and 6 did not specify. 43% of the participants were Caucasian, 24.5% were Hispanic, 13.9% were African American, 5.9% were Asian, 4.3% were Filipino, 1.2% were Native American, 0.9% were Asian Pacific Islander, and 3.4% indicated other. 29.4% of the sample were freshman, 23.5% were sophomore, 12.7% were junior, 25.1% were senior, and 7.7% were graduate students.

Materials

The personality measure was the instrument on which the tendency to fake was assessed. For the purposes of this study, it was important to utilize a personality measure that is (1) fakable, and (2) relevant to the selection context described in the instructions to participants (see the Procedure section). A personality dimension that fits these criteria is Conscientiousness, part of the Big Five Personality Dimensions. Conscientiousness describes one who is careful, thorough, organized, planful, hard-working, achievement oriented, and persevering (Barrick & Mount, 1991; Carver & Scheier, 1992). The concept of conscientiousness is termed differently by different authors. A compilation of these synonymous labels is taken from Barrick and Mount (1991) and Carver and Scheier (1992), and includes conformity, dependability, will to achieve, responsibility, and conscience. Peabody and Goldberg (1989) suggest that conscientiousness relates to the life domain of work, which would explain the ubiquitousness of this personality domain in job related contexts (Barrick & Mount, 1991). Since this dimension of personality was used to measure the tendency to fake, it was necessary to ensure that subjects who were high in Conscientiousness in both the honest and fake conditions (i.e., those who displayed no significant increase in scores between the honest and fake conditions to be described below) would not be confounded with subjects who do not have the tendency to fake. That is, subjects who are at the ceiling for a personality construct have no room to enhance their scores, and thus would not display an increase in scores from time one to time two. These subjects would consequently be identified as *not* faking good due to their high scores on the personality dimension.

In an effort to alleviate this potential ceiling confound, subjects were assessed on all dimensions of the Big Five (Extraversion, Emotional Stability, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, and Intellect) using Saucier's (1994) Mini-Marker's for the Big Five (see appendix a). This measure is a subset of Goldberg's 100 unipolar Big Five markers, and has comparable reliability to it (Saucier, 1994). Saucier (1994) reported reliability coefficients for each dimension: Extraversion (α = .83); Agreeableness (α = .81); Conscientiousness (α = .83); Emotional Stability (α = .78); and Intellect (α = .81). The present study used Saucier's mini-markers in two conditions - honest and fake (see procedure). The reliability coefficients on each dimension for the honest condition include: Extraversion (α = .82); Agreeableness (α = .76); Conscientiousness (α = .88); Emotional Stability (α = .72); and Intellect (α = .77). The reliability coefficients for the fake good condition were α = .76 for Extraversion, α = .79 for Agreeableness, α = .92 for Conscientiousness, α = .76 for Emotional Stability, and α = .73 for Intellect.

The tendency to fake good was assessed by a measure of the consistency of a given subject's responses to Saucier's Big Five Mini-Markers (1994) under two conditions: honest and fake. This method involved correlating subjects' scores from the honest and fake conditions. Lautenschlager (1986) argues that this within-subject correlation (r_{WHF}) is more sensitive to individual differences in faking than other methods; thus, it is certainly appropriate in the present study. As Lautenschlager (1986) notes:

> Large positive values will tend to indicate very consistent subjects, generally those subject who change their responses very little under the different

> response [conditions] (It is possible that some of these individuals are consistent fakers under both response [conditions], but then no method outside of external validation will detect them). Strong negative correlations will tend to indicate subjects who go to different extremes under the two response sets, i.e., exhibit the most faking. Thus, the range of values of the correlation indicate to some extent the degree of accuracy with which a given individual responds to the items under the F condition relative to the H condition (p. 311).

Gordon and Gross (1978) propose two other methods for detecting faking: mean differences in scores that were obtained under the H and F conditions ($Mean_F - Mean_H$); and the variance of these same difference scores (S^2_D). Lautenschlager notes that the first method is insensitive to individual differences in faking, but the second isn't. However, the second is insensitive to constant discrepancies. Thus Lautenschlager's method using within-subject correlations (r_{wHF}) will be employed to assess the tendency to fake good.

Self-Monitoring was assessed by Lennox and Wolfe's(1984) revised Self Monitoring scale. As Lennox and Wolfe note, Snyder's (1974) SM scale confounds acting ability with the ability to modify one's self presentation in daily social interactions. Therefore, Lennox and Wolfe (1984) developed a Revised Self-Monitoring Scale that defines the self-monitoring construct in a more parsimonious and empirically logical manner. Whereas Snyder's original scale has five components, the present only has two. Snyder's multidimensional scale "extends beyond the limits of the construct, creating a situation in which its factors compete with one another" (Lennox and Wolfe, 1984, p. 1350). The Revised Self-Monitoring Scale contains 13 items and two subscales: ability to modify self presentation (coefficient alpha = .77), and sensitivity to expressive behavior of others (coefficient alpha = .70). The scale as a whole has a coefficient alpha of .75 (see appendix b).

The inclusion of the sensitive to expressive behavior of others is justified given Snyder's definition of the high self-monitor as one who possesses the ability to attend to the behavior of others, and use it as a cue to guide self presentation (Lennox & Wolfe, 1984). This method of assessing self-monitoring is congruent with its conception in the present study, and thereby was the most appropriate way to measure it. The present sample obtained a coefficient alpha = .726 for ability to modify self presentation, and a coefficient alpha = .668 for sensitivity to expressive behavior of others. The scale as a whole had coefficient alpha = .757.

Social Desirability was measured by using the total score for Paulhus' Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (BIDR) which measures two constructs: Impression Management and Self-Deceptive Enhancement (see appendix c). When all items are summed for a measure of social desirable responding, the coefficient alpha is .83 (Paulhus, 1991). The coefficient alpha in the current sample for Social Desirability is .820.

Impression Management will be assessed by Paulhus' Impression Management subscale of the BIDR. Coefficient alphas range from .75 to .86 for this subscale (Paulhus, 1991). The current sample obtained a coefficient alpha = .816 for Impression Management. For the subscale of Self-Deceptive Enhancement, coefficient alpahs range from .68 to .80 (Paulhus, 1991). The coefficient alpha for Self-Deceptive Enhancement in the current sample is .65.

A measure of general intelligence was added as an exploratory measure in order to rule out the alternative hypothesis that general intelligence ("g") would account for more variance in the tendency to fake good than SM, SD, or IM. This measure is a 40 item, spiral omnibus

test of general intelligence (see appendix d). The reliability of this measure in the present sample is .834.

Procedure

Honest and fake conditions were operationalized by two different instructions. Honest instructions encouraged the subjects to respond honestly, as they really are (see appendix A). Fake instructions asked the subjects to place themselves in a selection context where they are an applicant for a job that they desire. They were asked to respond to the questions in a manner that they would use if they were an applicant attempting to acquire the job. The instructions read:

> Imagine that you are applying for a job that you *really* want, and your prospective employer will determine from this test whether to hire you or not. Please use this list of common human attributes to describe yourself *so as to ensure that you will get the job.*
> Before each attribute, please write a number indicating how that trait were to describe you if you were trying to give the *best possible impression of yourself*, using the following rating scale:

The rating scale was the same as the honest condition. Subjects received the measures for SM, SD, and IM during their honest condition. Otherwise, subjects in the fake condition may have been in a "fake" mind set, and consequently there could have been be carry over "fake" effects on these measures.

Results

The data were analyzed using bivariate scatter plots, scatter plots of the residuals, and expected normal probability plots. It was determined that the assumptions of linearity and normality were basically met. The minimum and maximum values, means, standard deviations, and coefficient alphas for the scales of self-monitoring (SM), social desirability (SD), impression management (IM), self-

deceptive enhancement (SDE), and the g measure are reported in table 1. The reliabilities obtained in this sample for SM, SD, IM, and SDE are comparable to those reported by the authors of these scales. The means and standard deviations for SD and the two subscales (IM and SDE) are comparable to what Paulhus reports (Paulhus, 1991). There were no normative data available for the SM scale used in this study regarding descriptives. The minimum and maximum values, means, standard deviations, coefficient alphas, and test-retest reliabilities for each scale on the Big Five on both the honest and fake conditions are reported in table 2. The reliabilities of the Big Five dimensions are also comparable to the reliabilities reported by Saucier (1994). The means and standard deviations for the within-subject correlations between the honest and fake conditions for each dimension on the Big Five are reported in table 3.

Participants significantly increased their scores from time one (honest) to time two (fake) on each of the Big Five dimensions. Results from these t-tests are reported in table 4. There were significant correlations between means on the Big Five dimensions (both honest and fake conditions) with SM, SD, IM, SDE, and the g measure (see table 5). An interesting finding is the significant decrease in the correlations with SD from the honest condition to the fake condition for Conscientiousness. On this dimension, there was a significant decrease ($z_{obt} = 2.43 > z_{.025} = \pm 1.96$, $p < .05$) in the correlation between mean scores in the honest condition and SD ($r = .355$, $p < .01$) from the correlation between the mean in the fake condition and SD ($r = .210$, $p < .01$). The correlation between the means on Conscientiousness and the g measure significantly increased ($z_{obt} = -3.38 > z_{.025} = \pm 1.96$, $p < .05$)

from the honest (r = .-.027, p > .05) to the fake (r = .243, p < .01) condition. The correlation between the means on Emotional Stability and the g measure also significantly increased (z_{obt} = -2.02 > $z_{.025}$ = ±1.96, p < .05), from the honest (r = .105, p < .01) to the fake (r = .266, p < .01) condition.

The within-subject correlations for the honest and fake conditions (r_{wHF}, the index for faking) were transformed to z scores using Fisher's r to z formula (Howell, 1992) in order to ensure an approximately normal sampling distribution of r_{wHF}. These transformed within-subject correlations (r'_{wHF}) were not significantly correlated with SM, SD, nor IM for any of the Big Five dimensions. The correlations of these transformed within-subject correlations with scores on SM, SD, IM, SDE, and the g measure are reported for each Big Five scale in table 6. The r'_{wHF} for Emotional Stability was significantly correlated with scores on the g measure (r = -.211; p<.01). The r'_{wHF} for Conscientiousness significantly correlated with scores on SDE (r = .112; p<.05). SM was significantly correlated with SD (r = .128, p < .01). IM (r = .899, p < .01), and SDE (r = .816, p < .01) were also significantly correlated with SD, as would be expected since they are subscales of Social Desirability (see table 7).

Subjects tended to fake more (as evidenced by a lower average r'_{wHF}) on the scale of Agreeableness ($M_{r'wHF}$ = .3993, $SD_{r'wHF}$ = .63601) than on Intellect ($M_{r'wHF}$ = .57508, $SD_{r'wHF}$ = .62840) (z_{obt} = -.2161 < $z_{.025}$ = ±1.96, α = .05). Subjects also tended to exhibit more faking on Conscientiousness ($M_{r'wHF}$ = .38584, $SD_{r'wHF}$ = .47591) than on Intellect (z_{obt} = -2.3503 > $z_{.025}$ = ±1.96, α = .05).

To examine the first hypothesis, a test of goodness of fit was conducted using five multiple regression analyses. Using simultaneous entry, the r'_{WHF} for each scale was used as the criterion, and SM, SD, IM, and the g measure were used as predictors. Results from these multiple regression analyses are in table 8. Since these adjusted R^2 as goodness of fit indices were not significant (except for the Adjusted R^2 for Emotional Stability, but even here it is extremely small) the proposed structural equation analysis was not carried out.

Analyses were conducted on just the cases that were (1) identified to be extreme fakers and (2) extremely consistent. This was done in order to isolate the effects occurring just for these extremes. This was determined by selecting only those cases that were less than or equal to the 33rd percentile, and greater than or equal to the 66th percentile on the faking index for each of the dimensions. Thus, extreme fakers were identified by very large, negative values for r_{WHF}(the lowest 33 percent for these values on each dimension); and extremely consistent subjects were identified by very large and positive values for r r_{WHF} (the highest 33 percent for those values on each dimension). T-tests were performed in order to determine if extreme fakers scored significantly higher on the dimensions in the honest and fake conditions than the non-fakers. For the fake good condition on Extraversion (time 2), extreme fakers ($\underline{M}$ = 6.72 , $\underline{SD}$ = 1.16) scored significantly higher [$\underline{t}(209) = 3.584$, $\underline{p} < .000$] than extreme non-fakers fakers ($\underline{M}$ = 6.14 , $\underline{SD}$ = 1.17). Extreme fakers ($\underline{M}$ =7.14, $\underline{SD}$ = 1.05) also scored significantly higher than the extremely consistent subjects ($\underline{M}$ =6.22, $\underline{SD}$ = 1.36) on the fake condition of Emotional Stability [$\underline{t}(209) = 5.517$, $\underline{p} < .000$]. The extremely consistent subjects ($\underline{M}$ = 6.86 , $\underline{SD}$ = 1.05) scored significantly *higher* on the honest condition of

Conscientiousness [$t(212) = -3.802$, $p < .000$] than the extreme fakers ($M = 6.33$, $SD = .989$).

Originally, r_{wHF} was proposed as the index of faking. However opposite to what was hypothesized, positive correlations between this index and SM, SD, and IM were obtained. In order to get a broader sense of the relationships between faking good and SM, SD, and IM, two other indices of faking were calculated. These were $Mean_{fake} - Mean_{honest}$ (D_{FH}) for each individual, as well as the within-subject variance of the differences in responses to the items under the honest and fake conditions (S^2_{wD}). Greater values for D_{FH} are associated with more faking (a change in the positive direction from honest to fake). Greater values of S^2_{wD} are also associated with more faking, while smaller values indicate subjects who give very consistent responses. However, as Lautenschlager (1986) notes, S^2_{wD} is insensitive to constant discrepancies. Nevertheless, this index of faking was examined in an effort to better understand the construct of faking good. When D_{FH} is used as a measure of faking, it is evident by correlations with SM, SD, and IM (see table 6) that faking good is negatively associated with these constructs. That is, the more subjects tended to fake good (i.e., the greater the positive change from honest to fake) the lower these subjects were on SM, SD, and IM. Additionally, D_{FH} as a faking index was positively correlated with higher scores on the g measure for Extraversion, Conscientiousness, and Emotional Stability. However, when S^2_{wD} is used as an index of faking, the relationship between faking good and SM, SD, and IM is further clouded. The correlations between these constructs and S^2_{wD} for each dimension of the Big Five are non-significant, and some are negative while others are positive. When S^2_{wD} is used, there were significant correlations between SDE and faking good

for Agreeableness (r = .151, p < .01), and Emotional Stability(r = .119, p < .05). Moreover, faking good (S^2_{WD}) on Emotional Stability is negatively associated with higher scores on the g measure (r = -.113, p < .05).

Discussion

The hypothesis that faking good on a personality measure would be correlated with the constructs of Self-Monitoring (SM), Social Desirability (SD), and Impression Management (IM) was not supported. Faking good (as measured by the within-subject correlation between scores on each of the Big Five scales in the honest and fake conditions) was not significantly correlated with any of the scales. Therefore in the context of this study, students displayed the tendency to fake good or not fake good *regardless* of their orientations on SM, SD, and IM. These results imply that faking good as an individual difference variable is a unitary and separate construct, unrelated to constructs of self-presentation.

A measure of general intelligence was employed in this study in order to rule out an alternative hypothesis that "g" would account for any potential individual differences in faking, rather than SM, SD, or IM. There was no evidence for this alternative hypothesis. In fact, faking good on Emotional Stability was *negatively* correlated with scores on the g measure. Thus, those individuals who displayed the tendency to fake good on this particular dimension also scored lower on the g measure. The fact that individual differences in faking good were not related to general intelligence lends more credit to the notion that faking good is a unified and separate construct.

One factor that may have contributed to the non-significant correlations between r'_{wHF} for each dimension of the Big Five and the scales of SM, SD, and IM is the lack of stability of these within-subject correlations. These correlations were based on eight items for all dimensions of the Big Five (except Conscientiousness, which was based on twenty items). These small N sizes produce unstable correlation coefficients with very large confidence intervals. The width of the confidence interval around r_{wHF} for Conscientiousness is ± .4753, more than one and a half standard deviation units. The width of the confidence intervals for Extraversion, Agreeableness, Emotional Stability, and Intellect is ± .8765, greater than two standard deviations for these within-subject correlations. Therefore the true values for r_{wHF} across scales range from (plus or minus) one and a half to two standard deviations from the obtained within-subject correlations. Given these confidence intervals, the within-subject correlations must be interpreted with caution. Indeed, Lautenschlager (1986) notes that when r_{wHF} is used as an index of faking, longer questionnaires should be employed in order to yield more stable within-subject correlations. Additionally, large sample sizes should be used to control for individual differences in reliability. While the sample size of the current study appears to be sufficient, the number of items on which the within-subject correlations are based does not.

Moreover, it is uncertain whether r_{wHF} as a faking index is reliable. That is, it is not known whether individuals would obtain similar correlations between scores in the honest and fake conditions in another situation. If a measure is unreliable, it will have near zero

correlations with other constructs. Thus, further research on r_{wHF} as a faking index is indeed necessary.

Additional findings that lend discredit to the within-subject correlations are the t-tests for the difference between the means on each dimension from time one and time two. These results indicate that subjects are significantly increasing their scores from the honest to fake conditions. This would suggest that on the whole, subjects tended to exhibit some degree of faking good. However, r_{wHF} as an index of faking is not congruent with these t-tests. While there is variability in the within-subject correlations, overall, subjects are fairly consistent in their responses from the honest to the fake conditions (mean within-subject correlations ranged from .287 to .416).

In an effort to better understand the processes of faking good, two other measures of faking were employed: D_{FH} and S^2_{wD}. D_{FH} is the difference between scores in the fake and honest condition for each dimension. S^2_{wD} is the within-subject variance of the differences in the responses to each item under the two conditions of honest and fake. When the results of the three indices of faking good are compared across dimensions (see table 6), it is evident that each index reveals something different about faking. While faking good (as operationalized by strong, negative within-subject correlations) is not significantly correlated with SD, SM, or IM, the difference scores from the conditions of honest to fake are significantly and *negatively* correlated with SM, SD, and IM. Analyses using the difference scores reveal that the more subjects fake good, the lower the subjects score on SM, SD, and IM. However, these conclusions are not upheld when S^2_{wD} is used as a measure of faking. Analyses using the within-subject variances of the differences as a measure of faking yield insignificant and erratic

correlations. Thus, regardless of which index of faking is used, faking good is still unrelated to the constructs of SM, SD, and IM. This further supports faking good as an independent construct.

Another notable result is that on Conscientiousness, the correlations between the mean scores on this dimension and SD significantly decreased from the honest to fake conditions. One explanation for this decrease in correlations from the honest to fake conditions may be method variance. That is, the differences in these correlations may not be indicative of a true relationship. For instance, in the honest condition the correlation for the means on Conscientiousness and SD was .355. In the fake condition, this correlation dropped to .210. This is a significant difference in the correlations ($z_{obt} = 2.43 > z_{.025} = \pm 1.96$, $p < .05$). Scores on SD may have been affected by subjects' responses to the Big Five in the honest condition, which they completed before any of the other measures. In the honest condition, one would expect significant correlations between means on the Big Five dimensions with scores on SD since subjects' responses to items on the Big Five will influence their subsequent responses to the measures that follow it (SM, SD, IM). However, subjects did not get a second administration of SM, SD, and IM in the fake condition. Responses to the Big Five in the fake condition are influenced by a new instructional set, and therefore, means at time 2 on the dimensions would not likely be as correlated with SD as means on the dimensions at time one. Any genuine differences that may exist between honest and fake conditions concerning the relationship of a dimension and SD could only be revealed and interpreted had these measures been given at time two.

In addition to possible method variance accounting for the differences in these correlations, recent meta-analytic work using 239 studies (Ones, Viswesvaran, & Reiss, 1995) shows that scores on measures of Conscientiousness are typically correlated about .20 with measures of Social Desirability. Thus it would appear that perhaps the correlation between Conscientiousness and SD at time two (r = .210, p < .01) is approaching this "true" correlation between the two constructs. Conversely, the correlation between Conscientiousness and SD at time one, where subjects received both measures (r = .355, p < .01), may be an inflated indication of the relationship due to potential method variance.

Limitations

Factors that may have contributed to the unexpected findings of this study include the limitations associated with using a college student population as participants, as opposed to actual job applicants. The instructions for the fake good condition asked subjects to place themselves in a selection context where they were an applicant for a job that they really desire. They were asked to respond to the questions in a manner that they would use if they were seriously attempting to land the job. Students participating in this study were possibly not as motivated to respond in the manner of a job applicant. They did not have a vested interest in the outcome of obtaining or not obtaining the desired job. It is reasonable to suggest that individual differences in the tendency to fake good may manifest themselves differently depending on the situation; and in this particular study, subjects' tendency to fake good may not have been elicited with the instructions alone. Even though there was variance in the values and magnitudes of the faking

index (r'_{wHF}), perhaps different results would have been attained had an applicant population been used.

Contrary to what would be expected given the instructions to fake good, some participants actually *decreased* their scores in the fake good condition as compared to their scores in the honest condition. Across dimensions, between 10 to 30 percent of the subjects had negative values for D_{FH}. This decrease in scores indicates that subjects actually faked bad in the fake good condition. Unfortunately, strong, negative values of the within-subject correlations would mis-identify those subjects as fakers since their scores were indeed inconsistent from the honest to the fake condition.

Another possible limitation could be the ceiling confound. While an attempt was made to alleviate this potential confound by using more than one personality dimension, it is possible that the people who are the actual fakers in this sample may have scored high across all dimensions in the honest condition. In time two, when these "true" fakers were instructed to fake good, they had no room to further enhance their scores given their previous high scores in the honest condition. If this was the case, these true fakers were identified as extremely consistent subjects (with large, positive values for r'_{wHF}), and thus mis-identified as extreme *non*-fakers. In his discussion of r_{wHF} as a measure of faking, Lautenschlager (1986) notes a possible interpretation of large, positive values for r_{wHF}, "It is possible that some of these individuals are consistent fakers under both response sets, but then no method outside of external validation will detect them." (p. 311). If the real fakers were mis-identified as consistent respondents, then the correlations between r'_{wHF} for each dimension and SM, SD, and IM are

inaccurate indicators of the relationship between faking good and these constructs. Moreover, the difference scores (D_{FH}) would also fail to identify these consistent fakers since they would have little change in their scores. Finally, S^2_{wD} would also fail to identify these consistent fakers since their values for the within-subject variance of the differences would likewise be small, causing these people to be treated as consistent respondents. Thus, given the current methods for detecting faking, there appears to be no way to identify those consistent fakers who initially score high in time one, and correspondingly in time two. This limitation in measuring faking contaminates any association that may exist between faking good and SM, SD, and IM.

Theoretical Implications

The information regarding faking good as an individual difference variable obtained from this study is valuable because it shows that people do vary in their tendency to fake good on a personality measure; and people vary in this tendency depending on the particular dimension of personality being assessed. Analyses of the differences between the means of the transformed within-subject correlations (r'_{wHF}) reveal that more faking tended to occur on the Conscientiousness dimension than on the Intellect dimension, and more faking occurred on the Agreeableness dimension than on the Intellect dimension. This is evidenced by the lower within-subject correlations on Conscientiousness and Agreeableness than on Intellect.

Moreover, results of this study suggest that faking good is its own construct. Faking good was not related to any of the hypothesized constructs, not even general intelligence. Even though the tendency to fake good was not found to be related to SM, SD, nor IM, it was

nevertheless found to be an individual difference variable. Future research should continue to address faking good as an individual difference variable, and identify the situations and circumstances in which this tendency will, and will not be manifested.

Whether these findings are indicative of true relationships remains to be tested with more accurate and stable measures of faking. In the current study, it is unclear whether faking good truly is unrelated to SM, SD, and IM, or whether faking good failed to be captured by the measures of faking that were utilized. Additionally, the current indices of faking are incapable of differentiating those people who score high in the honest condition across personality dimensions and are truly those who would display the tendency to fake good, from those people who are consistent from honest to fake conditions and who would not display this tendency.

Future Research

Therefore the current study has exposed three avenues for future research. The first involves developing better methods for measuring faking, since the three utilized in this study all revealed different results regarding faking. Secondly, if r_{wHF} is used in future studies, longer measures of personality should be used in order to produce more reliable within-subject correlations. By increasing the length of the measures, not only will the stability of r_{wHF} be increased, but a more accurate measure of this construct will be obtained. Indeed, Ones and Viswesvaran (in press) note that in order to increase the criterion-related validities of Conscientiousness, more than one Conscientiousness scale should be used in prediction because the criterion-related validity of a composite of Conscientiousness scales is higher than any one measure of Conscientiousness. Hence, it is not unreasonable to

administer a longer, aggregated scale of Conscientiousness in order to obtain more stable estimates of r_{WHF} as well as the construct of Conscientiousness itself. However it is important to note that the within-subject correlations between responses from the honest to fake conditions is more a measure of consistency of pattern rather than consistency of level, and thus may not be the most appropriate measure of faking. Thirdly, future design methods for research in faking good should include an administration of the independent variables during the fake good condition as well as the honest condition in order that more accurate interpretations of the decreased correlations from honest to fake conditions can be made. Additionally, these measures of SM, SD, and IM should also be given at a time before the personality measure is administered. In this way, a more pure assessment of these constructs can be made since the threat of method variance that was introduced in the current study can be reduced.

Table 1

Means and Standard Deviations for Self-Monitoring, Social Desirability, Impression Management, Self-Deceptive Enhancement, and the g measure

Scale	Number of Items	Total Possible	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	SD	Coefficient alpha
Self-Monitoring[a]	13	5	1.77	4.85	3.32	.529	.757
Social Desirability[b]	40	40	1	31	11.40	5.55	.783
Impression Management[c]	20	20	0	15	5.48	3.37	.724
Self-Deceptive Enhancement[d]	20	20	0	17	5.92	3.19	.650
g Measure[a]	40	40	3	37	16.64	6.24	.834

a: N = 323
b: N = 321
c: N = 312
d: N = 314

Table 2

Means, Standard Deviations, Reliability Coefficients, and Test-Retest Reliabilities for all Big Five Dimensions (honest and fake conditions)

Scale	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	SD	Coefficient α	Test-Retest Reliability for T1 & T2
Extraversion (honest)[a]	318	1.5	8.75	5.73	1.41	.820	.383
Extraversion (fake) [a]	318	2.88	8.88	6.49	1.17	.761	
Agreeableness (honest) [a]	322	3.88	9	7.11	1.20	.767	.524
Agreeableness (fake) [a]	321	3.75	9	7.62	1.02	.796	
Conscientiousness (honest)[b]	318	3.7	8.75	6.68	1.01	.883	.453
Conscientiousness (fake) [b]	314	3.5	9	7.65	1.00	.922	
Emotional Stability(honest) [a]	319	2.12	8.88	5.33	1.30	.728	.383
Emotional Stability (fake) [a]	317	3	9	6.76	1.26	.761	
Intellect (honest) [a]	322	2.62	9	6.47	1.18	.772	.468
Intellect (fake) [a]	319	2.65	9	6.92	1.01	.732	

Total possible score on all scales, honest and fake, is 9.
a: number of items = 8
b: number of items = 20

Table 3
Means and Standard Deviations for the Within-Subject Correlations of the Honest and Fake Conditions (r_{wHF}) for Each Scale of the Big Five

Scale	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	SD
Extraversion r_{wHF}	321	-.933	1.00	.3596	.4230
Agreeableness r_{wHF}	299	-.820	1.00	.2871	.4401
Conscientiousness r_{wHF}	311	-.509	.999	.3120	.2974
Emotional Stability r_{wHF}	318	-.945	1.00	.3166	.4130
Intellect r_{wHF}	312	-.845	1.00	.4155	.4111

Table 4

Results from T-tests on the Differences Between Means on Time 2 (fake) and Time 1 (honest) for each Dimension on the Big Five

Scale	Mean 1 (honest)	Mean 2 (fake)	Difference (Mean 1 - Mean 2)	t	df	Significance (two-tailed)	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference Lower	Upper
Extraversion	5.74	6.48	-.746	-10.31	314	.000	-.888	-.603
Agreeableness	7.11	7.62	-.516	-8.91	319	.000	-.630	-.402
Conscientiousness	6.69	7.65	-.955	-16.1	312	.000	-1.07	-.839
Emotional Stability	5.33	6.75	-1.42	-17.71	315	.000	-1.58	-1.26
Intellect	6.47	6.92	-.452	-7.03	318	.000	-.578	-.325

Table 5
Correlations Between Scores on the Big Five Dimensions (honest and fake conditions) and Self-Monitoring, Social Desirability, Impression Management, Self-Deceptive Enhancement, and the g Measure

	Self-Monitoring	Social Desirability	Impression Management	Self-Deceptive Enhancement	g measure
Extraversion (mean 1)	.356**	.183**	.060	.255**	- .034
Extraversion (mean 2)	.284**	.180**	.098	.211**	.069
Agreeableness (mean 1)	.045	.304**	.361**	.147**	.032
Agreeableness (mean 2)	.047	.219**	.260**	.107	.076
Conscientiousness (mean 1)	.121*	.355**	.365**	.234**	- .027
Conscientiousness (mean 2)	.127*	.210**	.220**	.133**	.243**
Emotional Stability (mean 1)	- .082	.363**	.337**	.277**	.105
Emotional Stability (mean 2)	.001	.243**	.242**	.167**	.266**
Intellect (mean 1)	.182**	.179**	.116*	.188**	.127*
Intellect (mean 2)	.182**	.108	.099	.082	.115*

* Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed).
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Table 6
Correlations Between All Indices of Faking Across All Big Five Dimensions

	Self-Monitoring	Social Desirability	Impression Management	Self-Deceptive Enhancement	g
Extraversion					
r'_{wHF}	.064	.059	.054	.045	-.087
D_{HF}	-.140*	-.035	.024	-.087	.111*
S^2_{wD}	-.025	-.016	-.041	.017	-.062
Agreeableness					
r'_{wHF}	.025	-.039	-.030	-.035	-.011
D_{HF}	-.006	-.109	-.129*	-.054	.034
S^2_{wD}	-.032	.051	-.059	.151**	-.103
Conscientiousness					
r'_{wHF}	.070	.082	.033	.112*	-.085
D_{HF}	.011	-.139*	-.141*	-.094	.265**
S^2_{wD}	-.026	-.012	-.100	.085	-.105
Emotional Stability					
r'_{wHF}	.071	.040	.060	.006	-.211**
D_{HF}	.078	-.115*	-.091	-.105	.141*
S^2_{wD}	.012	.027	-.068	.119*	-.113*
Intellect					
r'_{wHF}	-.048	.070	.012	.110	.029
D_{HF}	-.031	-.095	-.037	-.125*	-.030
S^2_{wD}	-.063	.047	.050	.028	-.090

* Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed).

** Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed).

Table 7
Pearson Correlations Between Self-Monitoring, Social Desirability, Impression Management, and Self-Deceptive Enhancement and the g Measure

	Social Desirability	Impression Management	Self-Deceptive Enhancement	g Measure
Self-Monitoring	.138*	-.016	.257**	-.022
Social Desirability		.855**	.837**	-.003
Impression Management			.432**	.015
Self-Deceptive Enhancement				-.021

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Table 8
Results from Multiple Regression Analyses as Tests of Goodness of Fit.

	R	R^2	Adjusted R^2	df	F
Extraversion	.159	.025	.013	4 314	2.032
Agreeableness	.037	.001	-.021	4 292	.100
Conscientiousness	.160	.026	.013	4 304	1.99
*Emotional Stability	.242	.059	.047	4 311	4.842***
Intellect	.098	.01	-.003	4 305	.734

* Significant beta weight for g measure (β = -.215; p < .001)
*** Correlations significant at the .001 level.
Note: The independent variables are Self Monitoring, Social Desirability, Impression Management, and the g Measure. The Dependent Variables for each of the multiple regressions are the transformed within-subject correlations for the respective Big Five dimensions.

Figure

The Model



Appendix A

Mini Markers (Saucier, 1994)

How Accurately Can You Describe Yourself?

Please use this list of common human attributes to describe yourself as accurately as possible. Describe yourself as you see yourself at the present time, not as you wish to be in the future. Describe yourself as you are generally or typically, as compared with other persons you know of the same sex and of roughly your same age.

Before each attribute, please write a number indicating how accurately that trait describes you, using the following rating scale:

Inaccurate				?	Accurate			
Extremely	Very	Moderately	Slightly		Slightly	Moderately	Very	Extremely
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

_____	Bashful	_____	Neat
_____	Bold	_____	Negligent
_____	Careful	_____	Organized
_____	Careless	_____	Philosophical
_____	Cold	_____	Practical
_____	Complex	_____	Prompt
_____	Conscientious	_____	Quiet
_____	Cooperative	_____	Relaxed
_____	Creative	_____	Rude
_____	Deep	_____	Shy
_____	Disorganized	_____	Sloppy
_____	Efficient	_____	Steady
_____	Energetic	_____	Sympathetic
_____	Envious	_____	Systematic
_____	Extraverted	_____	Talkative
_____	Fretful	_____	Temperamental
_____	Haphazard	_____	Thorough
_____	Harsh	_____	Touchy
_____	Imaginative	_____	Uncreative
_____	Impractical	_____	Undependable
_____	Inconsistent	_____	Unenvious
_____	Inefficient	_____	Unintellectual
_____	Intellectual	_____	Unsympathetic
_____	Jealous	_____	Unsystematic
_____	Kind	_____	Warm
_____	Moody	_____	Withdrawn

*Note that these direction differ for the "fake" condition.

Appendix B

Revised Self-Monitoring Scale (Lennox & Wolfe, 1984, p. 1361)

Subscale/item	M	SD	*r* with subscale	*r* with total
Ability to modify self-presentation				
1. In social situations, I have the ability to alter my behavior if I feel something else is called for.	3.7	0.9	.42	.29
3. I have the ability to control the way I come across to people, depending on the impression I wish to give them.	3.2	1.0	.46	.45
7. When I feel that the image I am portraying isn't working, I can readily change it to something that does.	2.4	1.1	.45	.41
*9. I have trouble changing my behavior to meet the requirements of any situation I find myself in.	3.1	1.2	.56	.46
10. I have found that I can adjust my behavior to meet the requirements of any situation I find myself in.	3.1	1.0	.60	.48
*12. Even when it might be to my advantage, I have difficulty putting up a good front.	2.8	1.2	.30	.28
13. Once I know what the situation calls for it's easy for me to regulate my actions accordingly.	3.0	1.0	.65	.54
Sensitivity to expressive behavior of others				
2. I am often able to read people's true emotions correctly through their eyes.	3.2	1.0	.42	.40
4. In conversations, I am sensitive to even the slightest change in the facial expression of the person I'm conversing with.	3.4	1.3	.36	.22
5. My powers of intuition are quite good when it comes to understanding others' emotions and motives.	3.7	.09	.47	.32
6. I can usually tell when others consider a joke to be in bad taste, even though they may laugh convincingly.	3.5	1.0	.35	.31
8. I can usually tell when I've said something inappropriate by reading it in the listener's eyes.	3.8	.08	.53	.44
11. If someone is lying to me, I usually know it at once from that person's manner of expression.	3.1	1.0	.42	.29

* Indicates items that are reversed coded.
Response format is a six point, Likert type scale:
0 = certainly, always false
1 = generally false
2 = somewhat false
3 = somewhat true, but with exception
4 = generally true
5 = certainly, always true

Appendix C

BIDR Version 6 - form 40 (Paulhus, 1991).
Using the scale below as a guide, write a number beside each statement to indicate how much you agree with it.

1 _____ 2 _____ 3 _____ 4 _____ 5 _____ 6 _____ 7
NOT TRUE SOMEWHAT TRUE VERY TRUE

_____ 1. My first impressions of people usually turn out to be right.
_____ *2. It would be hard for me to break any of my bad habits.
_____ 3. I don't care to know what other people rally think of me.
_____ *4. I have not always been honest with myself.
_____ 5. I always know why I like things.
_____ *6. When my emotions are aroused, it biases my thinking.
_____ 7. Once I've made up mind, other people can seldom change my opinion.
_____ *8. I am not a safe driver when I exceed the speed limit.
_____ 9. I am fully in control of my own fate.
_____ *10. It's hard for me to shut off a disturbing thought.
_____ 11. I never regret my decisions.
_____ *12. I sometimes miss out on things because I can't make up my mind soon enough.
_____ 13. The reason I vote is because my vote can make a difference.
_____ *14. My parents were not always fair when they punished me.
_____ 15. I am a completely rational person.
_____ *16. I rarely appreciate criticism.
_____ 17. I am very confident of my judgments.
_____ *18. I have sometimes doubted my ability as a lover.
_____ 19. It's all right with me if some people happen to dislike me.
_____ *20. I don't always know the reasons why I do the things I do.
_____ *21. I sometimes tell lies if I have to.
_____ 22. I never cover up my mistakes.
_____ *23. There have been occasions when I have taken advantage of someone.
_____ 24. I never swear.
_____ *25. I sometimes try to get even rather than forgive and forget.
_____ 26. I always obey laws, even if I'm unlikely to get caught.
_____ *27. I have said something bad about a friend behind his or her back.
_____ 28. When I hear people talking privately, I avoid listening.
_____ *29. I have received too much change from a salesperson without telling him or her.
_____ 30. I always declare everything a customs.

____ *31. When I was young I sometimes stole things.
____ 32. I have never dropped litter on the street.
____ *33. I sometimes drive faster than the speed limit.
____ 34. I never read sexy books or magazines.
____ *35. I have done things that I don't tell other people about.
____ 36. I never take things that don't belong to me.
____ *37. I have taken sick-leave from work or school even thought I wasn't really sick.
____ 38. I have never damaged a library book or store merchandise without reporting it.
____ *39. I have some pretty awful habits.
____ 40. I don't gossip about other people's business.

Items 1-20 assess Self-Deceptive Enhancement; items 21-40 assess Impression Management.
* indicates items keyed in the "false" (negative) direction.

Appendix D.

DIRECTIONS

- This is an exercise to appraise your knowledge of general information. Please answer the questions to the best of your ability. This portion should take no more than 12 minutes.
- Answer the questions by putting the correct answer within the parentheses. You should not use any outside resources to complete these questions.
- The following two questions are examples.

The opposite of down is:

1. east 2. under 3. up 4. cover
..... (*UP*)

What is your change from $1.00 when you buy one item costing 16 cents and a second item costing 34 cents?..... (50 *cents*)

Please Begin Answering the Questions

1. A person who is elated is:
   1. Sad 2. Angry 3. Happy 4. Gifted 5. Passive ....( )

2. Which of the following is most unlike the others?
   1. Typewriter 2. Desk 3. Cabinet 4. Stove 5. Calculator ....( )

3. Work is to pay as practice is to:
   1. Wealth 2. Curiosity 3. Happiness 4. Skill 5. Tired .....( )

4. Square is to circle as cube is to:
   1. Rectangle 2. Pyramid 3. Sphere 4. Trapezoid 5. Triangle .....( )

5. Eight percent of $20,000 is equal to sixteen percent of what amount? .....( )

Continued on the next page

6. Consider the following:
   A is larger than B
   C is smaller than D
   C is larger than A
   Which is the
largest?.....( )

7. To alleviate is to:
   1. Hasten 2. Ease 3 Prolon 4. Restrict 5. Change .....( )

8. When the following are arranged in an increasing sequence, what is the first letter of the third word:
   Square Cube Line Point .....( )

9. Permissive does not mean:
   1. Restrictive 2. Allowable 3. Loose
   4. Pardonable 5. Agreeable .....( )

10. Which is the best example of an entrepreneur?
   1. Usher 2. Foreman 3. Fireman 4. Grocer
   5. Janitor .....( )

11. If you had 13 cases of beans, 20 cases of carrots, 17 cases of pears and 11 cases of corn, how many cases of vegetables would you have?..( )

12. Which has the most similar meaning to lazy?
   1. Indulgent 2. Insolvent 3. Indolent 4. Inertia
   5. Involucrum .....( )

13. What should the first two numbers in this series be?
   _____ _____ 16 4 9 3 4 2 .....( )

14. Which of the following is most unlike a triangle?
   1. Square 2. Trapezoid 3. Rectangle 4. Circle
   5. Hexagon .....( )

15. A storage space measures 18 ft. x 10 ft. x 10 ft.
   What portion of this space will be occupied by 300 crates,
   each 3 ft. x 1 ft. x 1 ft in size? .....( )

Continued on the next page

16. Which word is least appropriate in the group below?

    1. Rock 2. Metal 3. Salt 4. Fish 5. Water .....( )

17. What is the next number in the following sequence?

    1 3 6 10 15 _____ .....( )

18. Fred, Alice, and George own 1/4, 5/12, and 1/3 of a company, respectively. The profits least year were $120,000. How much less would Alice have earned if the profits were divided evenly, rather than on the above basis? .....( )

19. Aristotle is to philosophy what Samuelson is to:

    1. History 2. Literature 3. Mathematics 4. Agriculture

    5. Economics .....( )

20. What is the last letter of the third word when the following is rearranged to make a complete sentence?

    orod poen eht .....( )

21. A man paid 20% income tax on his yearly income of $15,500. The government returned 10% of the amount of tax paid. How much was he taxed for the year? .....( )

22. What is the next number in the series?

    2 5 11 23 _____ .....( )

23. A flipped coin comes up heads three consecutive tosses. The chances for heads on the fourth toss are:

    1. 1 in 1 2. 1 in 2 3. 1 in 3

    4. 1 in 4 5 1 in 5 .....( )

24. Peter borrowed $25,000 at a 7 1/2 percent rate per annum. He received a bill for a quarterly interest payment. What was the amount?.....( )

25. Which number or letter in the following sequence is incorrect?

    1 D 3 E 5 F 6 G 9 H .....( )

26. The sum of three consecutive even numbers is 102. What is the smallest number? .....( )

27. Sedate is most similar to:

    1. Composed 2. Affected 3. Angry 4. Concerned 5. Select ... ( )

Continued on the next page

28. What is the missing fraction in the following series?
3/4 11/16 _____ 9/16 1/2 ..... ( )

29. Assume the following two statements are true. "All conservatives are businessmen. Bob is a liberal." From this, you can deduct:

1. Bob is not a businessman.
2. Bob is a businessman
3. Bob may or may not be a businessman.
4. None of the above.
5. Two of the above ..... ( )

30. A famous anthropologist is:
1. Aristotle 2. Freud 3. Mead 4. Darwin 5. Pavlov ..... ( )

31. Which of the following does not belong?
1. French 2. Spanish 3. Italian 4. Russian 5. Portuguese ...( )

32. A watch loses 20 seconds every 10 hours. If it has been properly set at 6:00 a.m. on Monday, how slow will it be by noon on Tuesday? ...( )

33. What is the missing number?
12 21 23 32 _____ 54 67 76 .....( )

34. A freight train one mile long goes through a tunnel that is one mile long. If the train is traveling at a speed of 15 miles per hour, how long does it take to pass through the tunnel? .....( )

35. Satiate is the same as:
1. Jailed 2. Incarcerate 3. Slovenly 4. Free 5. Satisfy ....( )

36. A department, working at 80 percent efficiency, produces 640 pieces per hour. What is the efficiency when this department produces 760 pieces per hour? .....( )

37. The manpower requirements for a certain plant are: first shift, 600; second shift, 2/3's as many; and third shift, 1/2 of the total of the first two shifts. How many total people are required for the three shifts? .....( )

38. What is the first letter of the third word when the following are arranged in their proper order?
1. Broke 2. Cereal 3. Go 4. Baby 5. The .....( )

Continued on the next page

39. Two small planes leave cities 970 miles apart and travel toward each other. One plane's average speed is 40 miles per hour greater than that of the other plane. If they meet in two and one-half hours, what is the speed of the slower plane? .....( )

40. Moon is to sun as:

1. Day is to night
2. Light is to dark
3. Fork is to tea
4. Friend is to foe
5. Sea is to land .....( )

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