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Military Intervention: Why it Fails to Promote Democracy

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Introduction

Democracy promotion through military intervention often fails and target countries are frequently plunged into violent civil wars that can last for years. Leading alternative theories suggest inadequate nation building and cultural incompatibility are the root cause of failed interventions. However, the failed attempts to convert regimes into democratic systems of government is best explained by Modernization Theory. Modernization theorists contend that economic development is a prerequisite for successful democratization, rather than nation building or a cultural incompatibility. The principles of nation building and cultural incompatibility are often shallow, with ethnocentric viewpoints and lack of a holistic view of the intricacies of society. Alternatively, modernization theory provides depth to the subject that is frequently lacking, taking into account a society's history, culture, and current economic development. The implications of modernization theory accurately being able to provide a clear picture of a country's ability to support a democracy means that for policy makers, careful evaluation of emerging international security crises can be made before any official action is taken. Other policy prescriptions, such as sanctions or negotiations can be suggested first. Having a clearer picture of a country's capability to convert to democracy may help policy makers avoid costly and possibly fruitless interventions that end in a worsening humanitarian crisis.

Literature Review

Failure of Nation Building

The successful rebuilding of Germany and Japan after WW II are habitually paraded as examples that, with enough time and effort, military interventions can lead to functioning democracies. The United States spent roughly $29.3 billion in 2005 USD on rebuilding Germany

(Serafino et al. 3). Nearly all of the aid starting in 1945 to Germany for the first three years went to humanitarian relief. The implementation of the Marshall plan in 1948 targeted the economic sector. In contrast, the U.S. only spent $15.2 billion 2005 USD on Japan with 40% of the aid going to economic recovery (Serafino et al. 3). Both Germany and Japan were able to recover from the destruction of the war and emerge as democratic societies. The idea that enough financial assistance can turn any society into a democracy over a short period of time is immediately contradicted by the Iraq war. By 2005 Iraq had received $28.9 billion in financial assistance with 40% of the money focusing on the country's infrastructure. This figure reached nearly $60 billion by 2013, about double the money provided to Germany with none of the same results (CBSnews.com, "$60B"). The inability of Iraq to convert to democracy highlights that there are compounding issues beyond economic funding.

Cultural Incompatibility

Since democracy is rarely found in non-western countries, there is a common assumption that democracy is not compatible with Eastern cultures (Wright 144). However, Japan an Eastern country, managed to transition to democracy after World War II. Their success provides credence to the idea that eastern cultures can sustain a democracy. Furthermore, other cultures that are also often disparaged as unable to support democracy, are Islamic and Arabic cultures. Many Islamic leaders have publicly disagreed with western democracy, and the Iranian revolution of 1979 in which the Iranian people rose up against the Sha's deliberate Western modernization of Iran, is often cited as evidence to support this idea (Esposito and Piscatori 434). However, much of this explanation can be discounted as ethnocentrism and misunderstanding of Islamic culture. Many Islamic philosophers insist that Islam is compatible with democracy, though it may not be the exact form of democracy employed by Western societies (Ehteshami

94). The leaders of the En-Nahda Movement, Rashid Ghannoushi and Abdelfattah Mourou, have worked together to combine Islam with democracy, stating "…the state is not something from God but from the people…The state has to serve the benefit of the Muslims…" (qtd. In Esposito and Piscatori 3) and Mourou specified, "…laws come from God, but sovereignty is that of the people" (qtd. In Esposito and Piscatori 3). Ghannoushi and Mourou are working together to propose a softer version of Islam. One that encompasses all of the basic principles and secular values of the people to create a version of democracy that coincides with Islamic culture instead of against it(Esposito and Piscatori 3). Ghannoushi also contends that the West operates from a point of ethnocentrism, "While the West criticizes Islamic governments for not being democratic, it also supports governments who are not democratic and are keeping Islamic movements from developing their ideas" (qtd. In Esposito and Piscatori 3). This is further highlighted by the situation that occurred in Algeria in 1990. After the end of the one party system in Algeria, the first multiparty election was held where the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) won the election by 60% (Wright 134). The FIS had worked in Algeria to improve the basic living conditions of the people, including cleaning up garbage that had built up during a strike by trash collectors. The transition towards a more democratic government also included the creation of a parliament. The FIS performed well during the parliament elections in 1991 holding almost a majority of the seats. This made the FIS the first Islamic party since the Iranian revolution to win an election (Wright 135). However, their victory was short-lived as Defense Minister Khaled Nezzar led what was later called the 'white coup' and forced the FIS out of power and suspended all elections. The FIS member and supporters found themselves forced into detention camps in the Sahara Desert (Wright 135). With democracy failing in Algeria, the United States made very little comment on the situation. Proving that there was in fact, an issue with Islamists in power,

even in a democratic government. In addition to little Western media response, the new leaders

that staged the coup were hosted by several Western countries to explain their plans going

forward and financial assistance was provided by a coalition of banks (Wright 137). Islamist

group leaders felt these actions sent a clear message to the Middle East that Western countries

only want to uphold democracy when it is in their best interest (Wright 137).

Theory

Modernization Theory

Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel combined the essential ideas of modernization

theory with "…socioeconomic development, cultural change and democratization…" in the

context of human development (Inglehart et al. 1). There are four main points that can be

distilled from their work:

- Societies develop along a semi-predictable path shaped by the culture of the region.
- Culture persists throughout socioeconomic development.
- Homogenous societies are more stable.
- Generational changes occur slowly.

Societies tend to develop on a similar path, from pre-industrial to postindustrial (Inglehart

et al. 46). Each stage of development brings predictable changes to the society. Industrialization

provides a shift from traditional to secular values. Post-industrialization affects survival and self-

expression values (Inglehart et al. 74). Post-industrial societies tend to highly value self-

expression. Increased self-expression means that citizens devote less time to food security and

begin to explore personal identity. Inglehart and Welzel discovered that culture reemerges as

self-expression. Additionally, people choose to define themselves through their national heritage.

At this point in societal development, behaviors change. The criteria of what constitutes a good

life changes, people begin to seek a higher quality of life experience rather than a quantity of

basic commodities (Inglehart et al. 25). When citizens with high self-expression values become disappointed with their situation, they have the confidence necessary to start mass political movements (Inglehart et al. 120). Culture is usually tied together with political movements and will diversify the governmental structure.

Furthermore, since culture can influence government structure, cultures without ethnic divisions tend to be more stable during regime transitions. In heterogeneous societies, ethnic differences are often exploited by those attempting to gain power and it is harder for citizens to identify with a collective identity. Democracy builds its foundation in the idea that citizens are equal and unified by a central cultural identity; however, simply having the same citizenship is not enough to override long standing ethical divisions (Inglehart et al. 205).

Lastly, societal changes happen slowly. Each generation establishes its value system by adulthood (Inglehart et al. 113). Generational changes are only expressed in societies in "…which younger generations have experienced substantially different formative conditions from those that shaped older generations" (Inglehart et al. 113). Societies that are experiencing economic stagnation will demonstrate little to no change in the self-expression of younger generations. Not all societies will develop at the same rate and several generations can pass with no change to self-expression values.

Definition of a Developed Country

Daniel Bell's theory of post-industrialization contains three main assertions:

- Movement from a manufacturing based economy to a service based economy (14)
- Centrality of science and knowledge based industries (18)
- Shift to technology (29)

Indicators most closely related to Daniel Bell's framework were selected for analysis:

High Technology Exports as percentage of Manufactured Exports, GNI per capita Atlas Method,

Manufacturing percent of GDP, Services percent of GDP and Inequality-adjusted Human

Development Index.

Daniel Bell's theory of post-industrialization places heavy emphasis on the shift towards

science in the economy and society. The High Technology Exports as a percentage of

Manufactured Exports indicator was selected to represent technology in a society due to it having

the most complete data set for the world, out of all the science indicators that were considered.[1]

GNI per capita Atlas Method is used as a general inquiry into a country's economy and what the

average citizen makes. Manufacturing percent of GDP and Services percent of GDP were

selected to compare if the economy is more industrial or serviced based. Bell's theory states that

countries will move towards a more service based economy when they reach post-

industrialization. Inequality-adjusted Human Development Index adds a general overall

assessment of the humanitarian conditions of a country. The Inequality-adjusted Human

Development Index is created based on life expectancy, per capita income and education; this

statistic is then adjusted to account for inequality found within the country through the Atkinson

measure of inequality (Santos 12; HDR.undp.org).

For the purposes of this paper the medians and other related statistics for each indicator

were established from the list of developed countries provided by the World Bank

(Worldbank.org; Un.org).[2] Within the context of this paper the target country's statistics should

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[1] The indicators of Researchers in R&D (per million people) and technicians in R&D (per million people) might be better suited to explain this phenomenon but the data sets were grossly incomplete.

[2] The World Bank has established four different economic groups; low, middle, upper middle and high income, and assigned numerical values to each based originally on GNP, and now on GNI. The original 1986 staff report lists the following values (numbers adjusted for 2017 inflation values): Low-income, below $914.81, Lower-Middle Income $916.97-1,797.34, Upper Middle Income $1799.49-3,725.00. Countries with GNP of higher than $12,915.00 is considered a High-income county. Though these figures alone are not the only determining factors, as high-income GNP oil export countries are not necessarily recognized as developed.

However, as to not deviate too far outside of the general accepted classifications because challenging the classifications is not the main goal of this paper, the framework I propose and use to evaluate my cases is built from data extracted from the World Bank on countries that are accepted as developed.

fall within these ranges to be considered a developed country. A developing country should possess some of the criteria, or fall within a few standard deviations.

Methodology

For this study we will be employing a most similar system design (MSSD) for examining the regime changes experienced in Tunisia and Libya during the Arab Spring in 2011. MSSD was selected for analysis because in using cases with the most similar geography, ethnic background and history of authoritarianism, assists in isolating the underlying variable that causes intervention to fail in promoting democracy in target countries. Tunisia and Libya were selected for exploration due to being located in the same geographical location in Africa and for possessing much of the same developmental history; even though they may differ in modern ethnic composition. The main difference between the two cases is that there was NATO intervention in Libya while Tunisia carried out their revolution without any outside intervening forces. The main analysis will look to see if modernization theory can explain why Tunisia transitioned to democracy while Libya, even with assistance, failed to do so and if intervention is the reason the country failed to stabilize and has been embroiled in civil war ever since.

The first cases will compare and contrast: historical timelines, modern pre-revolution political structure, population demographics, revolution timelines, and discuss specific elements of each revolution to provide a holistic framework for theory application in the following section. The second section, analysis, will apply Ingelhart and Welzel's modernization theory to each case to determine if the theory can explain why foreign intervention alone often fails to produce democratic regimes. Each defining factor as developed in the previous theory section: socioeconomic development, persistence of culture, generational value changes and homogenous societies, will be applied to each case for examination. Additionally, a framework developed

from Daniel Bell's theory on post-industrial economies and the global development data from the World Bank will be used to provide social science driven statistical relevance to the qualitative assessment of each case. Lastly, the final section of the paper, implications, will discuss the general consequences of the findings of analysis, discuss the conclusions, and relevance to policy makers and the international security community.

Cases

Tunisian History

Figure 2: Timeline of Tunisian History

Tunisia is located at the northern tip of Africa. During times of antiquity, it was founded by nomadic peoples, the ancestors of the modern-day Berber tribes (BBC.com). During the 7th and 8th centuries the region was conquered by Arab Muslims (BBC.com). The Arab leaders of Tunisia built up the region and founded the Aghlabid Dynasty. Eventually the Arabs left the region to the Berbers. Over the Centuries, Tunisia was invaded continuously from surrounding countries, including the Ottoman empire. Tunsiua's future looked bleak as it was under Turkish

rule, until Tunisian debt became so unsurmountable that the government declared bankruptcy, a few years later the French invaded. Tunisia was declared a French protectorate until they declared their independence in 1956.

Political Structure of Tunisia Pre-Revolution

From 1959 until 2011, Tunisia was recognized as a republic with an elected presidential leader. The system consisted of a president, prime minister, unicameral legislation and a Chamber of Deputies (Perkins 131-156). All of these changes were orchestrated by the first president, Habib Bourguiba, who in reality had created a 'presidential monarchy'(Perkins 133). Bourguiba would serve for life, as he banned and exiled all oppositional forces. However, in 1987, Ben Ali, the prime minister, replaced Bougubia after he was pronounced medically incapacitated. Although, while oppositional parties were legalized in 1981 by Bourgubia in an attempt to ease political tensions, Ben Ali never lost an election and served as president until 2011 (Perkins 167; 185-211).

Tunisian Demographics

Most citizens are of Arabic decent with about 2% of the population being made up of European and Jewish decent (Tunisia). The religious makeup of the country is also essentially homogenous, 99.1% of individuals belonging to the Muslim faith and 1% of the population to all others (Tunisia). The main languages spoken are Arabic, French and Berber (Tunisia). In 2010, more than 55% of Tunisians were less than 30 years old (Murphy 302).

Tunisian Revolution Timeline

Figure 3: Tunisian Revolution Timeline

The Tunisia revolution started in response to the death of Mohamed Bouazizi. Bouazizi was a street merchant who had his license to sell confiscated and then was beaten by the police. In response, Bouazizi set himself on fire in protest. Nation-wide protests erupted during December 2010 and January 2011 in response to his death (Chomiak 70). Bouazizi's struggle represented to many people in Tunisia the corruption of the government and inability to advance their socio-economic status.

To solidify his power, Ben Ali declared all protesters as terrorists and sanctioned the use of brutal force by the police. Nevertheless, the protests remained peaceful, and protesters only

fought back with their fists and rocks in self-defense. Advantaged citizens with cell phones used social media to break Tunisia's "media cocoon", exposing the government's violence against them to the West (Esseghaier 3). Desperately, Ben Ali attempted to quell the protests by insisting on national television that the protests were damaging to the economy (Murphy 301). After many unions called for strikes, Ben Ali declared a state of emergency and established a curfew. In mid-January, the military chief of staff disobeyed Ben Ali's orders to fire on the protesters. The military withdrew troops from vital locations and placed itself between the police and the protestors (Murphy 302).

Consequently, after his attempts to quell the protests failed, Ben Ali fled the country, and Fouad Mebazaa, who was the speaker of parliament was declared to be the interim president until elections could be held (Murphy 302). Emboldened, the protesters began to push for a full democratic government transition with the removal of the entire ruling party. However, police forces still loyal to Ben Ali continued to harass the protesters. The situation remained unsteady in Tunisia for several years as political forces worked to steady the country. Finally, in 2014, the new constitution was ratified, establishing Tunisia as a parliamentary republic (Tunisia).

Tunisian Revolution Discussion

An analysis of the Tunisian revolution, provides evidence that protesting and governmental revolution was born out of anger at the level of inequality experienced across the country. Wealth and infrastructure had become regionally stratified, within the coastal areas while most of the population lives in the rural interior (Aleya-Sghaier 20). Additionally, those with access to education still had no employment prospects; this united both the advantaged and disadvantaged (Aleya-Sghaier 21). With a common cause the people of Tunisia were able to use their relative position in society to contribute to the revolution. The disadvantaged took to the

streets; professionals held strikes and citizens with technology recorded and distributed images of the revolution, bringing the violence levied against protesters by the Ben Ali government to the world (Aleya-Sghaier 23).

Libyan History

Figure 4: Libyan Historical Timeline

Similar to Tunisia, Libya shares much of the same ancient cultural background and conquering forces. The Italians colonized Libya after the Italo-Turkish war in 1911-1912 and seizing the region from the Ottomans. After World War II, Libya was under Allied Occupation (Tremlett 29-34). Libya gained independence in 1951, becoming the United Kingdom of Libya (Chronology 213-244). Ghadafi took power in 1969 through a military-led coup (Bruce St John 92).

Political Structure of Libya Pre-Revolution

After Gadhafi assumed power, he began to transition the governmental form away from monarchy and toward socialism. Libya became the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya in 1977. The government maintained that the people were directly represented in the government through the General People's Congress. However, the system lacked political parties and official representatives (Bruce St John 94). Gadhafi frequently rearranged the system to suit his advantage (Bruce St John 102).

Libyan Demographics

96.6% of the population of Libya is Arab and Berber tribes, although, tribal divisions are still recognizable. 3% of the population is composed of Greeks, Italians, and Pakistanis. While, the predominant religion is Islam, 4% of the population practices Christianity, Buddhism, Hindu, Jewish or a native religion (Libya). The languages spoken are Arabic, Italian, English and Berber (Libya).

Libyan Revolution Timeline

Figure 5: Libyan Revolution Timeline

The Libyan people joined the Arab Spring in February 2011. After watching their neighbor, Tunisia, successfully overturn their government, the Libyans began to call for protests on Facebook and Twitter. The first protests were in Benghazi. However, the protests were dispersed by Gadhafi's security forces through the use of non-lethal force (Kuperman "A Model" 9). On February 15th, protesters set fire to the police buildings in Beyida (Aljazeera.com). Once protesters began to fight back, Gadhafi's security forces began to use live ammunition. In reprisal, the protestors caught two policemen and hung them (Mu). The protesters also reported to Western media that they were being slaughtered indiscriminately. In an attempt to make concessions, Gadhafi's son, Seif al-Islam Gadhafi, ordered the release of 110 members of the Libya Islamic Fighting Group (Theguardian.com). Soon after their release, the LIFG, a group with known terrorist ties, took up arms and joined the protesters.

In March, the Arab League called for the establishment of a no fly zone over Libya (Chivvis 70). After the Arab League endorsed the no fly zone, NATO passed UNSCR 1973 on March 17th certifying a humanitarian mission (Chivvis 71). A military coalition launched air strikes on Gadhafi's "…air-defense systems, forced his armored columns to retreat from the cities they were attacking, and established a no-fly zone over most of the country" (Chivvis 71) After ten days NATO took over military operations in Libya (Chivvis 74).

In April, the United States recommitted their predator drones to the battle field (Chivvis 77). Later that year, the coalition began to equip and train rebel forces (Chivvis 77). But it was not until August that the rebels were able to conquer Tripoli. It took another two months for rebel forces to locate Gadhafi and execute him. After the death of Gadhafi, all NATO forces pulled out of the region (Chivvis 78). The region has since fallen into civil war as the local tribes began fighting for control of the country.

Libyan Revolution Discussion

While both Tunisia's and Libya's revolutionary movements made calls for peaceful protests on Facebook and Twitter, that is where their similarities end. The Libyan revolution was a violent movement from its inception. The very first day saw the rebel groups burning police buildings and throwing gas bombs (Kuperman "A Model" 109). Protesters had firearms, car bombs, Molotov cocktails; they captured Benghazi a mere three days into the crisis (Kuperman "A Model" 109). To have these improvised weapons already prepared suggests that the protesters never intended to be peaceful. The violence and subsequent intervention in Libya provided other countries in the region with the motivation to take note and turn violent in an attempt to also attract NATO attention (Kuperman "Libya Debacle" 7).

Analysis

Tunisia

Tunisia	Technology	GNI Per Capita	Manufacturing %	Services %	IHDI
	4.9	4130	18.0	60.3	0.717*
Comparison Statistics					
Minimum	4.40	7480	4.40	57.30	0.709
Quartile 1	8.43	19783	8.73	68.50	0.7790
Median	13.20	40365	14.30	72.15	0.815
Mean	13.73	39044	14.58	72.28	0.81112
Quartile 3	17.35	50720	19.45	77.33	0.8505
Maximum	31.90	93530	31.90	87.70	0.898
SD	6.57	21398	10.70	7.13	0.04470

Figure 6: Tunisian Score for 2009-2010 vs. Comparison Data from Recognized Developed Countries
* This is the 2011 HDI score; only 2015 has an inequality adjusted score.

Tunisia has a GNI below minimum, a manufacturing percentage in the third quartile and services just below the first quartile. The HDI score falls above the minimum. These scores fall in line with modernization theory; there is the demonstration of a large service sector and technology is present in the society. Finally, agriculture makes up 14.8% of the labor force, only one fourth of the service industry percentage (Tunisia). This suggests that citizens should have secular and self-expression values. Individuals showed signs of autonomy and willingness to challenge elites. Strikes by those in the service industry illustrate this point. Also, persistence of culture was found when the Ennahdha Party, an Islamist party, was elected after the revolution, the people protested (Marzouki 3). Tunisia has always had a secular government (Cesari 5). Throughout the revolution, Tunisia benefited from having a homogenous population. The people were united by their cause rather than divided by ethnicity. Lastly, the current generation was raised in a growing economy; GNI had been increasing steadily since 1986 (Tunisia, GNI).

Overall, GNI per capita shows a fairly steady increase since 1986 when Ben Ali assumed the presidency. In 2011, GNI per capita was at its highest and due to the mostly smooth transition during the revolution, there was only a slight decrease in 2011 which recovered by

2014. Roughly half the population in 2011 was under the age of 30, meaning these generations were raised in a growing economy (Murphy 302). According to modernization theory, this is exactly the environment required to cause the shift between survival and self-expression values (Inglehart et al. 43). "Rising emphasis on self-expression does not reflect the prior existence of democracy…it can emerge under either democratic or authoritarian institutions…it generates mass demands for democracy" (Inglehart et al. 8-9). It did not matter in Tunisia that the country had never experienced democracy before because the environment to support the transition was present.

Libya

Libya	Technology	GNI Per Capita	Manufacturing %	Services %	IHDI
--		12250	4.5	19.9	0.756*
Comparison Statistics					
Minimum	4.40	7480	4.40	57.30	0.709
Quartile 1	8.43	19783	8.73	68.50	0.7790
Median	13.20	40365	14.30	72.15	0.815
Mean	13.73	39044	14.58	72.28	0.81112
Quartile 3	17.35	50720	19.45	77.33	0.8505
Maximum	31.90	93530	31.90	87.70	0.898
SD	6.57	21398	10.70	7.13	0.04470

Figure 7: Libyan Scores for 2008-201** vs. Comparison Data from Recognized Developed Countries
* This is the HDI score; there is no available data on inequality adjustments except for Life Expectancy, which is for 2010-2015 in relation to the civil war placing limits on life expectancy.
** There is a scarcity of data for Libya even in 2010 before the revolution, values from the closest year to 2010 were used to fill in the gaps. There is no High Technology exports % of GDP data from Libya in the World Bank online database.

Libya's GNI and HDI scores fall above minimum; service industry is far below minimum and manufacturing is nearly nonexistent. Libya is a high oil export county, these countries often suffer from extreme wealth stratification (Inglehart et al 45). 17% of the labor force is employed in the agricultural sector (Libya). There is no value for High Technology; most of Libya lacks access to technology. In 2011, Libya fell within the category of pre-industrial. Pre-industrial citizens typically have traditional, survival, family centric values and little to no autonomy or self-expression values (Inglehart et al. 52). Persistence of culture is demonstrated through the

tribal divisions still clearly present (Lacher 146). People with traditional values in ethnically divided countries controlled by inflexible social constraints, such as the ones used by autocratic regimes, often feel insecure and are intolerant of other groups (Lacher 146). Lastly Libya has had very little economic growth, with GNI per capita only beginning to increase in 2004 and stagnating in 2008 (Libya, GNI). There would have been no driving force to push generational values forward.

Comparison

Modernization theory paints a clear picture as to why Tunisia was able to change to a democratic regime and Libya was not. Tunisia has a more advanced economy, where citizens are beginning to express themselves and have greater access to technology. Alternatively, Libyan citizens are still mainly concerned about their survival and have little to no technology in comparison (Lacher 144). Tunisia has also experienced economic growth, whereas Libya has stagnated. Had NATO not intervened in Libya, the country would have likely continued along its developmental pathway, but intervention provided an outside shock that disrupted the system. Gadhafi was able to recapture cities easily because the rebels were not fully equipped to defend for themselves, and they were concerned mainly with their immediate survival rather than expressing an ideal, like the protesters in Tunisia despite drawing inspiration from them.

Additionally, statistical studies have found that there is a higher likelihood of democratization within one year of an intervention (Gleditsch 27). Libya attempted this by holding elections after the conflict, but they did not create a democracy because "…adopting democratic institutions does not automatically make self-expression values peoples top priority" (Inglehart et al. 8)

Implications

In comparison to Libya, Tunisia is a fairly simplistic case. However, it does a good job of illustrating the two ways to handle what some policymakers might view as an international security crisis. There was nothing at the time that would have warranted international involvement in Tunisia. The protests were peaceful and while the government was perpetrating violence against its citizens, the number of deaths was relatively low (Aljazeera.com "Tunisia Protests"). While Libya had more deaths initially, the protesters were violent from the beginning of the movement. Overall there are several lessons that can be learned from the comparison of these two events:

- Interventions are expensive
- It is difficult to determine which side is the 'correct' side
- Human rights situations may worsen
- Mission creep can occur
- History may have better answers

Nations need to understand the full cost and responsibilities of interventions; many of them are not easy in and out operations (Dobbins 90). David Cameron, Britain's prime minister at the time, refused to accept any of the post-conflict responsibilities or consequences of intervention by asserting, "…this is not about going into a country and knocking over its Government, and then owning and being responsible for everything that happens subsequently" (Davidson 325). Many of the coalition states were to afford to assist with the intervention for very long. It was estimated in 2012 that the total cost of intervention for the United States was close to $896 million, with the European allies owing the U.S. at least $222 million just for U.S. air support (Hallams 323).

In any international situation it is difficult to discern from the outside which side is the 'correct' side. Western media bought into reports that thousands of citizens had been killed, but

these reports later turned out to be false (Kuperman "Libya Debacle" 4). Much of the reporting also glossed over the fact that the rebels themselves were perpetrating much of the violence (Kuperman "Libya Debacle" 3). After the conflict was over, Human Rights Watch documented that there were only 233 initial deaths by February 20th, five days after the start of the conflict (Kuperman "A Model" 111). By March there had still only been 22 women and 8 children killed out of a total of 979 people, showing that Gadhafi's forces were in fact, being selective because women were not a large part of the protests (Kuperman "A Model" 111). These figures were backed up by reports by doctors within the country (Kuperman "A Model" 110). Human rights violations might have been occurring under the Gadhafi regime but some believe, like Kuperman in his 2015 article "Obama's Libya Debacle", that Gadhafi's leadership was more humane than the destabilization that followed the NATO intervention (3). It is estimated that 8,000 more people died after the NATO strikes, deaths that would not have occurred if Gadhafi had been allowed to maintain power (Kuperman "Libya Debacle" 4). This is not to mention the ethnic violence that was perpetrated by the victorious rebels (Kuperman "A Model" 125). Rebel groups committed retaliation killings, detained supposed Gadhafi supporters and forcefully removed roughly 30,000, nearly all black, residents of Tawerga from their homes (Kuperman "A Model" 125). This caused a diffusion of violence as groups were pushed out of Libya and forced to return to their native countries.

The other risk with interventions is mission creep, adding to the inability of the intervener to disengage quickly from the situation. The intervention was supposed to protect citizens from imminent threat only (Pattison 3). However, the coalition was adamant about regime change from the beginning (Pattison 4). They then overstepped their mission objectives by firing on Gadhafi's retreating forces (Kuperman "A Model" 113). The coalition also provided weapons

and training to the rebels (Kuperman "A Model" 114). Handing out weapons does not create less violence; especially not when they are being handed to protesters who were using makeshift weapons for the start of the conflict (Kuperman "A Model" 114). Targeted regime change under the guise of humanitarian intervention disrespects the sovereignty of the target country, if the country's government does not pose a direct threat to the international community (Reisman 516).

Instead of NATO attempting to facilitate a peaceful mediation of the situation, to which Gadhafi had tried several times to do, but was rejected each time by the rebels, NATO choose intervention immediately (Kuperman "A Model" 114). Gadhafi's previous behavior suggests that sanctions combined with economic/social linkage could have resolved the situation (Levitsky and Way 384). Gadhafi had showed response to previous U.N. sanctions in 1999 and 2003, working to modernize the economy after the sanctions were lifted (Bruce St. John 99; Kuperman "Libya Debacle" 7). Unless a country has never responded to or openly disregards sanction and other policy solutions, they should be implemented first and allowed time to work (Pattison 5).

Since modernization theory explains why Tunisia was able to peacefully transition and Libya was not, policymakers evaluate evolving crisis situations through the modernization theory framework before jumping to the conclusion of intervention. Intervention alone does not appear to have any impact on a country's ability to support democracy. Rather, the building blocks that form the foundation of democracy must be present and that will not happen overnight or with any amount of nation building.

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Appendix A: Economic Classification Data Extrapolation

Country	Stat Code	High Technology Exports % of Manufactured Exports	GNI, Per Capita, PPP	Manufacturing % of GDP	Services % of GDP	Inequality-Adjusted Human Development Index
Australia	1	13.5	60,050	6.8	71.9	0.861
Austria	2	13.4	47,260	18.9	70.4	0.815
Belgium	3	13.0	44,510	14.3	77.1	0.821
Bulgaria	4	7.6	7,480		67.3	0.709
Canada	5	13.8	47,250	10.6	69.3	0.839
Croatia	6	9.0	12,760	14.7	69.5	0.752
Cyprus	7	6.2	25,810	6.2	87.2	0.762
Czech Republic	8	14.9	18,150	14.9	59.7	0.830
Denmark	9	16.0	60,270	16.0	75.8	0.858
Estonia	10	11.4	18,320	11.4	69.2	0.788
Finland	11	8.7	46,560	8.7	70.6	0.843
France	12	26.8	40,710	26.8	78.8	0.813
Germany	13	16.7	45,790	16.7	68.9	0.859
Greece	14	11.0	20,270	11.0	80.2	0.758
Iceland	15	19.9	50,110	19.9	70.4	0.868
Ireland	16	7.5	52,550	26.8	57.3	0.850
Italy	17	7.2	32,830	7.2	74.2	0.784
Japan	18	16.8	38,840	16.8	73.4	0.791
Latvia	19	15.0	14,990	15.0	73.7	0.742
Lithuania	20	11.9	15,080	11.9	66.5	0.759
Luxembourg	21	6.8	77,480	6.8	87.7	0.827
Malta	22	31.9	23,900	31.9	82.8	0.786
Netherlands	23	19.9	48,850	19.9	78.2	0.861
New Zealand	24	9.6	40,020	9.6	70.9	
Norway	25	20.5	93,530	20.5	63.5	0.898
Poland	26	8.8	13,310	8.8	63.3	0.774
Portugal	27	4.4	20,470	4.4	75.4	0.755
Spain	28	7.1	28,380	7.1	73.8	0.791
Slovakia	29	10.3	17,570	10.3	61.5	0.793
Slovenia	30	6.4	22,250	6.4	64.9	0.838
Sweden	31	14.3	57,900	14.3	72.4	0.851
Switzerland	32	26.8	84,550	26.8	73.8	0.859
United Kingdom	33	20.8	43,700	20.8	79.9	0.836
United States	34	19.0	55,980	19.0	78.0	0.796

Figure 8: Complied data for all countries listed by the World Bank as developed in 2012, built off data from 2015 or 2014 if 2015 was missing. IHDI score are from 2015 data set. Countries with blanks for IHDI did not have an IHDI score. http://data.worldbank.org/

	Technology	GNI Per Capita	Manufacturing %	Services %	IHDI
Minimum	4.40	7480	4.40	57.30	0.709
Quartile 1	8.43	19783	8.73	68.50	0.7790
Median	13.20	40365	14.30	72.15	0.815
Mean	13.73	39044	14.58	72.28	0.81112
Quartile 3	17.35	50720	19.45	77.33	0.8505
Maximum	31.90	93530	31.90	87.70	0.898
IQR	8.93	30938	10.70	8.82	0.0715
SD	6.57	21398	10.70	7.13	0.04470
SE Mean	1.13	3670	1.21	1.22	0.00778
Skew	0.94	0.97	0.67	0.10	-0.25

Figure 9: Descriptive statistics for developmental indicators