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Why the Different Levels of Intervention?: Nigeria's Boko Haram and Somalia's al-Shabaab

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1. Introduction

Africa is home to countless terrorist organizations, including Boko Haram in Nigeria and al-Shabaab in Somalia. Both groups have received extensive coverage through news reports and academic texts. Such attentiveness has aimed to explain how both terrorist groups began, how they have flourished and their links to groups such as al-Qa'ida and the Islamic State. Understanding why both Nigeria and Somalia have received different levels of foreign intervention to help suppress their respective terrorist organizations is critical. In doing so, the relative strength of a state in the case of Nigeria (Boko Haram) and Somalia (al-Shabaab) influences the level of foreign intervention both countries receive to defeat their terrorist groups. The relative strength of a state either allows or limits the amount of foreign intervention.

State fragility and provisional indicators are used to understand how Nigeria is categorized as a weak state and Somalia a failed state.¹ This allows for a deeper understanding of the countries' strength. In answering the question, why Nigeria's Boko Haram and Somalia's al-Shabab have received different levels of foreign intervention the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) for Nigeria and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) for Somalia are the foreign interventions fighting the terrorist groups. The analysis of the foreign interventions shows evidence of variances regarding size and overall efforts.

Both Boko Haram and al-Shabaab receive distinct levels of foreign intervention for various possible reasons. In the case of Somalia, the relative state strength is "failed" which helps understand why such large and well-funded AMISOM response continues.² On the other hand, Nigeria's relative state strength is "weak" and has seen a smaller and less funded operation in the MNJTF.³ A few scholars and policymakers would like to move away from the Westphalian-state system in Africa to help alleviate issues such as those Nigeria and Somalia are facing. This recommendation might offer a solution but working within the current system is imperative in solving many of the issues plaguing Africa. Countries must strengthen themselves to tackle terrorist groups but also issues the Westphalian-state system has caused.

¹ Monty G. Marshall and Gabrielle Elzinga-Marshall, "State Fragility Index and Matrix 2016," *Center for Systemic Peace*, accessed May 26, 2018, <http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/SFImatrix2016c.pdf>.

² "AMISOM Mandate," *African Union Mission in Somalia*, accessed May 15, 2018, <http://amisom-au.org/amisom-mandate/>.

³ Joe Bavier, "Regional Armies Struggle in Last Push Against Boko Haram," *Reuters*, accessed May 12, 2018, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nigeria-security-niger-insight-idUSKCN10510I>.

2. Literature Review

Nigeria and Somalia have received differing levels of foreign intervention geared towards their respective groups, Boko Haram, and al-Shabaab. Identity fissures, oil production and the levels of corruption are a few plausible causes for the different levels of intervention. There are several ways to understand these alternative causes, which are valid and can serve in understanding the levels of intervention Boko Haram and al-Shabaab receive. Identity fissures are a possible cause for the difference in foreign intervention. According to Ian S. Spears, colonial rule left many Africans with no sense of identity, especially after the establishment of state boundaries.⁴ Western nations divided Africa during the Berlin Congress in 1884 which divided ethnic groups who lived across multiple regions placing them within a state. The ex-colonial powers established these boundaries to maximize their exploiting efforts and remain in control of the land and people. The consequences of colonialism and the drawing of borders have influenced the sense of identity in many African countries.

Differences between these groups can surface because they have been forced to live in a country. Such identity divisions in a country create a challenging environment for foreign intervention to take place, compared to a country that has an overarching identity. An intervening nation or coalition will have to account for the multiple groups who might have different cultures, practice different religions and speak distinct languages. If a country has an overarching identity, it can simplify the mission because there are fewer differences to address, resulting in fewer obstacles for foreign interventions. The complexity of identity can hinder or facilitate the level of foreign intervention.

Moreover, resources can explain the different levels of foreign intervention a country receives to tackle terrorist organizations. As Paul D. Williams points out, oil is the resource that pushes governments to try to have a keen hold on their country.⁵ Such take on oil influences a country's willingness to participate and allow foreign intervention. Countries that produce oil will have significant incentives and funds to control its territory, especially the oil-producing regions. The lack of oil lowers the possibilities of a government gaining funds from the sale and export of oil thus leading to the need for foreign intervention.

Corruption within a government's agencies and institutions impedes the advancements of foreign intervention. If government officials are corrupt, this can dissuade foreign intervention. As Simon Gray and Ibikunle Adeakin underline,

⁴ Ian S. Spears, "The State System and Africa's Permanent Instability," in *Routledge Handbook of African Security*, ed. James J. Hentz (Routledge, 2013): 117.

⁵ Paul D. Williams, "Resources," in *War and conflict in Africa*, (Polity Press, 2016): 100.

corruption can lead to failure in counter-terrorism efforts against a group.⁶ The existence of sympathizers of a terrorist group within the government makes counter-terrorist efforts difficult and counter-productive. This environment can cause foreign actors to think twice before intervening. However, if a state has lower levels of corruption, this will facilitate foreign intervention efforts. Foreign actors can maneuver and engage a terrorist group with a lower concern for operational security leaks.

For Nigeria and Somalia, Boko Haram and al-Shabaab pose significant threats. The different levels of foreign intervention that both countries have received are geared towards their terrorist groups and is understood through the creation of identities within a country who have been boxed in by the boundaries built by the ex-colonial powers. Nations that hold oil depend less on foreign intervention because there are more funds and therefore willingness to secure and control the oil-producing regions. A country with high levels of corruption can be perceived by other countries with distrust because of the unknown outcomes of a possible intervention, while a country that has lower levels of corruption can serve as a persuader for countries to intervene.

3. Technique

The use of a comparative research design serves to explore the cause of the differing levels of foreign intervention geared towards Boko Haram in Nigeria and al-Shabaab in Somalia. The use of the Most Similar System (MSS) is a helpful method to pinpoint the independent variable that best explains the cause of the dependent variable. According to Dr. Timothy C. Lim, "in methodological terms, the important point is that the characteristics the systems (countries) share can, in principle, be held constant and can, therefore, be considered irrelevant in explaining a particular social or political phenomenon that varies between or among the systems."⁷ In this case, the different levels of relative state strength explain the different levels of foreign intervention that Nigeria (Boko Haram) and Somalia (al-Shabaab) have received. As mentioned, this is possible by underlining the similarities between the two countries and their terrorist groups.

In comparing Nigeria (Boko Haram) and Somalia (al-Shabaab), there are various similarities between both countries and groups that help point to relative state strength as the cause of different levels of foreign intervention. Both groups

⁶ Simon Gray and Ibikunle Adeakin, "The Evolution of Boko Haram: From Missionary Activism to Transnational Jihad and the Failure of the Nigerian Security Intelligence Agencies," *African Security* 8, no. 3 (2015): 201.

⁷ Timothy C. Lim, *Doing Comparative Politics: An Introduction to Approaches and Issues* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2010), 34.

are Muslim and subscribe to Salafi jihadist ideology.⁸ Also, both groups have pledged allegiance to more capable and efficient terrorist organizations; Boko Haram is an ally of the Islamic State, and al-Shabaab is an ally of al-Qa'ida.⁹ Both groups operate in certain regions and neighboring countries. Boko Haram operates mainly in the northern regions of Nigeria while al-Shabaab mostly operates in the southern regions of Somalia.¹⁰ Outside of their respective countries, Boko Haram operates in Niger and Cameroon, and al-Shabaab in Kenya and Ethiopia.¹¹

The MSS method assists in ruling out these similarities as possible causes for the different levels of foreign intervention in Nigeria and Somalia. By eliminating these similarities as potential causes for the dependent variable, the MSS method narrows the possible independent variables. Subsequently, allowing for the emphasis on relative state strength as the cause of the various levels of foreign intervention.

4. Evidence

Therefore, it is essential to establish a baseline on how Nigeria's and Somalia's strength is rated. By comparing *State Fragility Index and Matrix* scores which provide an overall assessment of the strength of a country with provisional indicators, for example, poverty, education, and violence, this allows for a holistic understanding of the strength of a state. The relative strength of a state is understood through the coupling of state and provisional capacities. To understand how states are rated the Center for Systemic Peace provides a useful *State Fragility Index & Matrix* (SFIM), a baseline on how to rate Somalia and Nigeria. SFIM uses twelve indicators and provides three overall scores.

⁸ David Cook, "The Rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria," *Combating Terrorism Center at West Point Sentinel* 4, no. 9 (2011): 3.; Abukar Saneï, "Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram: Comparative Analysis and Policy Approaches," *Center for Policy Analysis & Research* (2015): 8.

⁹ Clionadh Raleigh, Roudabeh Kishi, Olivia Russel, Joseph Siegle and Wendy Williams, "Boko Haram vs. al-Shabaab: What do we know about their patterns of violence?" *The Washington Post*, accessed May 14, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/10/02/boko-haram-vs-al-shabaab-what-do-we-know-about-their-patterns-of-violence/?utm_term=.1247cb3351a9.

¹⁰ Paul D. Williams, "After Westgate: Opportunities and Challenges in the War Against al-Shabaab," *International Affairs* 90, no. 4 (2014): 914.; Manoj Harjani, "Nigeria's Fight against Boko Haram," *Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses* 5, no. 7 (2013): 12, accessed May 12, 2018, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/26351166>.

¹¹ "The Evolution of Militant Islamist Group Activity in Africa 2010-2016," *African Center for Strategic Studies*, January 10, 2017, accessed June 09, 2018, <http://africacenter.org/spotlight/evolution-militant-islamist-group-activity-africa-2010-2016/>.

The security, political, economic, and social effectiveness of a country are added to provide an overall effectiveness score.¹² SFIM also provides a legitimacy score by adding the security, political, economic, and social legitimacy of a country.¹³ The overall effectiveness score and legitimacy score are added, resulting in a country's *State Fragility Index and Matrix* score.¹⁴ This score is used to compare and chart all the countries. Furthermore, SFIM uses referent indicators that provide a country's most recent experience with armed conflict, regime type, net oil production or consumption, and whether a country has a Muslim majority or a non-Muslim majority population.¹⁵ Somalia has poor governance, experiencing armed conflict and has a Muslim majority and low levels of petroleum. While Nigeria has a more stable government, yet weak, experiencing armed conflict, a non-Muslim majority, and is a minor consumer of oil.

Understanding how each country measures at a provisional level is useful and paired with the state score provides a holistic understanding of both countries. Somalia takes first place as the most violent state in Africa, with most of the attacks taking place in the south of the country where 32% of deaths were related to al-Shabaab as of 2010.¹⁶ In Somalia "extreme poverty is highest in internally displaced person settlements, followed by the rural North West, Mogadishu, North West urban and lastly by rural and urban North East."¹⁷ The Somali population overall share a low education attainment rate, with madrassas filling most of the void.¹⁸ Madrassas are Islamic schools that have supplanted other education systems in Somalia

The Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) shows that the second most violent country in Africa is Nigeria with most of the violence taking place in the northern and central provinces of Nigeria.¹⁹ According to the Center of Global Development out of 36 states, 18 have poverty rates higher than the national poverty rate with 17 of those states located in the north.²⁰ The United

¹² Marshall and Elzinga-Marshall, 7.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Ibid., 8-10.

¹⁶ "Summary of Political Violence and Protest in Somalia," *Armed Conflict Location & Event Project*, January 2018, accessed May 20, 2018, <https://www.acleddata.com/dashboard/#706>.

¹⁷ "Somali Poverty Profile," *United Nations Children's Emergency Fund*, June 2017: 68.

¹⁸ "Country Profile: Somalia," *United Nations Economic Commission for Africa*, 2016: 16-17.

¹⁹ "Summary of Political Violence and Protest in Nigeria," *Armed Conflict Location & Event Project*, January 2018, accessed May 20, 2018, <https://www.acleddata.com/dashboard/#566>.

²⁰ Zuhumnan Dapel, "Poverty in Nigeria: Understanding and Bridging the Divide between North and South," *Center for Global Development*, April 6, 2018, accessed August 14, 2018,

Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) country profile on Nigeria underlines the lack of access to education in the north of the country.²¹ Northern Nigeria one of the poorest regions also lacks proper educational funds for youth. With many young people in the area and limited opportunities for education and high levels of poverty, Boko Haram poses as an enticing group to join.

Moreover, it is imperative to analyze the foreign interventions in both countries. Five countries constitute AMISOM: Burundi, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda. While Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Uganda, and Zambia provide police forces.²² AMISOM's military component is divided into five sectors. The first sector consists of the regions Banadir, and Lower Shabelle which belong to Ugandan troops. Sector two includes the regions of Lower, and Middle Jubba corresponds to Kenyan forces, sector three composed of Bay, Bakkool and Gedo are under Ethiopian command. Sector four includes Hiiraan, and Galgaduud and belongs to Djiboutian forces. Burundian forces command sector five covering the Middle Shabelle region.²³

The five sectors of AMISOM cover the southern section of Somalia, all areas south of Galguduud fall under a sector. AMISOM also works alongside the Somali National Army (SNA) with support from the African Union (AU). The SNA lacks training and is accused of rape and human rights violations.²⁴ AMISOM has taken a role as the overseer of much of Somalia's territory due to the ghost-like Somali government. In this role, AMISOM has caused significant blows to al-Shabaab, causing it to focus more on civilian targets.²⁵

The Somali government has received support from the United States such as airstrikes which have helped reduce the al-Shabaab threat.²⁶ Somalia has a history of contemporary individual interventions, Ethiopia occupied Somalia from 2006-2009 with about 8,000 to 15,000 troops.²⁷ Similarly, in October 2011—

<https://www.cgdev.org/blog/poverty-nigeria-understanding-and-bridging-divide-between-north-and-south>.

²¹ "Country Profile: Nigeria," *United Nations Economic Commission for Africa*, 2016: x.

²² "African Union Mission in Somalia Military Component," *AMISOM*, accessed May 17, 2018, <http://amisom-au.org/mission-profile/military-component/>.

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ Josh Meservey, "Al-Shabaab's Somali Safe Havens: A Springboard for Terror," *Perspectives on Terrorism* 7, no. 6 (2013): 95-96, <http://www.jstor.org.libproxy.lib.csusb.edu/stable/26297067>.

²⁵ Syed Huzaifah Bin Othman Alkaff, and Nur Aziemah Azman, "Somalia," *Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses* 8, no. 1 (2015): 121, <http://www.jstor.org.libproxy.lib.csusb.edu/stable/26369579>.

²⁶ Williams, 915.

²⁷ Brian J. Hesse, "Introduction: The Myth of 'Somalia'," *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 28, no. 3 (2010): 248.

Kenya Defense forces entered Somalia to defend its citizens from al-Shabaab—this was followed by another Ethiopian invasion a few months later.²⁸

On the other hand, MNJTF was established in April 2012 and is composed of Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigerian armed forces.²⁹ MNJTF operations are split into four sectors, sector one corresponds to a Cameroonian brigade, sector two belongs to a Chadian brigade, the Nigerian 7th brigade controls the third sector, and the fourth sector belongs to the 5th military regiment of Niger.³⁰ Benin contributes through its responsibilities in MNJTF garrisons.³¹ All the sectors are in the Lake Chad Basin, and the MNJTF is present in three states in northeastern Nigeria: Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe.

Boko Haram's attacks concentrate on or near the Lake Chad Basin explaining why most of the MNJTF sectors are near the lake. According to the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Boko Haram's attacks in the region coupled with years of drought, recent heavy rain and flooding have resulted in 7.7 million people in need of humanitarian assistance.³² The most impacted Nigerian states are Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe, covered by the Nigerian sector three of the MNJTF. Nigeria has had difficulty assisting people located near the Lake Chad Basin who depend on water, fishing, and agriculture. The situation will continue to deteriorate because about 90% of the Lake Chad Basin has evaporated.³³

Nigeria has received much-needed training in intelligence-gathering from the United States. As Hussein Solomon remarks, "there is a dearth of human intelligence assets in the Nigerian State."³⁴ The United States has provided Nigeria intelligence and training to develop intelligence capabilities to assist

²⁸ Brian J. Hesse, "Two Generations, Two Interventions in One of the World's Most-Failed States: The United States, Kenya, and Ethiopia in Somalia," *Journal of Asian and African Studies* 51, no. 5 (2016): 583-585.

²⁹ Isaac Olawale Albert, "Rethinking the Functionality of the Multinational Joint Task Force in Managing the Boko Haram Crisis in the Lake Chad Basin," *Africa Development / Afrique Et Développement* 42, no. 3 (2017): 120, 124, <http://www.jstor.org.libproxy.lib.csusb.edu/stable/90018137>.

³⁰ "Multinational Joint Task Force Sectors," *Multinational Joint Task Force*, accessed May 24, 2018, <https://www.mnjtf.org/sectors/>.

³¹ Ibid.

³² "Lake Chad Basin-Complex Emergency," *United States Agency for International Development*, August 2, 2018, accessed August 20, 2018, 2,4. https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1866/lake_chad_ce_fs19_08-02-2018.pdf.

³³ Mariama Sow. "Figure of the Week: The Shrinking Lake Chad," *Brookings Institute*, February 9, 2017, accessed August 21, 2018, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2017/02/09/figure-of-the-week-the-shrinking-lake-chad/>.

³⁴ Hussein Solomon, "Counter-terrorism in Nigeria: Responding to Boko Haram," *The RUSI Journal* 157, no. 4 (2012): 8.

Nigeria in curtailing Boko Haram.³⁵ Nigeria has obstructed numerous operations against Boko Haram because of extra-judicial killings by the Joint Task Force created by ex-president Goodluck Jonathan.³⁶

5. Analysis & Key Judgments

The MSS method assists in ruling out similarities between Nigeria (Boko Haram) and Somalia (al-Shabaab) as variables that are unable to explain the different levels of foreign intervention a country receives. Afterward, the MSS method helps outline potential independent variables such as corruption, identity fissures, and oil as the sole explanation for the different levels of foreign intervention. In ruling out these possible independent variables, the MSS method allows for the underlining of the strength of a state as the cause of different levels of foreign intervention. The strength of a state is essential to stopping threats to the government, population, and infrastructure. Hence increasing the strength of a state increases possibilities of a country surviving and foiling terrorist attacks while also making it difficult for terrorist groups to recruit members.

When looking at Nigeria and Somalia, both countries have low levels of state strength. It is important to note that Somalia's strength is lower than that of Nigeria, and here is where a larger, more funded AMISOM comes into play. Nigeria's MNJTF has fewer members, and capabilities because of Nigeria's capacities to check Boko Haram's activities. Nigeria is a member of MNJTF which means they have an active say on operations but also attests to Nigeria's capabilities, while Somalia through the SNA plays a sideline role in AMISOM.

The possible independent variables all have merit, but they are not stand-alone causes for the dependent variable. Instead, through the MSS method, these possible variables help to reinforce that a state's strength explains the levels of foreign intervention a country receives in dealing with a terrorist group. The ability of a state to have a united populace, properly use resources and have low levels of corruption can decrease a state's fragility. Populations that can co-exist will create a united country helping leaders to move forward with projects and operations. Countries with oil or other resources can use the funds obtained from the selling of resources to invest in its infrastructure, education system, economy

³⁵ "Fact Sheet: U.S. Effort to Assist the Nigerian Government in its fight Against Boko Haram," *The White House President Barak Obama*, accessed May 16, 2018, <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/10/14/fact-sheet-us-efforts-assist-nigerian-government-its-fight-against-boko->

³⁶ Gbemisola Abdul-Jelil Animasawun, "The Military and Internal Security Operations in Nigeria's Fourth Republic: Rethinking Security for Positive Peace in Maiduguri, Nigeria," *Peace Research* 44/45, no. 2/1 (2012): 118, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/24429462>.

and increase security efforts in areas impacted by terrorist groups. A nation with minimal to no corruption would result in better governance.

According to the SFIM Nigeria is a weak state and scores poorly in every aspect of the index but lands outside of the failed state section. Nigeria has managed to remain just a few scores away from being labeled a failed state. The provisional indicators such as education, violence, and poverty for Nigeria point to the regional disparities within the state. The north of Nigeria is overall neglected when compared to the south.³⁷ This disparity is highlighted in Boko Haram's rise and continued attacks in northern Nigeria. Boko Haram has exploited such divisions between the north and south in order to flourish.³⁸ Nigeria is overall a weak country, but it is much weaker in the northern regions.

Nigeria's religious tension divides the country in half. The religious tension hinders Nigeria from rising passed a weak state score. Such division was displayed during the 2015 presidential elections between Goodluck Jonathan, a Christian and Muhammadu Buhari (current president), a Muslim. Most of the Muslim north favored Muhammadu Buhari while the Christian south favored Goodluck Jonathan.³⁹ Nigeria's north and south divide cuts through its social, economic and political landscapes.

For this reason, if the SFIM only considered the southern region of Nigeria, it would score further away from the failed section. Nigeria might be labeled a weak state, but in certain aspects, this is untrue.⁴⁰ As the country tries to tackle the Boko Haram crisis, it is also dealing with militias in the Nigerian Delta. Motives for the militias in the Nigeria Delta are non-religious; instead, they demand a clean environment and a share of the profits from the oil extracted from the area.⁴¹ The Nigeria Delta holds large amounts of oil deposits but is suffering from armed conflicts between militias and government forces. The lack of economic opportunities for locals has led to numerous illegal and unsafe oil extracting procedures.

The Nigeria government has different options to stop the unrest. If Nigeria provides economic opportunities and helps clean the area, it would minimize the militias in the region. The demands of the militias in the Nigerian Delta has

³⁷ John S. Olanrewaju, "Globalization of Terrorism: A Case Study of Boko Haram in Nigeria," *International Journal of Politics and Good Governance* 6 (2015): 3.

³⁸ Daniel Egiegba Agbiboa, "Why Boko Haram Exists: The Relative Deprivation Perspective," *African Conflict & Peacebuilding Review* 3, no. 1 (2013): 151.

³⁹ "How Nigeria's Presidential Election Works," *BBC*, March 2015, accessed May 25, 2018, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-31111572>.

⁴⁰ Samuel Oyewole, "Boko Haram and the Challenges of Nigeria's War on Terror," *Defense & Security Analysis* 29, no. 3 (2013): 253.

⁴¹ Felix Akpan, Okonette Ekanem, and Angela Olofu-Adeoye, "Boko Haram Insurgency and the Counter-Terrorism Policy in Nigeria," *Canadian Social Science* 10, no. 2 (2014): 153.

caused disdain in the Nigeria government, but these demands do not threaten the security of the state as does Boko Haram. Nigeria is experiencing two significant problems one in the north with Boko Haram and the Nigeria Delta militias in the south. The south has higher educational opportunities and lower poverty rates. Boko Haram operates mainly in the northern states where the government has failed to alleviate any religious marginalization.⁴² Although the president of Nigeria is now Muslim, it will take a while for the north to close the gap with the south regarding education, employment, and poverty rates.

Nigeria's mishandling of issues in the north has helped Boko Haram thrive and brought about the MNJTF to the northern region, in specific towards the Lake Chad Basin.⁴³ The porous borders in the area have allowed Boko Haram to attack the neighboring countries of Chad and Cameroon. Porous borders allow Boko Haram to come and go as they please, yet, the same borders limit Nigerian forces. Borders are a sophisticated infrastructure to establish and maintain. For instance, shared boundaries between countries are more secure if both nations are active in patrolling the area. Surrounding nations have to do their part in maintaining and securing the shared borders.

Nonetheless, Nigeria is making strides towards achieving secure borders. There have been border shutdowns, and curfews, but these rules are inapplicable to a non-state actor like Boko Haram.⁴⁴ Nigeria shares borders with Benin, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger where porous borders have existed before Boko Haram's rise. Boko Haram has added to the instability in the border regions especially those Nigeria shares with Cameroon, Chad, and Niger through attacks and kidnappings.

Boko Haram mainly operates in the north, and it is no coincidence that the states with the highest poverty rates, the regions with the most violence, and least educational opportunities are home to such group. Corruption within Nigeria and its agencies and security forces obstruct its ability to become a stronger state. For instance, John Campbell argues that Nigeria is facing a fundamental issue due to "the institutionalized corruption that channels money into the pockets of few Nigerian big men."⁴⁵ This corruption has penetrated many levels of the Nigerian government. Boko Haram's early backing came from alienated northern

⁴² Daniel Egiegba Agbiboa, "Ethno-religious Conflicts and the Elusive Quest for National Identity in Nigeria," *Journal of Black Studies* 44, no. 1 (2013): 21-23, accessed May 12, 2018, <http://www.jstor.org.libproxy.lib.csusb.edu/stable/23414701>.

⁴³ Usman A. Tar and Mala Mustapha, "The Emerging Architecture of a Regional Security Complex in the Lake Chad Basin," *Africa Development / Afrique Et Développement* 42, no. 3 (2017): 110-111, accessed May 9, 2018, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/90018136>.

⁴⁴ Solomon, 7.

⁴⁵ John Campbell, "Nigeria's Battle for Stability," *The National Interest*, no. 118 (2012): 32. accessed May 12, 2018, <http://www.jstor.org.libproxy.lib.csusb.edu/stable/42896438>.

politicians within both of the primary parties in hopes of using them as leverage.⁴⁶ Nigeria's corruption is rooted in its federalist system.

When looking at Somalia, it is clear that it is a failed state, explaining the substantial amount of foreign intervention it has received to counter al-Shabaab. According to the SFIM, Somalia is a failed state facing armed conflict as of mid-2017 and has a weak democratic government.⁴⁷ The index as stated before is an overall assessment of a country's stability but, if a provisional assessment is conducted there would be no significant difference in the south where al-Shabaab operates. In the case of Somalia, most of the indicators for a state's strength are spread out evenly in the country except for violence. Violence concentrates in the south. Somalia is a failed state throughout all of its regions, while the violence in the south is due to al-Shabaab.

There is one caveat in Somalia because al-Shabaab at times has provided education, training, security, the rule of law, food and employment. Through civil services, Oscar Gakuo Mwangi argues that al-Shabaab focuses on "community-level operations" to build "local-community infrastructure and support."⁴⁸ Most of these efforts are located in the regions al-Shabaab controls in southern Somalia. Al-Shabaab has attempted to fill the regulatory void in Somalia through its vision of how a government should operate. Here is where madrassas sponsored by al-Shabaab educate the youth, and other efforts to keep the population productive occur. Services provided by al-Shabaab present difficulties in measuring indicators such as educational attainment. Therefore, populations in al-Shabaab-controlled regions might have higher education attainment rates, security and more food but it is difficult to measure these indicators.

AMISOM's five sectors concentrate in the southern section of Somalia. The Somali government is weak and is unable to provide basic needs, services and security.⁴⁹ Somalia's failed state status and skeleton-like government are the norms in the country. Although the motives are debatable, to be that Kenya invaded Somalia once, and Ethiopia invaded Somalia twice. Somalia's failed state status explains the large intervention force it has received from AMISOM and the individual invasions from Kenya and Ethiopia.

⁴⁶ Carlo Davis, "Anatomy of African Terrorism Boko Haram: Nigeria's Homegrown Terror Network," *World Policy Journal* 29, no. 4 (2012): 16, <http://www.jstor.org.libproxy.lib.csusb.edu/stable/23326708>.

⁴⁷ Marshall and Elzinga-Marshall, 7.

⁴⁸ Oscar Gakuo Mwangi, "State Collapse, al-Shabaab, Islamism, and Legitimacy in Somalia," *Politics, Religion & Ideology* 13, no. 4 (2012): 526-527.

⁴⁹ Ken Menkhaus, "State Collapse and Local Response in Somalia," in *Failed States and Fragile Societies: A New World Disorder?*, ed. by Ingo Trauschweizer and Steven M. Miner, 142, (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2014), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1rfsq1z.10>.

In comparing the cases of Somalia and Nigeria, Somalia's failed state status severely influenced the level of foreign intervention it received. This intervention can be seen through AMISOM and the multitude of countries who have placed troops and police forces in Somalia. The invasion of Somalia by both Ethiopia and Kenya also highlights the fact that Somalia's government and therefore its agencies and security forces were unable to take care of the al-Shabaab threat on their own.

Nigeria, on the other hand, is stronger than Somalia but by a low margin. For Nigeria, Boko Haram is the major threat in the north due to porous borders, corruption, and religious division.⁵⁰ Nigeria is taking steps with help from the United States to improve its intelligence gathering capabilities showing why Nigeria is labeled a weak state and not a failed state.⁵¹ A country with an intelligence apparatus that is being revamped underlines efforts to stop Boko Haram. By comparison, AMISOM troops have supplemented Somalia's government and its military that is weak and incapable of such tasks.⁵²

Somalia has less of an influence on who intervenes in its soil; while Nigeria has a significant influence on who intervenes. Nigeria has a stronger security apparatus; for example, in 2011 the federal government established the "Military Joint Task Force (JTF) comprised of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Department of State Security, and the Nigerian Police."⁵³ The Nigerian government is capable of enforcement, but internal factors impede it from becoming a stronger state which would make the MNJTF unnecessary to contain Boko Haram.

If Somalia were a stronger state, this would enable it to handle security issues and depend less on AMISOM and other foreign actors. Unfortunately, Somalia remains a failed state, and continues to have an active AMISOM mission providing security, clinics and basic needs, for example, food and medicine.⁵⁴ On the contrary, Nigeria has resources and governmental structure but has to cope with its growing corruption, divisions, and Boko Haram. Numerous factors play into state strength, which explains the different levels of foreign intervention.

6. Implications

⁵⁰ Romanri Loimeier, "Boko Haram: The Development of a Militant Religious Movement in Nigeria," *Africa Spectrum* 47, no. 2/3 (2012): 137, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23350455>.

⁵¹ Richard Downie, "Collective Insecurity in the Sahel: Fighting Terror with Good Governance." *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs* 16, no. 1 (2015): 70-71, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/43773669>.

⁵² Sally Healy, "IGAD and Regional Security in the Horn," in *Routledge Handbook of African Security*, ed. James J. Hentz (Routledge, 2013): 217.

⁵³ Abdul-Jelil Animasawun, 118.

⁵⁴ "AMISOM Mandate," *African Union Mission in Somalia*, accessed May 15, 2018, <http://amisom-au.org/amisom-mandate/>.

In answering why countries dealing with terrorist groups receive different amounts of foreign intervention, the strength of a state was shown as the primary cause for such dissimilarities. Scholars and policymakers must try to work within the current Westphalian-state system to provide security, social services, food, and other necessities to the people of Nigeria and Somalia. The change of the Westphalian-state system is long overdue, but making sure policies are aimed at helping those in need should be the primary objective.

Furthermore, the strength of a state is arguably more important now than ever due to the growing threat from terrorist organizations in Africa.⁵⁵ There are essential steps states can take to increase the possibilities of strengthening their departments, agencies, and overall government. Such as tackling corruption through anti-corruption campaigns. An anti-corruption campaign will look different in every country due to the complex social, economic and political climate in each state. Policy and initiatives aimed at rooting out corrupt officials and easing tensions within a nation are everyday actions nations should pursue. These countries can better withstand the onslaught by terrorist groups.

Dissolving divisions within a country, whether religious or ethnic, through co-existing campaigns can help minimize tensions and support for terrorist groups. Countries with ethnic and religious tensions need to focus on providing a political environment where differences are not used to promote specific agendas or discriminate against a group. By strengthening the state, a country is fundamentally strengthening its populations. If a country can strengthen itself, there is a high probability it can provide education, security, food, and employment for its people. There are limits to the recommendations, the history of corruption and patronage in Africa are lengthy and can hamper efforts to strengthen states.

While Nigeria is less dependent on its neighbors (MNJTF), it must focus on ending the north-south divide. Nigeria benefits from being part of the MNJTF but can function independently from MNJTF to fight Boko Haram. Nigeria is capable of countering Boko Haram; it has a strong economy, funds, and military. Ending the division of the country will curtail Boko Haram's trajectory for years. Nigeria has a substantial amount of oil that can be used to strengthen the state, but the corruption and the division of its people must be addressed.

Somalia is wholly reliant on AMISOM, and this dependency is weakening an already failed state. Somalia needs assistance to combat al-Shabaab, and the potential for overdependence on AMISOM may hinder Somalia from becoming a functioning country. For Somalia to provide employment, infrastructure, necessities and security for its population especially those in the south who suffer

⁵⁵ Kwesi Aning and Naila Salihu, "The African Security Predicament," in *Routledge Handbook of African Security*, ed. James J. Hentz, (Routledge, 2013): 14-17.

from the most violence, it will have to overcome hurdles such as al-Shabaab. The SNA should relieve AMISOM of its duties by taking hold of operations. If the state of Somalia is unable to gain strength, it will continue relying on a foreign intervention that one day may run out of funds. The dependency on AMISOM and the need to eliminate al-Shabaab places Somalia in a dilemma. Does Somalia first become independent from AMISOM, and then focus on al-Shabaab? Or vice-versa? If the transition is mishandled, it will be detrimental and would leave a failed state with a military incapable of confronting al-Shabaab and providing services to its population.

Finally, Nigerian and Somalian leadership must comprehend that in trying to combat Boko Haram and al-Shabaab both countries will need a higher level of capabilities and cooperation with their neighbors. The borders set by the Berlin Congress limits how states can respond to terrorist groups. Boko Haram and al-Shabaab do not adhere to the same boundaries as Nigeria and Somalia. In order to eliminate the terrorist threat, Nigeria and Somalia must be aware of the issues the Westphalian-state system has caused. Understanding how these issues impact each country respectively contributes to the overall path to strengthen the state.

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