Roland Barthes's Ancient rhetoric: A translation

Sandra Ohse Fredriksen

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ROLAND BARTHES'S ANCIENT RHETORIC:
A TRANSLATION

A Thesis
Presented to the
Faculty of
California State University,
San Bernardino

In Partial Fulfillment
Of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts
in
English Composition

by
Sandra Ohse Fredriksen
May 1988
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May 1988

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May 27, 1988 Date
Abstract

This thesis includes an introduction to and translation of Roland Barthes's *L'ancienne rhétorique*. Originally delivered as a series of lectures, Barthes's ancient rhetoric offers a chronological study of rhetoric from its beginnings in ancient Greece through the nineteenth century.

Following the principles of Saussurean linguistics, Barthes divides his work into two main sections, a syntagmatic section and a paradigmatic section. The first deals with the origins of rhetoric as it was used in courts of law to try property cases and introduces the reader to the works of Aristotle, Cicero, Quintilian, etc. It traces the various turns of classical rhetoric through the Middle Ages and into the modern era, with special attention to pedagogical methods and trends.

The second introduces the technical workings of rhetoric through taxonomic systems and more importantly through an analysis of the *inventio*, *dispositio* and *elocutio*. Barthes concludes his essay with a lengthy peroration in which he calls for a new history of rhetoric based on linguistics, semiology, Marxism, etc. At the end of his peroration, he draws attention to the ideology of mass culture which is inherent in the history of rhetoric up to the present.
Acknowledgements

I wish to express my gratitude to Bruce Golden, whose patience and prodding have kept this thesis alive. Thanks also to Peter Schroeder and Helene Koon for their careful and prompt reading and their invaluable suggestions. Finally, special thanks to Danielle Haskell and Liliane Fucaloro, who guided me through some difficult passages.
# Table of Contents

Introduction.................................................vii
Works Cited..................................................xxix
Ancient Rhetoric: A Handbook..............................1
   Notes..........................................................126
Appendix I  Rhetoric: Chronology..........................133
Appendix II  The Rhetoric Tree.............................137
Index..........................................................138
Contents.....................................................140
From philosophy, rhetoric. That is, here, to make from a volume, approximately, more or less, a flower, to extract a flower, to mount it, or rather to have it mount itself, bring itself to light—and turning away, as if from itself, come round again, such a flower engraves—learning to cultivate, by means of a lapidary's reckoning, patience . . .

Jacques Derrida
INTRODUCTION

The study of rhetoric has traditionally unearthed more questions than it can answer and discovered more problems than it can solve. As Roland Barthes explains at the beginning of his treatise on ancient rhetoric, he undertook to compile a brief overview of what was known of rhetoric's history in order to lecture systematically on the subject. Putting together the best sources on ancient rhetoric, Barthes applied what he drew from the history of rhetoric and his earlier studies in sociology, linguistics, and semiology to these general questions.

It is true, as Barthes points out in his introduction, that no brief, systematic treatment of ancient rhetoric existed at the time. George A. Kennedy's Classical Rhetoric and Its Christian and Secular Tradition from Ancient to Modern Times, the closest work to approach what Barthes was seeking, appeared only in 1980, sixteen years after Barthes's course in ancient rhetoric. Although larger in scope than what Barthes proposes here, Kennedy's work fulfills Barthes's request for a "chronological and systematic" treatment of ancient rhetoric. But a comparison of the two would reveal Barthes's distinguishing characteristics. For example, Kennedy's work in no way connects rhetoric with social issues of class and power as such. And, whereas Barthes relies heavily upon linguistics
and semiology, Kennedy's history of rhetoric makes no use of any extra-disciplinary systems. There are also more ambitious examinations of ancient rhetoric and its applications to teaching, e.g., Edward P.J. Corbett's Classical Rhetoric for the Modern Student, but Corbett's compendious and tendentious work was not what Barthes had in mind for his more concise and probing "aide-mémoire." (Besides, the first edition of Corbett's rhetoric appeared in 1965, a year after Barthes's seminar).

There exists a basic difference between traditional Anglo-American studies of language and literature and continental theories. English-speaking scholars have tended to focus on the individual work and its place in the history of literature, while continental scholars have tended to devise systems for the study of language and literature in general. The rhetoric of Anglo-American writers, whether "new" or "old," is most often dogmatically objective; their "history" of rhetoric is concerned only with the chronological facts. Thus for Kennedy, it matters not at all that rhetoric sprang up in Ancient Greece out of property disputes, or that rhetoric has been used through the ages to enhance the authority of certain groups at the expense of oppressed minorities. It matters only that rhetoric was used in the political arena, that rhetoric was taught to certain young men down through the centuries. But
for Barthes and some of his colleagues, these subjects are of fundamental importance. No strangers to Marxism, they are quick to pick up concerns over such issues as private property, the oppression of certain classes, and the situation of power among an elect group.

The ideology inherent in Barthes's "aide-mémoire" and in much of his other writing is clear. It is a desire to dislodge the comfortable assumptions of the petit-bourgeoisie, the ways in which it turns its myths into "universal nature." Barthes states in "Introduction: The Semiological Adventure" (1974), that what Semiology must attack is not only . . . the petit-bourgeois good conscience, but the symbolic and semantic system of our entire civilization; it is not enough to seek to change contents, we must above all aim at fissuring the meaning-system itself: we must emerge from the Occidental enclosure . . . (8)

The emphasis of classical rhetoric has traditionally been on teaching and performing. From its earliest sources in ancient Greece down to modern times, rhetoric has been used to teach students to speak and write well. The "new rhetoric," such as that expounded by Group , has been employed almost exclusively as a means of literary study and a system for literary analysis. The "new rhetoric," or what
Jonathan Culler calls "the structuralist revival of rhetoric," has succeeded in utilizing figures—especially synecdoche, metaphor and metonymy—as a way to inform reading and interpretation. Thus, as Culler states in *Structuralist Poetics*, when the reader comes upon a given figure, he or she can perform a series of systematic operations which will lead him or her "from one meaning to another--from the 'deviant' to the integrated . . . labelling this transformation as appropriate to a particular poetic mode" (179). Further on, he writes that

the repertoire of rhetorical figures serves as a set of instructions which readers can apply when they encounter a problem in the text, though in some cases it is not so much the operations themselves that are important as the reassurance that rhetorical categories offer the reader: reassurance that what seems odd is in fact perfectly acceptable since it is figurative expression of some kind and therefore capable of being understood. (181)

What Barthes does initially in his "aide-mémoire" is to disregard this new rhetoric, saying that "it does not yet exist," and decide that the questions posed by rhetoric are best answered by approaches introduced from the study of linguistics and semiotics; one of his more important
"moves," in order to expose the underlying importance and sociological significance of ancient rhetoric in Barthes's work, is this assertion which he purports to address in his essay. Despite his avowed distance from new rhetoric, Barthes cites the innovative work of Perelman and Obrechts-Tyteca, but more revealingly, his essay also shares many common concerns with Group μ’s General Rhetoric, which came out simultaneously with Barthes’s publication of his "aide-mémoire."

Indeed, Group μ, in its introduction to the General Rhetoric, states that "rhetoric appears not only as a science of the future but also as a timely science within the scope of structuralism, new criticism and semiology" (1). In fact, Group μ’s General Rhetoric is based upon semiological analyses of metaboles (changes in any aspect of language), a concept obviously called for by Barthes in his earlier work and reaffirmed in the peroration of his essay on ancient rhetoric. This project was perhaps influenced by Barthes and the work of the Tel Quel group, especially when it comes to the study of narrative structures, something Barthes does in his "Introduction to the Structural Analysis of Narratives" (1966). (Dates given for Barthes’s work refer to the original French texts.) In addition the General Rhetoric asserts that "the rhetorical function has the effect of reifying language (21), i.e., it makes
language an object of study and classification.

Annette Lavers in Roland Barthes: Structuralism and After, also speculates that Barthes dissociates himself from the new rhetoric because of its reliance on binarism and because he considers binary opposition as representing a rather primitive logic and "a historical process of reification" (126). But in defense of binarism, Barthes writes in Elements of Semiology (1965):

... the opposition is still in the all-or-nothing category. We again find the principle of difference which is the foundation of opposition: it is this principle which must inspire the analysis of the associated sphere; for to deal with the opposition can only mean to observe the relations of similarity or difference which may exist between the terms of the opposition. (74)

Saussurean linguistics, which has had a most profound influence on the structuralists, is based on this notion of difference; for example, the words "gut" and "cut" are distinguished from each other solely by the difference between the minimal features of the voiced and unvoiced consonants /g/ and /c/. And so it is precisely this semiological and linguistic model--the structuralist enterprise--which Barthes employs in his essay.

But Maria Ruegg in her article "Metaphor and Metonymy:
The Logic of Structuralist Rhetoric," argues convincingly that "structuralists, who pretend to make an abrupt break with pre-scientific thought," are curiously drawn to classical rhetoric. In their attempt to take up Saussure's arguments, such structuralists as Roman Jakobson and Jacques Lacan, and by extension, Barthes himself, force all of language into two poles (metonymy/metaphor: Jakobson and Lacan, syntagmatic/paradigmatic: Barthes), thereby reducing "complex givens to the terms of simple binary opposition ..." and ignoring "logical inconsistencies within the binary oppositions themselves" (141-57). Had she known Barthes's "aide-mémoire," she could have argued more strongly for the structuralist's fascination with classical rhetoric.

Metaphor and metonymy, terms which themselves come from rhetoric, are one such binary opposition, taken up by Jakobson in his work on poetics and by Lacan in his work on psychoanalysis. **Lanque** (any individual's system of language) and **parole** (the actual events of speech) constitute the original Saussurean opposition. The syntagmatic and paradigmatic are a third binary opposition, seized upon by structural linguistics and in turn by Barthes.

Now the syntagmatic axis of language, which characterizes "the ordered arrangement of phonemes,
morphemes," words or parts of discourse, represents a horizontal movement which relates it to the diachronic aspect of language, that which considers phenomena as they occur or develop through time—also a horizontal movement. And the paradigmatic axis of language, "the listing of all the phonemes," morphemes, words, figures and other "isolated elements" from which individual units are chosen, represents a vertical movement which relates it to the synchronic aspect of language, or the study of events of a particular time or era without consideration of historical data (Pei and Gaynor, 159 and 211).

And yet, as Derek Attridge stresses in Peculiar Language, Saussure, from whom Barthes borrows his structure based on binary oppositions, did not in fact oppose diachrony to synchrony, but merely separated the two in order to develop a methodological approach to language based on parole. Subsequent followers of Saussure—notably Emile Benveniste and Roman Jakobson—mistakenly polarized the two terms and linked langue with diachrony, and also placed the paradigmatic on the same (vertical) axis as synchrony and the syntagmatic on the same (horizontal) axis as diachrony (94-95). This move reifies an opposition that is not really an opposition, but nonetheless has had widespread effects on structuralism. Whatever the case may be, these polarizations have enjoyed much popular appeal, probably due
to the graphic clarity and strategic usefulness of such binary oppositions to argue other matters in the human sciences—Lacan in psychoanalysis, Levi-Strauss in anthropology, Jakobson in linguistics.

Barthes's essay on rhetoric—although it takes as its very structure this bipolarization—seems to account for the complexities of such distinctions. For example, Barthes makes a "stop" at Gorgias, whose codification of prose gives rhetoric a paradigmatic aspect. And Barthes actually provides us with a paradigmatic diagram which designates the differences between the Platonic "good rhetoric" (that of dialectic) and "bad rhetoric" (that of the Sophists) (A.3.3. of text). Likewise, under the general paradigmatic section (B.0.4. of text), Barthes connects the syntagmatic of discourse with the paradigmatic by making use of a tree-like metaphor, one which evolves from his paradigmatic diagram. At this point he abandons a strict binary opposition in order to introduce the most important steps in the rhetorical process: inventio, dispositio, elocutio. In Beautiful Theories, Elizabeth Bruss writes, "it is in the Sade essay that he begins to use tree diagrams, rather than compiling syntagms and paradigms" (438). Quite properly, Bruss sees the tree diagram as a compromise with true binarism. But what she has left out is Barthes's transitional metaphor between the binary diagram and the
tree diagram. (See also S/Z, 129).

In speaking of Saussure (B.3.4. of text), Barthes asks what can be made "of the stable combinations of words, of the fixed syntagms which partake of language and speech, of structure and combination at the same time?" Clearly, rather than seeing the binary opposition between diachrony and synchrony as simple and straightforward, Barthes views structural linguistics as adding complexity to the system of language. As he writes in Criticism and Truth (1966):

The work of linguistics is not to reduce the ambiguities of language, but to comprehend them and, so to speak, institute them . . . the symbolic language to which literary works belong is by its very structure a plural language whose code is constructed in such a way that every utterance (every work) engendered by it has multiple meanings. (70-71)

In all, I believe that Barthes's work on classical rhetoric succeeds in delineating the complexities of language in general and ancient rhetoric especially, even though the historicist is likely to find his methods merely distracting. But this may be Barthes's point exactly—to drive the historicist-academics off, to destabilize the academics' "rhetoric," their "language," their "system," that historical and positivistic bias, without departing
from classical texts.

Dividing his essay on rhetoric as he does, then, into the diachronic Voyage (a descent through time) and the synchronic Network (an exploration of the individual parts of discourse), Barthes gives us an accessible account of the important turns of classical rhetoric and its influence on society. Section A, the Voyage, takes us on a journey through history, with stops or "day trips" as he calls them, at the most salient points in rhetoric's past, from its origin in property disputes, through Gorgias and Plato, to Aristotle, Cicero and Quintilian, and on to the "death" of rhetoric.

Section B, the Network, examines the divisions of classification of the parts of discourse by the metaphor of a "huge creeper which descends level by level, now dividing a generic element, now reuniting scattered parts" (B.0.4. of text). Barthes, here, passes rhetoric through machines, systems and grids, picking up content to fill the form of Section A (content being associated with the paradigmatic and form with the syntagmatic). In this section, we again encounter names from the past, but now in more detail and substance. We are dealing in this section with what Aristotle, Cicero, Quintilian, etc., actually did with rhetoric.

A note on Aristotle: the Aristotle in Barthes's essay
is likely to seem unfamiliar to American readers; he is not the elitist philosopher taught in American universities, most notably among the University of Chicago Neo-Aristotelians, who helped make their Aristotle authoritative for their kind of literary criticism, as well as their peculiarly American tradition of "Ideas and Methods."
Instead, Barthes's Aristotle becomes a skillful trader in the goods of mass culture. Barthes's entire conception of Aristotle hinges on the notion of verisimilitude, or that which appears to be true. For Barthes's Aristotle, it is important merely to convince an audience that something is likely or probable—it doesn't matter whether it is factual or even possible. This places him well beyond the Platonic ideal of Truth arrived at through dialectic and almost into the Sophist camp. Above all, Barthes's Aristotle would have rhetoric appeal to the greatest number. It is a rhetoric of the democracy, where popular appeal reigns supreme.

Although until recently critics and scholars have paid little attention to Barthes's treatise on ancient rhetoric, Barthes interest in rhetoric in general has a long and steady history. As early as Writing Degree Zero (1953), Barthes worries out the problems of how writers deal with their literary and rhetorical inheritance and how many modern writers attempt to achieve a "colorless" writing, a kind of writing (always doomed to fail) that tries to
abandon its rhetorical past.

And in Image/Music/Text, Barthes also extends his knowledge of rhetoric to discourse analysis. (See "Introduction to the Structural Analysis of Narratives.") Again in another article, "The Reality Effect" (1968), Barthes writes that

Western culture, in one of its major currents, has certainly not left description without a meaning, but has in fact assigned to it an end perfectly well recognized by the institution of literature. The current is rhetoric, and the end is "beauty": description has long had an aesthetic function.

(12)

The "aide-mémoire," falling, as it does, squarely in Barthes's "structuralist phase," bears a close resemblance with other works of the same period. Many of Barthes's commentators have admitted that there are problems in classifying his works into discrete categories, and Bruss notes that the Barthes the English-speaking world knows has much to do with the order in which his works were translated (366). But his interest in rhetoric and the structural approach it invites seem constant and long-lived. As Lavers writes:

Following Saussure's founding gesture as it does, it is appropriate that the headings in Elements
[Of Semiology (1964)] mostly come from his famous dichotomies: Language and Speech, Signifier and Signified, Syntagm and System (or Paradigm). The dichotomy between Synchrony and Diachrony is found in the chapter on language and speech in connection with the notion of linguistic value and also in the conclusion, in connection with methodological hints about the formation of a corpus for research. Each of these sections first establishes why some particular linguistic concepts and operations are suitable for extension to semiology . . . (135-36)

In S/Z (1970) Barthes tells us that his five codes fall into a network, "a kind of topos through which the entire text passes (or rather, in passing, becomes text)" (20). And later in the same work, we note that the rhetorical code takes over as the organizing element, that it pushes the sentence through a transformation into text by way of a tree with "forks," "branches" and "joints" (128-29), echoing through metaphor the tree diagrams developed a few years earlier as an outgrowth of his work in the "aide-mémoire." Similarly in Sade/Fourier/Loyola (1971), Barthes treats the "network" as a topic or grill.

a form pre-existent to any invention . . . a tablature of cases through which the subject to be
treated (the quæstio) is guided . . . . Thus the topic contains all the wonders of an arsenal of latent powers. (58)

As should be evident, the "aide-mémoire" comes between Barthes's studies in sociology and his fully formulated work in semiology. Here, ancient rhetoric is examined by a "structuralist" whose tools are supplied by linguistics and sociology, leading to his own work in semiology. Throughout much of his work, then, and over a long period of time, Barthes applies rhetorical models and semiological methods to the subject at hand. Lavers writes:

In the discourses of society, Barthes identifies figures which he lists at the end as in a treatise of rhetoric. This gives rise to the question, as in the case of Marxism, why rhetoric, which clearly corresponds to Barthes's spontaneous way of looking at things is not presented as an explicit model in "Myth Today." Actually the two problems partly overlap: Marxism and its Hegelian sources (for instance, The Phenomenology of Mind, frequently used by Lacan) have often of late been viewed as systems of figures. All of Barthes's spontaneous objects of study, themes in Michelet, myths in Mythologies, functions and patterns in On Racine, and even the signifieds of the various
fragments which make up so many of his works, are all figures in the wider sense. His use of figures as a category is therefore overdetermined.

(123)

Another of Barthes's abiding interests is the connection between language and class. Originally a sociologist, and continuously interested in Marx throughout his intellectual voyage, Barthes was keenly aware that how one speaks largely determines who one is. Although this may be a universal of language, or at least it holds in Western cultures, Barthes notes that it was and is especially true in France. From this awareness it is but a small step to an interest in the origins of language and class. Language, when it is used publicly begins to function rhetorically.

Although Barthes shifted his theoretical positions and methods frequently and often abruptly, the major part of his work shows a sharp and persistent interest in the social institution of language—and that social institution is rhetoric. Elsewhere in his writings, Barthes also extends the notion of language as class to the priesthood of writers and critics, those who establish power through language and control who may use it and how it is to be used--those guardians of present-day language. In his much publicized reply to the critic Raymond Picard, Criticism and Truth, Barthes views the language strictures of traditional
criticism as those of a special class, just as in the present essay he claims that all special language, i.e., rhetoric, stems from class needs. "French 'clarity,'" he writes, "is a language whose origin is political" (47). And again, "it [critical language] is universally appropriated by the class of property owners" (49). Above all, "language is never innocent."

Recognizing as we do that not every use of language is rhetorical, we note that what is constant in almost all of Barthes's writing on language is that language is an object in itself and not an instrument. Language by itself need not always be studied or used as a means to an end, it does not always or necessarily expose or indicate external reality (referents); but it is always for him and, so he claims, for all writers, a problem, an intensely complex object of study and experimentation (Criticism and Truth, 64). Never is this more evident than in Barthes's own writing.

Barthes's language is at once erudite and anti-intellectual. He is the master of neologisms and archaisms, and he has a special fondness for words with multiple meanings. Clarity, as stated previously, is not Barthes's long suit. He favors a language "full of uncertainties." Again in Criticism and Truth, he writes

Still today they [the old critics] fight with
ridiculous passion for their "French language": oracular chronicles, fulminations against foreign invasions, death sentences on certain supposedly unwanted words. We must endlessly clean, scrape off, forbid, eliminate, preserve." (47)

This is precisely what Barthes refuses to do in his own writing.

Compared with English, French syntax is somewhat loose, and Barthes's syntax is loose even by French standards. Throughout the body of the "aide-mémoire," he keeps fairly close to standard French, but in his peroration, he unleashes his language, so that it tends to become rhapsodic. This rhapsodic prose, one senses, is what Barthes wishes to write all along, but under the constraints of a scholarly study, he is unable to break loose. This is typical for much of Barthes's writing; he is able to sneak his exotic words into fairly straight discourse when necessary, but there is often this release, this plunge into the delight of writing for its own sake.

Elizabeth Bruss writes in Beautiful Theories:

In Barthes's later writing, with what Culler calls its "preference for loose and evasive appositional syntax," the emphasis falls more heavily on the individual word and especially on its shimmering capacity to mean many different and inconsistent
things at once, once syntax no longer constrains it to a single value. Moreover Barthes always played with and against the standards of linguistic purity as determined by the French Academy (an institutional commitment to the national tongue that neither England nor America can match), and if the aura of each separate word becomes greater, so too must the delicate interplay between the common and the arcane, the polite word and the vulgarism. (372)

The reference here is to Jonathan Culler's "The Ever-Moving Finger," (934), Times Literary Supplement no.3782, (30 August 1974).

All of this makes translating Barthes's work a difficult and at times impossible task. As Bruss notes:

with a writer as supple as Barthes and one as intoxicated by enantiosemes (words with the same form, but contradictory meanings) and amphibology (phrases where the grammar allows two or more distinct readings) as he gradually became, translation will always present problems. (371)

Barthes's punctuation is also strangely idiosyncratic, so that, at times, it is impossible to track down the antecedent of a particular pronoun. Lavers writes of Barthes's punctuation that it is always a guide to something
important, sometimes being "weirdly casual" in the face of a significant matter (57-58).

Beyond all this, there are the overwhelming problems of modern translation in general. Recent work in translation has emphasized that an enterprise that sets out to give a "faithful translation" is doomed to failure. By now it is conventional wisdom that is not enough to hold close to the text. The real goal of translation is not to reduce the author's ideas or to replace one signifier with another, presumably equal signifier. The translator must realize that a skilled "reading" is as close as he or she can come to a fair rendition of the original.

As Barbara Johnson points out in her essay, "Taking Fidelity Philosophically," "faithfulness to the text has meant faithfulness to the semantic tenor with as little interference as possible for the constraints of the vehicle. Translation, in other words, has always been the translation of meaning" (145). But the deconstructionists have made evident the impossibility of this traditional approach to translation. With words that are deliberately as polysemic as possible and new concepts of textuality, one has the choice of inventing a new and similar meaning or retaining the original language (144-46).

In my own translation, I have attempted to give a close and sensitive reading of Barthes's work, while at the same
time preserving as much of the indeterminacy as possible. This has not, I realize, always been successful. At times I have opted for a decisive meaning, when to do otherwise would have produced sheer nonsense. I have, above all, tried to let Barthes's own language and style come through.

As Walter Benjamin writes in "The Task of the Translator,"

a real translation is transparent; it does not block its light, but allows the pure language, as though reinforced by its own medium, to shine upon the original all the more fully. This may be achieved, above all, by a literal rendering of the syntax which proves words rather than sentences to be the primary element of the translator. (79)

If the syntax in my translation sometimes seems awkward, it is largely for this reason. Finally, where Barthes's vocabulary is especially difficult, I have provided translator's notes to clarify the language as much as possible.
Notes

1 *The Semiotic Challenge*, a collection of Barthes's essays released in March 1988, includes a translation of this essay, entitled "Old Rhetoric: an aide mémoire," by Richard Howard. My own translation was completed well before this book came out, and at no time did I consult Howard's translation for use in my own work. Howard does not provide an introduction, nor does he include Barthes's two appendices, his index, or table of contents, all of which form a part of my thesis.

2 For an excellent example of "new rhetoric" put to critical use, see Michael Riffaterre's "Models of the Literary Sentence."

3 See *Writing Degree Zero*. 
Works Cited


Ancient Rhetoric
A Handbook¹
By Roland Barthes

The following is a transcription of a seminar given at the École Pratique des Hautes Études in 1964-1965. At the beginning—or the horizon—of this seminar, as always, there was the modern text, that is: the text which does not yet exist. One way to approach this new text is to know from the outset the source from which and the background against which it tries to understand itself, and then to compare the new semiotic of writing with the ancient practice of literary language which has been called Rhetoric down through the centuries. Hence the idea for a seminar on ancient Rhetoric: ancient does not mean that there is a new Rhetoric today; rather Ancient Rhetoric is set against the new one which perhaps has not yet been achieved: the world is incredibly full of ancient Rhetoric.

I would never have agreed to publish these working notes if a manual, a notebook of some sort, which presented a chronological and systematic overview of that ancient and classical Rhetoric had already existed. Unfortunately, to my knowledge, there is nothing of the sort (at least not in
French). I have therefore been obliged to put together this knowledge myself, and it is the result of that personal introduction (propedeutic) which is presented here: here is the handbook that I would have wished to find complete at the time I began to ask myself about the death of Rhetoric. Nothing more, then, than an elementary system of information, the preliminary listing of a certain number of terms and classifications—which is not to imply that in the course of this work I was not frequently struck with excitement and admiration by the force and subtlety of that ancient rhetorical system, the modernity of some of its propositions.

Unfortunately, (for practical reasons) I am no longer able to authenticate the references for this text of knowledge: I have had to draft this manual in part from memory. My excuse is that these are matters of common knowledge: Rhetoric is poorly known, yet to know it does not require one to be erudite; therefore everyone will be able to find easily the bibliographical references which are missing here. What is assembled (at times, perhaps on its own, in the form of involuntary citations) proceeds essentially from: (1) treatises on the rhetoric of antiquity and classicism, (2) scholarly introductions to the collected works of Guillaume Budé, (3) two fundamental books, one by Curtius and the other by Baldwin, (4) some specialized
articles, notably those concerned with the Middle Ages, (5) some customary sources such as Morier's dictionary of Rhetoric, F. Brunot's history of the French language, and a book by R. Bray on the development of classical doctrine in France, and (6) some related readings, themselves fragmentary and contingent (Kojève, Jaeger).²

0.1. THE RHETORICAL PRACTICE

The rhetoric which will be examined here is that meta-language (whose language-object was "discourse") which prevailed in the western world from the fifth century (B.C.) until the nineteenth century. We will not be concerned with more remote experiences (India, Islam), those which are the proper concern of the Orient, and of the western material we will restrict ourselves to Athens, Rome, and France. This meta-language (discourse on discourse) allowed for various practices in "Rhetoric" which were present simultaneously or successively according to the period:

1. A technique, that is, an "art" in the classical sense of the word: the art of persuasion, a set of rules and formulas which, when put into operation, allows the audience of a discourse (and much later, the reader of a work) to be convinced, even if he must be persuaded of something which is "false."

2. An academic discipline: the art of rhetoric, at first transmitted by interpersonal means (a rhetor and his
disciples, his clients), rapidly worked its way into those institutions of learning: in the schools it has formed the core of what one would today call the second stage of secondary and advanced education; it has transformed itself into examination material (exercises, lessons, tests).

3. A science, or in any case, a proto-science; that is; (a) an autonomous field of study, delimiting certain homogeneous phenomena, in order to understand the "effects" of language, (b) a classification of these phenomena (whose best-known mark is the list of rhetorical "figures"), (c) an "operation" in the Hjelmslevian sense, in other words, a meta-language, the set of treatises on rhetoric, the subject—or signified—of which is a language-object (argumentative language and "figurative" language).

4. An ethic: as a system of "rules," rhetoric is permeated with the ambiguity of the word: it is at one and the same time a manual of formulas, driven by a practical finality, and a Code, a body of moral prescriptions which function to monitor (that is, to permit and restrain) the "deviance" of emotional language.

5. A social practice: Rhetoric is that privileged technique (since one must pay to acquire it) which allows the ruling classes to assure themselves of the propriety of their speech. Language being a privilege or a power, they have proclaimed selective rules of access to that power by
making it into a pseudo-science, closed to "those who do not know how to speak," dependent upon a costly initiation: born 2,500 years ago of property disputes, rhetoric wore out and died when the "rhetorical" class did, when the bourgeois culture was first established.

6. A ludic practice: All these practices constitute a powerful (today one would say "repressive") institutional system; it was inevitable that it should spread to include a mock rhetoric, a "black" rhetoric (accusations, insults, ironies); play, parody, erotic or obscene allusions, college jokes, all those schoolboy pranks (which incidentally remain to be explored and classified according to cultural codes).

0.2. THE EMPIRE OF RHETORIC

All these practices attest to the breadth of the achievement of rhetoric--an achievement which nevertheless has not yet given rise to any important synthesis or historical interpretation. Perhaps it is because rhetoric (beyond the taboo which weighs upon language), a veritable empire, vaster and more tenacious than any political empire, by its dimensions, by its endurance, frustrates the very limits of science and historical reflection, to the point of implicating history itself, at least as we are accustomed to imagine and manage it, and compelling us to invent what otherwise might be called a monumental history. The
scientific contempt attached to rhetoric would partake then, of that general refusal to recognize multiplicity, overdetermination. Let one dream, nevertheless, that rhetoric--whatever might be the internal variations of the system--has reigned in the west for two and a half millenia, from Gorgias to Napoleon III; let one dream of all that which, immutable, impassible, and almost immortal, it has seen born, pass and disappear, without itself moving or altering: the Athenian democracy, the Egyptian dynasties, the Roman Republic, the Roman Empire, the great invasions, the feudal system, the Renaissance, the monarchy, the Revolution; it has withstood regimes, religions, civilizations; moribund since the Renaissance, it takes three centuries to die, and it is still not absolutely dead. Rhetoric gives rise to what must indeed be called a super-civilization: the historical and geographic Occident: it was the only system (along with grammar, born after it) that permitted our society to recognize language and its supremacy (kuros, as Gorgias puts it), which was also a form of social superiority; the classification system it imposed is the only truly common feature of successive and varying historical groupings, as if an ideology of form existed beyond ideologies of content and the determinacy of history, as if--a principle anticipated by Durkheim and Mauss and confirmed by Levi-Strauss--a taxonomic identity
existed for each society, a socio-logic that makes it possible to define another history, another social order, without destroying those which are recognized at other levels.

0.3. THE VOYAGE AND THE NETWORK

This vast territory will here be explored (in the loose and casual sense of the term) in two directions: a diachronic direction and a systematic direction. We cannot reconstruct a history of rhetoric with absolute certainty; we will have to content ourselves with isolating a few significant moments; we will tour two thousand years of rhetoric, stopping off at some points of interest which will be like "day trips" (these "day trips" may be a bit uneven in duration). In this extended diachrony, there will be seven stages in all, seven "day trips," whose value will be essentially didactic. Then we will reassemble the classifications of the rhetors in order to form a unique network, a sort of artifact allowing us to imagine the art of rhetoric as a finely adjusted machine, a system of operations, a "program" intended to produce discourse.

A. THE VOYAGE

A.1. THE BIRTH OF RHETORIC

A.1.1. Rhetoric and property.

Rhetoric (as meta-language) was born of property
disputes. Around 485 B.C., two Sicilian tyrants, Gelon and Hieron, conducted deportations, population transfers and expropriations, in order to populate Syracuse and to distribute mercenaries. When they were overthrown by a popular revolt and the people wished to return to the ante quo, there were innumerable law suits, because property rights had been obscured. These suits were of a new type: they mobilized popular grand juries, and in order to convince them, the speaker now had to be "eloquent." This eloquence, partaking at the same time of democracy and demagoguery, the judicial and the political (later called the deliberative), caught on rapidly as a subject to be taught. The first professors of the new discipline were Empedocles of Agrigento, Corax, his student from Syracuse (the first to pay for his lessons), and Tisias. This teaching spread just as quickly in Athens (after the Median wars), owing to disputes by merchants who pleaded jointly in Syracuse and in Athens: rhetoric is already, in part, Athenian by the middle of the fifth century B.C.

A.1.2. A great syntagmatic.

What is proto-rhetoric, this Coraxian rhetoric? A rhetoric of the syntagm, of discourse, and not of tricks and figures. Corax already sets forth the five major parts of the oratio, which over the centuries have formed the "blueprint" of oratory discourse: (1) the exordium, (2) the
narration or action (an account of the facts), (3) the argument or proof, (4) the digression, (5) the epilogue. It is easy to verify that in the shift from judicial discourse to the scholarly dissertation, the blueprint has retained its principal organization: an introduction, a demonstrative body, a conclusion. That first rhetoric is, in effect, a great syntagmatic.

A.1.3. Deceptive speech.

It is tantalizing to note that the art of speech is originally bound up with property claims, as if language, insofar as it is an object of transformation, the rules governing a practice, were determined not to proceed from subtle, ideological mediation (as had occurred with so many art forms), but from the most naked social interaction, confirmed in its fundamental brutality, that of the possession of land: we began to reflect upon language as a way of defending our own goods. It is that spirit of social conflict that gave birth to the first theoretical sketch of deceptive speech (different from fictive speech, the speech of poets: Poetry was the only literature at the time, prose did not attain that status until much later).

A.2. GORGIAS, OR PROSE AS LITERATURE

Gorgias of Leontium (today's Lentini, to the north of Syracuse) came to Athens in 427; he had been Thucydides'
master and is Socrates' Sophist interlocutor in the *Gorgias*.

A.2.1. The codification of prose.

Gorgias' chief interest for us is that he brought prose under the rhetorical code, certifying it as learned discourse, an aesthetic object, "sovereign language," ancestor of "literature." How? The funeral elegies (threnodies), composed at first in verse, passed into prose and were entrusted to men of state; they were, if not actually written (in the current sense of the word), at least learned in a certain fixed manner. Thus was born a third genre (after the judicial and the deliberative), the epideictic: this is the advent of ornamental prose, of prose-spectacle. In the transition from verse to prose, the meter and music were lost. Gorgias seeks to replace these with a code more appropriate to prose (although borrowed from poetry): words of like consonance, symmetry of phrases, reinforcement of antitheses by assonance, metaphor, alliteration.

A.2.2. The advent of elocutio.

Why make a stop at Gorgias along our voyage? There are roughly, in the complete art of rhetoric (that of Quintilian, for example), two poles: the order of the parts of discourse, the *taxis* or *dispositio*; and a paradigmatic pole: the figures of rhetoric, the *lexis* or *elocutio*. We
have seen that Corax launched a purely syntagmatic rhetoric. Gorgias, in demanding that one work the "figures," gives it a paradigmatic aspect: it opens prose to rhetoric and rhetoric to sylilics.

A.3. PLATO

Plato's dialogues which deal directly with rhetoric are: the Gorgias and the Phaedrus.

A.3.1. The two rhetorics.

Plato treats of two rhetorics, one evil and the other good. I. The rhetoric of fact is constituted by the logography, an activity which consists of writing any discourse (it is not only a matter of judicial rhetoric; the totality of the notion is important); its object is verisimilitude, illusion; this is the rhetoric of the rhetors, of the schools, of Gorgias, of the Sophists. II. The rhetoric of the right is the true rhetoric; philosophical rhetoric or dialectic. Its object is truth; Plato calls it a psychologos (the training of the soul through speech). The opposition of good and evil rhetoric, Platonic and sophistic rhetoric, forms part of a very large paradigm: on the one hand, flattery, servile activity, the perversion of truth; on the other, the rejection of all complacency or coarseness; on the one hand, controls and routines, on the other hand, art: the activities of pleasure.
are a contemptible counterfeit of the arts of the Good: rhetoric is the counterfeit of justice, sophistry of legislation, quackery of medicine, cosmetology of physical fitness; rhetoric (that of the logographers, the rhetors, the Sophists) is therefore not an art.

A.3.2. Eroticized rhetoric.

True rhetoric is a psychogogy; it demands a total knowledge, impartial, common (this will become a topos with Cicero and Quintilian, but the notion will be insipid: one demands of the orator a good "general education"). The object of this "synoptic" knowledge is the correspondence or interaction between species of souls and the types of discourse. Platonic rhetoric renounces writing and turns instead to interpersonal conversation, the adhominatio; the fundamental mode of discourse is the dialogue between master and pupil, united by inspired love. To think in common, this might be the motto of the dialectic. Rhetoric is a dialogue of love.

A.3.3 The division, the mark.

The dialecticians (those who live that eroticized rhetoric) conduct two interdependent processes: one part, a gathering, rising movement toward an unconditional term (Socrates, reproving Lysias in the Phaedrus, defines love in its totality, its unity); the other part, a descending
movement, a division of the unity according to its natural clefts, according to species, until reaching the indivisible unit. This "descent" proceeds by a climbing motion: with each stop, each step, one encounters the two terms; it is necessary to choose one over the other in order to increase the descent and accede to a new binary split, from whence one sets out afresh; such is the progressive definition of the sophist:

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GAME HUNTING
Land
Wild

Tame (man)

by force
by persuasion

in public
in private

with gifts
with graft

for subsistence:
Flatterers

for money:
The Sophists
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this segmented rhetoric—which sets itself apart from the syllogistic rhetoric of Aristotle—closely resembles a digital computer program: each choice determines the alternative that follows; moreover according to the paradigmatic structure of language, each binary segment consists of a marked term and an unmarked term: here the marked term raises the alternative play. But how does the
mark occur in the first place? Where does it come from? And here one redisCOVERS the eroticized rhetoric of Plato: within the Platonic dialogue, the mark is generated by a concession of the respondent (the pupil). Plato's rhetoric implies two interlocutors, one of whom admits defeat: that is the necessary condition for movement. Thus all these particles of agreement which we encounter in Plato's dialogues, and which often make us smile at their silliness and their obvious triviality (when they do not bore us), are really structural "marks," rhetorical acts.

A.4. ARISTOTELIAN RHETORIC

A.4.1. Rhetoric and Poetics.

Isn't all rhetoric (if we exclude Plato) Aristotelian? Yes, no doubt: all of the didactic elements which feed the classical handbooks come from Aristotle. Nevertheless, a system does not define itself by its elements alone, but also, and above all, by the opposition in which it finds itself caught. Aristotle wrote two treatises on discourse, and the two are distinct: the Technē Rhetorikē deals with the art of everyday communication, with public discourse; the Technē Poietikē deals with the art of the inspired imagination. In the first case, it is important to control the progression of the discourse from idea to idea; in the second case, the flow of the work from image to image. For Aristotle, these are two independent thought processes, two
autonomous "technai"; and it is the opposition of these two systems, the rhetorical and the poetic, which in fact defines Aristotelian rhetoric. All authors who acknowledge this opposition can be placed in Aristotelian rhetoric; this will cease when the opposition is neutralized, when Rhetoric and Poetics merge, when rhetoric becomes a poetic technē (a creative enterprise): this occurs during the reign of Augustus (with Ovid, Horace) and a bit later (Plutarch, Tacitus)—although Quintilian still practices Aristotelian rhetoric. The fusion of Rhetoric and Poetics is sanctioned by the vocabulary of the Middle Ages, a period when the poetic arts are the rhetorical arts, when the great rhetoricians are poets. This fusion is paramount because it is of the same origin as the idea of literature: Aristotelian rhetoric places its emphasis on reasoning; the elocutio (or the division of figures) is not even a part of it (it has low priority with Aristotle). Afterwards the contrary is the case: rhetoric concerns itself with problems; not with "evidence," but with composition and style: literature (the act of writing in its fullest scope) defines itself by the well-written. We must therefore include in our voyage, under the general heading of Aristotelian rhetoric, the earlier rhetoric of a dominant poetics. We will take our theory of Aristotelian rhetoric from Aristotle himself, the practice we will get from

Aristotle defines rhetoric as "the art of extracting from each subject whatever degree of persuasion it can sustain," or as "the faculty of discovering hypothetically that which in any given case is most likely to be persuasive." What is perhaps more important than such definitions is the fact that rhetoric is a techne (it is not an empirical datum), that is: rhetoric is the means of producing something that may either be or not be, whose origin is in the creative agent, not in the created object: there is no techne of things which are either natural or necessary, and discourse is neither of these. Aristotle considers discourse (the oratio) to be a message and relegates it to a branch of information systems. Book I of the Rhetoric is the book of the transmitter of the message, it is the book of the orator: it mainly deals with the conception of arguments, inasmuch as these depend on the skill of the orator, on his ability to adapt his material and himself to the audience, this according to the three recognized genres of discourse (judicial, deliberative, epideictic). Book II is the book of the receiver of the message, the book of the public: here the subject is the
emotions and, again, arguments; but this time the author focuses on their reception (and not, as before, on their formulation). Book III is the book of the message itself: it deals with the *lexis* or *elocutio*, in other words, with "figures," and with *taxis* or *dispositio*, or the order of the parts of discourse.

A.4.3. The Probable.

Aristotle's Rhetoric is, above all, a rhetoric of argument, of reasoning, of the elliptical syllogism (the enthymeme); it is a voluntarily diminished logic, adapted to the standards of the public, that is, to common sense, to current opinion. Extended to literary productions (where it does not properly apply), it favors an aesthetic of the public rather than an aesthetic of the work. That is why, *mutatis mutandis* and all (historical) allowances being made, it is well suited to our so-called mass culture, ruled by Aristotelian "verisimilitude" or what the public believe is possible. How many films, magazines, commercials exploit the Aristotelian principle: "Better a probable impossibility than an improbable possibility"; it is better to tell what the public believes is possible, even if it is scientifically impossible, than to tell the public what is in reality possible if it is likely to reject it by the censure of *collective current opinion*. Of course it is tempting to make a connection between this mass rhetoric and
Aristotle's politics; it was, to be sure, a politics of the "golden mean," which favored a balanced democracy situated in the middle class and charged with easing tensions between rich and poor, majority and minority; hence a rhetoric of good sense, voluntarily subject of the "psychology" of the public.

A.4.4. The Rhetorica of Cicero.

In the second century (B.C.), Greek rhetors flee to Rome, schools of rhetoric are founded; functioning by age group, the schools practice two kinds of exercises: the suasoriae, "persuasive" sorts of dissertations (primarily in the deliberative genre) for children, and the controversiae (in the judicial genre) for older students. The oldest Latin tract is the Rhetorica ad Herennium, attributed sometimes to Cornificius and sometimes to Cicero: this [the attribution to Cicero] is what the Middle Ages did; along with Cicero's De Inventione, they never stopped copying this manuscript, which became fundamental in the art of writing. Cicero is an orator who speaks of the art of oratory, whence a certain practical application of Aristotelian theory (thus little really new with regard to that theory). Ciceronian rhetorics include: (1) (assuming that he wrote it) the Rhetorica ad Herennium, a sort of digest of Aristotelian rhetoric; the classifying of "questions," however, replaces in importance the theory of the enthymeme: rhetoric becomes
professionalized. At this point the theory of the three styles (the low, the high, and the middle) emerges. (2) De Inventione Oratoria, a youthful (and incomplete) work, purely judiciary, devoted to the epicheireme, an expanded syllogism in which one of the premises or both are followed by their proofs: it is the "good argument." (3) De Oratore, a work held in high regard up to the nineteenth century ("a masterpiece of good sense," "of right and sound reason," "of noble and lofty thought," "the most original of the treatises on rhetoric"): as if recalling Plato, Cicero moralizes rhetoric and reacts against teaching it in the schools: it is the claim of a well-rounded man against specialization. The work takes the form of a dialogue (Crassus, Antonius, Mucius Scaevola, Rufus, Cotta): it defines the orator (who must have a general education) and briefly reviews the traditional parts of Rhetoric (Inventio, Dispositio, Elocutio). (4) Brutus, a history of the art of oratory in Rome. (5) Orator, an ideal portrait of the orator; the second part is more didactic (it will be amply annotated by Peter Ramus): specific attention is given to the theory of the oratorical "number," later revived by Quintilian. (6) The Topoi; this is a digest, done from memory in eight days while traveling by boat to Greece after Mark Antony seized control of Rome, of the Topoi of Aristotle; of greatest interest to us is the structural
network of the *quaestio* (cf. in B.1.25). (7) The *Partitio*: a little manual of questions and answers in the form of a dialogue between Cicero the father and Cicero the son, and the most dry and least moralistic of Cicero's treatises (and consequently the one I like best): this is a complete elementary rhetoric, a kind of catechism with the added advantage of providing within its scope the classifications of rhetoric (this is the meaning of *partitio*: systematic overlay).

A.4.5. **Ciceronian Rhetoric.**

Ciceronian rhetoric is marked by the following characteristics: (a) dread of the "system"; Cicero is completely indebted to Aristotle, but he disintellectualizes him, he tries to put some "taste" and "naturalness" into his theory; this de-structuring will reach its extreme in the *Rhetorica sacra* of St. Augustine (Book IV of *On Christian Doctrine*): these are not rules for eloquence, which the Christian orator needs nonetheless: here he must merely be clear (that is an act of charity), he must stick to the truth more closely than to the terms, etc.: this pseudo-naturalistic rhetoric triumphs again in the Scholastic conception of style; (b) the nationalization of rhetoric: Cicero attempts to Romanize it (this is the significance of *Brutus*), "Romanness" emerges as a concept; (c) the mythical collusion of professional empiricism
(Cicero is an attorney immersed in political life) and the appeal of the great cultures; that collusion is heir to an immense fortune: the culture becomes the political arena; (d) the elevation of style: Ciceronian rhetoric inaugurates the development of the elocutio.


There is a certain pleasure in reading Quintilian: he is a fine professor, not a fine phrase-maker, not too moralizing; his mind was at the same time discriminating and perceptive (a combination which always appears amazing to the world). The epitaph which M. Teste dreamed for himself, Transiit classificando, might well be applied to Quintilian. He was an official rhetor, appointed by the state; his reputation, extraordinary during his own lifetime, suffered an eclipse after his death, but glittered anew from the fourth century on. Luther preferred him above all others; Erasmus, Bayle, La Fontaine, Racine, Rollin held him in high esteem. In twelve books, De institutione oratoria outlines the education of the orator from childhood on: it is a complete pedagogical plan (and in that sense an institutio). Book I deals with primary education, regular instruction with the grammarian, then with the rhetor; Book II defines rhetoric and its functions, Books III through VII deal with the Inventio and the Dispositio, Books VIII through X with the Elocutio (Book X gives practical advice for "writing"),
Book XI treats of the minor elements of rhetoric: the Action (bringing the discourse into play) and the Memory, Book XII sets forth the moral qualities required of the orator and establishes the advantage of a general, liberal arts education.

A.4.7. Instruction in rhetoric.

Education consists of three phases (today we speak of three stages): (1) apprenticeship in language: speaking errors are not to be permitted in nurses (Chrysippe would have them schooled in philosophy), in slaves, nor in teachers. Parents should be as well-educated as possible. The child begins, in Greek, to learn to read and write; students are no longer beaten; (2) the grammaticus (the meaning is more comprehensive that than of our word "grammar": it is, if you will, the whole of grammar); the child probably keeps its company from about the age of seven on; he attends courses in poetry and reads aloud (lectio); he writes compositions (narrating fables, paraphrasing poetry, expounding on maxims), he receives lessons in acting (animated recitations); (3) with the rhetor; he must begin instruction in rhetoric at an early age, probably around fourteen years, at puberty; the master must incessantly provide examples by way of extravagant performances, (but the students must refrain from rising up to applaud him). The two principal exercises are: (a) narrations, summaries
and analyses of narrative arguments, historical events, elementary panegyrics, comparisons, explorations of commonplaces (theses), discourse according to an outline (preformata materia); (b) declamations, or discourse on hypothetical cases; these are in effect exercises in the rational fiction (therefore, the declamatio is already very close, to the work). The extent to which this pedagogy forces speech is obvious: the latter, surrounded on all sides, is forced out of the pupil, as if there were an innate inhibition against speaking, as if a single technique, a single type of education, was necessary to put an end to silence, and as if this speech once grasped, conquered at last, represented a good "objective" relationship with the world, a firm command of the world, of others.

A.4.8. Writing.

In his treatment of tropes and figures (Books VIII through X), Quintilian establishes an original theory of "writing." Book X is addressed to those who would write. How does one obtain the "well-founded facility" (firma facilitas), that is, how does one overcome that innate sterility, the terror of the blank page (facilitas), and how, at the same time does one manage to say something, without getting carried away by prattle, wordiness, logorrhea (firma)? Quintilian drafts a propedeutic for the
writer: one must read and write a great deal, imitate models (do pastiches), revise extensively, but after having let it "rest," and one must know when to stop. Quintilian notes that the hand is slow, the pace of thought is different from that of writing (this is a surrealist problem: how to achieve a writing as fast . . . as itself?); but the hand's slowness is beneficial: one must not dictate, writing should remain attached, not to the voice, but to the hand, to the muscle: it should settle into the slowness of the hand: no quick rough drafts.


The final venture of Aristotelian rhetoric: its dilution by syncretism: Rhetoric no longer opposes itself to Poetics, and this advances the transcendent notion which today we call "Literature"; no longer merely constituting an object of instruction, it becomes an art (in the modern sense); from this time on it is a theory of writing and a treasury of literary forms. This transition can be summed up in five points: (1) Ovid is often credited by medieval writers with having postulated the relationship between poetry and the art of oratory; this connection is likewise affirmed by Horace in his Ars Poetica, where the subject is often rhetoric (theory of style); (2) Dionysius of Halicarnassus, a Greek and a contemporary of Augustus, in his De compositione verborum, abandons the principal element
of Aristotelian rhetoric (the enthymeme) in order to concentrate on a new value: the arrangement of phrases; hence the autonomous notion of style: style is no longer based in logic (the subject precedes the predicate as the substants precede the accidens); the order of words is variable, guided solely by the values of rhythm; (3) the Moralia of Plutarch includes a short treatise, "Quomodo adulescens poetas audire debeat," (how to read the poets to young folks), which moralizes on the nurturing of literary aesthetics. As a disciple of Plato, Plutarch attempts to lift the indictment which Plato brought against poets. How? Precisely by connecting Poetry and Rhetoric; rhetoric provides a way of distinguishing imitated (often reprehensible) action from the (often admirable) art which imitates; only when one is able to read poetry aesthetically can one read it morally; (4) On the Sublime (Peri Hypsous), an anonymous treatise written in the first century (erroneously attributed to Longinus and translated by Boileau), is a sort of "transcendental" rhetoric; the sublimitas is, in effect, the "height" of style; it is the same style as in the expression "to have style"; it is literariness defended in a passionate, inspired tone: the myth of "creativity" begins to appear. (5) In the Dialogue of Orators (whose authenticity is occasionally questioned), Tacitus politicizes the causes of the decadence of
eloquence: the cause is not the "poor taste" of the era, but rather the tyranny of Domitian, which imposes silence upon the Forum and leads to an uncommitted art, poetry; but by itself, eloquence tends toward "Literature," it penetrates and constitutes it (eloquentia comes to signify literature).

A.5 NEO-RHETORIC

A.5.1. A literary aesthetic.

We call the literary aesthetic (Rhetoric, Poetics, and Criticism) which dominated the Greco-Roman world from the second to the fourth century A.D. neo-rhetoric or the second sophistic. This is a period of peace, of commerce, of trade, favorable to a leisure class, particularly in the Near East (Middle East). Neo-rhetoric was truly ecumenical: the same figures were treated by St. Augustine in African Latin, by the pagan Libanius, by St. Gregory of Nazianzus in eastern Greece. That literary empire constructed itself under a double reference: (1) the sophistic: the orators of Asia Minor, without political connection, want to revive the name of the Sophists, with no pejorative connotation, whom they think to imitate (Gorgias); these orators of pure pomp enjoy great glory; (2) the rhetorical: it encompasses everything; no longer entering into opposition with another related notion, it absorbs all speech; it is no longer a (special) technē, but a general field of knowledge, and even more: a national education (on the order of the schools of
Asia Minor). The sophistes is a school superintendent, appointed by the emperor for one city; the master who is his subordinate is the rhetor. In this collective institution not a single name can be cited; there is a sprinkling of authors, a movement known only through Philostratus' *Life of the Sophists*. Of what does this education in speech consist? One must once more distinguish the syntagmatic rhetoric (the parts of discourse) from the paradigmatic rhetoric (the figures).

A.5.2. The declamatio, the ekphrasis.

At the syntagmatic level, one practice is predominant: the *declamatio* (mélê). It is an improvisation governed by a theme: for example, Xenophon refuses to survive Socrates, the Cretans claim to possess the tomb of Zeus, a man is in love with a statue, etc. The improvisation relegates the order of the parts of discourse (disputatio) to a secondary level; being pointlessly persuasive but purely ostentatious, the discourse de-structures itself, atomizes itself in the careless pursuit of brilliant passages arranged according to a rhapsodic model. The principle of these pieces (it had the advantage of very wide appeal) was the *descriptio*, or *ekphrasis*. The *ekphrasis* is an anthologized fragment, transferrable from one discourse to another. This is an organized description of places.
and/or, personages (the origin of the topoi of the Middle Ages). Thus a new syntagmatic unit, the piece, appears. Less extensive and narrower in scope than the traditional parts of discourse, greater than the periodic sentence, this unit (landscape, portrait) departs from oratorical discourse (juridical, political) and easily adapts itself to narration and the sustained romance. Once again rhetoric "eats" into the literary.

A.5.3. Atticism/Asianism.

At the paradigmatic level, the new rhetoric establishes the value of "style"; it thoroughly valorizes the following ornaments: the archaism, the loaded metaphor, the antithesis, the rhythmic clause. Invoking its opposite, this baroquism enters into a conflict between two schools: (1) Atticism, upheld chiefly by the grammarians, guardians of the pure vocabulary (moral castrators for the sake of purity who still exist today); (2) Asianism returns, in Asia Minor, to the development of a style exuberant to the point of being strange, based, like mannerism, upon surprise effects; here the "figures" play an essential role. Clearly, Asianism has been condemned (and continues to be by all of classical aesthetics, the heir of Atticism). 5

A.6. THE TRIVIUM

A.6.1. The agonistic structure of education.
In antiquity, the pillars of education were essentially oral instruction and whatever transcriptions it gave rise to (acroematique treatises and the technai of the speech writers). From the beginning of the eighth century, teaching takes an agonistic turn, reflecting an intense, competitive situation. The independent schools (in contrast to the monastic or episcopal schools) are left to the initiative of a master—often very young (20 years); all of them inspired by the success of Abelard, a gifted student who "defeats" his master, steals his paying public, and founds a school; the financial circumstances are tightly bound to the battle of ideas: the same Abelard obliges his master Guillaume de Campeaux to renounce realism: he liquidates it from all points of view; the agonistic structure coincides with the commercial structure: the scholasticos (professor, student or former student) is a combatant of ideas and a professional rival. There are two school exercises: (1) the lesson, the reading and explication of a fixed text (Aristotle, the Bible), includes: (a) the expositio, which is an interpretation according to a subdividing method (a sort of analytic mania), (b) the quaestiones, which are the propositions of the text that can be argued for or against: one debates and ends in refuting; each reason must be presented in the form of a complete syllogism; the lesson fell gradually into
neglect because of its tedium. (2) The debate is a ceremony, a dialectical joust conducted under the supervision of a master. After several days, the master determines the solution. What matters on the whole is the sporting culture: one trains athletes of speech: speech is the object of an established prestige and power; aggressiveness is encoded.

A.6.2. Writing.

As for writing, it is not subject, as it is today, to the value of originality; that which we call the author does not exist. There are different duties attending the classical text, the only text studied and in some sense managed, like renewable capital: (1) the scriptor recopies purely and simply; (2) the compilator adds to that which he copies but never anything of his own; (3) the commentator often intrudes into the recopied text but only in order to make it intelligible; (4) and finally, the auctor presents his own ideas but always based on other authorities. These duties are not sharply defined in a hierarchy: the commentator, for example, could have the prestige which a great writer enjoys today (such was the case in the twelfth century with Peter Helias, nicknamed "the commentator"). What anachronistically we would call the writer, therefore, is in the Middle Ages essentially: (1) a transmitter: he preserves an absolute content which is the classical
treasure, the source of authority; (2) a controller: he has the right to "break up" the works of the past by unbridled analysis and to recompose them (if they had had such an idea in the Middle Ages, "creation," a modern notion, would have been sacrificed to the profit of structure).

A.6.3. The Septennium.

In the Middle Ages "culture" is taxonomy, a functional network of "arts," that is obedient to the rules of language (the etymology of that period compared art to arctus, which means articulated), and these "arts" are called "liberal" because they do not lead to profit (in contrast to the mechanical arts and manual activities): they are general, sumptuous languages. These liberal arts take the place of that "general education" which Plato rejected in the name and in favor of the true philosophy, but which were finally reclaimed (by Isocrates and Seneca) as propadeutic to philosophy. In the Middle Ages, philosophy is diminished and passes into the general education as one art among many (Dialectica). It is no longer philosophy that the general education prepares its students for, it is theology which stands supreme above the seven arts, the Septennium. Why are there seven? Already in Varro one finds a theory of liberal arts: at this point there are nine (our own with the addition of medicine and architecture; this structure is revived and codified during the fifth and sixth centuries by
Martianus Capella, an African pagan who established the hierarchy of the Septennium in an allegory, *The Marriage of Mercury and Philology*. Here, philology designates total knowledge: Philology, the learned virgin, is betrothed to Mercury; she receives as a wedding gift the seven liberal arts, each presented with its symbols, its costume, its language; for example, *Grammatica* is an old woman who has survived Athens and wears Roman garments; in a small ivory box, she holds a knife and a file for correcting the errors of children; *Rhetorica* is a beautiful woman, whose clothes are adorned with all the figures; she carries weapons destined to harm her adversaries (the coexistence of persuasive rhetoric and ornamental rhetoric). These allegories of Martianus Capella were widely known; one finds them erected on the facades of Notre Dame and the Cathedral of Chartres, and portrayed in the works of Botticelli. Boethius and Cassiodorus (sixth century) elaborated the theory of the Septennium, first by incorporating Aristotle’s *Organon* into *Dialectica*, and second by postulating that the liberal arts are inscribed for all eternity in the divine wisdom and in the Scriptures (the Psalms are full of "figures"): rhetoric receives the Christian sanction (enjoys the protection of Christianity; it can legally emigrate from Antiquity to Christendom and thence into the modern era). This privilege will be confirmed by Bede during the
Carolingian era. Of what does the Septennium consist? It must first summon that which it opposes: on the one hand technology (the "sciences" as impartial languages, form part of the Septennium) and on the other theology; the Septennium organizes human nature in its humanity; that nature can only be overturned by the Incarnation which, if it is applied to a classification, takes the form of a subversion of language: the Creator becomes the creature, the Virgin conceives, etc.: in hac verbi copula stupet omnis regula. The Seven Arts are divided into two unequal groups, which correspond to the two paths (viae) of wisdom: the Trivium includes Grammatica, Dialectica and Rhetorica; the Quadrivium includes Musica, Arithmetica, Geometria, Astronomia (medicine would be added much later). The opposition between the Trivium and the Quadrivium is not that of letters and sciences; it is rather that of the secrets of speech and the secrets of nature. 

A.6.4. The diachronic play of the Trivium.

The Trivium (which is our only concern here) is a taxonomy of speech; it attests to the persistent effort of the Middle Ages to fix the place of speech in man, in nature and in creation. Speech is not at the time, as it has since become, a vehicle, an instrument, the means to "something else" (soul, thought, passion); it consumes everything mental: not actual experiences, not psychology: speech is
not expression but instant construction. What is of interest in the Trivium, therefore, is less the continuum of each discipline than the play of these three disciplines among themselves, throughout the ten centuries: from the fifth to the fifteenth century, the leadership of one art over the other emerged in such a way that each period of the Middle Ages was placed under the domination of one of these arts: by turns, it is Rhetorica (fifth through seventh centuries), then Grammatica (eighth through tenth centuries), then Logica (eleventh through fifteenth centuries) which dominates its sisters and reduces them to the level of poor relations.

RHETORICA
A.6.5. Rhetorica as supplement.

Ancient Rhetoric has survived in the traditions of some of the Roman schools of Gaul and with some Gallic rhetoricians such as Ausonius (310-393), grammaticus and rhetor of Bordeaux; and Sidonius Apollinaris (430-484), bishop of Auvergne. Charlemagne inscribes the rhetorical figures in his scholastic reform, after the Venerable Bede (673-735) had completely Christianized the rhetoric (a task initiated by Augustine and Cassiodorus) by showing that the Bible itself is full of "figures." Rhetoric did not dominate for long; it was very quickly "stuck" between Grammatica and Logica: Rhetoric becomes the poor parent of
the Trivium, destined only for a beautiful resurrection at the time when it becomes possible for it to be reborn through "Poesie" and, in the most general fashion, under the name of Belles-lettres. This weakness of Rhetoric—diminished by the triumph of emasculated languages, grammar (remember the file and knife of Martianus Capella) and logic—is perhaps due to the fact that it is entirely carried away with ornament, that is toward the reputedly inessential, with regard to truth and fact (the first apparition of the referential spectre): it appears then as "what comes later." This medieval rhetoric sustains itself essentially on the treatises of Cicero (Rhetorica ad Herennium and De Inventione) and Quintilian (better known by teachers than by students), but itself produced primarily related treatises on ornament, figures, "color" (colores rhetorici), and afterwards, poetic arts (artes versificatoriae); the dispositio did not approach the "commencement" of a discourse (ordo artificialis, ordo naturalis); the designated figures are above all amplification and abbreviation; style is ascribed to the three genres of the wheel of Virgil: gravis, humilis, mediocrus, and to the two ornaments: facile and difficile.


The domain of Rhetorica encompasses three canons of order (three formal rules), three artes. I. Artes
sermocinandi: these are the oratory arts in general (the object of rhetoric properly speaking), that is then, essentially, sermons or parentic discourse (exhorting to virtue); the sermons may be written in two languages: *sermones ad populum* (for the people of the parish), written in the vernacular, and *sermones ad clerum* (for the Synods, the schools, the monasteries), written in Latin; nevertheless, everything is prepared in Latin; the vernacular is merely a translation. II. *Artes dictandi, ars dictaminis*, epistolary art; the development of administration since Charlemagne carried with it the theory of administrative correspondence: the *dictamen* (the practice of dictating letters), the "dictator" is a recognized profession which is taught; the model is the *dictamen* of the papal chancellery: the *stylus romanus* surpasses everything, a stylistic notion takes hold, the *cursus*, the flowing together of a text, filled with the criteria of rhythm and accentuation. III. *Artes poeticae*; poetry at first comprised part of the *dictamen* (the opposition of prose/poetry has long been hazy); then the *artes poeticae* take charge of the *rhythmicum*, borrow Latin verse from *Grammatica*, and begin to aim at the "literature" of imagination. A structural reshaping begins, which, at the end of the fifteenth century, sets the *First Rhetoric* (or general rhetoric) against the *Second Rhetoric* (or poetic
rhetoric), from which the Poetic Arts such as those of Ronsard proceed.

GRAMMATICA

A.6.7. Donatus and Priscian.

After the Invasions, the cultural leaders are the Celts, the English and the Franks; they had to learn Latin grammar at the famous schools of Fulda, Saint Gall and Tours; grammar is introduced into general education through poetry, liturgy and Scripture; it includes, along with grammar in the strict sense, poetry, prosody and some figures. The two great grammatical authorities of the Middle Ages are Donatus and Priscian. I. Donatus (circa 350) produces an abridged grammar (ars minor) which deals with the eight parts of the sentence in the form of questions and responses, and an expanded grammar (ars major). Donatus' success is enormous; Dante places him in heaven (the opposite of Priscian); some of this writings would be among the first ever printed, along with the Scriptures; he has given his name to some elementary treatises on grammar, the Donats. II. Priscian (late fifth century, early sixth century) was a Mauritanian, a professor of Latin in Byzantium, nurtured on Greek theory and in particular the grammatical doctrine of the Stoics. His Institutio grammatica is a normative grammar (grammatica regulans), neither philosophical nor "scientific"; it falls
into two abridgements: the Priscianus minor deals with construction, the Priscianus major deals with morphology. Priscian leaves numerous examples borrowed from the Greek Pantheon: the man is Christian, but the rhetor is pagan (one sees the advantage of this dichotomy). Dante dispatches him to hell, in the seventh circle, that of the Sodomites: apostate, drunk, madman, but reputedly a great genius. Donatus and Priscian represent absolute law—except when they do not agree with the Vulgate: grammar is therefore unable to be so normative, since one believes that the "rules" of locution have been invented by the grammarians; they have been distributed largely by Commentatores (such as Peter Helias) and by grammars in verse (a very big fashion). By the end of the twelfth century, Grammatica includes grammar and poetry, it deals with "precision" and "imagination," with letters, with syllables, with the phrase, with the complete sentence, with figures, with prosody; it relinquishes very little to Rhetorica: some figures. It is a fundamental science, linked to ethica (part of the common wisdom, expressed through the text, outside of theology): "the science of speaking well and writing well," "the cradle of all philosophy," "the first nurse of all literary studies."

A.6.8. The Modistae.
In the twelfth century Grammatica again becomes speculative (as it had been with the Stoics). That which one calls Speculative Grammar is the work of a group of grammarians called Modistae, because they wrote the treatises titled "De modis significandi"; many came from the monastic provinces in Scandinavia, then called Dacia, and more precisely from Denmark. The Modists were denounced by Erasmus for having written a barbaric Latin, for the confusion of their definitions, for the excessive subtlety of their distinctions; in fact, they had produced the foundations of grammar for two centuries, and we even owe to them certain speculative terms (for example, instance). The treatises of the Modists take two forms; the modi minores, in which the subject is presented modo positivo, that is, without critical discussion, in a brief, clear and very didactic manner; and the modi maiores, presented in the form of questio disputata, that is, with pros and cons, with more and more specialized questions. Each treatise contains two parts, in the manner of Priscian: Ethymologia (morphology)--spelling errors are common to this period and correspond to a false etymology for the word Etymology--and Diasynthetica (syntax), but the treatise is prefaced by a theoretical introduction bearing on the connections between the modi essendi (being and its properties), the modi intelligendi (taking possession of being under its aspects), and the modi
significandi (level of language). The modi significandi themselves comprise two strata: (1) the designation corresponds with the modi signandi; its elements are: vox, the acoustic signifier, and dictio, word-concept, generic semanteme (in dolor, doleo, it is the idea of sorrow); the modi signandi do not yet come within the scope of the grammarian: vox, the phonic signifier, belongs to philosophus naturalis (to the phonetician, as we would say), and dictio, referring back to an inert state of the word, which is not yet animated in any respect, escapes the logician of language (it comes under what we would now call lexicography); (2) the level of the modi significandi is attained when it attaches an international meaning to the designation. At this level, the word, checked in the dictio, is quite productive; it is perceived in so far as it is "constructible": it fits into the superior unity of the sentence; it restores a great deal then to the speculative grammarian and the logician of language. Also, far from blaming the Modists, as sometimes happened, for having reduced language to nomenclature, we should congratulate them for having done everything to the contrary: for them, language does not begin with the dictio and the significatum, that is, with the word-sign, but with the consignificatum or constructible, that is, the connection or the inter-sign: a privileged status is accorded to syntax,
to inflection, to order—and not to semantics—in a word, to structure, which would perhaps be the best way to translate *modus significandi*. There is then a definite relationship between the Modists and some of the modern structuralists (Hjelmslev's glossematics, Chomsky's competence): language is a structure, and that structure is, as it were, "guaranteed" by the structure of being (*modi essendi*) and by that of the mind (*modi intelligendi*): there is a *grammatica universalis*; this will be something new, as it is commonly believed that there are as many grammars as there are languages: *Grammatica una et eadem est secundum substantiam in omnibus linguis, licet accidentaliter varietur*. *Non ergo grammaticus sed philosophus proprias naturas rerum diligentiter considerans . . . grammaticam invenit.* (Grammar is one and the same in all languages, as far as substance is concerned, although it can vary by accident. Therefore it is not the grammarian but the philosopher who, by examining the nature of things, discovers grammar.)

**LOGICA (OR DIALECTICA)**


*Logica* dominates in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries: it pushes *Rhetorica* aside and absorbs *Grammatica*. This struggle took the form of a conflict between schools. In the first half of the twelfth century, the schools of Chartres develop particularly the teaching of *Grammatica* (in
the broadest sense of the word): this is the *studium*, which is of literary orientation; on the contrary, the school of Paris develops theological philosophy: this is the *sacerdotium*. Paris is victorious over Chartres, the *sacerdotium* over the *studium*: *Grammatica* is absorbed into *Logica*, and this brings with it a revival of folk literature, a taste for the vernacular, a retreat of humanism, a movement toward the professional disciplines (medicine, law). Previously, *Dialectica* was preserved in the *Topics* of Cicero and the work of Boethius, the first interpreter of Aristotle; then, in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, after the second (massive) infusion of Aristotle, it was preserved in all the Aristotelian logic which dealt with the dialectic syllogism.\(^\text{12}\)

A.6.10. The disputatio.

*Dialectica* is the art of lively discourse, discourse between two people. This dialogue is in no way Platonic; it is not a question of principally subjecting the beloved to the master; here, the dialogue is aggressive; it is undertaken in order to enjoy a victory which is not predetermined: this is a battle of syllogisms, Aristotle staged by two partners. Also, *Dialectica* becomes confused with an exercise, a mode of expression, a ceremony, a sport, the *disputatio* (what one might call a symposium of adversaries). The procedure (or protocol) is that of *Sic et
Non. One collects contradictory evidence on a given question. The exercise is presented to an opponent and a respondent; the respondent is ordinarily the candidate: he responds to the objections presented by the opponent; as in the Conservatory competitions, the opponent is on call: he is a friend or he is appointed; one poses the thesis, the opponent poses the argument (*sed contra*) the candidate responds (*respondeo*): the conclusion is presented by the master who presides. The *disputatio* invades everything; it is a sport: the masters dispute among themselves, in front of the students, once a week; the students dispute for examinations. One gestures to the head-master for permission to debate (there is a parodic echo of these gestures in Rabelais). All of this is codified, ritualized in a treatise which governs the *disputatio* meticulously in order to prevent any deviation from the discussion: the *Ars obligatoria* (fifteenth century). The thematic material of the *disputatio* comes from the argumentative part of Aristotelian Rhetoric (by way of the *Topics*); it allows *insolubilia*, propositions which are very difficult to prove; *impossibilia*, propositions which seem impossible to everyone; *sophismata*, cliches and paralogisms, which serve as the bulk of *disputationes*.

A.6.11. The neurotic sense of the disputatio.

If one wishes to evaluate the neurotic aspect of such
an exercise, he must of course retrace the maché of the Greeks, that sort of conflictual sensibility which makes any contradiction between the subject and himself intolerable to the Greek (and later to the West in general): driving a partner to contradict himself is enough to reduce him, to eliminate him, to annul him: Callicles (in the Gorgias) chooses not to respond rather than to contradict himself. The syllogism is the same weapon which permits that liquidation, it is the knife which cuts but is itself indestructible. The two disputants are two torturers who try to mutilate each other (whence the mythical episode of Abelard, the castrated castrator). So volatile was the neurotic explosion that it had to be codified, the narcissistic injury limited. They turned logic to sport (just as today we turn soccer into everyone's conflictual outlet, especially the underprivileged or the oppressed): it is the eristic. Pascal saw the problem: he wanted to avoid being in such a conflict with another; he wanted to "reprove" him without mortally wounding him, to rise to his level (to complement him) when it was necessary only to "complete" him (and not to conquer him). The disputatio had vanished, but the problem of rules (ludic, ceremonial) of verbal play remains: how do we dispute today in our writing, in our colloquia, in our meetings, in our conversations and, to a certain extent, in the "scenes" of our private lives?
Have we settled our score with the syllogism (or merely concealed it)? Only an analysis of intellectual discourse will someday be able to answer this precisely.\textsuperscript{15}


We saw that the three liberal arts were waging a battle of preceillance\textsuperscript{16} among themselves (to the final advantage of Logica): it is truly the symbol of the Trivium, in all its fluctuations, that is significant. Its contemporaries had been aware of this: some of them had tried to restructure in their own way the entire spoken culture. Hugh de Saint-Victor (1095-1141) opposes the theoretical, practical and mechanical sciences to the logical sciences: Logica recovers the Trivium in its entirety: it is all the science of language. St. Bonaventure (1221-1274) tries to discipline all knowledge by submitting it to Theology; in particular Logica, or the science of interpretation, includes Grammatica (expression), Dialectica (education), and Rhetorica (persuasion); once more, even if it is for the sake of opposing it to nature and to grace, language absorbs all that is mental. But above all, (because it anticipates the future), as far back as the twelfth century something that must be called letters separates itself from philosophy; for John of Salisbury, Dialectica operates in all disciplines where the outcome is abstract. Rhetorica, on the other hand, picks up whatever Dialectica doesn't.
want: it is the field of the hypothesis (in ancient rhetoric the hypothesis opposes itself to the thesis as the contingent to the general, see below B.1.25.), that is to say, all that which involves concrete circumstances (Who? What? When? Why? How?); in this way an opposition appears which will have great mythical success (it still exists): that of the concrete and the abstract: the letters (stemming from Rhetorica) will be concrete, philosophy (stemming from Dialectica) will be abstract.

A.7. THE DEATH OF RHETORIC


We have seen that Aristotle had entered the West twice: once in the sixth century through Boethius, and once in the seventh century from the Arabs. He came in a third time through his Poetics. This Poetics is little known in the Middle Ages, except through distorted abridgments. But in 1498, the first Latin translation from the original was published in Venice; in 1503, the first Greek edition appeared; in 1550, Aristotle's Poetics is translated and commented upon by a group of erudite Italians (Castelvetro, Scaliger--of Italian origin--the bishop of Veda). In France, the text itself is little known. It is through Italianism that it erupts in seventeenth century France. The generation of 1630 brings together Aristotle's disciples; the Poetics lent to French classicism its
principle element—a theory of verisimilitude. It is the code of the literary "creation," of which theoreticians are the authors, the critics. Rhetoric, which took as its principal object "writing well," style, is restricted to education, where in fact it triumphs. It is the domain of the professors (the Jesuits).

A.7.2. **Triumphant and moribund.**

Rhetoric is triumphant; it reigns over education. Rhetoric is moribund; limited to this area, it falls little by little into serious intellectual discredit. This discredit is ushered in by the promotion of a new value—evidence (fact, ideas, feelings) which is sufficient unto itself and is independent from language (or is believed to be independent), or at least pretends to use language as nothing more than an instrument, a medium, a means of expression. From the sixteenth century on, "evidence" takes three directions: personal evidence (in Protestantism), rational evidence (in Cartesianism), and the evidence of the senses (in empiricism). Rhetoric, when it is tolerated at all (in Jesuit education), is no longer a complete logic but merely a color, an ornament that one keeps a close watch on in the name of "realism." There had undoubtedly been some postulation of this new spirit in Pascal, since it is to him that one credits the Anti-Rhetoric of modern humanism. What Pascal calls for is a rhetoric (a "persuasive art") that is
mentalistic, sensitive, instinctual, partaking of the complexity of things (of "subtlety"); eloquence consists not in applying an external code to discourse, but in gaining awareness of the thought which is inherent in us, a way of being able to reproduce that tempo which we use when we speak to one another, bringing out the truth, as if one had discovered it oneself, by oneself. The system of discourse does not have intrinsic characteristics (clarity or symmetry), but depends on the nature of thought, which, in order to be "right," must conform itself to language.

A.7.3. The Jesuit teaching of Rhetoric.

Late in the Middle Ages, we have seen, the teaching of rhetoric was sacrificed somewhat; it subsisted, however, in some colleges in England and Germany. In the sixteenth century, this heritage organizes itself, takes a stable form, at first at the gymnasium of St. Jerome, maintained at Liege by the Jesuits. This college is imitated at Strasbourg and at Nimes. The form of education in France for three centuries is established. Very quickly, forty colleges follow the Jesuit model. The education given here is codified in 1586 by a group of six Jesuits: this is the Ratio Studiorum, adopted in 1600 by the University of Paris. This Ratio devotes itself primarily to the "humanities" and to Latin rhetoric; it invades all of Europe, but its greatest success is in France. The force of the new Ratio
undoubtedly becomes identified—in the ideology which it legitimizes—with a scholarly discipline, a discipline of thought and a discipline of language. In this humanistic education, Rhetoric itself is the noble subject; it dominates everything. The only scholarly prizes are the values of Rhetoric, of translation and of memory, but the value of Rhetoric, assigned to the conclusion of a special examination, designates the top student, who is called from that time on the imperator or the tribun (we should not forget that speech is power—and even a political power). Up to around 1750, beside the sciences, eloquence constitutes the only prestige; in this epoch of the decline of the Jesuits, rhetoric is revived somewhat by the Freemasonry.

A.7.4. Treatises and Manuals.

The codes of rhetoric are innumerable, at least up to the eighteenth century. Many (in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries) are written in Latin; these are scholarly manuals drafted by the Jesuits, notably P. Nunez, Susius and Soarez. The "Institution" of P. Nunez, for example, comprises five volumes: the preparatory exercises, the three principal parts of rhetoric (invention, arrangement and style) and a moral section (the "wisdom"). Meanwhile, rhetorics in the vernacular flourish (here we will cite only those in French). At the end of the
fifteenth century the rhetorics are chiefly poetics (the art of writing poetry or the minor arts of the Second Rhetoric); it is necessary to cite: Pierre Fabri, "The Great and True Art of Complete Rhetoric" (six editions from 1521 to 1544) and Antoine Foclin (Foquelin), "French Rhetoric" (1555) which includes a clear and complete classification of figures. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, up to about 1830, the Treatises of Rhetoric dominate; these treatises present in general: (1) the paradigmatic rhetoric (the figures), (2) the syntagmatic rhetoric (the "oratory structure"); these two facts are felt to be necessary and complementary to such an extent that in 1806 a trade journal brings the two most famous rhetoricians together: the Figures, by Du Marsais, and the oratory construction by Du Batteux. We will cite the best known of the treatises. For the seventeenth century, it is undoubtedly the Rhetoric of P. Bernard Lamy (1675): this is a complete treatise on speech, useful "not only in the schools, but also in every phase of life; when you buy, when you sell"; evidently it rests upon the principle of the exteriority of language and thought. One has a "picture" in the mind, one tries to "reproduce" it with words. For the eighteenth century, the most celebrated treatise (and moreover the most intelligent) is that of Du Marsais, (Treatise of Tropes, 1730); Poor and unsuccessful during his lifetime, Du Marsais frequented the
anti-religious circle of Holbach and worked as an encyclopedist; more than a rhetoric, his work is a linguistics of the transformation of meaning. At the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth centuries, many treatises, absolutely oblivious to the revolutionrary change happening at the time, were published (Blair, 1783; Gaillard, 1807--The Rhetoric for Young Ladies --Fontanier, 1827--recently republished with an introduction by G. Gennette). In the nineteenth century, rhetoric survives only artificially, under the protection of official regulations; even the titles of the tracts and manuals change in a significant way: 1881, F. de Caussade: Rhetoric and Literary Genres; 1889, Prat: Elements of Rhetoric and Literature. Literature once more "carries" rhetoric before choking it completely; but in its final gasp, classical rhetoric completely; but in its final gasp, classical rhetoric competes with the "psychology of style."

A.7.5. The end of Rhetoric.

Nevertheless, to say in a comprehensive way that Rhetoric is dead, it should be possible to specify what replaced it, because--we have seen this a good deal through this diachronic survey--rhetoric must always be read within the structural play of its neighbors (Grammar, Logic, Poetics, Philosophy): it is the play of the system, not each of its parts individually, that is historically significant.
We will follow this problem through in order to finish some lines of inquiry: I. We would have to trace the present lexicology of the word; what happens to it? It sometimes recaptures its original contents, personal interpretations coming from writers, not from rhetors (Baudelaire and the complete rhetoric, Valery, Poulhan); but above all, we would have to reorganize the actual field of its connotations: Pejorative here,\(^1\) analytic there,\(^2\) reevaluated elsewhere,\(^3\) so as to outline the ideological process of ancient rhetoric. II. In education, the end of the rhetorical treatises is difficult to date, as it always is in such cases; once more, in 1926, a Jesuit from Beirut writes a textbook on Rhetoric in Arabic; again, in 1938, a Belgian, M.J. Vuillaume, publishes a manual of rhetoric; and the classes in Rhetoric and advanced Rhetoric disappeared only a very short time ago. III. To exactly what extent and under what circumstances has the science of language taken charge of the field of ancient rhetoric? At first there had been a transition to a psycho-stylistic (or stylistic of expressivity),\(^4\) but today where is linguistic mentalism pursued? From all of rhetoric, Jakobson has retained only two figures, metaphor and metonymy, making them the symbol for the two axes of language; for some the formidable work of classification carried out by ancient rhetoric still seems useful, especially if one applies it to the marginal
field of communication or of the signification of the advertising image, where it is not yet used up. In any case, these contradictory evaluations clearly show the present ambiguity of the rhetorical phenomenon: prestigious object of intelligence and insight; awesome system which an entire civilization developed to an extreme in order to classify, that is, in order to think its language; instrument of power; scene of historic conflicts whose reading is compelling if one puts precisely that object back into a manifold history where it expands; but also an ideological object, pushed into ideology by the advance of that "other thing" which replaced it and today forces an indispensable critical distance.

B. THE NETWORK

B.0.1. The demand for classification.

All the treatises of antiquity, particularly the post-Aristotelian, demonstrate an obsession for classifying (the term oratory partitio itself gives such evidence): rhetoric openly lends itself to that sort of classification (materials, rules, divisions, genres, styles). Classification itself is the object of discourse: the announcement of the outline of the treatise, an intense discussion of the classifications proposed by predecessors. The passion for classifying always seems pointless to those
not participating: why argue so bitterly over the placement of the propositio, sometimes put at the end of the exordium and sometimes at the beginning of the narratio? Yet most of the time—and this is normal—the taxonomic choice implies an ideological choice: there is always something at stake in the placement of things: tell me how you classify, I’ll tell you who you are. One cannot then adopt, as we will here for didactic purposes, a canonical classification which will voluntarily "forget" the numerous variations that have taken the plan of the techné rhetorike as their object, without first saying a word about these fluctuations.

B.0.2. The divisions of classification.

The account of Rhetoric itself is made essentially according to three different divisions (here I am simplifying). I. For Aristotle, the starting point is the techné (a speculative institution with the ability to determine that which can and cannot be); the techné (rhetorike) gives rise to four types of operations, which are the parts of the rhetorical art (and not in the least the parts of discourse, of the oratio): (1) Pisteis, the working out of "proofs" (inventio), (2) Taxis, the placing of these proofs throughout the discourse and in a certain order (dispositio), (3) Lexis, putting arguments into verbal form (at the level of the sentence) (elocutio), (4)
Hypocrisis, the performance of the total discourse by an orator who must make himself a comedian (actio). These four operations are examined three times (the means of which are the concern of the inventio): from the point of view of the transmitter of the message, from the point of view of the recipient, and from the point of view of the message itself (A.4.2.). In accordance with the notion of the techné (this is a skill), the Aristotelian division places the process of structuring a discourse in the foreground (active operation) and relegates its structure (discourse as product) to the background. II. For Cicero, the starting point is the doctrina dicendi, that is, no longer a speculative techné, but an acquired knowledge with practical applications; from the taxonomic point of view, the doctrina dicendi gives rise to: (1) a force, a work, vis oratoris, which depends upon the specified Aristotelian operations; (2) a product, or if you will, a form, the oratio, by which it is connected to the extended parts that comprise it; (3) a subject, content (a type of content), the quaestio, which depends upon the genres of discourse. Thus begins a certain autonomy of the work with regard to the labor that produced it. III. A conciliator and pedagogue, Quintilian combines Aristotle and Cicero; his starting point is indeed the techné, but it is practical and pedagogical techné, not a speculative one; it aligns:
(1) the operations (de arte)—which are those of Aristotle and Cicero, (2) the operator (de artifice), (3) the work itself (de opere) (these last two themes are annotated, but not subdivided).

B.0.3. The stake of classification: the site of the plan.

One is able to stake out the location of these taxonomic fluctuations with precision (even if they do seem infinitesimal): it is the place of the place, the dispositio, the order of the parts of discourse. What is it connected to, this dispositio? There are two possible options: either one considers the "plan" as a "putting in order" (and not as a ready-made order), as a creative act of distributing material—in a word, a task, a structuring—and thus one connects it with the preparation of a discourse. Or one takes the plan in its state of production, the structure fixed, and thus connects it with the work, the oratio. It is either a dispatching of material, a distribution, or it is a grid, a stereotyped form. In short, is the order active, creative, or passive, created? Each option has had its proponents who have pushed it to its limit: some connect the dispositio with the probatio (the discovery of proofs); others have connected it with the elocutio: this is a simple verbal method. We know the extremes to which this problem has been carried up to the threshold of modern times: in the sixteenth century,
Ramus, violently anti-Aristotelian (the techne is an affectation contrary to nature), radically separates the dispositio from the inventio: order is independent from the discovery of arguments: first the research of arguments, then their organization, called method. In the seventeenth century, the decisive blows against a declining rhetoric were leveled precisely at the reification of the scheme, the dispositio, which had ended in conceiving a rhetoric of the product (and not of the process). Descartes discovers the coincidence of invention and order not among the rhetors, but among the mathematicians; and for Pascal, order is a creative value, sufficient to begin something new (it cannot be a ready-made grid, exterior and prior). "So they can't say that I have said nothing new: the disposition of material is new." The connection between the order of invention (dispositio) and the order of presentation (ordo) and notably the deviation and the orientation (contradiction, inversion) of two parallel orders, therefore, always has a theoretical range: this is entirely a conception of literature, which is always in play, as witnessed by the exemplary analysis which Poe gave his own poem, "The Raven": in order to write the work, he started from what appears to be the last thing the reader grasps (as an "ornament"), knowing the melancholy effect of the
nevermore (e/o), and thus raising the narrative and metric form to the level of invention.

B.0.4. The rhetoric machine.

If, ignoring these stakes, or at least opting resolutely for the Aristotelian division, we superimpose the sub-classifications of ancient rhetoric in some way, we obtain a canonical distribution of the different parts of the techne, a network, a tree, or better yet, a huge creeper which descends level by level, now dividing a generic element, now reuniting scattered parts. This network is a linking up. One thinks of Diderot and the stocking machine. "One can regard it as a singular and unique faculty of which the fabrication of the work is the outcome . . ." In Diderot's machine, what one feeds in at the entrance is textile material, what one takes out at the exit are the stockings. In the rhetoric "machine," what one puts in at the start, barely emerging from a native aphasia, are the raw materials of reasoning--facts, a subject; what one finds at the end is a complete, structured discourse, fitted out for persuasion.

B.0.5. The five parts of the techne rhetorike.

Our starting line, then, will be constituted by the different operations-matrices of the techne (it is understood from the preceding that we connect the order of
parts, the dispositio, with the technē and not with the oratio: that is what happened with Aristotle). In its fullest extension, the technē rhetorikē includes five principal operations; we must stress the active, transitive, programmatic, operative nature of these divisions. It is not the elements of a structure that matter, but the acts of progressive structuring, as the verbal form (with verbs) of definition amply demonstrates:

1. **INVENTIO**
   - Euresis
   - *invinire quid dicas* to find what to say

2. **DISPOSITIO**
   - Taxis
   - *inventa disponere* to organize that which one has found

3. **ELOCUTIO**
   - Lexis
   - *onare verbis* to add ornament of words and figures

4. **ACTIO**
   - Hypocrisis
   - *opere et pronuntiare* to perform the discourse as an actor: gestures and diction

5. **MEMORIA**
   - Mneme
   - *memoria mandare* to call upon memory

The first three operations are the most important (*Inventio, Dispositio, Elocutio*); each supports an ample network of subtle notions, and all three have sustained rhetoric since antiquity (especially *Elocutio*). The last two (*Actio* and *Memoria*) were quickly sacrificed, since rhetoric is not only
carried on through the spoken discourse ( declamation) of lawyers or politicians, or "conferenceers" (epideictic genre), but also later, more or less exclusively, through "works" (writings). Little wonder, though, that these two parts do not hold much interest. The first (actio) because it refers to a dramaturgy of the speech (that is, to a hysteria and a ritual); the second because it postulates a standard level of stereotypes, a fixed inter-text, mechanically transmitted. But since these last two operations are absent from the written work (as opposed to the oratio), and since, as with the ancients, they did not call for any classifications (but only brief commentaries), they can be eliminated here from the rhetoric machine. Our tree, then, includes only three trunks (1) INVENTIO, (2) DISPOSITIO, (3) ELOCUTIO. Let us specify, however, that between the concept of techne and these three parts yet another level intervenes: that of the "substantial" materials of discourse: Res et verba. I do not think that this ought to be translated simply as Things and Words. Res, says Quintilian, are quae significantur, and Verba, quae significant; in short, at the level of discourse, the signifieds and signifiers. Res, that which is already destined for meaning, constituted from the outset by signification material; verbum, which is the form already in search of meaning to fulfill it. It is the res/verba
paradigm that counts, the relationship, the complementarity, the exchange, and not the definition of each term. Since the Dispositio turns on the contents (res) and on the discursive form (verba) at one and the same time, the first division of our tree, the first diagram of our machine, must inscribe itself like this:

![Diagram]

B.1. THE INVENTIO

B.1.1. Discovery and not invention.

The inventio refers less to invention (arguments) than to discovery: everything exists already; it needs only to be rediscovered: it is more an "extractive" than a "creative" notion. This is corroborated by the designation of a "place" (the Topic), from which one can extract the arguments and to which one must return them: the inventio is a process (via argumentorum). This idea of inventio implies two feelings: on the one hand a very secure confidence in the power of the method, of the track: if one casts the net of argumentative forms over the material with a good technique, one is sure to haul in the contents of an
excellent discourse; on the other hand, the conviction that the spontaneous, the unmethodical, brings in nothing: the nothingness of the original speech corresponds to the power of the ultimate speech; man cannot speak without being delivered of his speech, and for that delivery there is a particular techne, the inventio.

B.1.2. To convince/to move.

Two major tracks branch out from the inventio, one is logic, the other is psychology: to convince and to move. To convince (fidem facere) demands a display of logic or pseudo-logic which is called roughly the Probatio (the domain of "Proofs"): according to the argument, it is a matter of doing righteous violence to the spirit of the audience, whose character or psychological disposition, then, has nothing to do with it: the proofs carry their own force. To move (animos impellere), on the contrary, consists in thinking of a message which is probative not in itself, but in its intended purpose, the mood which it should inspire, mobilizing subjective or moral proofs. To begin with, we descend along the track of the probatio (to convince), to return later to the second term of the original dichotomy (to move). All these "descents" will be represented graphically in the form of a tree in the appendix.
B.1.3. **Technical proofs and proofs external to the technique.**

*Pisteis*, the proofs? One habitually watches out for this word, but for us it has a scientific connotation whose absence itself defines the rhetorical *pisteis*. It would be better to say: convincing explanations, ways of persuasion, means of influence, mediators of confidence (*fides*). The binary division of the *pisteis* is well-known: there are the arguments that are outside of the *techné* (*pisteis atechnoi*) and the arguments that are part of the *techné* (*pisteis entechnoi*). In Latin: *probationes inartificiales/artificiales*; in French (B. Lamy): *extrinseques/intrinseques*. This opposition is not difficult to grasp if we keep reminding ourselves that it is a *techné*: a speculative institution, a means of producing that which is probable or improbable; in other words, that which is neither scientific (necessary) nor natural. The proofs outside of the *techné*, then, are those that escape to the freedom of creating the contingent subject; they are found outside the orator (the operator of the *techné*); they are the subject's inherent arguments. On the other hand, the proofs within the *techné* depend upon the orator's ability to argue.

B.1.4. **Proofs outside of the techné.**

What can the orator do with the *atechnoi* proofs? He
cannot direct them, because they are in themselves inert; he can only arrange them, assert them through a methodical placement. What are they? They are fragments of reality that pass directly into this dispositio by a simple development, not by transformation. Or better yet, they are elements of the "dossier," which one cannot invent (deduce) and which are furnished by the case itself, by the client (for the time being, we are in the purely judicial). These pisteis atotechnoi are classified in the following way: (1) the praejudicia, previous arrests, jurisprudence (the problem is to destroy them without attacking them head-on); (2) the rumores, public testimony, the consensus of an entire community; (3) confessions under torture (tormenta, quaesita): any moral conviction, but especially a social conviction with regard to torture: antiquity acknowledged the right to torture slaves but not free men; (4) documents (tabulae): contracts, agreements, transactions between individuals, up to and including forced relations (theft, premeditated murder, robbery, insult); (5) the oath (jusjurandum): it is the element which relies most heavily on a game of combinations, tactics, language: one can agree or refuse to swear, one accepts or refuses the oath of another, etc.; (6) testimonies (testimonia): these are essentially high-minded testimonies, at least for Aristotle. They issue either from the ancient poets (Solon citing Homer
in order to support Athens' claims to Salamine), or from
proverbs, or from notable contemporaries; these are, then,
if anything, "citations."

B.1.5. The meaning of the atechnoi.

The "extrinsic" proofs belong to the judiciary (the rumores and the testimonia can serve deliberative and
epideictic purposes); but one can imagine that they might
also be useful in private life, to judge an action, to know
what to praise, etc. This is what happened to Lamy. For
him, the extrinsic proofs could support fictive
representations (novels, theater); one must take care,
however, that they are not factors which themselves make up
part of the argument; they are simply elements of the
dossier that come from the outside, from an
institutionalized reality; in literature, these proofs would
serve to compose the novel-dossiers (it happened
that . . .), which would renounce all bound writing, all
prolonged representation, would give only fragments of a
reality already constituted in language by the society.
This is indeed the sense of atechnoi: they are elements
constituted by social language which pass directly into the
discourse without being transformed by any technical
operation of the orator, the author.

B.1.6. Proofs within the techne.
The arguments which depend entirely upon the ability of the orator (pisteis entechnoi) oppose themselves to these fragments of social language which are conveyed directly, to the crude state (except the development of an arrangement). Indeed, the Entechnos means: that which revives the oratory practice, because the material is transformed in a persuasive way by a logical operation. This operation, in all strictness, is double: induction and deduction. The pisteis entechnoi, then, is divided into two types: (1) the exemplum (induction), (2) the enthymeme (deduction). It is not a question of scientific induction and deduction, but simply a "public" induction and deduction. These two ways are compulsory: All orators, in order to persuade, demonstrate by examples or enthymemes; there is no other way to do it (Aristotle). Yet a sort of quasi-aesthetic difference, a difference in style, creeps in between the example and the enthymeme: the exemplum produces a gentler persuasion, more highly valued than the vulgar one; it is an illuminating force, gratifying the pleasure inherent in all comparison; the enthymeme—which is stronger, more vigorous—produces a violent, turbulent force and profits from the energy of the syllogism; it works a veritable abduction; it is the proof in all the force of its purity, its essence.

B.1.7. The exemplum.

The exemplum (paradeigma) is rhetorical induction: one
proceeds from one particular to another particular, to the general, by an implicit chain: from an object, one infers a class, then to this class one adds a new object. 22 The exemplum can have no other dimension; it may be a word, a fact, a set of facts or an account of these facts. It is persuasive similarity, an argument by analogy: one finds the right exempla if one has the gift of recognizing analogies—and also, of course, their opposites. 23 As its Greek name indicates, it tends toward the paradigmatic, the metaphoric. As far back as Aristotle, the exemplum has been subdivided into the parable and the fable; the real covers historical examples, but also mythological examples, being opposed not to the imaginary but to that which one invents oneself. The parable is a brief 24 comparison, the fable (logos) a collection of actions. These indicate the narrative nature of the exemplum, which is going to flower historically.

B.1.8. The exemplary figure: the imago.

At the beginning of the first century A.D., a new form of the exemplum appears: the exemplary personage (eikon, imago), investing a figure with the incarnation of a virtue. Cato illa virtutem viva imago (Cicero). A repertoire of these "imagoes" is established for use in the schools of the Rhetors (Valerius Maximus, under Tiberius: Factorum ac dictorum memorabilium libri novem), followed much later by a version in verse. This collection of figures enjoys immense
success in the Middle Ages; erudite poetry sets forth the
definitive canon of these personages, a veritable Olympus of
archetypes which God has placed into the course of history;
the *imago virtutis* occasionally seizes upon people of very
minor importance who are destined for great fame, such as
Amyclas, the ferryman who will carry "Caesar and his
fortune" from Epirus, to Brindisi in a storm (poverty and
sobriety); there are numerous "imagoes" in the works of
Dante. The very fact that one could put together a
repertoire of *exempla* emphasizes well what one might call
the structural inclination of the *exemplum*: it is a
detachable piece which expressly carries with it a meaning
(hercic portrait, hagiographic narrative); clearly,
therefore, one can trace its development from fragmented and
allegorical writing to today's major presses: Churchill,
John XXIII are "imagoes," examples destined to persuade us
that we must be courageous, that we must be good.

B.1.9. Argumenta.

Opposite the *exemplum*, the mode of persuasion by
induction, there is a group of deductive modes, the
*argumenta*. The ambiguity of the word *argumentum* is
significant here. The most common ancient meaning is: the
subject of a scenic fable (the argument of a comedy by
Plautus), or rather: articulated action (in contrast to
*muthos*, a collection of actions). For Cicero, it is at the
same time "a fictive thing that could happen" (the plausible), and "a conceivable idea employed to convince," whose logical scope Quintilian makes even more clear: "the way to prove one thing or another, to confirm that which is in doubt by that which is not." Thus an important duplicity becomes evident: that of "reasoning" ("all forms of public reasoning," says a rhetor), tainted, easily dramatizable, which participates in the intellectual and the fictional, the logical and the narrative, at one and the same time (don't we recapture this ambiguity in a good number of modern "essays"?) The appearance of the argumenta, which begins here and will go on to consume all of the probatio right up to its end, opens on a masterpiece, the tabernacle of the deductive proof, the enthymeme, which is sometimes called commentum, commentatio, the literal translation of the Greek enthymema (all reflection of consciousness), but more often by a significant synecdoche: argumentum.

B.1.10. The enthymeme.

The enthymeme received two successive significations (which are not contradictory). I. For the Aristotelians, it is a syllogism based on a the similarity of signs and not on the true and immediate (as is the case with the scientific syllogism); the enthymeme is a rhetorical syllogism, developed uniquely at the public level (as one says: to get down to someone's level), to set out from the probable, that
is, to set out from what the public thinks; it is a
deduction whose value is concrete, posed with a view to its
presentation (it is a sort of acceptable spectacle), in
opposition to the abstract deduction carried out solely for
analysis; it is a public reasoning, handled easily by
uneducated men. By virtue of its origin, the enthymeme
achieves persuasion, not demonstration. For Aristotle, the
enthymeme is sufficiently defined by the probable character
of its premises (the probable admits of contraries): whence
the necessity to define and classify the premises of the
enthymeme. (See below: B.1.13, 14, 15, 16.). II. A new
definition prevails from Quintilian on and is completely
victorious during the Middle Ages (since Boethius): the
enthymeme is defined not by the contents of its premises,
but by the elliptical character of its articulation: it is
an incomplete syllogism, a shortened syllogism: its parts
are "neither as many nor as distinct as the parts of the
philosophic syllogism": one can omit one of the two
premises or the conclusion; therefore it is a syllogism
truncated by the suppression (in the expression) of a
proposition whose reality seems incontestable to man and
which is, for that reason, simply "preserved in the spirit"
(en thumo). If one applies this definition of the master
syllogism to all of culture (in a peculiar way, it repeats
to us our own death)---and although its premise is not simply
probable, it cannot be an enthymeme in the strictest sense—
one may have the following enthymemes: man is mortal, 
therefore Socrates is mortal; Socrates is mortal because all 
men are; Socrates is a man and therefore mortal; etc. One 
might prefer the more factual example of this funereal model 
proposed by Port-Royal: "all bodies which reflect light on 
all sides are uneven; the moon reflects light on all sides; 
therefore the moon is an uneven body," and all the 
enthymemic combinations that can be extracted from it (the 
moon is uneven because it reflects light on all sides, 
etc.). In effect, this second definition of the enthymeme 
is chiefly that of Port-Royal Logic, and one clearly sees 
why (or how): classical man believes that the syllogism is 
developed wholly in the mind: ("the number of the three 
propositions is in good proportion with the breadth of the 
mind"): if the enthymeme is an imperfect syllogism, it can 
be so only at the level of language (which is not that of 
the "mind"): it is a perfect syllogism in the mind, but it 
is imperfect in its expression; in short, it is an accident 
of language, a lapse.

B.1.11. Metamorphoses of the enthymeme.

Here are some variables of the rhetorical syllogism: 
(1) the prosyllogism, a series of syllogisms in which the 
conclusion of one becomes the premise of the following; (2) 
the sorite (soros, the heap), an accumulation of premises or
succession of truncated syllogisms; (3) the **epicheireme**, (often commented upon in antiquity), or developed syllogism, each premise being accompanied by its proof; the epicheirematic structure may extend to all five parts of the discourse: the proposition, the major argument, the assumption or minor argument, the lesser proofs, the disposition or conclusion: A . . . because . . . Now B . . . because . . . therefore C;²⁶ (4) the **apparent enthymeme**, or an argument based on a confidence game, a play of words; (5) the **maxim**, (**gnome**, **sententia**): a very elliptical, monodic form, it is a fragment of an enthymeme, the rest of which is potential: "one must not give one’s children too much knowledge (because they will reap the envy of their fellows)."²⁷ A significant revolution, the **sententia** migrates from the **inventio** (from reasoning, from the syntagmatic rhetoric) to the **elocutio**, to style (figures of amplification or diminution); in the Middle Ages, it blooms, contributing to form a treasury of citations on all subjects of wisdom: phrases; gnomic verse learned by heart; collections classified in alphabetical order.

B.1.12. The pleasure of the enthymeme.

Since the rhetorical enthymeme is made for the public (and does not come under the scrutiny of science), the psychological considerations are pertinent, and Aristotle insists on them. The enthymeme has the charm of a
promenade, a voyage. One sets out from the point that does not need to be proved and proceeds toward another point that does need to be proved. One has the agreeable feeling (the same feeling that arises from vitality) of discovering something new by a sort of natural contagion or capillary attraction which extends the known (the opinable or assentable) toward the unknown. Nevertheless, in order to give all its pleasure, the process must be supervised: reasoning should not be carried too far, and it must not run the full course of its stages to come to a conclusion: this taxes the patience (the epichremep should be used only on great occasions), because one must reckon with the ignorance of the listeners (ignorance is precisely that incapacity to infer by numerous stages and to follow an argument for a long time); or rather: one must exploit this ignorance and give the listener the feeling that he himself has put a stop to it by his own mental effort. The enthymeme is not a truncated syllogism by default or dissipation, but because it must allow the listener the pleasure of doing all he can in the construction of the argument: it is part of the pleasure one gets from working out a given grid oneself (cryptograms, games, crossword puzzles). Port-Royal, although always judging language faulty compared to the mind—and the enthymeme is a linguistic syllogism—recognizes this pleasure in incomplete reasoning. "This
suppression of part of the syllogism flatters the vanity of those to whom one speaks. By leaving some things to their intelligence and by cutting the discourse short, one makes it stronger and more lively;\(^{29}\) therefore, one sees the moral transformation in comparison with Aristotle: the pleasure of the enthymeme is attributed less to a creative autonomy of the listener than to an excellence stemming from concession, given triumphantly as the sign of a surplus of thought over language (thought supersedes language in terms of length): "... one of the chief beauties of a discourse is to be full of meaning and to give the mind occasion to form a thought more extended than its expression ...".

B.1.13. The enthymemetic premises.

The place from which we leave to take the pleasant route of the enthymeme is the premise. This place is known, certain, but not with a scientific certainty: it is our human certainty. What do we hold, then, as certain? (1) that which falls under the senses, that which we see and understand: reliable indicators, tekmeria; (2) that which falls under sense, that which people are in general agreement on, that which is established by law, that which has passed into usage ("it is handed down from the gods," "thou shalt honor thy father and thy mother," etc.): these are the probabilities, eikota, or generically, the probable
(eikos); (3) between these two types of human "certainties," Aristotle puts a looser category: the semeia, the sign (a thing which serves to make another thing understood, per quod alia res intelligitur).

B.1.14. The tekmerion, the reliable indicator.

The tekmerion is the reliable indicator, the necessary sign, or even "the indestructible sign," that which is what it is and which cannot be otherwise. A woman has given birth: this is a reliable indicator (tekmerion) that she has had relations with a man. This premise comes very close to the one that inaugurates the scientific syllogism, although it rests only on a universality of experience. As always, when one exhumes this old logical material (or rhetoric), one is amazed to see it function perfectly well in the works of the culture of mass appeal—to the point that asks oneself if Aristotle isn't the philosopher of this culture and consequently doesn't found the critique which holds sway over it; in effect, these works easily mobilize "physical evidence" which serves as an origin for implicit arguments, for a certain rational perception of the development of an anecdote. In Goldfinger, there is an electrocution by water: this is familiar and doesn't need to be explained; it is a "natural" premise, a tekmerion; elsewhere (in the same film) a woman dies because someone has painted her body with gold; here one has to know that
the gold paint prevents the skin from breathing and therefore causes asphyxiation: this, being rare, needs to be explained; therefore it is not a tekmerion, or at least it is "disconnected" from an antecedent certitude (the asphyxiation causes death). It goes without saying that the tekmeria don't historically have the beautiful stability that Aristotle gives them: public "certainty" depends on public "knowledge," and that varies with time and society. In order to recover Quintilian's example (and to refute it), I must be assured that certain populations don't establish the connection between the birth and the sexual union (the child sleeps in the mother; God awakens it).

B.1.15. The eikos, the probable.

The second type of (human, non-scientific) "certitude" which can serve as the premise of the enthymeme is the probable, a capital notion in the eyes of Aristotle. It is a general idea resting on the judgment which men develop by experience and imperfect deduction. (Perelman proposes that it be called the preferable). In the Aristotelian probable, are there two nuclei: (1) the idea of the general, and its opposite, the universal: the universal is necessary (it is an attribute of science); the general is not necessary (it is a human "general," determined on the whole statistically, by the opinion of the majority); (2) the possibility of contrariness: certainly the enthymeme is received by the
public as a kind of syllogism; it seems to start from an opinion in which one believes, "strong as iron"; but according to science, the probable admits the contrary: within the limits of human experience and moral life, which are those of the eikos, the contrary is never impossible: one cannot predict with (scientific) certainty the potentials of a free being: "he who is in good health will live to see another day," "a father loves his children," "a burglary committed without forceful entry must have been done by someone known to the household," etc.: very well, but the contrary is always possible; the analyst, the rhetorician, feels keenly the force of these opinions, but in all objectivity, he holds them at a distance, introducing them by an esto (it may be) which dilutes its force in the eyes of science, where the contrary is never possible.

B.1.16. The semeion, the sign.

The semeion, the third possible division of the enthymeme, is a more ambiguous factor, less sure than the tekmerion. Traces of blood imply a murder, but this is not certain; the blood may be the result of a nosebleed, or of a sacrifice. In order for the sign to be conclusive, there must be other concomitant signs; or better yet, in order to stop the sign from being polysemic (the semeion is in effect the polysemic sign), it must have recourse to a total context. Atalanta was not a virgin, since she ran the woods
with boys: for Quintilian, it is yet to be proved; the proposition itself is so uncertain that it throws the semeion out of the techné of the orator, who cannot seize upon the semeion in order to transform it, by enthymematic inference, into a certainty.

B.1.17. Practice of the enthymeme.

Insofar as the enthymeme is a "public" reasoning, it is permissible to extend its practice out of the judiciary, and it is possible to retrieve it from rhetoric (and from antiquity). Aristotle himself studied the practical syllogism, or enthymeme which concludes with a determinate act. The major premise is concerned with a current maxim (eikos); in the minor premise, the agent (for example, I myself) verifies what happens in the situation covered by the major premise; it concludes with a behavioral decision. How does it happen, then, that so often the conclusion contradicts the major premise and that the orator resists that knowledge? It is because, very often, there is a deviation between the major and the minor premises: "To drink alcohol is harmful to a man; I am a man; therefore, I should not drink." And yet, in spite of this nice enthymeme, I drink. It is because I am "discreetly" reminded of another major premise: the sparkling, icy, thirst-quenching drink that does one good (a major premise well-known to advertising and bistro conversation). Another
possible extension of the enthymeme: in "cool" and rational language, both distant and public at the same time, such institutional languages as public diplomacy, for example: Chinese students, having demonstrated in front of the American embassy in Moscow (March 1965), the demonstration having been put down by the Russian police, and the Chinese government having protested against the suppression, a Soviet memo responds to the Chinese protest with a fine epicheireme, worthy of Cicero (see above B.1.11.): (1) Major premise: eikos, general opinion: Diplomatic standards exist which all nations respect; (2) Proof of the major premise: the Chinese themselves respect these standards of courtesy in their own country; (3) Minor premise: Now, the Chinese students in Moscow have violated these standards; (4) Proof of the minor premise: this is an account of the demonstration (insults, acts of violence and other deeds falling within the provisions of the penal code); (5) the conclusion is not stated (this is an enthymeme), but it is clear: it is the memorandum itself as a rejection of the Chinese protest: the adversary has been placed in a bind between the eikos and himself.

B.1.18. The place, topos, locus.

The classes of enthymematic premises having been determined, they must still be filled and premises be found: one has the principal methods, but how to invent the
contents? It is always the same agonizing question that Rhetoric poses and that Rhetoric tries to answer: **what to say?** From whence the importance of the reply, as witnessed by the scope and the success of that part of the Inventio which is charged with furnishing the contents of the argument and which begins henceforth: the **Topic.** The premises may indeed be drawn from certain **places.** What is a place? Aristotle says it is where a multiplicity of oratorical arguments coincide. The places, says Port-Royal, are "certain general authorities from which one can retrieve all the proofs which one makes use of in the diverse material that one deals with"; or even (Lamy): "general opinions which remind those who consult them of all the aspects from which one can consider a subject." However, the metaphoric approach to place is more significant than its abstract definition. One is presented with many metaphors for identifying the place. To begin with, why **place?** Because, says Aristotle, in order to remember things, it helps to recollect the place where they are found (the place, therefore, is an element of the association of ideas, of a package, of a discipline, of a mnemonic; the places, therefore, are not the arguments themselves but the compartments in which they are stored. Thence the whole image uniting the idea with a space and that which it reserves, with a locality and a quarrying: a **region** (where
one can find arguments), the vein of some ore, a circle, a sphere, a source, a pit, an arsenal, a treasury, and even a pigeon hole (W. D. Ross); "The places, Du Marsais says, are the cells where everyone can go to take, as it were, the material of a discourse and arguments on all sorts of subjects." A scholastic logician, exploiting the domestic nature of the place, compares it to a tag which indicates the contents of a receptacle (pyxidum indices); for Cicero, the arguments coming from places, will come forth by themselves for the purpose of debate just as the "letters for making words" will fall into place: the places, then, form that very particular reserve that constitutes the alphabet: a body of forms deprived of meaning in themselves, but, by selection, combining to make meaning, arrangement, actualization. With regard to place, what is the Topic? It seems that one can distinguish three successive definitions or at least three aspects of the word. The Topic is--or has been--(1) a method, (2) a grid of empty forms, (3) a store of occupied forms.


Originally (according to the Topica of Aristotle, anterior to his Rhetoric), the Topic was a collection of commonplace of the dialectic, that is, of the syllogism founded on the probable (intermediate between the scientific and the possible); then Aristotle made a method of it, more
practical than the dialectic: that which "we put in order, on every proposed subject, to furnish conclusions extracted from plausible reasons." This methodical sense has lasted or at least reappeared throughout the history of rhetoric: it is, then, the art (knowledge organized with an eye to teaching: disciplina) of finding arguments (Isidore), or even: an ensemble of "quick and easy ways to find material to discourse on subjects which are entirely unfamiliar" (Lamy)—one can appreciate the philosophic misgivings regarding such a method.


The second meaning is that of a network of forms, that of a quasi-cybernetic circuit to which one submits the material which one wants to transform into a persuasive discourse. One must resist things like this: a subject (quaestio) is given to the orator; in order to find arguments, the orator "runs" his subject through a grid of empty forms: from the contact of the subject with each compartment (each "place") on the grid (on the Topic) a possible idea, an enthymematic premise, arises. In antiquity a pedagogical version of this process had existed: the chrie (chreia), or "helpful" exercise, was a test of virtuosity, given to students, which consisted of making them pass through a series of places: quis? quid? ubi? quibus auxiliis? cur? quomodo? quando? Taking his
inspiration from ancient topics, Lamy proposes the following grid in the seventeenth century: the genre, the difference, the definition, the enumeration of parts, the etymology, the relationships (this is the associative range of the root), the comparison, the aversion, the effects, the causes, etc. Let us suppose that we have to prepare a discourse on literature: we are "stumped" (for good reason), but fortunately we have Lamy's topics: we may at least be able to ask ourselves questions and attempt to answer them: to what genre do we connect literature? art? discourse? cultural production? If it is an art how is it different from other arts? How many parts are assigned to it and what are they? What does the etymology of the word suggest to us? its connections with its morphological cousins (literary, literal, letters, literate)? to what does literature have an aversion? money? the Truth? etc. The conjunction of the grid and the quaestio resembles that of the theme and the predicates, the subject and its attributes: the "attributive topic" has its apogee in the tables of the Lullists (ars brevis): the general attributes are a kind of place. One can see what the range of the topical grid is: the metaphors that allude to the place (topos) make it obvious enough to us: the arguments are hidden, and are nestled in regions, depths, strata from which one must call them, awaken them: the Topic is the
midwife of the latent: it is a form that articulates contents and in this way produces fragments of meaning, intelligible units.


The places are principally empty forms; but these forms have had a very strong tendency to be filled in the same manner, to carry off contents, at first contingent, and then repeated, reified. The Topic has become a stockpile of stereotypes, of established, time-honored themes, of complete "pieces" which one uses almost obligatorily in the treatment of each subject. Hence the historical ambiguity of the expression commonplaces (topoi koinoi, loci communi):
(1) they are empty forms, common to every argument (the less they contain, the more common they are, see B.1.23. below);
(2) they are stereotypes, propositions used time and again.

The Topic, a full stockpile: its meaning is not in the least that of Aristotle, but already that of the Sophists: they had felt the necessity of having a catalog of things about which one commonly speaks and on which one need not "get stuck." This reification of the Topic is systematically pursued from Aristotle through the Latin authors; it had triumphed in the neo-rhetoric and was absolutely standard in the Middle Ages. Curtius gave an inventory of these indispensable themes accompanied by their fixed treatments. Here are a few of these reified places (from the Middle
Ages): (1) topos of affected modesty: every orator must declare that he is overwhelmed by his subject, that he is incompetent, that there is assuredly no affectation in saying this, etc. (excusatio propter infirmitatem),

(2) topos of the puer senilis: this is the magical theme of the adolescent endowed with perfect wisdom or the old man equipped with the beauty and grace of youth; (3) topos of the locus amoenus: the ideal landscape; Elysium or Paradise (trees, shrubbery, springs and meadows) has furnished a good number of literary "descriptions" (see the ekphrasis, A.5.2. above); but its origin is judiciary: every demonstrative connection of a cause demands the argumentum a loco: one ought to base the proofs on the nature of the place where the action transpired; topography then invaded literature (from Virgil to Barres); once reified, the topos has fixed contents, independent of the context: olives and lions are placed in Nordic regions: the landscape is detached from place, because its function is to constitute a universal sign—that of Nature: the landscape is the cultural sign of Nature; (4) the adynaton (impossibilia): the topos described as roughly compatible with contrary phenomena, objects and beings, this paradoxical conversion functions as the disturbing sign of a world turned upside-down: the wolf flees from the sheep (Virgil); this topos flourishes during the Middle Ages, where it allows criticism of the epoch: it
is the disagreeable old theme of "Now I’ve seen everything," or again: of "the last straw." All of these topoi, even before the Middle Ages, are detachable pieces (proof of their strong reification), mobile, transportable: they are the elements of a combinatory syntagmatic; their location was subject to only one limitation: they could not be put into the peroratio (peroration), which is entirely contingent, because it must summarize the oratio. Nevertheless, from then on and even today, how many stereotyped conclusions!

B.1.22. Some Topics.

Let us return to our Topic-grid, since it is that which allows us to recapture our rhetoric tree, for which it is a great distributing or dispatching place. Antiquity and classicism have produced numerous topics, defined by affinitive grouping according to either place or subject. In the first case, one can cite the General Topic of Port-Royal, inspired by the German logician Clauberg (1654); the topic of Lamy, which has already been cited and sketched out: there are the grammatical places (etymology, conjugata), logical places (genres, characteristics, irregularities, specifications, differences, definitions, divisions), metaphysical places (final cause, efficient cause, effect, totality, parts, opposing terms); this is obviously an Aristotelian place. In the second case, that
of topics by subject, one can point to the following Topics:

(1) the **oratorical Topic**, properly speaking; in fact, it comprises three topics: a rational topic, a moral topic (**ethe**: practical intelligence, virtue, affection, dedication), and a topic of passion (**pathe**: anger, love, fear, shame and their contraries); (2) a **topic of the laughable**, a part of a possible rhetoric of the comic;

Cicero and Quintilian have enumerated some of the laughable places: physical defects, spiritual defects, incidents, appearances, etc.; (3) a **theological topic**: it includes the different sources from which the theologians can derive their arguments: Scriptures, Popes, Synods, etc.; (4) a **topic of the senses** or **topic of the imagination**; one finds it sketched out in Vico: "the founders of civilization [an allusion to the anteriority of Poetry] engage in a **topic of the senses** in which they combine the properties, the qualities or the connections of individuals or species and employ all of them concretely to form their poetic genre"; Vico speaks elsewhere of "universals of imagination"; in this topic of the senses one can see the ancestor of thematic criticism, that which proceeds by categories, not by authors: that of Bachelard, in short: the soaring, the cavernous, the torrential, the shimmering, the dormant, etc., are the "places" to which one submits the "images" of poetry.
B.1.23. The commonplaces.

The Topic strictly speaking (the oratorical, Aristotelian topic), that which depends upon the pisteis entechnoi, as opposed to the topic of characters and that of passions, comprises two parts, two sub-topics: (1) a general topic, that of commonplaces, (2) an applied topic, that of special places. The commonplaces (topoi koinoi, loci communisimi) have a different sense for Aristotle than that which we attribute to the expression (under the influence of the third meaning of the word Topic, B.1.21). The commonplaces are not loaded stereotypes, but on the contrary, precise places: being general (the general is suited to the probable), they are common to all subjects. For Aristotle, these commonplaces are, in all, only three in number: (1) the possible/impossible; combined with time (past, future), these terms produce a topic question: can the thing have been done or not, could it be or not? This place can be applied to opposing relationships: if it is possible for a thing to begin, it is possible for it to end, etc.; (2) existent/nonexistent (or real/not real); like the preceding, the place can be compared with the time: if a thing which is unlikely to occur has nonetheless occurred, that which is more likely has certainly occurred (past); building materials are assembled here: it is probable that one will build a house here (future); (3) more/less: this is
the place of magnitude and smallness; what triggers it is the "all the more reason": there is a greater chance that X may have hit his neighbors considering that he even hits his own father. Although by definition the commonplaces may be without special features, each is best suited to one of the three oratory genres: the possible/impossible is well suited to the deliverative (is it possible to do this?), the real/not real to the judiciary (has the crime taken place?), the more/less to the epideictic (praise or blame).

B.1.24. The special places.

The special places (eide, idia) are the places proper to determined subjects; these are particular truths, special propositions accepted by everyone; these are the experimental truths attached to politics, to law, to finance, to the sea, to war, etc. However, since these blend in with the practice of disciplines, genres, particular subjects, one cannot enumerate them. The theoretical problem must nonetheless be posed. The course of our tree, then, comes to consist in comparing the inventio, such as we know it up to here, and the speciality of the content. That comparison is the quaestio.


The quaestio is the form of the discursive specialty. Into all the operations ideally set by the rhetoric...
"machine," one introduces a new variable (which is, to tell the truth, when it is a matter of making the discourse, the variable of division): the content, the point of debate, in short, the referential. By definition contingent, this referential can nonetheless be classified in two broad forms which constitute the two major types of quaestio: (1) the position or thesis (thesis, propositum): this is a general question, "abstract" as we would now say, but though specified, referred (otherwise it would not bring the special places into relief), yet without (and here is its mark) any parameter of place or time (for example: is it necessary to get married?); (2) the hypothesis (hypothesis): this is a particular question, implying facts, circumstances, persons, in short, a time and a place (for example: must X get married?)--one sees that in rhetoric the words thesis and hypothesis have a meaning completely different from the one to which we are accustomed. Now the hypothesis, this temporalized and localized point of debate, has another, former, great name: the hypothesis is the causa. Causa is a negotium, a concern, a combination of various contingencies; a problematic point where the contingent, and most particularly time, is engaged. Just as there are three "times" (past, present, future), one will then have three types of causa, and each type will correspond to one of the three oratory genres that we
already know: so here they are, then, structurally grounded, placed in our rhetoric tree. One can give them the following attributes:


Of these three genres, it is the judiciary which has been commented upon most in antiquity; the rhetoric tree extends beyond its neighbors. The special places of the judiciary are called the status causae. The status causae are the heart of the questio (whence the words: stasis, status). The status causae greatly excited the taxonomic passion of antiquity. The simplest classification enumerates three status causae (it is always a matter of forms which the contingent can take): (1) the conjecture: has this taken place or not (an sit)? This is the first place because it is the immediate result of an initial conflict of assertions: fecisti/non feci: an fecerit? Is it you who did this/no, it is not I: is it he? (2) the definition (quid sit?) what is the legal definition of the act, under what (juridical) name does it fall? is it a crime? a sacrilege? (3) the quality (quaie sit?): is the act permitted, useful, excusable? This is the order of extenuating circumstances. To these three places, one occasionally adds a fourth place, the order of quibbling: this is the state (status) of objection (the domain of the
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Genres</th>
<th>Audience</th>
<th>Adaptation</th>
<th>Object</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Reasoning (a)</th>
<th>Commonplaces</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>DELIBERATIVE</td>
<td>members of an assembly</td>
<td>to advise/harmful</td>
<td>useful/</td>
<td>future</td>
<td>exempla</td>
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<td>just/</td>
<td>past</td>
<td>enthmeme</td>
<td>real/not real</td>
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(a) This is a question of a dominant characteristic.

(b) This is a variety of induction, an exemplum oriented towards the exaltation of the person praised (by implicit comparisons).
Abrogation). The status causae set down, the probatio is exhausted; one proceeds from the theoretical elaboration of discourse (rhetoric is a technē, a speculative practice) to the discourse itself; one comes to the point where the "machine" of the orator, of the ego, must link itself to the machine of the adversary, which, for its part, will have made the same effort, done the same work. This linking, this engagement of gears, is clearly conflictual: it is the discemptatio, the point of friction of the two parties.

B.1.27. The subjective or moral proofs.

The entire probatio (the set of logical proofs, subject to the finality of conviction) having been examined, we must return to the original dichotomy which opened the field of the Inventio and go back to the subjective and moral proofs, those which depend on emotion. This is the province of psychological Rhetoric. Undoubtedly two names dominate it: Plato (one must find types of discourse adapted to types of souls) and Pascal (one must recover the interior movement of the thought of the other). As for Aristotle, he fully recognized a psychological rhetoric, but as he persisted in making it depend on a technē, it is a "projected" psychology: psychology such as everyone imagines it: not "that which goes on in the head" of the public, but what the public believes goes on in other people's heads: this is an endoxon, a verisimilar psychology, opposed to the "true"
(demonstrative) syllogism. Before Aristotle, technographs recommended taking into account psychological states such as pity (compassion); but Aristotle broke new ground by carefully classifying the passions, not according to what they are, but according to what one believes them to be: he did not describe them scientifically, but sought the arguments that one could use in terms of ideas of the public regarding the passions. The passions are expressly premises, places: the rhetorical "psychology" of Aristotle is a description of the eikos, of what is plausible according to the passions. The psychological proofs are divided into two broad groups: ethe (the characters, the tones, the airs) and pathe (the passions, the sentiments, the affects).

B.1.28. Ethe, the characters, the tones.

Ethē are the attributes of the orator (and not those of the public, pathe): these are the character traits that the orator must display to the audience (his sincerity matters little) to make a good impression: these are his airs. It is not, then a question of an expressive psychology, but of an imaginary psychology (in the psycho-analytical sense): I must signify that which I want to be for the other. This is why—in the perspective of that theatrical psychology—it is worth more to speak of tones than of characters: tone: in the musical and ethical sense.
that the word has in Greek music. **Ethos** in the proper sense is a connotation: the orator makes a statement and **at the same time** he says: I am this, I am not that. For Aristotle, there are three "airs," which together constitute the personal quality of the orator: (1) **phronesis**; this is the quality of those who deliberate well, those who weigh the **pros** and **cons** well: it is an objective wisdom, a displayed common sense; (2) **arete**: this is the show of a candor which does not fear its consequences and expresses itself with the help of direct purposes, impressions of a theatrical honesty; (3) **eunoia**: this is a matter of not shocking, not provoking, of being sympathetic (and perhaps even: **sympa**), of entering into an obliging complicity with respect to the audience. In short, while he speaks and unfolds the protocol of logical proofs, the orator must likewise say incessantly: follow me (**phronesis**), admire me (**arete**) and love me (**eunoia**).

B.1.29. *Pathe*, the sentiments.

*Pathe* are the affects of the one who listens (and not of the orator), such, at least, as he imagines them. Aristotle did not take them up in his account within the perspective of a **techné**, that is, as protases of argumentative chains: the distance which he marks with the **esto** \(^33\) (**let us admit that**) which precedes the description of each passion and which, as we have seen, is the operator of
the "plausible." Each passion is picked out in its habitus (the general dispositions which favor it), according to its object (for which one experiences it) and according to the circumstances which give rise to the "crystallization" (anger/composure, hatred/friendliness, fear/confidence, desire/rivalry, ingratitude/obligingness, etc.). We must stress this, because this is the mark of Aristotle's profound modernity, and in fact, the master dreamed of a sociology of the so-called mass culture: all these passions are intentionally taken in their banality: anger is what everyone thinks of as anger, the passion is only what one says of it: it is the pure intertextual, it is the "citation": (this is the way Paolo and Francesca understood it; they were in love with each other only for having read of Lancelot's loves). Rhetorical psychology is therefore completely contrary to a reductionist psychology, which attempts to see what is behind what people say and which claims to reduce the anger, for example, to another thing, more deeply concealed. For Aristotle, public opinion is the first and ultimate given. For him, there isn't any hermeneutic (to be decoded) idea; for him, the passions are fully developed pieces of language that the orator must simply know well; hence the idea of a grid of passions, not as a collection of essences but as a framework of opinions. For the reductionist psychology (which prevails today),
Aristotle substitutes (in advance) a classifying psychology, which characterizes "languages." It may seem very trite (and no doubt untrue) to say that young people get angry more easily than older people; but this platitude (and this error) becomes interesting if we understand that such a proposition is only one element in this general language of other people which Aristotle reconstructs, perhaps according to the mystery of Aristotelian philosophy: "universal opinion is the measure of the being" (Nicomachean Ethics, X.2.1173, a 1).

B.1.30. Semina probationum.

Thus ends the field or network of the Inventio, the heuristic preparation of the materials of discourse. We must now tackle the Oratio itself: the ordering of its parts (Dispositio) and its setting in words (Elocutio). What are the "programmatic" connections of the Inventio and the Oratio? Quintilian said it in a word (an image): he recommends arranging the "germs of proof" (semina quae, dam probationum spargere) as early as the narratio (that is before the argumentative part properly speaking). From the Inventio to the Oratio, then, there is a swarm of connections: one must scatter, then suppress, recapture, explode further. In other words, the materials of the Inventio are already pieces of language, set down in a state
of reversibility, which one must now put into a fatally irreversible order—that of discourse. Hence the second major operation of the techne: the Dispositio or treatment of the constraints of succession.

B.2. THE DISPOSITIO

We have seen that the position of the Dispositio (taxis) in the techne constitutes an important stake. Without returning to the problem, one would define the dispositio as the arrangement (either in the active sense, operative, or in the passive sense, reified) of the major parts of discourse. The best translation is perhaps: composition, bearing in mind that the compositio in Latin is something else: it refers uniquely to the arrangement of words within the phrase; as for the conlocatio, it designates the distribution of material within each part. According to an incremental syntagmatic, one has, then: the structure of the phrase (compositio), the structure of the part (conlocatio), the structure of the discourse (dispositio). The major parts of discourse were set down quite early by Corax (A.1.2), and their distribution has hardly varied since then. Quintilian named five parts (he split the third part into confirmatio and refutatio), Aristotle four: it is this division that we will adopt here.

B.2.1. The egressio.
Before enumerating these fixed parts, we must draw attention to the optional existence of a movable part: the egressio or digressio: it is a display piece, off the subject or connected to it by a very loose thread, and its function is to make the orator shine; more often than not, it is a eulogy to places or men (for example), the eulogy to Sicily in Cicero's Verres). This movable unit, beyond classification and, as it were, fluttering about—the origin of the ekphrasis in neo-rhetoric—is a vehicle for the spectacular, a sort of hallmark, of the signature of the "sovereign language" (the kuros of Gorgias, the "poetics" of Jakobson). However, just as a painting is always signed in the same place, so likewise the digressio ends by taking its place fairly regularly between the narratio and the confirmatio.

B.2.2 The paradigmatic structure of the four parts.

The Dispositio proceeds from a dichotomy which was previously, in other terms, that of the Inventio: animos impellere (to excite)/rem docere (to inform, to convince). The first term (the appeal to the sentiments) covers the exordium and the epilogue, in other words, the two extreme parts of the discourse. The second term (the appeal to facts, to reason) covers the narratio (relationship of facts) and the confirmatio (establishment of proofs or means of persuasion), in other words, the two median parts of the
discourse. The syntagmatic order, therefore, does not follow the paradigmatic order, and we are dealing with a chiastic construction: two sections pertaining to the "passions" frame a demonstrative block:

```
1  2  3  4
exordium  narratio  confirmatio  epilogue
```

We will treat the four parts according to the paradigmatic order: exordium/epilogue, narration/confirmation.

B.2.3. The beginning and the end.

The solemnization of beginnings and endings, of inaugurations and conclusions, is a problem which transcends rhetoric (rites, ceremonies, liturgies). The opposition of the exordium and the epilogue, under well-organized forms, is no doubt somewhat archaic; also, in developing itself, in secularizing itself, the rhetorical code has been induced to allow discourse without exordium (in the deliberative genre), according to the rule in medias res, and even to advise abrupt endings (Isocrates for example). In its canonical form, the opposition beginning/end allows for an unevenness: in the exordium, the orator must engage himself with prudence, reserve, moderation; in the epilogue, he no
longer has to control himself, he engages himself with depth, he puts into play all the resources of a great, touching performance [jeu].

B.2.4. The proem.

In archaic poetry, that of the aedes, the prooimon (proem) is that which preceded the song (chant) (oime): it is the prelude of the lyre players who, before the competition [concourse], loosen their fingers and thereby take advantage of the opportunity to gain favor with the jury in advance (there are vestiges of this in Wagner's Die Meistersinger). The oime is an old epic ballad: the narrator would begin to tell the story from a totally arbitrary moment: he would just as well have been able to "catch" it earlier or later (the story is "infinite"); the first words cut the potential thread of a narrative without origin. This arbitrariness of the beginning was marked by the words ex ou (from what): I begin from here: the aede of the Odyssey asks the Muse to sing of Ulysses' return from whatever moment it pleases her. The function of the proem is thus, in a way, to exorcize the arbitrariness of the very beginning. Why begin with this rather than that? Why cut in with the speech that Ponge (the author of the Proems) calls the analogical, unrefined magma? What is necessary at this knife edge is a softening, at this anarchy a formal decision: this is the Prooimon. Its apparent role is to
tame, as if beginning to speak, encountering language, were risking the unknown, the scandal, the monster. In each of us there is a terrifying solemnity in "breaking" silence (the other language)—except among certain blabbermouths who fling themselves into speech like Gribouille and "grab" it by force, no matter where: it is this which we will call "spontaneity." Such perhaps is the base from which the exordium of rhetoric, the regulated inauguration of discourse, proceeds.

B.2.5. The exordium.

Canonically, the exordium comprises two moments—I. The captatio benevolentiae, or the enterprise of the seduction of the listener, which is a matter of immediately gaining his good will by a proof of complicity. The captatio was one of the most stable elements of the rhetorical system (it is already flourishing in the Middle Ages and remains the same into our own time); it follows a very elaborate model coded according to the classification of cases: the means of seduction varies depending upon the connection between the case and the doxa, or current standard of opinion: (a) if the case is identified with the doxa, it is a matter of a "natural" case, of good form, it is of no use to submit the judge to each seduction, each pressure; this is the genre of the endoxon, the honestum; (b) if the case is in some way neutral with regard to the doxa, a positive action is
necessary to vanquish the inertia of the judge, to arouse his curiosity, to make him attentive (attentum); this is the genre of the adoxon, the humile; (c) if the case is ambiguous, for example if two doxai enter into conflict, it is necessary to obtain the favor of the judge, to make him benevolum, to make him lean to one side; this is the genre of the amphidoxon, the dubium; (d) if the case is complicated, obscure, it is necessary to lead the judge to follow you as he would a guide, a scout, to make him docilem, receptive, malleable; this is the genre of dysparakoloutheton, the obscurum; (3) finally, if the case is extraordinary, if it arouses astonishment in situating itself very far from the doxa (for example: pleading against a father, an old man, a child, a blind man, going against the human touch), a vague action (of connotation) toward the judge is no longer sufficient, a true remedy is necessary, but it must nonetheless be an indirect remedy, because it is not necessary to offend or overtly shock the judge: this is the insinuatio, an autonomous fragment (and no longer a simple tone) which places itself after the beginning. For example: pretending to be impressed by the adversary. Such are the modes of the captitio benevolentiae. II. The partitio, the second stage of the exordium, announces the divisions that one comes to adopt, the plan that one comes to follow (one can multiply the partitiones by putting one
at the beginning of each part); the advantage, says Quintilian, is that once one has the ending, the story never seems too long.

B.2.6. The epilogue.

How to tell when a discourse is finished? This is also as arbitrary as the beginning. A sign of the end, of the closure, is therefore necessary (so in certain manuscripts: *ci falet geste que Turolthus declinet*). This sign was rationalized under the alibi of pleasure (that which shows the degree to which the ancients would be conscious of the "ennui" of their discourse!). Aristotle indicated it, not in connection with the epilogue, but in connection with the periodic sentence: the sentence is a "pleasing" phrase, because it is the opposite of that which is unfinished. It is unpleasant, on the other hand, not to know what's coming, not to see the end of something. The epilogue (*peroratio, conclusio, cumulus, climax*) allows for two levels: (1) the level of "things" (*posita in rebus*): this is a matter of recapitulating and summing up (*enumeratio, rerum repetitio*); (2) the level of "sentiments" (*posita in affectibus*); this moving, maudlin conclusion was little used in Greece, where an usher would impose silence upon an orator who went too far or tugged at the heartstrings for too long; but in Rome, the epilogue was the occasion for great theatrics, for the advocate's gesture: revealing the accused surrounded by his
parents and children, producing a blood-stained dagger, bones pulled from the wound. Quintilian examined all these special effects.

B.2.7. The narratio.

The narratio (diegesis) is of course the narration of the facts involved in the case (since causa is the quaestio in that which is penetrated by the contingent), but this narration is conceived uniquely from the point of view of the proof, it is "the persuasive exposition of some fact or alleged fact." The narration, then, is not a narrative (in the romantic sense and as detached from the term), but an argumentative protasis. Consequently, it has two inevitable characteristics: (1) its nakedness: no digression, no prosopopoeia, no direct argumentation: there is no technē appropriate to the narratio; it must only be clear, credible, brief; (2) its functionalism: it is a preparation for the argumentation; the best preparation is that in which the meaning is hidden, in which the proofs are disseminated in imperceptible seeds (semina probationum). The narratio includes two types of elements: the facts and the descriptions.

B.2.8. Ordo naturalis/ordo artificialis.

In classical rhetoric the exposition of facts is subject to a single structural rule: that the connections be
plausible. But much later, during the Middle Ages, when Rhetoric was completely detached from the judiciary, the narratio became an autonomous genre and the arrangement of its parts (ordo) became a theoretical problem: this is the opposition of the ordo naturalis and the ordo artificialis.

"All order," says a contemporary of Alcuin, "is either natural or artificial. The order is natural if one can recount the facts in the same order as they occurred: the order is artificial if one starts not from the beginning of what has happened, but in the middle." This is the problem of the flashback. The ordo artificialis forces a violent cutting up of the sequence of facts, since it relies on movable, reversible units; it implies or produces a distinct particular, boldly displayed, since it destroys the (mythical) "nature" of linear time. The opposition of the two "orders" rests not on the facts but on the parts of discourse themselves: the ordo naturalis, therefore, is that which respects the traditional norm (exordium, narratio, confirmatio, epilogue), the ordo artificialis is that which upsets that order according to circumstances; paradoxically, (and this paradox is no doubt frequent), naturalis therefore means cultural, and artificialis means spontaneous, contingent, natural.

B.2.9. The descriptions.
Beside the strictly chronological—or diachronic, or diegetic—axis, the narratio permits an axis of aspect or duration, formed by a flowing sequence of states: the descriptions. These descriptions were strongly coded. There were primarily: the topographies, or descriptions of place; the chronographies, or descriptions of time, periods, ages; the prosopographies, or portraits. We know the fate of these "pieces" in our literature, outside of the judiciary. After all, in order to finish the narratio, one must point out that discourse can at times allow for a second narration: the first having been very brief, one takes it up again in detail, ("Here is how, in detail, what I have come to say happened"): this is the epidiegesis, the repetita narratio.

B.2.10. The confirmatio.

From the narratio, or account of the facts, follows the confirmatio, or account of the arguments: it is there that the "proofs" elaborated in the course of the inventio are stated. The confirmatio (apodeixis) can include three elements: (1) the propositio (prothesis): this is a definition brought in for the case, for the point of debate; it can be simple or complex depending on the charges. ("Socrates was accused of corrupting the youth and introducing new superstitions"); (2) the argumentatio, which is the account of convincing evidence; no particular
structure is recommended except this: one must begin with strong evidence, continue with weak proofs and end with very strong proofs; (3) at times, at the end of the confirmatio, the sustained discourse (oratio continua) is interrupted by a very lively dialogue with the opposing advocate or a witness: the other interrupts the monologue: this is the altercatio. This oratory episode was unknown to the Greeks; it is connected with the genre of the Rogatio, or accusatory interrogation (Quousque tandem, Catilina . . . ).

B.2.11. Other slices of discourse.

The very strong coding of the Dispositio (of which a deep furrow remains in the pedagogy of the "plan") amply attests that humanism, in its thinking on language, is greatly concerned with the problem of syntagmatic units. The Dispositio is one slice among others. Here are some of these slices, starting with the largest units: I. The discourse as a whole can form a unit, if one opposes it to other discourses; this is the case of classification by genres or by styles; this is also the case of figures of subject, the fourth type of figures after the tropes, the figures of speech and the figures of thought: the figures of subject seized all of the oratio; Dionysius of Halicarnassus distinguished three of them: (1) the direct (say what you mean to say), (2) the oblique (circuitous discourse: Bossuet advising the king, under the pretext of religion), (3) the
contrary (antiphrasis, irony); II. the parts of the Dispositio (we know what they are); III. the piece, the fragment, the ekphrasis or descriptio (we know this as well); IV. in the Middle Ages, the atriculus is a developing unit: in a comprehensive work, a collection of Disputationes or Summa, one gives a summary of the disputed question (introduced by utrum); V. the periodic sentence is a sentence structured according to an organic model (with a beginning and an end); it has no less than two members (elevation and abasement, tasis and apotasis) and no more than four. Immediately under (and truly, from the periodic sentence on) begins the sentence, the object of the compositio, the technical operation which calls forth the Elocutio.

B.3. THE ELOCUTIO

The arguments having been found and divided into the parts of discourse by large blocks, it remains to "put them into words": this is the function of that third part of the techne rhetorike which is called lexis or elocutio, to which one has the habit of abusively reducing rhetoric, because of the interest given in modern times to the figures of rhetoric, a part (but only part) of the Elocutio.

B.3.1. The evolution of the Elocutio.
In effect, the *elocutio* has evolved greatly since the origin of Rhetoric. Absent from Corax's classifications, it made its appearance when Gorgias decided to apply aesthetic criteria (coming from Poetry) to prose; Aristotle dealt with it less fully than the rest of rhetoric; it developed chiefly with the Romans (Cicero, Quintilian), it blossomed into spirituality with Dionysius of Halicarnassus and the anonymous author of *Peri Hypsous* and ended by absorbing all of Rhetoric, identified under the single species of the "figures." However, in its canonical state, the *elocutio* defines a field which bears upon all language: it includes at one and the same time our grammar (up to the heart of the Middle Ages) and that which we call *diction*, the theater of the voice. The best translation for *elocutio* is perhaps not *elocution* (which is too limited), but *enunciation*, or if need be *locution* (locutory activity).

B.3.2. The network.

The internal classifications of the *elocutio* were numerous undoubtedly for two reasons: first because this *technē* had to pass through different idioms (Greek, Latin, the Romance languages) by which each of them could bend the nature of the "figures"; next because the increasing promotion of that part of rhetoric was subject to terminological reinventions (made obvious by the delirious naming of figures). Here we will simplify this network.
The matrix opposition is that of the paradigmatic and the syntagmatic: (1) choose the words (electio, eclogue), (2) assemble them (synthesis, compositio).

B.3.3 The "colors."

The electio implies that one can substitute one term in the language for another: the electio is possible because synonymy is part of the system of language (Quintilian). The speaker [locuteur] can substitute one signifier for another and he can even produce a second meaning (connotation) in that substitution. All kinds of substitutions, some of them being the volume and the manner, are of the Tropes ("conversions"), but the meaning of the word is ordinarily restricted so that it can be opposed to the "Figures." The truly general terms which indiscriminately take in all classes of substitutions are "ornaments" and "colors." By their own connotations, these two words demonstrate well how the ancients conceived of language: (1) there is a naked base, a natural level, a normal state of communication, starting from which one can elaborate a very complicated, ornate expression, marked by a greater or lesser distance with regard to the original ground level. This postulate is decisive, because it seems that even today it determines all attempts to revitalize rhetoric. Recovering rhetoric: this is fatally believing in the existence of a gap between two states of language;
conversely, condemning rhetoric is always done in the name of a denial of the hierarchy of languages, among which one admits only of a "fluctuating hierarchy" and not a fixed one, founded in nature; (2) the second layer (rhetoric) has a function of animation: the "natural" state of language is inert, the second state is "lively": colors, lights, flowers (colores, lumina, flores); the ornaments tend toward the feelings, the body; they make speech pleasurable; there is a venustas of language (Cicero); (3) at times the colors are used "to spare modesty the difficulty of a statement which is too naked," Quintilian); to put it another way, as a possible euphemism, the "color" indexes a taboo, that of the "nudity" of the language: like the rouge which tints the face, color exposes the desire to hide the object: this is the same dialectic as clothing (schema means costume, figura appearance).

B.3.4. The taxonomic rage.

That which we call by the generic term the figures of rhetoric, in all historical rigor and for the purpose of avoiding the ambiguity between the Tropes and the Figures, it would be better to call ornaments. Throughout the centuries they were and still are today the object of a veritable taxonomic rage, indifferent to the mockery which very soon sprang up nonetheless. It seems that one can do nothing with these figures of rhetoric other than name them
and classify them: from certain terms, to either very banal forms (epithet, reticence) or very barbaric forms (anantapodoton, epanadiplose, tapinose, etc.) to dozens of groupings. Why this fury for cutting apart, for name-giving, this sort of intoxicated activity by the language on the language? Undoubtedly (this is at least a structural explication) because rhetoric tries to codify speech (and not just language either), that is to say the very space where, in principal, the code stops. Saussure encountered this problem: what to make of the stable combinations of words, of the fixed syntagms which partake of language and speech, of structure and combination at the same time? It is to this extent that Rhetoric prefigured a linguistics of speech (other than statistics), a contradiction in terms, that which lost its breath trying to keep the "manners of speech" within a more and more complex network, wanting to control the uncontrollable: the mirage itself.

B.3.5. Classification of ornaments.

All these ornaments (hundreds of them) have been divided for all time according to several binary groups: tropes/figures, grammatical tropes/rhetorical tropes, figures of grammar/figures of rhetoric, figures of speech/figures of thought, tropes, figures of diction. From one author to another, the classifications are contradictory: here the tropes are opposed to the figures, there they form
part of them; for Lamy hyperbole is a trope, for Cicero it is a figure of thought, etc. A word on the three most frequent oppositions: I. Tropes/ Figures. This is the most ancient of the distinctions, that of antiquity; in the Trope, the conversion of meaning turns on a unity, on a word (for example, catachresis: the wing of a windmill, the arm of a chair), in the Figure, the conversion requires several words, all together a little syntagm (for example, the periphrasis: the comforts of conversation). This opposition would correspond roughly with that of the system and the syntagm. II. Grammar/Rhetoric. The grammatical tropes are conversions of meaning that have passed into current usage to the extent that one no longer "senses" the ornament: electricity (a metonym for electric light), a cheerful house (a trivialized metaphor), even when the rhetorical tropes are felt to be extraordinary: nature's wash, for the Flood (Tertullian), the snow of the keyboard, etc. This opposition would correspond roughly to that of denotation and connotation. III. Speech/Thought. The opposition of figures of speech and figures of thought is the most common; figures of speech exist where the figure would disappear if one were to change the words (such as the anacoluthon, which is contained only in the order of the words: The nose of Cleopatra, if it had been shorter, the face of the world . . .); the figures of thought always subsist, whatever words
one decides to use (such as the antithesis: I am the wound and the knife, etc.); this third opposition is mentalistic; it brings together the signifieds and the signifiers, the one being able to exist without the other. It is still possible to conceive of new classes of figures, and indeed one can assert that any one engaged in rhetoric would be tempted to classify the figures in his turn and in his way. However, we are still lacking (but perhaps it is important to produce) a purely operative classification of the principal figures: the dictionaries of rhetoric in effect allow us to know easily what a chleuasmus, an epanalepsis, a paralipsis is, to look up the often very obscure name, for example; but no book permits us to take an inverse path, to get from the sentence (found in a text) to the name of the figure; if I read "so much marble trembling over so much shadow," what book will tell me that this is a hypallage if I don't already know it? We lack an inductive instrument useful for analyzing classical texts according to their own meta-language.

B.3.6. Recalling some figures.

There is clearly no need to furnish a list of the "ornaments" recognized by ancient rhetoric under the general name of "figures": there are dictionaries of rhetoric. Nonetheless I think it useful to recall the definition of ten or so figures taken at random so as to give a concrete
perspective to these few remarks on the electio. I. Alliteration is a closely related repetition of consonants in a short syntagm (Le zele de Lazare); when the tones are repeated, it is apophonia (Il pleure dans mon coeur comme il pleut sur la ville). It has been suggested that alliteration is often less intentional than critics and stylists tend to believe: Skinner has shown that in Shakespeare's sonnets alliteration does not exceed what one can expect in a normal frequency of letters and groups of letters. (2) Anacoluthon is an occasionally faulty rupture in construction (Beyond the sight of a great, well-ordered army, the Macedonians, were astonished when . . .). (3) Catechresis takes place when language, having no "proper" term at its disposal, one must use a "figure" (the wings of a windmill). (4) Ellipsis consists of omitting syntactic elements up to the point where intelligibility can be affected (I loved you fickle, what would I have done faithful?); ellipsis was often reputed to represent a "natural" state of language: this would be the "normal" mode of speech in pronunciation, in syntax, in the dream, in children's language. (5) Hyperbole consists of exaggerating: either in augmentation (auxesis: to go faster than the wind), or in diminution (tapinose: slower than a tortoise). (6) Irony or Antiphrasis consists of implying something other than what one says (this is a connotation);
as F. de Neufchateau says: "There is a tenderness in the words she chooses/but another meaning in the tone she uses."

(7) Periphrasis arises from a detour of language that one makes to avoid a taboo expression. If the periphrasis is understated, one calls it perissology. (8) Reticence or aposiopesis marks an interruption of discourse due to an abrupt change in feeling (the Virgilian Quos ego). (9) Suspension delays the text, by adding incidental clauses before the resolution: this is a suspense at the level of the sentence.

B.3.7. The Literal and the Figurative.

As we have seen, the entire structure of the "figures" rests upon the idea that there are two languages, one literal and one figurative, and that consequently, Rhetoric, in its elocutionary part, is a table of the deviations of language. From antiquity on, the meta-rhetorical expressions which attest to this belief are innumerable: in the elocutio (the field of figures), the words are "transported," "diverted," "removed" from their normal, familiar environment. Aristotle sees in this a taste for disorientation: one must "keep a distance from common expressions . . . : in this respect, we experience the same impressions as in the presence of strangers: style must be given a foreign air, because what comes from afar excites admiration." There is accordingly a relationship of
strangeness between the "current words," which we all use (but who is the "we"?), and the "distinctive (strange) words" in daily usage: "barbarisms" (the words of strange people), neologisms, metaphors, etc. For Aristotle, a mixture of the two terminologies is necessary, for if one makes use only of current words, one produces a vulgar discourse, and if one makes use only of distinctive words, one has an enigmatic discourse. From the domestic/foreign and the normal/strange, the opposition has slid to the literal/figurative. What is the literal meaning? "It is the initial meaning of the word." (Du Marsais): "When the word signifies that for which it was originally established." However, the literal meaning does not have to be the most ancient (the archaism is disorienting), but the meaning immediately prior to the creation of the figure: the literal, the true, once again, the preceding (the Father). In classical Rhetoric, the preceding found itself neutralized. Hence the paradox: how can the literal meaning be the "natural" meaning and the figurative the "original" meaning?

B.3.8. The function and origin of the Figures.

One can distinguish two groups of explications here. I. Explications by function: (a) the second language arises from the necessity to euphemize, to circumvent taboos; (b) the second language is a technique of illusion (in the same
sense as a painting: perspective, shading, visual deception); it redistributes things, facts appear different from what they are or as they are but more impressive; (c) there is an inherent pleasure in the association of ideas (we say: a ludic pleasure). II. Explications by origin: these explications begin from the postulate that the figures exist "in nature," that is, in the "people" (Racine: "One only has to listen to a dispute between two lower-class women: what a wealth of figures! They squander metonymy, catachresis, hyperbole, etc.")); and F. de Neufchateau: "In the city, at the court, in the fields, at the mart, the figures exhale the eloquence of the heart." How then to reconcile the "natural" origin of the figures with their secondary, posterior position in the structure of language? The classical response is that the art chooses the figures (in accordance with an accurate assessment of their distance, which must be measured), it does not create them; in short, the figurative is an artificial combination of natural elements.


In leaving this last hypothesis (the figures have a "natural" origin), we can distinguish two more types of explication. The first is mythical, romantic, in the broadest sense of the term: "literal" language is poor; it does not satisfy all needs, but it is supplemented by the
irruption of another language, "the divine blossoming of the spirit which the Greeks called Tropes," (Hugo); or again (Vico according to Michelet), Poetry being the original language, the four great archetypal figures were invented in the course of nature, not by writers, but by humanity in its poetic age: Metaphor, then Metonymy, then Synecdoche, then Irony; originally they were employed naturally. How then could they have become the "figures of rhetoric"? Vico gives a highly structural response: when abstraction was born, that is to say when the "figure" found itself caught in a paradigmatic opposition with another language.

B.3.10. The language of the passions.

The second explication is psychological: it is that of Lamy and the classicists: the figures are the language of the passions. The passions distort one's point of view on things and require peculiar words: "If men conceived all things which occur to their spirit simply, as they are in themselves, they would speak of them all in the same manner: geometers all speak the same language" (Lamy). This is an interesting viewpoint, for if the figures are the "morphemes" of the passions, we can tell through the figures what the classical taxonomy of the passions is, especially the amorous passions from Racine to Proust. For example, the exclamation corresponds to the sudden abduction of speech, to emotional aphasia; the doubt, the dubitation (the
name of a figure) corresponds to the torment of uncertainty of conduct (What to do? this? that?), to the difficulty of reading the other person’s "signs"; the ellipsis corresponds to the censure of everything that generates passion; the paralipsis (to say that one is not going to say what one finally ends up saying) corresponds to the resumption of the "scene," the spirit to offend; repetition corresponds to the obsessive preoccupation with "good reasons"; hypotyposis corresponds to the scene which one imagines vividly, to the inner fantasy, to the mental scenario (desire, jealousy), etc. One therefore understands better how the figurative can be a language which is at the same time natural and secondary: it is natural because the passions are natural; it is secondary because morality demands that these same passions, although "natural," be kept at a distance, placed in the region of the Fault; it is because, for the classicist, "nature" is bad, the figures of rhetoric are at the same time both justified and suspect.

B.3.11. The compositio.

We must now return to the primary opposition, that which serves as the origin of the network of the Elocutio: the compositio, the associative field of words in the sentence, stands opposed to the electio, the substitutive field of ornaments. We will not take sides here on the linguistic definition of the "sentence": for us it is merely
that unit of discourse which is intermediate between the
pars orationis (the major part of the oratio) and the figura
(a small groups of words). Ancient Rhetoric codified two
types of "construction": (1) a "geometric" construction:
that of the periodic sentence (Aristotle): "a sentence
having in itself a beginning, an end, an a range that one
could easily grasp"; the structure of the sentence depends
on an internal system of commas (individual characters) and
colons (sections); the number of them is variable and open
to dispute; in general, one needs 3 or 4 colons, subject to
opposition (1/3 or 1-2/3-4); the frame of reference of this
system is organic (the in-and-out motion of breathing) or
sportive (the sentence reproduces the ellipsis of the
stadium: a journey out, a curve, a trip back); (2) a
"dynamic" construction (Dionysius of Halicarnassus): in this
case the sentence is conceived as a sublimated periodic
sentence, animated, transcended by "movement"; it is no
longer a matter of a trip out and a trip back, but of an
ascent and a descent; this sort of "swing" is more important
than the choice of words: it depends on a sort of innate
sense of the writer. This "movement" has three modes: (1)
brutal, hard-edged (Pindar, Thucydides), (2) smooth,
encased, lubricated (Sappho, Isocrates, Cicero), (3) mixed,
the reserve of undecided cases.

Thus ends the rhetorical network—since we have
decided to leave out those parts of the techne rhetorike which are strictly theatrical, hysterical, bound to the voice: actio and memoria. The slightest historical conclusion would exceed the purely didactic intention of this simple handbook (moreover, there would be some irony in my constructing a second meta-language, which we have just used for a peroration which originates from the first meta-language). However, in taking leave of ancient Rhetoric, I would like to say what endures for me personally of this memorable voyage (the descent in time, the descent into the network, as of a double river). "What endures for me" means: the questions that come to me from that ancient empire in my present work, and which, having once approached Rhetoric, I am no longer able to evade.

First the conviction that many features of our literature, our education, our institutions of language (and is there a single institution without language?) would be clarified or understood differently if we thoroughly knew (that is to say, if we would not censure) the rhetorical code which gave its language to our culture; neither a technique, nor an aesthetic, nor a morality of Rhetoric is any longer possible, but a history? Yes, a history of Rhetoric (as research, as book, as education), extended by a new way of thinking (linguistics, semiology, historical science, psychoanalysis, Marxism), is necessary today.
Next this idea that there is a sort of obstinate agreement between Aristotle (from whom rhetoric originates) and the so-called mass culture, as if Aristotelianism, dead since the Renaissance as philosophy and as logic, dead as an aesthetics since Romanticism, has survived in a degraded, diffuse, inarticulate state in the cultural experience of Occidental societies—an experience founded through democracy on an ideology of "the greatest number," the majority rule, the current opinion: all this indicates that a sort of Aristotelian vulgate still defines a type of trans-historic Occident, a civilization (our own) which is that of the endoxa: how does one avoid the evidence that Aristotle (poetics, logic, rhetoric) furnishes a complete, analytic grid for all language—narrative, discursive, argumentative—which is conveyed by "mass communication," a complete analytic grid (from the notion of "verisimilitude") and that he represents this optimal homogeneity of a meta-language and a language-object which can define an applied science? In a democratic regime, Aristotelianism would therefore be the best of cultural sociologies.

Finally, this statement, rather troubling in its brevity, that all our literature, formed by Rhetoric and sublimated by Humanism, has issued from a politico-judicial practice (unless we hold to the mistaken view which limits Rhetoric to the "figures"): in that arena where the most
brutal conflicts—of money, property, social class—are taken up, contained, domesticated, and maintained by the power of the State; where the institution regulates feigned speech and codifies all recourse to what is significant; it is there where our literature is born. This is why to let Rhetoric fall to the level of a fully and simply historical object--to claim, in the name of the text, of writing a new application of language--and never to cut oneself off from revolutionary knowledge--these are one and the same pursuit.

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NOTES


3 There are numerous obscene jokes on the *casus* and *conjunctio* (which are in fact grammatical terms) of which this drawn out metaphor borrowed from *A Thousand and One Nights* can give an idea: "He used the preposition in the correct construction and joined the subordinate clause with the conjunction, but his spouse fell like the nominal ending before the genitive." More nobly, Alain de Lille explains that humanity commits barbarisms in the union of the sexes, the *metaplasm* (abuses) which infringe upon the rules of Venus; man falls into the *anastrophes* (inversions of construction); in his folly, he goes as far as the *tmesis* (Curtius, 512-513); likewise Calderón commenting upon the situation of a woman spied upon while she goes to see her lover, "It is a great barbarism of love to go to see and be seen, because, like a bad grammarian, it make a passive person out of an active person." One knows in which anatomical sense P. Klossowski revived the terms of the scholastic (*untrumsit. sed contra. vacuum. quidest*; "the quidest of the inspectress"). It goes without saying that the collusion between grammar (or rhetoric or scholastics) and the erotic is not only "funny"; it traces with precision and gravity a transgressive place where two taboos are raised: that of language and that of sex.


5 Atticism: this ethnocentrism is evidently connected to that which one could call the racism of class: one must not forget that the "classical" expression ("classicism")
has as its origin the opposition proposed by Aulus Gellius (second century) between the author *classicus* and the *proletarius*: the allusion to the constitution of Servius Tullius who divided citizens according to their wealth into five classes, the first of which formed the *classici* (the *proletarii* was beyond class); therefore *classique* means etymologically: that which pertains to the social "upper crust" (wealth and power).

6 T.N. Robert lists an "acroamatique: an oral lesson, the teaching of Aristotle," vol. 1, 44. There is no similar listing in the Oxford English Dictionary.

7 There was a mnemonic list of the seven arts: *Gram(matica)* loquitur. *Dia(lectica)* vera docet. *Rhe(torica)* verba colorat. *Mu(sica)* canit. *Ar(ihetmetica)* numerat. *Ge(ometria)* ponderat. *As(tronomia)* colit astra. An Allegory by Alain de Lille (twelfth century) accounts for the system in all its complexity: the Seven Arts are summoned in order to furnish a carriage for **Prudentia**, which seeks to guide man: **Grammatica** furnishes the pole, **Logica** (or **Dialectica**) the axle, which **Rhetorica** adorns with jewels; the quadrivium furnishes the four wheels, the horses are the five senses harnessed by **Ratio**: the carriage goes toward the saints, Mary, God; when the limits of human power are reached, **Theologia** takes over for **Prudentia** (education is redemption.

8 The phantom is always on the prowl. Outside of France today, in certain countries where it is necessary, by opposition to a colonial past, to reduce French to the status of a foreign language, one hears it affirmed that it must be taught, that is, only the French language, not the literature: as if there were a barrier between language and literature, as if language were here and not there, as if one could hold back some part, beyond which there were simply inessential supplements, whence literature.

9 "**Suprema manus apponit, opusque sororum Perficit atque semel factum perfectius ornat.**" (Rhetoric applies the finishing touches, completes the work of her sisters and embellishes the act in a most accomplished fashion.)

10 The wheel of Virgil is a figurative classification of the three "styles": each of the three sectors of the wheel gathers together a homogeneous ensemble of terms and symbols:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>AENEID</strong></th>
<th><strong>BUCOLICS</strong></th>
<th><strong>GEORGICS</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>gravis stylus</td>
<td>humilis stylus</td>
<td>mediocrus stylus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>miles dominans</td>
<td>pastor otiosus</td>
<td>agricola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hector, Ajax</td>
<td>Tilyrus, Meliboeus</td>
<td>Triptolemus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>equus</td>
<td>ovis</td>
<td>bos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gladius</td>
<td>baculus</td>
<td>aratrum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>urbs, castrum</td>
<td>pascua</td>
<td>ager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>laurus, cedrus</td>
<td>fagus</td>
<td>ponius</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


12 In pointing out certain ancient sources of the Middle Ages, one must recall that the unrivalled intertextual foundation, if you will, is Aristotle, and even, in a sense, Aristotle over against Plato. Plato was transmitted partially by St. Augustine and in the twelfth century fostered the school of Chartres (a "literary" school, as opposed to the logical, Aristotelian school of Paris) and the Abbey of St. Victor; yet in the thirteenth century, the only genuine translations were those of the Phaedrus and the Meno, which were moreover little known. In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, a bitter struggle arose against Aristotle in the name of Plato (Marsilio Ficino and Giordano Bruno). As for Aristotle, he is introduced into the Middle Ages on two occasions: the first time, in the fifth and sixth centuries, partially by Martinus Capella, the Categories of Prophyry, Boethius; the second time, in full force, in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries: in the ninth century all of Aristotle has been translated into Arabic; in the twelfth century, one had at one's disposal integral translations, either in Greek or in Arabic: this is the massive intrusion of the Posterior Analytics, the Topics, the Refutations, the Physics and the Metaphysics; Aristotle is Christianized (St. Thomas). The third introduction of Aristotle will be that of his Poetics in the sixteenth century in Italy and in the seventeenth century in France.

13 The death of Christ on the cross is itself assimilated in the scenario of the Disputatio (today some would find this reduction of the Passion to a school exercise a sacrilege; others, on the contrary, would admire the liberty of spirit of the Middle Ages, which would never breech any taboo against the "drama" of intellect): Circa tertiam vel sextam ascendunt magistri (in theologa) cathedram suam ad disputandum et querunt unam questionem.
Cui questioni respondet unus assistentium. Post cuius responionem magister determinat questionem, et quando vult ei defferre et honorem facere, nihil aliud determinat quam quod dixerat respondens. Sic fecit hodie Christus in cruce, uni ascendit ad disputandum; et proposuit unam questionem Deo Parti: Eli, Eli, lamma sabachtani, Deus, Deus meus, quid me dereliquisti? Et Pater resondit: Ha, Fili mi, opera manuum tuarum ne despicias: non enim Pater redemit genus humanum sine te. Et ille respondens ait: Ha, Pater, bene determinasti questionem meam. Non determinabo eam post responsionem tuam. Non sicut ego volo, sed sicut tu vis. Fiat voluntas tua. (Around the third or sixth hour, the master (in theology) takes the pulpit in order to dispute and pose a question. One of the assistants then responds to this question. Following his response, the master settles the question, and when he wants to confer an honor on him, he says nothing other than what the respondent has said. This was what Christ did on the cross one day, when he yielded to dispute, posing a question to God the Father: Eli, Eli, lamma sabachtani, My God, my God why have you forsaken me? And the Father responds: my Son, do not doubt the work of your hands, because the Father cannot redeem mankind without you. And Christ responds: my Father, you have answered my question well. I can say nothing after your response, etc.) [T.N. There is no such dialogue between the Father and Son in any of the canonical Gospels, and a thorough check of concordances of the Apocrypha turned up nothing either. This dialogue may come from some Latin tract on teaching rhetoric.]


17 (The sophistic of no among the mystics: "to belong to everything, be careful to belong to nothing in respect to nothing.") "By an easily explained paradox, this destructive logic is pleasing to conservatives: that is


20 "The disappearance of traditional Rhetoric has created a void in the humanities, and stylistics has already gone a long way to fill this void. In fact, it would not be wrong to describe stylistics as a 'new rhetoric,' adapted to the models and exigencies of modern studies in linguistics and literature." S. Ullmann, *Language and Style*, 130.


22 An example of the *exemplum* given by Quintilian: "The flute players who had retreated from Rome were called back by a decree of the Senate; all the more reason to remember the great citizens who have deserved well of the Republic and whom the misfortunes of the times have forced into exile": a general link in the inductive chain: the class of utilitarian people, first driven out then called back.

23 *Exemplum a contrario*: "These pictures, these statues that Marcellus returned to the enemies, Verres stole from allies." (Cicero).

24 An example of the parable taken from a Socratic discourse: one must not chose magistrates by lot any more than athletes and pilots.


26 An extended epicheireme: The whole *Pro Milone* by Cicero: 1) killing those whom we set traps for is permitted,
2) proof drawn from natural law, the rights of the people, the exempla, 3) Clodius set a trap for Milo, 4) proof drawn from facts, 5) Milo is therefore permitted to kill Clodius.

27 The maxim (gnomé, sententia) is a formula which expresses the general, but only the general which has actions (those which are chosen or avoided) as its object; for Aristotle, the foundation of the gnomé is always the eikos, in accordance with his definition of the enthymeme by the content of the premises; but for the academics, who define the enthymeme by its "truncation," the maxim is essentially an "abridgment": "it therefore happens sometimes that one encompasses two propositions in a single proposition: the enthymematic sentence" (for example: Mortal, do not harbor an immortal hatred).

28 T.N. This kind of discovering is quite similar to what Michael Polanyi describes as "tacit knowing" in the first chapter of The Tacit Dimension (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Co., 1966).

29 An example of an apt abridgment: this line from Medea by Ovid, "which contains a very elegant enthymeme": Servare potui, perdere an passim rogas? I was able to save you, therefore you could die. (That which can be saved can die, now I can save you, therefore you could die.)

30 These topical grids are stupid; they have nothing whatsoever to do with "life," "truth," and there has been good reason to banish them from modern teaching, etc. Without doubt: still the "subjects" (of obligation, of dissertation) must follow this great movement. At the moment I write this, I mean that one of the "subjects" for the final diploma is something like this: Must one respect one's elders? A stupid subject, an indispensible topic.

31 The excusatio propter infirmitatem still reigns abundantly in our writing. Witness this joking excusatio of Michel Cournot (Nouvelle observateur, 4 March, 1965): "I am not laughing this week, the Gospel is my subject, and why not say it at once, I'm not up to it, etc."

32 Two examples of adynaton:
Dellile: Soon the black crow unites with the swallow; Soon the unfaithful dove will go without dread To her love, far from the marriage bed And without fear will give her heart and fidelity To the savage sparrow hawk, his heart and honor.
Theophile de Viau: This brook flows backwards in its course,
An ox climbs the belltower,
Blood runs from this rock,
An asp mates with a she-bear.
At the top of this old tower
A serpent tears open a vulture;
Fire burns inside the ice,
The sun has become black,
I see the moon falling,
This tree has left its place.

33 T.N. Elsewhere Barthes translates this as "It may be," which seems to work well here also.

34 T.N. "Aedes, n. m. (Gr. aiodos, singer). A poet-singer in ancient Greece. Orpheus was an aede." Robert vol. 1, 58. There is no listing for this item in the Oxford English Dictionary.

35 T.N. An English example might be: "Borne on the bier with white and bristly beard." In any case, the English tradition here is quite unlike the French.

36 T.N. The numbers in the original text are incorrect. I have corrected them here.
APPENDIX I

RHETORIC: CHRONOLOGY

Before Christ

5th century

(480-460)
--Sicily: rhetoric taught.
--Corax: first division of the Oratio.
--Gorgias at Athens: Prose rhetorified.
--Hippias of Elis: everyday culture opposed to Philosophy: distant origin of the Liberal Arts of the Middle Ages.

4th century

(395-375)
--Plato: dialogues concerning Rhetoric.
(329-323)
--The Rhetoric of Aristotle.
--Zeno of Citium, Greek Stoicism and philosophical grammar.

3rd-2nd century

--The Alexanderians: Quarrel between the Analogists and the Anomologists. (The Analogists postulate that grammar is rule-governed and that this regularity reflects the regularity of the world and the spirit. The Anomologists searched for irregularities, exceptions.)

1st century

(116-27)
--Varro: a) mediation in the quarrel between the Analogists and the Anomologists. b) Revival of the liberal disciplines.
(107-43)
--Cicero: practice of Aristotelian rhetoric.
(ca. 85)
--Rhetorica ad Herennium.
(65-8)
--Horace: The Art of Poetry.
(43 B.C.-A.D. 16)
--Ovid: fusion of Rhetoric and Poetry.
After Christ

1st century

(40-118) --Quintilian: pedagogy of Aristotelian
rhetoric.
(45-125) --Plutarch: moralization of rhetoric.
(55-120) --Tacitus: unification of all the arts
of discourse under the name of
eloquentia.

2nd century

   --The Second Sophistic or Neo-Rhetoric.
   Asianism against Atticism.

3rd century

   --Prophrv: Eisagoge (Categories): introduction to Aristotle's logic.

4th century

(310-393) --Ausonius: transmits Neo-Rhetoric to
the Middle Ages.
(ca. 350)   --Donatus, grammarian.
(354-430)   --St. Augustine: Christian Rhetoric.

5th century

   --Sidonius Apollinaris: transmits Neo-
Rhetoric to the Middle Ages.
   (ca. 420)   --Martianus Capella: the establishing of
   the Seven Liberal Arts.
   (end of 5th c.,
beginning of
6th c.)   --Priscian, grammarian.

6th century

(480-524)   --Boethius: the first entry of
Aristotle: logic limited.
(490-575)   --Cassiodorus: Christianization of the
Liberal Arts and notably the figures
of Rhetoric.
7th century
(570-636)  --Isadore of Seville: (Etymology); confirmation of the Trivium.

8th century
(673-735)  --Bede: Rhetoric applied systematically to the Bible.

9th century
--Carolingian reform of the schools: Alcuin.
--Aristotle translated into Arabic.

11th century
--Scot Erigene and Realism.
--Roscelin and Nominalism.

12th century
--Second entry of Aristotle: the complete Logic.
(1096-1141) --New classifications of the Trivium under the dominance of Dialectica: Hugh of St. Victor.
(1128-1202) --Alain de Lille: Allegory of the Chariot.
(ca. 1150)  --Peter Helias: beginning of speculative grammar.

13th century
(1200)  --Founding of the University of Paris.
--The Modistae.

14th century
--Ars obligatoria, code of the Disputatio.
15th century

--Arts of the Second Rhetoric = poetic arts (from the point of view of verbal forms and not of composition).

16th century

--Entry of Aristotle's *Poetics* into Italy: Castelvetro, Scaliger, Veda.  
(1521) --Fabri's *Comprehensive Rhetoric*.  
(1555) --Ramus' (anti-Aristotelian) *Dialectic*.  
(1555) --Foclin's *Rhetoric*.  
(1592) --Nunez's rhetoric in Latin.  
--Rhetoric becomes the foundation of Jesuit education.

17th century

(ca. 1630) --Entry of Aristotle's *Poetics* into France.  
(1675) --Bernard Lamy: the Rhetoric or the Art of speaking.

18th century

(1730) --DuMarsais: Treatise of the Tropes.  
(1783) --Rhetoric of Hugh Blair.

19th century

(1807) --Gaillard: the Rhetoric for Young Ladies.  
--Fontanier: Classic manual for the study of the Tropes.

(end of the 19th century) --Gradual extinction of treatises on Rhetoric.
INDEX

Adynaton: B.1.21.
Alliteration: B.3.6.
Altercatio: B.2.10.
Anacoluthon: B.3.5.,6.
Antithesis: B.3.5.
Apophony: B.3.6.
Aposiopesis: B.3.6.
Arête: B.1.28.
Argumentatio: B.3.10.
Articulus: B.2.11.
Atechnoi (pisteis): B.1.4.,5.
Author: A.6.2.
Auxesis: B.3.6.

Captatio benevolentiae: B.2.5.
Catachresis: B.3.5.,6
Causa: B.1.25.
Chreia (Chrie): B.1.20.
Colon: B.3.11.
Commentator: A.6.2.
Commonplaces: B.1.21.,23.
Compilator: A.6.2.
Compositio: B.2.,B.3.2.,11.
Conclusio: B.2.6.
Confirmatio: B.2.10.
Conlocatio: B.2.
Controversiae: A.4.4.
Color: B.3.3
Cumulus: B.2.6

Declamatio: A.4.6.,A.5.2.
Descriptio: A.5.2, B.2.9.
Dictator: A.6.6.
Dispositio: B.2.
Disputatio: A.6.1, 10.
Dubium: B.2.5.

Egressio: B.2.1.
Ekphrasis: A.5.2.
Electio: B.3.2., 3.

Ellipsis: B.3.6.
Elocutio: B.3.
Enumeratio: B.2.6.
Entechnoi (pisteis): B.1.6.
Enthymeme: B.1.6., 10.
Epichiereme: B.1.11.
Epideictic: A.2.1.
Epidegesis: B.2.9.
Epilogue: B.2.3.,6.
Esto: B.1.15.,29.
Ethé: B.1.28.
Eunoia: B.1.28.
Exemplum: B.1.6.,7.
Exordium: B.2.3.,5.

Fable: B.1.7.
Figures: B.3.5.
Figures of Subject: B.2.11.

Genres: B.1.25.

Honestum: B.2.5.
Humile: B.2.5.
Hypallage: B.3.5.
Hyperbole: B.3.6.
Hypotyposis: B.3.10.

Imago: B.1.8.
Imperator: A.7.3.
Insinuatio: B.2.5.
Inventio: B.1., B.1.1.

Jusjurandum: B.1.4.

Lectio: A.4.6.
Maxim: B.1.11.
Metaphor: B.3.5.
Metonymy: B.3.5.

Narratio (part of discourse): B.2.7.
## Contents

0.1. THE RHETORICAL PRACTICE ......................................................... 3
0.2. THE EMPIRE OF RHETORIC .......................................................... 5
0.3. THE VOYAGE AND THE NETWORK .................................................. 7

A. THE VOYAGE .................................................................................. 7

A.1. THE BIRTH OF RHETORIC ............................................................. 7
A.1.1. Rhetoric and property ............................................................ 7
A.1.2. A great syntagmatic .............................................................. 8
A.1.3. Deceptive speech ................................................................. 9

A.2. GORGIAS, OR PROSE AS LITERATURE ........................................ 9
A.2.1. The codification of prose ...................................................... 10
A.2.2. The advent of elocutio .......................................................... 10

A.3. PLATO ....................................................................................... 11
A.3.1. The two rhetorics ................................................................. 11
A.3.2. Eroticized rhetoric ............................................................... 12
A.3.3. The division, the mark .......................................................... 12

A.4. ARISTOTELIAN RHETORIC .......................................................... 14
A.4.1. Rhetoric and Poetics ............................................................. 14
A.4.2. Aristotle’s Rhetoric ............................................................... 16
A.4.3. The Probable ................................................................. 17
A.4.4. The Rhetorica of Cicero ........................................................ 18
A.4.5. Ciceronian Rhetoric ............................................................. 20
A.4.6. The Works of Quintilian ......................................................... 21
A.4.7. Instruction in rhetoric .......................................................... 22
A.4.8. Writing ............................................................................... 23
A.4.9. Unified rhetoric ................................................................. 24

A.5. NEO-RHETORIC ........................................................................ 26
A.5.1. A literary aesthetic ............................................................... 26
A.5.2. The declamatio, the ekphrasis .............................................. 27
A.5.3. Atticism/Asianism ............................................................... 28

A.6. THE TRIVIUM ........................................................................... 28
A.6.1. The agonistic structure of education .................................... 28
A.6.2. Writing ............................................................................... 30
A.6.3. The Septennium ................................................................. 31
A.6.4. The diachronic play of the Trivium ...................................... 33
A.6.5. Rhetorica as supplement ...................................................... 34
A.6.6. Sermons, dictamen, poetic arts .......................................... 35
A.6.7. Donatus and Priscian ............................................................ 37
A.6.8. The Modistae ..................................................................... 38
A.6.9. Studium and Sacerdotium ................................................... 41
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A.6.10.</td>
<td>The disputatio</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.6.11.</td>
<td>The neurotic sense of the disputatio</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.6.12.</td>
<td>Restructuring of the Trivium</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.7.</td>
<td>THE DEATH OF RHETORIC</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.7.1.</td>
<td>The third introduction of Aristotle: the Poetics</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.7.2.</td>
<td>Triumphant and moribund</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.7.3.</td>
<td>The Jesuit teaching of Rhetoric</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.7.4.</td>
<td>Treatises and Manuals</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.7.5.</td>
<td>The end of Rhetoric</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.</td>
<td>THE NETWORK</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.0.1.</td>
<td>The demand for classification</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.0.2.</td>
<td>The divisions of classification</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.0.3.</td>
<td>The stake of classification: the site of the plan</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.0.4.</td>
<td>The rhetoric machine</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.0.5.</td>
<td>The five parts of the techné rhetoriké</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.1.</td>
<td>THE INVENTIO</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.1.1.</td>
<td>Discovery and not invention</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.1.2.</td>
<td>To convince/to move</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.1.3.</td>
<td>Technical proofs and proofs external to the technique</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.1.4.</td>
<td>Proofs outside of the techné</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.1.5.</td>
<td>The meaning of the atechnoi</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.1.6.</td>
<td>Proofs within the techné</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.1.7.</td>
<td>The exemplum</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.1.8.</td>
<td>The exemplary figure: the imago</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.1.9.</td>
<td>Argumenta</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.1.10.</td>
<td>The enthymeme</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.1.11.</td>
<td>Metamorphoses of the enthymeme</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.1.12.</td>
<td>The pleasure of the enthymeme</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.1.13.</td>
<td>The enthymematic premises</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.1.14.</td>
<td>The tekméron, the reliable indicator</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.1.15.</td>
<td>The eikos, the probable</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.1.16.</td>
<td>The séméion, the sign</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.1.17.</td>
<td>Practice of the enthymeme</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.1.18.</td>
<td>The place, topos, locus</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.1.20.</td>
<td>The Topic: a grid</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.1.21.</td>
<td>The Topic: a reserve</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.1.22.</td>
<td>Some Topics</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.1.23.</td>
<td>The commonplaces</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.1.24.</td>
<td>The special places</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.1.25.</td>
<td>The thesis and the hypothesis: causa</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.1.26.</td>
<td>Status causae</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>