The breakdown of group cohesion as a key factor in the Chinese brainwashing of Army prisoners of war during the Korean War

David E. Moore
THE BREAKDOWN OF GROUP COHESION AS A KEY FACTOR IN THE
CHINESE BRAINWASHING OF ARMY PRISONERS OF WAR DURING
THE KOREAN WAR

A Thesis
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By
David E. Moore
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DEDICATION

To Mom And Dad, With Love
I. BACKGROUND

Article 17 of the Geneva Convention of 1949, Relative To The Treatment Of Prisoners Of War stated that, "No physical violence or mental torture, nor any other form of coercion may be inflicted on prisoners of war to secure from them information of any kind whatsoever. Prisoners of war who refuse to answer may not be threatened, insulted, or exposed to unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of any kind."\(^1\) There were three countries that did not sign the document: the United States, North Korea, and China.\(^2\)

The Korean War

On July 1, 1950, a C-54 landed in the Republic of Korea carrying the first contingent of American troops. This was in response to the North Korean invasion of South Korea on June 25, of that year. The troops went directly from a peacetime setting to war, without any political


\(^2\) Ibid, p. 118.
The fighting during the next two months was heavy, with virtually no POWs taken by the North Korean People's Army (NKPA). They treated captured American soldiers inhumanely, resorting to torture and murder. It was common to find captured servicemen with their hands bound behind their backs with a bullet through their heads. During this time, General Douglas MacArthur, the Commander In Chief Of United Nations Forces, Korea, was asked to hold off the NKPA until units could be activated for action in Korea. After much fighting with little success, the United Nations (U.N.) detachment found itself in trouble around the port of Pusan. On September 15, forces which had been staging in Japan made an amphibious landing at Inchon (near Seoul), deep in the enemy's rear. At the same time, the troops holding the perimeter at Pusan made a big offensive push, which succeeded in trapping the NKPA


between the two forces. This bold move, combined with constant air and naval strikes, broke up the North Korean advance, and sent them fleeing back across the 38th parallel. On October 1, 1950, MacArthur asked General Kim Il Sung, North Korea's Chairman of the Military Council, for his surrender.

The response to MacArthur's request came not from Kim Il Sung, but from China. In a radio broadcast from Peking, the United States was accused of entering Korea with the purpose to "expand its aggression in the East," and due to this fact was seen to be a "most dangerous foe to the People's Republic Of China." They also hinted that if United Nations Forces crossed the 38th parallel, China would enter the war.

By October 9, U.N. troops had advanced as far as 100 miles north of the parallel. The Chinese again issued

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7 The 38th parallel (north latitude) was a dividing line as stipulated by Japan's surrender in World War II; the Russians controlled north of the parallel while the United States controlled south of the parallel.

8 The term "United Nations Forces" refers to United States troops unless otherwise specified.

a warning. They stated that they "could not 'stand idly by' in the face of the 'serious situation' created by the invasion of Korea." Washington chose to ignore this message, with the State Department concluding that "Chinese intervention in Korea was unlikely."  

In late October, reports began filtering in indicating a large number of Chinese troops massing and moving in North Korea. These troops had been deployed from South and Central China to Shantung and Manchuria just north of the China-North Korea border as early as April, 1950. There were three reasons that those reports were, for the most part, ignored:

1. The State Department's belief that Chinese intervention was unlikely, 

2. The Chinese moved mostly at night, hiding in tunnels and villages during the day, and often set forest fires for screening against air reconnaissance, which left, no overt signs of a moving

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10 Ibid, p. 121.  
12 Griffith, The Chinese People's Liberation Army,  
13 U.S., Congress, Senate, Military Situation In The Far East, p. 1933.
army, and,

3. Most of the reports came from peasant or civilian sources.5

Even with the taking of Chinese prisoners, the U.N. Command and the State Department would not change their positions.16 On November 2, the U.S. Army's Third Battalion of the Eighth Cavalry Regiment was surrounded by the Chinese, sustained many casualties, and became ineffective as a fighting force.17 The Chinese had officially entered the war.

Meeting the Chinese for the first time with their defenses down caused the U.N. forces to look upon their enemy in unrealistic terms. Due to the aggressiveness and the "human wave" tactics used by the Chinese soldiers, they were seen as "drug crazed fanatics" who could care less about their own lives, let alone the lives of others.18 The effect was that the Chinese were seen as an all-


15 Ibid, p. 52.

16 Ibid, p. 51.


18 George, The Chinese Communist Army In Action, p. 2.
powerful enemy, who could not be beaten. They did not wait long to show their civilized side. This was through their initial treatment of POWs.

On November 22, the Chinese released twenty-seven severely wounded men to U.S. forces. This came as a shock to the U.N. Command, since they were accustomed to the NKPA's killing POWs. The soldiers were released after being treated with kindness and sympathy, and it was found that many Chinese soldiers shared their meager rations with the prisoners. The wounded soldiers were told to pass on news of their favorable treatment, with instructions to "urge them all [their comrades] to 'turn their guns against officers' and thus free themselves from the oppression... victims of capitalism (sic) suffered."\(^{19/20}\) The first attack on the minds of the servicemen was somewhat weak, but was an indication of things to come.

The NKPA, it must be recalled, had a history of maltreating POWs by torture or murder; the Chinese, on the other hand, employed a more humane policy. Soon after the Chinese policy was enacted, radio broadcasts and Communist-

\(^{19}\) Ridgeway, The Korean War, pp, 58-59.

\(^{20}\) When released, these individuals also carried them propaganda leaflets. Examples of these and other leaflets are in Appendix 1. Source: Charles J. Nilsson, LTC, U.S. Army Retired, Assistant G-3, 2nd Infantry Division, Korea 1950-1951, personal collection.
inspired writings authored by American POWs began pouring out of North Korea.21 The mystery as to why these actions were taking place remained until Operation Little Switch (April 1953), in which 149 sick and wounded POWs were repatriated, and Operation Big Switch (August-September 1953), in which 3,323 were returned.22 Once the statistics were out, the American people were shocked: it was reported that approximately 38 percent of the POWs died in captivity, and roughly one out of every three Americans collaborated with the enemy at one time or another. Moreover, not one soldier successfully escaped from a permanent camp, and for the first time in history, twenty-one Americans refused to return home and decided to stay with the enemy.23 It was only after the U.S. Army and a team of psychiatrists who studied and evaluated the returnees that the basis for this peculiar behavior was labeled. The word that was on the lips of all Americans was "brainwashing."24


22 Kinkead, In Every War But One, p. 39.

23 Ibid, pp. 16-17.

24 The term "brainwashing" will be used throughout this study wherever a general term applies. For other terms see Appendix 2.
Brainwashing, or hai hao (wash brain), was the unofficial name of the process that the Chinese Communists used for "mind reform and re-education" of the people in China. The term was used in Red China only among trusted friends or when a cadre member would lose his temper and tell someone, "what you need is a good brain-wash."26

At about the time that the U.N. forces had the NKPA on the run, the term was first put into print in the United States in an article published in the Miami Daily News. The author was Edward Hunter (a journalist and it was not known until recently), a Central Intelligence Agency employee.27

Hunter was stationed in Hong Kong in the late 1940's when he first came into contact with the Chinese thought reform program. He interviewed many men and women who had been through the process and were leaving China for

25 Here cadre refers to the mediator between the Communist Party, the State, and the masses. The term can also refer to all party members at the lower levels. See R. L. Walker, China Under Communism (London: Allen And Unwin, 1956) p. 51.

26 Hunter, Brainwashing: From Pavlov To Powers, p. 3.

good. He found that brainwashing was the norm for all men, women, and children who belonged to one of two groups: foreigners or Chinese with "questionable backgrounds." "Before anyone could be considered trustworthy, he was subjected to brain-washing...Only then did the authorities consider that he could be depended upon." This line of thought stems from the Chinese Communist's belief that "all people retain ideological poisons" from their previous society, with this poison needing removal in order for the citizen to be able to take his place in the "new society." This action of removing the poison is described by Hunter:

The intent is to change a mind so radically so that its owner becomes a living puppet-a human robot-without the atrocity being visible from the outside. The aim is to create a mechanism in flesh and blood, with new beliefs and new thought processes inserted into a captive body. What that amounts to is the search for a slave race that, unlike the slaves of olden times, can be trusted never to revolt, always to be amenable to


Hunter saw this "intent to atomize humanity" as a real threat to Americans and free people everywhere. In response to this perceived threat, the facts presented above became the basis for his first book, *Brainwashing In Red China*.

The purpose of *Brainwashing In Red China* has been described as three-fold, with only the first two being important to this study:

1. To warn the American public of the "spreading cancer of oriental Communism,"

2. To look at Mao Tse-tung's attempts to re-educate the people of Red China through brainwashing and to condemn those attempts,

3. To aid the CIA in gaining American support for covert operations by scaring them into a belief of something mysterious going on in China.

Although Hunter recognized the threat, his warning was not heeded. Someone once said that to be forewarned is to be

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33 Ibid., p. 23.
34 Hunter, *Brainwashing: From Pavlov To Powers*, p. 3.
fore-armed. It has been suggested that if fore-warned, the POWs might have fared better in Korea. After repatriation, the question asked again and again was, "Why wasn't I told." For those who were not told and captured, the war was not over—it was also to be waged in the POW camp.

Such was the situation confronting American ground troops in 1950. They were vulnerable to Chinese brainwashing techniques for the following reasons: first, they were soldiers of a peacetime army thrown into battle with no information about their foe or reasons for being in Korea. Second, due to the aggressiveness of the Chinese soldier, it was assumed that all POWs would be murdered as the NKPA had done; when given a reprieve, the psychological impact was staggering. Third, even though Hunter had published works on the dangers of the Chinese brainwashing program at the same time that broadcasts and written propaganda were coming from the POW camps, no one paid any attention to his warnings. Consequently, the American soldiers were not prepared for what confronted them when

they became POWs. Finally, one must recall that China and North Korea did not sign the Geneva Convention of 1949, and therefore were not legally bound by the Convention's "rules" for the treatment of POWs.
II. BRAINWASHING: SOME DEFINITIONS

According to Edward Hunter, the reason for the popularity of the term "brainwashing" was due to the fact that "a vacuum in language existed...it described a strategy that had yet no name."\(^{37}\) J. A. M. Merloo went further and stated that "to name an object is to bring it within the sphere of human control...without a name it arouses fear, because it is unknown."\(^{38}\) Once given the name "brainwashing," it was initially used to describe the process of thought reform used by the Chinese on their people, but it soon spread to other Communist block countries approaches to thought reform as well. "It was not long before anything the Communists did anywhere was labeled as brainwashing."\(^{39}\) As stated above however, it was with the return of the POWs from Korea that put the word in the dictionary and in the minds of the people of the world. With this rise in popularity, many writers have

\(^{37}\) Hunter, Brainwashing: From Pavlov To Powers, p. 3.

\(^{38}\) Ibid, p. 4.

presented various definitions of brainwashing. Therefore, it would be helpful at this stage to review these definitions with the purpose of arriving at a single definition which at best describes what took place in China during the Communist takeover in 1948, and in the Korean POW camps during the 1950's. A definition which centers on the brainwashing of groups will help the reader better understand the information presented in this paper.

Edward Hunter defined brainwashing as a technique whereby "actual damage was done to a man's mind through drugs, hypnotism, or other means so that a memory of what actually happened would be wiped out of his mind and a new memory of what never happened inserted." This definition was acceptable in 1950, given the limited knowledge of the subject and psychology of the day. Today, it has been criticized because it insinuates that a memory can be totally erased. Based on the information obtained from the Korean POWs, we now know that it is scientifically impossible to completely erase one's memories, and that past memories are still vivid; they have merely been suppressed. In Korea, one must also remember that there was no documentation which indicated that drugs or hypnosis were used on the prisoners.

\[40\] Scheflin and Opton, The Mind Manipulators, p. 86.
In contrast to Hunter's definition, The Random House Dictionary Of The English Language describes brainwashing as "a method of systematically changing attitudes or altering beliefs, originated in totalitarian countries, esp. through the use of torture, drugs, or psychological stress techniques."\(^{41}\)

This definition, as with Hunter's, is inadequate due to the references to drugs and hypnosis. Furthermore, it states that it originated in totalitarian countries, which is not true. It has been traced back to Ancient Greece, a democracy, and was used in the rites of priests.\(^{42}\)

Alan Scheflin, on the other hand, sees brainwashing as an ideological conversion that takes place "when a person has been compelled to believe subjectively a set of principles originally alien to him. Furthermore, the means...must have been aggressive or violent, otherwise...education or advertising would be brainwashing."\(^{43}\)

This definition is more appropriate for the purpose of this study. It eliminates from consideration

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\(^{43}\)Scheflin and Opton, The Mind Manipulators pp. 85-86.
advertising, education, and other forms of persuasion in our society as nothing more than brainwashing. More importantly, it brings to light the fact that ideological conversion is the objective of the process, which has been stated by many others as well.\textsuperscript{44} Schefflin's definition, although an improvement on Hunter's, is still not fully suitable for the purpose of this paper.

Robert Merloo, in his book \textit{Rape Of The Mind}, coined the term "menticide" to describe the brainwashing process as it has taken place through time. Menticide was derived from "mens", meaning the mind, and "caedere", meaning to kill.\textsuperscript{45} He sees brainwashing as a crime against the mind originating from the days of torture in earlier times. It differs from torture because in modern times it has a new twist, which he has aptly named, "the refinement of the rack."\textsuperscript{46} Merloo describes menticide as "an attack on man's very mind, on his sovereign will and conviction. It destroys free thought and makes servile, mechanical

\textsuperscript{44} For a detailed discussion of this matter see pp. 77 to 81.

\textsuperscript{45} Merloo's idea for the term was taken from the word genocide, which means the systematic killing of a racial group.

instruments of his inviolate thought process." After being subjected to this process, the subject usually conforms to the demands or requests of his interrogators. Merloo further states that such a condition confuses those interacting with the subject since the process involves conflicting ideas and information. This leaves doubt as to what is true or false and whom to believe or trust. This last statement is very important to this study, as it brings to light the effects that brainwashing has on a group.

Robert Lifton sees brainwashing as "thought reform", and believes it comes from the Chinese word szu-hsiang kai-tsaq, which means ideological remoulding, ideological reform, or thought reform. During a visit to Hong Kong, he became involved in studying several individuals who escaped from Mainland China and had been subjected to the Chinese thought reform program. He hypothesized after interviewing several who had been through the program, that what they had been through was a much more


48 Idem, The Rape Of The Mind, p. 28.

49 Lifton was one of a few psychiatrists involved in the evaluation of POWs repatriated in Operation Big Switch and Little Switch.
powerful, comprehensive, and effective program than the one that the POWs went through. He saw both programs, however, as bringing "into play a series of pressures and appeals--intellectual, emotional, and physical--aimed at social control and individual change." These pressures and appeals use the group as social manipulators. Thus, the group is not only affected by someone going through the process (as Merloo indicates), but it also becomes an instrument in the process.

Still another author, Edgar Schein, used the term "coercive persuasion" to describe the process that American civilians imprisoned in China were subjected to. He felt that "what happened to the prisoners was that they were subjected to unusually prolonged persuasion from which they could not escape...they were coerced into allowing themselves to be persuaded." To Schein, this indicated that a prisoner was not merely a passive recipient or information taker, but that he participated in the process, in which a "genuine clash of beliefs and points of view were involved." The result was an avoidance-avoidance

50 Lifton, Thought Reform And The Psychology Of Totalism, p. 4.


conflict, in which the prisoner was confronted by two or more undesirable alternatives. Consequently, in order to survive he permitted himself to be persuaded.

It should be noted that the brainwashing process retains its grip on the individual only as long as one is in such an environment. Once free of this environment, one does not generally practice those beliefs which were forced upon him. In other words, the effects of brainwashing are not permanent. This statement can be verified from the behavior of the POWs who returned from Korea as well as by the American and Chinese civilian prisoners who were returned from China.

Therefore, after reviewing these definitions, for the purpose of this paper brainwashing will be defined as follows:

Brainwashing is an attempt at ideological conversion which tries to get a group to believe subjectively something that is alien to them. The process must be violent or aggressive in nature, and consists of intellectual, emotional, and physical pressures. The results are that the victims conform, as there are not acceptable alternatives left open to them. This leaves doubt as to what is true and false, with conflict as to who to believe or trust. The process fails


if the individual leaves the sterile brainwashing environment.

With this definition in mind, the Communist methods of brainwashing used on the people of China and American servicemen captured in Korea and held by the Chinese will be explored.
III. BRAINWASHING IN CHINA AND NORTH KOREA

The Application Of Brainwashing In China

The Communist Party Reform Movement of 1942-1944 laid the groundwork for China's future. Since they had been greatly influenced by the Soviet Union, the Reform Movement centered around the thoughts of Marx and Lenin. It was for this reason that China's thought reform program (also known as brainwashing) was derived from Russia as well.55

The Civil War between the Chinese Communists and Chiang K'ai-shek's Nationalists was taking place when the Russian Secret Police intervened on the side of the Communists. Since it was in their best interests that the Nationalists be defeated, they taught their secret techniques of brainwashing to the Communists in order to help them win the minds of the people. Its existence in Russia was not well known due to the fact that when it was put to use on an individual, once they got what they wanted out of him, he was eliminated. In China, however, the process could not be hidden because those subjected were not eliminated (with the target group being all of China,

55 Walker, China Under Communism, pp. 54-55.
instead of a few individuals as in Russia). The large scale application of such a process was difficult to keep secret.56

This thought reform program was in use throughout China when Mao Tse-tung became the Chairman of the Communist Party in 1949. He continued its use because he felt that all man's possessions belonged to the Chinese Communist Party, including his mind.57 Mao's policy on brainwashing is best described in the following statement:

to integrate individuals into the new body politic as deeply as possible, and, at the same time, to detach them from the old groups, such as the family or traditional village organizations. These groups must be disintegrated, always through action from within.58

This statement shows that Mao Tse-tung's use of brainwashing had as its objective the breaking down of group cohesion. It should follow therefore, that the extent and quality of this group breakdown would be the key to its success. This was, in fact, the method used by the Chinese Communists in their quest for control during their Civil War (and which was later used in the Korean War). A

56 Hunter, Brainwashing: From Pavlov To Powers, p. 9.


58 Ellul, Propaganda: The Formation Of Men's Attitudes, p. 308.
more comprehensive explanation on Chinese brainwashing is contained in the *The Wang Report*.

Wang Tsun-ming was an anti-Communists counter-intelligence officer with Chiang K'ai-shek from 1946 to 1950. His work dealt with studying the "Communist methods for seizing and consolidating power over communities and over groups of people." Upon capture in 1950 by Communist forces, he was subjected to the very process he had been observing for four years. After a year of this brainwashing, he was sent to Korea as a private to fight the Americans. Upon arriving in North Korea, he made his way to American forces; not to fight them, but to surrender. His information on the Communist's methods of brainwashing as applied to groups is the subject of a U.S. Army study entitled, *The Wang Report*. The highlights of that report are described below.

In his debriefing with U.S. intelligence officers in 1953, Wang began by stating that when a village was singled out for Communist takeover, the total process would usually take about eight months. In the beginning, soldiers would move into the village, share simple slogans and new ideas, and help the villagers in their work. Their purpose during this "helping period" was not to convert

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59 Kinkead, *In Every War But One*, p. 89.
people to Communism (though at times it did), but to discover all they could about the village, the people in it, and how the town interacted with surrounding villages.

Upon learning all they needed to know, they approached the town "undesirables" and informed them that they were to become the town leaders. These future leaders were called "progressives" by the Communists. A town meeting was then called, with the progressives planted among the villagers with instructions to present grievances against the upper class. These rich were accused of exploitation of the people for their own selfish gains, and were then forced to confess such "crimes" publicly. The progressives would not accept the confessions of the rich, and would beat them and accuse others in the audience of exploitation as well. Subsequently, the Communists then turned the poor farmers against the progressives, and consequently more accusations and more confessions took place. With this growing confusion and anomie among the villagers, all of the farms were confiscated by the Communists and the land redistributed. The best land was given to those who would further the Communist cause once the soldiers left the area. With this, the group was on its way to total disorganization and breakdown, as Wang went on to show.

The final act was to bind the people back together as one under Communism. They accomplished this by forcing
a randomly picked man who had caused trouble during the takeover, to confess to "crimes" during a village meeting. Those given the best land (seen as the "new progressives"), were strategically placed throughout the crowd to aid in fostering hostility toward the victim by the villagers. The result would be that the whole town—men, women, and children—would take part in beating the man to death. With everyone taking part in the killing, they would thus be "bound to each other and to Communism by a common stigma of blame."

The emphasis of Wang's report centered on the Communists strategy of creating chaos, disorganization, and anomie within the village. "They were not satisfied with turning class against class; they went inside of each family, to turn individuals against each other and so loosen irreparably the cement that held together the class itself." The village's conversion to Communism was therefore seen as the result of the total breakdown in group cohesion.

**The Application Of Brainwashing In Korea**

In relationship to the above, while looking at

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60 Ibid, p. 89-94.

61 Ibid, p. 91-94.
this process as it was applied in the Chinese controlled prisoner of war camps in North Korea, one might keep in mind the following statements made by Colonel Willis A. Perry, at the time of the prisoner's repatriation one of the intelligence officers responsible for security matters of the returning POWs. He believed that:

The principles used to undermine and weaken our men and their relationships were basically the same as those used in China except that psychological pressures replaced the physical ones....In China, the Communists were seeking to purge reactionary elements and to redistribute the land; in the prison camps, their goals were to isolate reactionaries and redistribute ideas...They could not obtain these results with beatings, torture, and death...If the Communists had tortured or killed our men, their buddies would have banded together in a unified way to resist their captors.62

As we shall see, the Chinese would not give the prisoners this opportunity to unite.

The application of the Chinese techniques of brain-washing in the North Korean POW camps63 has been summarized by many writers.64 For the most part, they all agree on

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63 Throughout this paper, North Korean POW camps will refer solely to those controlled by the Chinese unless otherwise specified.

what the soldier experienced while in enemy hands. Therefore, for the purpose of this paper I will rely mostly on Schein's work, "The Chinese Indoctrination Program For Prisoners Of War," as he goes into much greater detail than the others. However, reference will also be made to others when it becomes necessary to fill in gaps or to make a point clearer. The following summary thus represents the average experience of the American Army POW in Korea, and will show that the breakdown of group cohesion was a key element in the Chinese techniques of brainwashing.

The soldiers who were taken prisoner in Korea, did not fit into any pattern as to how they fell into enemy hands. Some were members of units that were surrounded or overrun by the Chinese. Others were separated from their units due to the shifting front that was common in Korea, with these individuals soon finding American lines in their rear. Consequently, many of these individuals (as well as large combat elements), became POWs of the Chinese. 65

After being captured, the first few hours in the


hands of the Chinese were frightening due to rumors that had been spread throughout the units about the treatment one could receive. The newly captured prisoner expected torture and death; by not being killed outright however, their fears of being killed were soon alleviated.

After getting the prisoner away from the front lines, the Chinese went to great lengths to show that they were friendly and humane. They would meet their captives with outstretched hands, offer them congratulations on being released from the Capitalist bonds, and give them food and cigarettes. Emphasis was put on the fact that they were lucky not to have fallen into the hands of the North Koreans, as they would not be alive. The prisoners were repeatedly asked if they were for peace, as were the Chinese. If they answered affirmatively, they were then promised to be released if they "did well," "cooperated," and "learned the truth." This strategy had the effect of elevating the enemy in the minds of the POWs. All of the horror stories they had previously heard and believed were obviously not true—the Chinese soldiers were kind and

66 Ibid, pp. 150-151.

67 Kinkead, In Every War But One, p. 94.

a humane people. After gaining a little of the POW's trust during this initial meeting, the march to the permanent camp was begun. This journey would take the prisoners initially to temporary camps (which were not far from the permanent camps) in order that the prisoners might rest, while the guards could observe their reactions to their ordeal (i.e. look for potential collaborators). 69

The conditions during the march to the camps took their toll on the prisoners. As the Chinese had not thought of how they were going to feed the prisoners during the march, they usually had to buy what they could from local villagers. The food they bought was insufficient, with the calorie content well below that of the soldier's normal diet. 70 In addition, the men were usually given drinking water only once a day, therefore, to quench their thirst, it was not uncommon for them to drink water found in ditches or, if the season was right, to eat snow. Under these conditions, the men soon began to suffer from

69 Ibid, p. 152.

70 The calorie content of what the men were getting on the march and in the camps amounted to between 800-1200 calories; they were accustomed to the Army combat ration of 3,500 calories. In addition, their diet was deficient in proteins, minerals, and vitamins; see Kinkead, In Every War But One, pp. 142-143.
diarrhea, which left them in a very weak state. 71

Due to the fact that all of the Chinese camps were on the China-North Korea border, the journey could be up to 300 miles in length, depending on the location of the front and where captured. 72 The columns moved only under the cover of darkness (as daylight brought the fear of U.S. air strikes), while averaging twenty miles per night. 73 During daylight halts, propaganda leaflets and Communist songs were distributed, as was news of Chinese victories. After allowing the prisoners time to read and digest this information, a discussion of the content followed. During this period, anything that the prisoners wished to discuss could also be brought up. Many times the conditions of the march, particularly the lack of food, was the subject of these conversations. The Chinese would remind the POWs that the Chinese soldiers were eating the same food, and enduring the same hardships. Moreover, they were reminded that the prisoners were allowed to keep their own clothing


72 Biderman, March To Calumny, pp. 96, 202; see map in Appendix 3.

73 Schein states that not all men participated in these foot marches, however, it seemed to be the norm; see Schein, "The Chinese Indoctrination Program For Prisoners Of War," p. 151.
and were protected from the North Koreans and any guards who got too aggressive. Consequently, since they were all going through bad times together, the POWs were asked to hold on until they could get to the temporary camps. Because of these hardships, "Lines of authority tended to break down, and the prevailing attitude was 'every man for himself.' Open competition for food, clothing, and shelter made the maintenance of group ties almost impossible." The thought of better conditions at the temporary camps is what kept most POWs going. For many however, this was not enough and many perished during the march.

For those who made it to the temporary camps, the conditions were actually worse than during the march. Disease, lack of food, and exposure to the elements took many lives. The lack of better treatment was blamed either on United Nations' air strikes (which the Chinese claimed destroyed much of the food in North Korea), or the failure

White disagrees with this point. In his example he showed the guards as brutal and being replaced every few days. As the norm seems to be as stated above, we will go with that interpretation, with the understanding that there were limited acts of brutality and ill treatment by the guards; see White, The Captives Of Korea, pp. 46-49.


See Appendix 4 for Tables.
of the POWs to cooperate. Additionally, although prisoners were inadequately guarded in these temporary camps, few attempts to escape were made. The reasons for this has been attributed to weakness due to the lack of proper food and rest, fear of capture by the North Koreans, and to the concept of every man for himself. Schein explains that, "It was difficult to maintain close group ties if one was competing with others for the essentials of life."77 It is therefore not surprising that the prisoners that reached the permanent camps were not only mentally and physically drained, but were lacking in group cohesion due to the inability to satisfy basic biological needs.

The permanent POW camps were usually part of a small village, separated by either man-made or natural barriers. The POW's permanent quarters consisted of mud huts, with straw matting to sleep on. Other prominent buildings included a mess hall, latrine, Chinese officer and enlisted quarters, and a large building used for lectures and administrative purposes. The facilities were inadequate according to Schein, "but far better than in temporary camps." Furthermore, although guards and barriers were present, they were inadequate for the number

of POWs in the camp. The physical set-up was therefore not a deterrent for anyone wishing to escape or venture into the adjoining village.  

Upon arrival at the permanent camp, the prisoners were greeted by the senior interrogator of the camp. This interrogator and his assistants were unique in that they were well educated and could speak English fluently. Their knowledge of the United States was extensive, and it has been stated that "they were often so conversant with American slang, and so knowledgeable about Stan Musial's batting average or the landmarks along U.S. Highway No. 1, that many of them might have just got off a plane from the States."  

The interrogator's job was to find out all he could from the prisoner under the guise of friendship. The POWs were all led to a room where they were asked to fill out a form with heading of the International Red Cross. The reason given for answering the approximately 140 questions was to enable the Chinese to have enough information to inform the U.S. Army, friends, and relatives that the prisoner was alive and well. The actual purpose of the

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79 Kinkead, *In Every War But One*, pp. 99-100.

80 Ibid, pp. 95-96.
form was to arrive at the prisoner's socio-economic status and to discover any weakness in the individual which could be exploited. \(^81\) "They sized up each prisoner's character to find out whether he carried a grudge against his superiors, his neighbors, or society in general."\(^82\) Through this and other means, the Chinese gathered "the largest fund of information about the American soldier ever acquired by an enemy...[this] provided the Communist with intelligence they could never have obtained from other sources."\(^83\) The purpose of later interrogation was to either gather information of military nature or to gain further knowledge about the prisoner, both of which could be used as instruments of blackmail in the future. Whatever the reason, the POW was always put in a situation where if he lied, the interrogator would know it. For example, the Chinese would call in the same prisoner for days trying to get information about a piece of military equipment. When the POW lied, he would go through the confession as listed below. If he would say nothing, the

\(^{81}\) Ibid, p. 95.

\(^{82}\) U.S., Congress, House Communist Psychological Warfare (Brainwashing), p. 16.

\(^{83}\) Kinkead, In Every War But One, pp. 115-116.
interrogator might go as far as to move in with the prisoner as a ploy to get him talking about anything. After many days of this, the interrogator would call in the prisoner and ask him the question again. With a lie or no answer given, the interrogator would pull out the Army Technical Manual on the piece of equipment, and read in great deal the specifications he had been asking for.\textsuperscript{84} This has been referred to as the "deception" technique,\textsuperscript{85} and leads the individual to believe that the interrogator knows the answers to his questions, so it saves him a lot of time and he confesses by answering the questions correctly.\textsuperscript{86} Questions regarding the prisoner's personal history were already in the hands of the interrogator, who was armed with the individual's Red Cross form (which was previously mentioned). Any deviation from the information on that form was used to discredit the soldier. In this manner, the Communists determined who were good candidates for brainwashing and, after being indoctrinated, would be


\textsuperscript{85}Also known as the "I know all" technique.

\textsuperscript{86}U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School, Military Intelligence Subcourse 105: Examination Of Prisoners Of War And Documents, Fort Huachuca, Arizona, February 1963 (Revised November 1974), p. 105;2;23; For a complete listing of Communist techniques used in Korea, see Appendix 5.
useful to them in organizing the POW camp.

The organization of the camp followed the "company" scheme which was familiar to the U.S. soldiers. In a standard infantry company, there are four platoons, with the platoons broken down into four squads. Each POW camp had between three to seven of these companies, with approximately 200 men per company. Each company consisted of three to four platoons which were broken into six squads, each squad having from six to fifteen POWs. The very structure of the companies had the appearance of a military unit, which consists of formal chains of command, rank structure, etc.. The chain of command and rank structure, however, were dominated by the Chinese. They put their own people in charge of the companies and platoon, with lower ranking POWs as squad leaders. They meant to emphasize that under Communism all were equal, and rank was unimportant. Schein has described this policy as "a systematic attempt to undermine the internal structure of the group by removing its leaders...the noncommissioned officers, who were at first in the enlisted camps, were put into a special camp when the Chinese found out that they were quite effective in keeping the other men from various kinds of collaboration. It was reported that this segregation

87Kinkead, In Every War But One, pp. 102-103.
was often followed by a considerable increase in collaboration, particularly among the younger enlisted men."\(^88\)

Moreover, the Chinese not only separated the POWs by rank, but also by race and nationality.

The prisoners were separated by race and nationality in an attempt to exploit minorities. The basis for this type of separation can be traced in the history of prisoner of war camps as a successful tactic. In our Civil War, both the North and South concentrated on men from border states as possible turncoats; in World War I, the Germans targeted the Irishmen among the British forces; in World War II, the United States worked on the Austrian prisoners; in Korea, it was the Negro,\(^89\) Puerto Rican, and other Spanish speaking Americans whom the Chinese targeted. The Chinese felt that due to racial problems and discrimination in the U.S., these minorities could be easily exploited and indoctrinated. It was for this reason


\(^89\) The Negro, although specially targeted for brainwashing, performed admirably. This has been attributed to not only the strong moral character of the Negro, but to stupid mistakes made by the Chinese. For example, the Chinese segregated them right after the U.S. Army desegregated them. Furthermore, when the Chinese talked about how badly they (the Negroes) were treated in America, the Negro would see a correlation between this and the way the Chinese treated the North Koreans; see Mayer, "Why Did Many GI Captives Cave In?," p. 60.
that a lot of time and pressure was spent on the American POW minorities in the Chinese held camps.90

Thus far, it has been shown that the breakdown of the prisoner group was initially aided by the withholding of physical necessities, isolation of leaders, and segregation of the men by race, rank, and nationality. The Chinese enhanced this breakdown through the use of spies, informers, rewards, and manipulation of the mail. Their purpose was to put a halt to all friendships, emotional bonds, and group activities that were not beneficial to them.91

Spies and informers were very important in the breakdown of the group according to Schein: "The men reported that the Chinese were forever sneaking around their quarters and listening to conversations or observing activities from hidden posts, and they also knew that some of their number were acting as informers." These informers gave the Communists information about everything that took place in the camp, such as what groups were forming, who was planning an escape, who the troublemakers were, etc.92

90Biderman, March To Calumny, pp. 25-26.


Anyone discovered or caught participating in any of the above activities, or violating any of the camp rules was subject to disciplinary action.

The punishment employed by the Chinese was usually psychological in nature, although the fear of physical abuse and/or mistreatment was always of great concern to the prisoners. This was due to the fact that no matter how trivial or insignificant the "crime," the wrongdoings were made to look monumental, resulting in the POW's writing a self-criticism statement. The purpose of these statements were not only to produce guilt and anxiety in the prisoner, but also to be used as an initial step in collaboration. The procedure used was as follows:

1. A crime took place (it could be as insignificant as not bowing in the presence of a Chinese guard).

2. The prisoner was brought in front of the camp commander.

3. The camp commander informed the prisoner of the seriousness of the crime, and stressed that if the policy of the Chinese was not so lenient, he would be severely punished.

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93 The mere threat of death or non-repatriation was especially frightening. The prisoners understood that they could be listed as having died of a jungle disease or heart problem, and no one would know the real cause.

94 Mayer, "Why Did Many GI Captives Cave In?", p. 72.
4. The commander would then ask the POW for his apologies, and ask that he not behave in such a "criminal" manner again.

5. If the prisoner was indeed sorry, he was asked to write a self-criticism statement, which did not seem to be too much to ask considering the punishment he could receive.

6. Lastly, he would then have to present his oral statement to a group of prisoners, who would discuss the seriousness of the crime and the ramifications if such a crime were allowed to continue taking place in the camp. This discussion would be monitored by either the Chinese or a POW working for the enemy.

Such public self-criticism was degrading and humiliating to the prisoner and only added to his confusion since he did not know who his friends really were. As fellow prisoners took part in the discussion, they were often so convincing in their arguments that he would not be sure who actually believed what he did was a crime. In addition, since it was impossible not to violate a rule or anger a guard, one would soon be on report again. This time the camp commander would show more anger because of the prisoner's second violation. The POW would again be willing to write a statement to alleviate the commander's

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anger, even if it was of more use to the Chinese than the previous one. In time, he would again be back in the commander's office, writing still another but more significant statement. In this way the prisoner had progressed from writing a small, useless statement (i.e., he should follow the rules more closely) to writing one of greater significance (i.e., he was involved in the killing of innocent civilians). William Mayer has concluded that, the self-criticism amounted to a virtual confession...a great many soldiers participated in it without realizing that this was what was happening. Moreover, confessions were eventually required to implicate others. Once a man confessed about himself, the Communists would urge him: 'Now let's go a step further. Why don't you talk about your fellow prisoners' problems as well as your own?' It is very simple to see what happened next. These documents became not only confessions, but accusations—depositions of an informer.

It is now understandable why many repatriated POWs made the comment, "You could not rely on anyone."

The Chinese's use of rewards was also effective in undermining the group. It was common knowledge throughout the camp that if one cooperated, the Chinese would reward you with fruit, cigarettes, a blanket, etc. Whenever an

96 Ibid, p. 159.

97 Mayer, "Why Did Many GI Captives Cave In?," p. 72.

98 Kinkead, In Every War But One, p. 109.
informer or spy would report a troublemaker or a group leader, instead of physically removing him (which would leave the group intact), they would simply make him look like he was working for them. For example, a prisoner thought to be a group leader would be removed from his company for a day or two. He would then be asked to make a broadcast or sign a self-criticism statement once away from his peers. This was merely a front, because while he was gone, the Chinese would inform his peers that he was working for them. Upon his return to camp, he would be given tangible rewards for all to see. This action would arouse suspicion and hostility in others, and break down any ties there may have been. As a result, it was not uncommon for this individual to begin to collaborate in order to gain more privileges. He would rationalize his actions by believing that he was doing no harm or that he was doing it as a service by gathering intelligence. He eventually was cut off from all ties with his friends since no one would trust him, not even other collaborators. He became isolated from other Americans in the camp, and only had the mail from home to keep him in touch with his former society.

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The mail, however, offered no salvation for the POW, since his captors were in control of that also. They did not attempt to censor the mail in the usual way (by deleting certain phrases or words). Instead, they withheld the letter. Kinkead has stated that whether the mail was outgoing or incoming, "The likelihood of a letter's reaching its destination increased proportionally with the amount of material it contained favorable to the Communists." Thus, outgoing letters filled with the appropriate propaganda or incoming letters containing bad news had a very good chance of reaching its destination.

Another tactic used by the Chinese was to blame the United States for the lack of mail that the POW received. The number of excuses mentioned were so legitimate sounding that they were believed by some of the POWs. Examples of such reasons included: "Americans are too busy to write to you;" "The U.S. Army has not forwarded any mail;" or "U.S. bombing raids destroyed the mail awaiting distribution in North Korea." Consequently, a "friendly" Communist (an interrogator or guard) would often offer to look into the matter in order to help his "comrade." Oftentimes, within a few days, he would give several letters to the prisoner.

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100 Kinkead, In Every War But One, p. 121.

101 Ibid, p. 120.
This evoked a sense of gratitude in the POW, and even though he could not trust anyone else in the camp, he could trust his Communist friend.\textsuperscript{102} This procedure was used by the Chinese whenever it suited their purpose.

In commenting on these tactics, Edward Hunter states that, "The Communist interrogators, as the brainwashers called themselves, sought to remove a man's trust in his own side, and to convince him that he was being let down and even betrayed by his own country and relatives... The Reds sought to deprive him of all hope."\textsuperscript{103} Edgar Schein further adds that the outcome of the above treatment was that it "helped to create a feeling of general distrust...the only fully safe course was to withdraw from all intimate interaction with other prisoners."\textsuperscript{104}

While the Chinese were in the process of breaking down the group solidarity, the POWs went about their normal daily routine. It consisted of strenuous work details, such as gathering wood, carrying water, repairing roads, 

\textsuperscript{102}Ibid, pp. 121-122.

\textsuperscript{103}U.S. Congress, House, Communist Psychological Warfare (Brainwashing), p. 16.

and the general maintenance of the camp.\textsuperscript{105} Another part of the daily routine consisted of attending indoctrination classes for five hours.\textsuperscript{106} There were two main reasons the prisoners were required to participate in the classes. First, as stated by Mayer, the Chinese "obviously believed that the average American soldier was poorly informed to an extreme degree about his own country, his own economic and political systems; was even more poorly informed about the politics, economics, and social problems of other countries;... and was a man who, if deprived of material sources of support, would prove to be insecure, easily manipulated and controlled, lacking in real loyalties and convictions."\textsuperscript{107} Second, as the U.N. entrance into the Korean War was considered a criminal act by the Chinese, the POWs were to be treated as "students," so that they could learn the truth about the facts of Communism and U.S. aggression.\textsuperscript{108}

As a student, the prisoner had to listen to

\textsuperscript{105}Ibid, p. 152.
\textsuperscript{106}Kinkead, \textit{In Every War But One}, p. 103.
\textsuperscript{107}Mayer, "Why Did Many GI Captives Cave In?," p. 58.
\textsuperscript{108}Schein, "Reaction Patterns To Severe, Chronic Stress In American Army Prisoners Of The Chinese," p. 22.
lectures and radio broadcasts, and read material slanted toward the Communist point of view. They stressed the social, political, and economic problems in the United States and compared them to a more promising way of life—Communism. At the conclusion of each lecture, the prisoners were given questions to discuss and answer. These discussions would be monitored by both Chinese and POW monitors. After a predetermined amount of time, each individual would be required to submit his answers to the lecturer. If the answers were unacceptable, the process would start over again, until the individual's answer were accepted. The effect of this process was as follows:

There is an endless repetition of formulas, explanations, and simple stimuli. Of course, in the beginning all this merely evokes the subject's scorn and disbelief. After some time, however, erosion takes place; whether the subject likes it or not, he ends up knowing by heart certain formulas of the catechism repeated to him a thousand times; he ends up inhabited by these slogans, which still carry no conviction...But it must not be forgotten that the prisoner hears nothing else, and that the incessant repetition of these slogans also prevents any personal

109 This reading material included not only Communist Party publications, but writings by Tolstoy, Charles Dickens, Upton Sinclair, and John Steinbeck to name a few. These writers highlight aspects of Capitalism which were unacceptable to the Communists; see Kinkead, In Every War But One, p. 103.

reflection or meditation. The result is an involuntary penetration and a certain intellectual weakening, added to the impossibility of leading a private intellectual life.111

The outcome was that given the one-sidedness of the argument, "Half-truths and even entire lies sounded convincing...The inquisitors gave our men nothing to think of except Communism."112 Furthermore, if the lectures did not enlighten the prisoner as far as the lecturer was concerned, he could be put into solitary confinement.113 This would allow him to reflect on the Communist viewpoint, while at the same time, question his own beliefs as well.

In the Spring of 1950, the first "peace committees" were organized as instruments of propaganda and to further aid the brainwashing process.114 POWs were recruited for these committees either on the basis of their prior work for the Communists, or for the purpose of discrediting a particular prisoner. Those recruited were chosen by the

111 Ellul, Propaganda: The Formation Of Men's Attitudes, p. 312.

112 U.S. Congress, House, Communist Psychological Warfare (Brainwashing), pp. 16-17.

113 This was not the only reason a prisoner was put in solitary confinement; other reasons included punishment for resistance, disrespect to guards, etc.

"democratic" method. An election would be held, but everyone knew that the one favored by the Communists would win. If he did not, the election was held again and again until he was elected. \footnote{Schein, "The Chinese Indoctrination Program For Prisoners Of War," p. 154.} In this manner, the Chinese had the men they wanted serving on the committees.

The loyalties of the other prisoners was a critical factor that had to be contended with if chosen to be a member of (or in dealing with) the peace committee, since no one knew who was working for the Chinese or who was merely pretending to do so. "If a man was pretending, he had to hide this carefully lest a real pro \footnote{Pro's, also known as progressives and participants, were those prisoners who aided the enemy whenever possible in order to gain rewards, special treatment, etc; see Julius Segal, "Correlates Of Collaboration And Resistance Behavior Among U.S. Army POWs In Korea," The Journal Of Social Issues 3 (1957): p. 32.} turn him in to the Chinese. Yet a man who sincerely believed in the Chinese peace effort had to hide this fact from others who might be pretenders, for fear that they might harm him directly or blacklist him for the future, at the same time convincing other pro's that he really was sincere." \footnote{Schein, "The Chinese Indoctrination Program For Prisoners Of War," p. 155.} This "Catch
in which the prisoner was in trouble with his fellow prisoners if he was known to be a pro, and on the other hand, was in trouble with the Chinese if he was found to be pretending, is further evidence of the overall group breakdown that occurred and the problem it caused. A POW in fact had to be a good actor, and not say the wrong thing at the wrong time in order to stay out of trouble with the Chinese or his fellow prisoners.

In June of 1951, it was suggested by the Soviet Ambassador to the United Nations that talks should begin in order to put an end to the hostilities in Korea. Two months later, negotiations began. Admiral C. Turner Joy, then Senior Delegate and Chief of the United Nations Command Delegation to the Korean Armistice Conference, brought up the matter of exchanging names of their respective prisoners of war to the North Korean delegates. A sub-committee was formed, and by the end of the year, lists were exchanged. It has been suggested by Leslie Dixon

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118 A "Catch 22" can be seen as an avoidance-avoidance conflict, most accurately described as, "You're damned if you do and damned if you don't;" see Joseph Heller, Catch 22 (New York: Dell Publishing Co., Inc., 1955), p. 47.


120 Ibid, pp. 148-150.
that the exchange accounted for the fact that conditions began to improve for the POWs. With these improved conditions came fewer deaths and fewer charges of collaboration for the time period that followed, since the brainwashing program also came to an end.\textsuperscript{121}

The information presented in Chapter Three has shown that the breakdown of formal and informal groups and restricting normal relationships was an important variable in explaining the behavior of American POWs. Although this breakdown was found to be a "key factor" in the brainwashing process, there were other factors that aided in this breakdown. It is necessary therefore to explore some of these factors, especially the various theoretical interpretations, to further clarify what took place in the Chinese held POW camps.

\textsuperscript{121}Dixon, "Duress And Coercion: A Defense Of Collaborating," p. 239.
IV. SOME THEORETICAL EXPLANATIONS OF BRAINWASHING

The Psycho-physiological Explanation

In the article, "Communist Interrogation and Indoctrination of 'Enemies Of The State',"¹²² Lawrence E. Hinkle Jr., and Harold G. Wolff recognize that in Korea, the Communists were successful in "demoralizing" American soldiers. They believe that initially the demoralizing process was accidental, resulting from supply and communication problems, inadequate facilities, and the insensitivity of the peasant soldier. Later however, the use of informers and the segregation of leaders greatly aided the Chinese in achieving their goal.

In using the psycho-physiological model to explain what happened in Korea, Hinkle and Wolff utilize the concept of homeostasis, in which an individual's environment is in a state of equilbrium. This equilbrium is not only dependent on satisfying one's physical needs, such as having a comfortable body temperature, adequate food, air, and water intake, but also on one's psychological needs as well. This also includes satisfactory interaction with

others who are close in proximity. Problems seem to arise when one's equilibrium is upset, and man, taking the natural course expected of him, attempts to restore this balance.123

Some of the psycho-physiological techniques used by the Chinese in Korea were: standing at attention for long periods of time; being slapped or kicked; being kept in solitary confinement; being made to stand on toes with rope around neck; and being made to stand in water.124 In experiments where individuals are placed in a situation which produces disequilibrium, the individual does everything he can to relieve the stress he is going through. This includes random exploration, in which one becomes "excited, anxious, hyperactive, and panicky." If the stress is not satisfactorily relieved, he goes into an inactive, dejected state. In this state he becomes dependent upon anyone who offers to help him. In the POW camp, it was one of the Chinese Communists (usually an interrogator or


124Kinkead, In Every War But One, p. 112; Schein, "The Chinese Indoctrination Program For Prisoners Of War," p. 162; The Army did not consider the above acts torture, and equated them to the same type of stress a combat soldier undergoes; see Kinkead, In Every War But One, p. 112.
guard) who came to the prisoner's aid. This gave the prisoner the opportunity to talk, for he was in great need of social interaction due to the breakdown of the group, distrust of the other POWs, and from the ordeal he had just gone through. The prisoner was allowed to talk about anything he wished, because this afforded the Communist the opportunity to establish a good relationship with the captive. "Because of his dependence upon the interrogator, the prisoner develops an intense desire to please him. The prisoner glows when he is rewarded, and is deeply disturbed when he is rejected."\(^{125}\)

An example of this process has been cited on pages 43-44 of this thesis. It showed that a POW looking for social ties was aided by Chinese Communists who gave him mail from home. This would evoke a sense of trust in the POW and it enabled them to exploit the prisoner under the guise of friendship.\(^{126}\)

Another excellent example has been described by Captain Zach W. Dean after his repatriation from the Chinese. After being taken on what was described as a "death march", Dean was not only harassed by the Chinese

\(^{125}\) Hinkle and Wolff, "Communist Interrogation And Indoctrination Of 'Enemies Of The State'," pp. 170-171.  

\(^{126}\) Kinkead, \textit{In Every War But One}, p. 122.
but he was also deprived of food and warmth. When he felt he could not hold on any longer, the Communists went to great lengths to revive him. He was treated kindly, and given food and adequate living accommodations. After a few weeks, he was again deprived of physical needs, harassed and lectured on Communism, and left to die. Again he was revived and nursed back to health. The effects of this treatment are best expressed by Dean: "I don't believe you'll be able to understand what I'm going to tell you now. After the Reds do that to you a few times, you are grateful to them for saving your life. You forget that they are the people who almost killed you." 127

The Learning Theory Explanation

According to other writers, what took place in the Chinese held POW camps was the outcome of Ivan Pavlov's work with dogs. 128 Robert Merloo has suggested that in

127 U.S. Congress, House, Communist Psychological Warfare (Brainwashing), p. 17.

128 Lifton, Thought Reform And The Psychology Of Totalism, p. 388; Robert Merloo, "Pavlovian Strategy As A Weapon In Menticide," American Journal Of Psychiatry 110 (1954): p. 809; P. S. Santucci and G. Winokur, "Brainwashing As A Factor In Psychiatric Illness," AMA Archives Of Neurology And Psychiatry 74 (1955): pp. 11-16; Sargant, Battle For The Mind, pp. 29-45; Hunter, Brainwashing: From Pavlov To Powers, pp. 17-41; (Hunter has even gone so far as to state that a four hundred page secret manuscript exists in the Kremlin in which results of extensive research by Pavlov on human beings is compiled.)
order for conditioning to have taken place in the POW camps, two elements had to be present. First, there had to be the breakdown of the group, in which "old patterns have to be broken down in order to build up conditioned reflexes."\(^{129}\) This was done by isolation, whereby "feelings of terror, fear, and hopelessness, of being alone, of standing with one's back to the wall" is the outcome. Secondly, "guilt must be aroused." This was done by interrogations, self-criticism statements, etc.\(^{130}\) William Sargant agrees with Merloo and contends that, "Once a state of hysteria has been induced in men or dogs by mounting stresses which the brain can no longer tolerate, protective inhibition is likely to supervene." This is seen to disturb the individual's previously conditioned behavior patterns, and leaves one increasingly susceptible to suggestion.\(^{131}\) The two types of conditioning mentioned deal with the basic conditioning of reflexes and neurosis.

At the core of the classical conditioning process is the learning of reflexes, which are "involuntary responses elicited by a specific stimulus" (i.e., pulling

\(^{129}\) Merloo, *The Rape Of The Mind*, pp. 43-45.


\(^{131}\) Sargant, *Battle For The Mind*, p. 59.
one's hand away from a hot stove). In Pavlov's studies, a
dog was given food immediately after the flashing of a
light. The dog's response to the food was the activation
of its salivary glands. It was discovered that after
several pairings of the food with the light, the light
alone would elicit salivation. In order that the
reader may better understand this process, the following
terms should be clarified:

1. **Unconditioned Stimulus (UCS)**—Any
   stimulus that regularly produces a
   response.

2. **Unconditioned Response (UCR)**—The
   reaction to the UCS.

3. **Condition Stimulus (CS)**—A neutral
   stimulus that is paired with the UCS
   which prior to the process does not
   produce UCR.

4. **Conditioned Response (CR)**—After
   several pairings with the UCS, the CS
   begins to elicit the same reactions
   as the UCS, making the response a
   conditioned response (CR) or a learned
   response.  

In a classical conditioning framework, a neutral
conditioned stimulus (CS) is paired with a non-neutral
stimulus (UCS) which produces a response (UCR). After
several pairings of the conditioned stimulus (CS) and the

132 Gregory Kimble, Norman Garmezy, and Edward
Zigler, *Principles Of General Psychology, Fourth Edition*

unconditioned stimulus (UCS), the conditioned stimulus (CS) has the ability to elicit a response resembling that of the unconditioned response (UCR). The reflex is therefore learned or conditioned, and referred to as the conditioned response (CR).\textsuperscript{134}

An example of the type of conditioning which took place in North Korea is diagrammed as follows:

\begin{itemize}
\item[UCS] Food (or reward of some sort)
\item[CS] Slogans (propaganda)
\item[UCR] Favorable reaction to Chinese
\end{itemize}

This shows that the food (UCS) is paired with slogans (CS). The UCS emits a favorable reaction to the Chinese (UCR). After several pairings, the slogans alone will elicit a favorable response to the Chinese. This is shown as:

\begin{itemize}
\item[CS] Slogans
\item[CR] Favorable reaction to Chinese
\end{itemize}

It is seen that the prisoners were conditioned to equate a previous neutral stimulus to favorable reactions to the Chinese by the POWs. Edward Hunter, after watching

\textsuperscript{134} Ibid, p. 214.
a film entitled The Nervous System, in which Pavlov himself conditions a man to salivate to a flash of light, asked the following question to a psychiatrist with whom he saw the movie:

Hunter: "What if the person doesn't want to react that way?"

Psychiatrist: "He can't help it! Nothing he can do can stop his saliva glands from working."^3d

In other words, once conditioned, the individual is powerless to do anything about it as long as the proper sequence of reinforcement is used and other variables are not introduced.

In other studies, Pavlov found that if a dog was presented with food in temporal association with light, the dog would salivate. After conditioning the dog to salivate to this circle of light, it was found that the dog would not salivate if presented with an eclipse of light (and no food). In addition, the closer the eclipse came to representing a whole circle, differentiation became harder for the dog. This conflict caused the dog to howl and become excited, which has become known as an experimental

135 Edward Hunter claims he has seen two versions of this film—-one depicting experimentation on people and one that deletes the experience.

neurosis, or confusion neurosis. This explanation has also been used by P. S. Santucci and G. Winokur to account for how the prisoners were brainwashed in Korea.

Santucci and Winokur believe that there are three types of conditioned responses, and that behavior consists not only of verbal activities, but of thinking and motor activity as well. In the POW camps, the prisoners were forced into doing things that they did not wish to do (i.e. sing Communist songs, and write statements). By participating, even though forced to do so, they were rewarded for their behavior. "If, in the beginning, the patient did not believe in his statements and activities, there would have inevitably been an internal conflict between his motor and speech responses as opposed to thinking." When put in this situation (described as a Catch 22 above), a confusion neurosis was likely to ensue. There are three ways to care for this type of neurosis: try and outwit the


139 Santucci and Winokur refer to the POWs as patients throughout the article.

140 Santucci and Winokur, "Brainwashing As Factor In Psychiatric Illness," p. 15.
captors, refuse to do their bidding, or think and act as they wish you to act. Santucci and Winokur feel that the latter of the three was the course of action that the POWs in Korea took since it was the path of least resistance, and, in addition, was where rewards instead of punishments prevailed.\textsuperscript{141}

I. F. Farber, Harry F. Harlow, and Louis J. West present a theoretical analysis of the psychological states that were at work in Korea in their article, "Brainwashing, Conditioning, and DDD (Debility, Dependency, and Dread)." Although they did not go into great detail on the contributing factors, they did recognize that "the effectiveness of Communist methods was undoubtedly greatly enhanced by their control of the means for satisfying nuclear social needs for recognition, status, communication, and so on." Therefore, what took place in the camps was possible due to these social controls, which the author of this thesis perceives as the breakdown of the group.\textsuperscript{142}

Farber et al feel that the psychological states at work in Korea consisted of debility, in which individuals exposed to noxious stimulation, injury, malnutrition,

\textsuperscript{141} Ibid, pp. 15-16.

\textsuperscript{142} I. F. Farber, Harry F. Harlow, and Louis J. West, "Brainwashing, Conditioning, And DDD (Debility, Dependency, And Dread)," \textit{Sociometry} 20 (1957), p. 273.
deprivation, etc., were left in a weakened psychological state; dependency, in which they were dependent on the Chinese for basic need satisfaction; and dread, which consists of great fear and anxiety. The manipulation and use of these three factors had a two-fold effect. First, it put the prisoner in a state in which he had little response for what was going on around him. This tended to disrupt his sense of time and self-concept. Second, his symbolic processes were affected, which has been suggested could have made him susceptible to conditioning. This conditioning process, according to Farber et al., relies mainly on operant (instrumental) conditioning, although classical conditioning was also used.

The first thing the Communists did was to condition the prisoner to believe that DDD could be alleviated. (This was referred to as classically conditioning anticipatory goal response by Farber et al.) Such expectancy of relief served the purpose of keeping the prisoner's hopes alive, whereas if he were totally broken down he would be of no use to the Communists. An example of this can be seen in the case of the soldier who was instructed by the Chinese to stand at attention for long hours or confined

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to the "hole"\footnote{The hole was usually a small, tin box in which the prisoner was deprived of food and water, and where temperatures reached dangerous extremes.} for failure to cooperate. The prisoner was made aware that the reason for his predicament was "self-inflicted." If he wished his hardships to cease, all he had to do was inform his captors of his willingness to cooperate. This served to increase the intensity of his thoughts of relief, since he knew he had the ability to alleviate his hardships.\footnote{Farber, et al., "Brainwashing, Conditioning, And DDD (Debility, Dependency, And Dread)," pp. 276-277.} Upon cooperating, operant conditioning was a by-product (that is, what takes place after a response determines whether that response will persist—with emphasis on reinforcement\footnote{Robert E. Silverman, Psychology (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1975), p. 456.}). In the above example, relief from standing at attention or release from the hole is a reinforcer. Additionally, "interrogation, threats, and contumely\footnote{contumely—"insulting display of contempt in words or actions; contemptuous or humiliating treatment; see "contumely." see The Random House Dictionary Of The English Language, s.v. "contumely."} may also have a rewarding aspect, so great is the acquired reinforcement value of social communication and speech under conditions of isolation,
dependency, and debility." DDD is thus seen to encompass the ideas of Hinkle and Wolff, Pavlov, and Skinner's operant conditioning as well.

The Socio-psychological Explanation

In response to this psycho-physiological explanation, Edgar Schein has stated that the physical hardships and deprivations used in Korea were either attempts to degrade and humble the prisoner or the result of extenuating circumstances (Chinese inability to keep the prisons supplied, anger of the guards, inspire fear in others, etc.). Schein sees a socio-psychological explanation for the methods used in North Korea. In his article, "Interpersonal Communication, Group Solidarity, and Social Influence," he uses many of the Sociologist Erving Goffman's ideas in order to present a theory of influence dealing with attitude and value change. Schein believes that groups and individuals are protected against change or influence through an interpersonal communication process. This process includes social relationships, roles, and self-images which are important to groups and

\[149\] Farber et al., "Brainwashing, Conditioning, And DDD (Debility, Dependency, And Dread)," p. 277.

\[150\] Schein, "Reaction Patterns To Severe, Chronic Stress In American Army Prisoners Of The Chinese," p. 29.
individual functioning. He further believes that, "In order for people to accomplish any kind of task together they must have a certain level of regard for each other, which is usually reflected in the degree of attention they give to each other...If such regard or involvement is improperly low or high, it is a signal that the person cannot be trusted not to take advantage of the other participants in the situation." With the breakdown of the group in Korea, the regard and involvement which POW's had for each other was consequently very low. The result was that their opinions and beliefs, self-images, and fundamental values became susceptible to change. Schein gives two reasons for this. First, with the breaking of old ties within the group, the POW was looking to regain those ties or establish new ones. Schein believes this could not occur without "some personal change." Secondly, having no one with whom to compare beliefs and judgements, he became susceptible to "cognitive re-definition." By this Schein means that "process of accepting new definitions for existing concepts, placing concepts into new scales of evaluation, or shifting the anchors or neutral points on

such scales.\textsuperscript{152} Such re-definition might take the form of not recognizing that his behavior was in fact helping the enemy, or of re-evaluating relative priorities where conflicting values were involved.\textsuperscript{153}

An example of this can be seen to have occurred before the breakdown of the group had begun. If one recalls the fears that the soldier initially experienced upon capture, it was shown that not long after falling into the enemy's hands, a change in the individual's beliefs took place. Since he was not tortured or killed outright, his prior attitudes and beliefs about the Chinese were suddenly being questioned, and an inevitable change occurred in those beliefs.\textsuperscript{154}

Another example previously cited was about the prisoner who was in distress because he had not received any mail. After talking with a sympathetic Communist guard, the outcome was that the guard would bring him some mail within a few days. Consequently, a re-defining of the prisoners beliefs took place, because the Communist guards

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\textsuperscript{152} Ibid, p. 151.
\textsuperscript{153} Ibid, p. 157.
\textsuperscript{154} Schein, "The Chinese Indoctrination Program For Prisoners Of War," pp. 150-151; Kinkead, \textit{In Every War But One}, p. 94.
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would be looked upon much more favorably.  

Further examples of cognitive re-definition as it took place in the prisoner of war camps were as follows: a confined officer would write a propaganda statement rather than risk having all of his men shot; prisoners giving information during an interrogation because they knew that a fellow POW had already given the same information; prisoners collaborating with the Communists in order that a friend would be given medicine or that their families would be notified that they were alive but prisoners.

The above examples support Schein's theory that with the breakdown of the group (and in certain cases before the brainwashing process began in the permanent camps), the cognitive processes and existing beliefs are thrown into a state of disequalibrium or dissonance. Due to this disruption of social ties, the individual's beliefs, self-image, and social roles become subject to change, because "forces against change are reduced or removed" (group cohesion broken down); "motives toward re-integration are induced" (ripe for influence); and "cognitive re-definitions are facilitated" (change in

155 Kinkead, In Every War But One, pp. 121-122.

beliefs, values, etc.).

The Sociological Explanation

In the theories cited above, it was shown that the methods employed by the Chinese were largely responsible for the POW's brainwashing in Korea. Furthermore, emphasis was always placed on the breakdown in group cohesion as a key factor in each of the theories presented. Both William E. Mayer, in an article in U.S. News & World Report, and Eugene Kinkead, in his book, In Every War But One, submit that the breakdown of the group was an important aspect in the brainwashing process. The methods used could not have been successful they believe, if it was not for certain defects in American society. These were seen in three main areas: character development and discipline; education; and military preparedness.

Regarding character development and discipline, Mayer felt that many of the prisoners he interviewed and studied "had not been taught a sense of personal

157 Ibid, p. 158.

158 Kinkead, In Every War But One, pp. 154-157; Mayer, "Why Did Many GI Captives Cave In?", pp. 60-64.

159 Major Mayer was (in 1956) a U.S. Army expert on brainwashing. He bases his theory on interviews with two hundred repatriated POWs and by studying approximately eight hundred of the returnees records; see Mayer, "Why Did Many GI Captives Cave In?", p. 56.
responsibility for the welfare of others." He emphasized that the Significant Others who were responsible for instilling this in children failed in their duty. Additionally, it was suggested by Major Clarence L. Anderson, an Army doctor and prisoner in Korea, that the POW's problems were the result not only of inadequate socialization of the POWs, but of a "new softness" that this lack of socialization induced. This softness has been attributed to "momism", with such dependence resulting in passivity and immaturity in the young soldiers. This type of socialization was also reflected in the type of education that the individual received.

In his discussion on education, Mayer not only referred to the lack of basic education, but to an educational system which did not stress the benefits and/or difficulties of living in a democracy. He also stated that education should be directed toward each citizen so that each person becomes an active, responsible member of our democratic society. This advocated the revival of patriotism, which was being looked upon at the time as

160 Mayer, "Why Did Many GI Captives Cave In?", p. 60.
161 Kinkead, In Every War But One, p. 156.
162 Mayer, "Why Did Many GI Captives Cave In?", p. 60-61.
With this type of breakdown in the socialization process of our society, it is reasonable to conclude problems would occur in the ranks of the U.S. military, since the services drew its members from society.

In addition to the "inadequate socialization and education" our young men received, the problems were compounded by the results of the Doolittle Board of 1945. The purpose of the Doolittle Board was to deal with the perceived inequities between the officer and enlisted ranks. As World War II had recently come to close, the decisions of that board were reached for two reasons. First, the Army was planning its future around peace, and second, the abuses of enlisted men by officers (which were later the subject of many popular movies and books, i.e. From Here To Eternity, The Caine Mutiny, etc.).

Therefore, in response to the social climate of the time, two of the actions recommended by this board greatly affected the Army and its discipline:

1. The power of the Company Grade Officer was perceived as being diminished, particularly in the area of summary court martial.

2. The Inspector General (IG) system was emphasized as a viable "complaint department" for any soldier who felt

he was wronged.\textsuperscript{164}

The effects of these two measures were seen by some as an extension of the problems in our society, by fostering the breakdown of discipline. They argued that many officers felt stripped of their power, refused to be responsible for the actions of their men, and would not give unpopular orders. The Noncommissioned officer, who previously had been looked upon as a demi-god, saw that the officers as well as themselves were without their past status and authority. Moreover, with the threat that anyone could go over their heads to the Inspector General, they were reluctant to enforce disciplinary measures which might precipitate an investigation. As a consequence, many believe this policy was responsible for the "complete gutting of discipline."\textsuperscript{165}

The effects of this "gutting of discipline" on military preparedness was also explored. It was suggested that too much time was spent on the mechanical aspects of

\textsuperscript{164} The summary court martial is, "The lowest of three types of courts-martial. It consists of one commissioned officer who acts as judge, jury, trial counsel, and defense counsel (unless the accused is represented by a separate counsel)"; see Edward M. Byrne, Military Law (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1981), p. 756; Kinkead, In Every War But One, pp. 175-176.

\textsuperscript{165} Kinkead, In Every War But One, pp. 174-178.
The Army was referred to as a "riding Army" which, when vehicles broke down, the soldier, accustomed to riding, was ineffective on foot. With the emphasis on mechanized armies in modern warfare, discipline suffered the same breakdown as the vehicles. Thus, according to Mayer and Kinkead, the Army was supplied and influenced by a society which did not properly socialize its members. The Army fielded in Korea was not only weak in moral character, education, and preparedness, but it was also lacking in the discipline needed in battle. When taken prisoner, the soldiers were ill-prepared for the ordeals they encountered.

In contrast, perhaps one might use the following summary of the Turkish soldier's resistance to brainwashing in Korea. Of the roughly 6,000 United Nations soldiers captured by Communist forces, 229 of them were Turkish. At the cessation of hostilities, all 229 Turkish prisoners were repatriated during Operation Big Switch. Eugene Kinkead and William Mayer indicate that the Turks were subjected to the same brainwashing process and living

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166 Mayer, "Why Did Many GI Captives Cave In?", p. 60.
167 Kinkead, In Every War But One, p. 173.
168 Ibid, pp. 164-165.
conditions as the other U.N. prisoners, yet they held up very well—all 229 captured were repatriated, all resisted indoctrination, and only two collaborated (and were ostracized)—even though specifically targeted for indoctrination. Their success stemmed from their adherence to military organization and discipline, which resisted all attempts to break down the group.\textsuperscript{169} A Turkish officer stated: "I told the Chinese Commander of the camp that while we were a unit, I was in charge of my group...If he wanted anything done, he was to come to see me, and I would see that it was done. When he removed me, the responsibility would fall not on him, but on the man next below me, and after that on the man below him. And so on, down through the ranks, until there were only two privates left."\textsuperscript{170} Moreover, it was found that if a man was too sick or wounded to care for himself, men were assigned to nurse him back to health; oftentimes this required bathing and spoon-feeding the patient.\textsuperscript{171} According to Kinkead:

\begin{quote}
the Turks pretty well flouted the authority of their Chinese captors. They broke rules and
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\textsuperscript{169}Mayer, "Why Did Many GI Captives Cave In?," p. 58; Kinkead, \textit{In Every War But One}, pp. 165-168.

\textsuperscript{170}Kinkead, \textit{In Every War But One}, p. 166.

\textsuperscript{171}Mayer, "Why Did Many GI Captives Cave In?," p. 58.
often refused to obey ostensibly reasonable requests. They simply declined to cooperate, and eventually the Communists left them alone. It was generally believed that the Chinese feared the Turks to some degree because they stuck together as a group and resisted as a group. Their discipline and military organization saw them through as prisoners with no fatalities and virtually no indoctrination.172

The successful resistance to the breakdown of the group was therefore seen as the reason that the Turks fared so well in the POW camps. This would, in Mayer and Kinkead's viewpoint, be attributed to the solidity of their socialization process and in their society in general. There are other cases of similar actions by U.S. servicemen,173 however, the Turkish viewpoint was presented due to the number involved and their continued effectiveness at thwarting the Chinese's attempts to brainwash them.

The Eclectic Explanation

Albert Somit has submitted an eclectic explanation for the processes at work in brainwashing. He stated that, "There is now also general agreement that the techniques was not the outgrowth of a consistent or even conscious adherence to any single school." He believed that there

172 Kinkead, *In Every War But One*, p. 168.

are ten mechanisms in the brainwashing process. They are as follows:

1. **Identification**—Due to isolation, the prisoner will try to find someone to identify with in order to establish social ties. The likely candidate is an interrogator, in which emotional involvement becomes an important aspect in the prisoners capitulation.

2. **Decrease Of Intellectual Capacity**—Due to physical and mental exhaustion, the prisoner is unable to think effectively.

3. **Disorientation Arising From Solitary Confinement**—When confined alone for a long period of time, the prisoner is in need of interaction. This can lead to a "stimulus hunger," in which the prisoner becomes susceptible to suggestion.

4. **Suggestion**—With great stresses put on the prisoner, the individual's mental conditions are weakened. He is then subject to suggestion.

5. **Repetition**—With constant repetition, any message is likely to get through defenses, especially those that are credible.

6. **Guilt Feeling**—These are aroused by having the prisoner reflect on past bad deeds. Once these are brought to light, these deeds are used against the individual to undermine resistance.

7. **Ego Destruction**—The humiliation and degradation the prisoner goes through results in the loss of self-esteem. This affects the prisoners ability to resist.

8. **Conditioned Behavior**—Somit sees this as a matter of controversy, but concedes that, "there is no question,
however, that the deliberate relating of punishment and reward to progress or the lack of progress is one way of 'conditioning' the prisoner to make the type of response desired."

9. **Nonrational Behavior In The Face Of Sudden Stimulus**—Prisoners who are suddenly subjected to an unexpected, overwhelming stimulus are not seen to be able to resist for long.

10. **Alternation Of Fear And Hope**—Although the prisoners are treated poorly, the captors insinuate that there is a better life ahead for those that cooperate. This keeps the prisoners from completely giving up, leaving them open for exploitation.¹⁷⁴

Although Somit makes a weak case for the breakdown of the group, it should be noted that his explanation refers mainly to the brainwashing of individuals, which differs slightly from that of groups. The difference is that, with individuals, the prisoner is isolated from the start due to the fact that he is alone in his ordeal. In a group setting, however, the group must be broken down prior to the isolation. It is this writer's opinion that had Somit expanded his summary to include the brainwashing of groups, he would have highlighted this point.

In summary, it should be emphasized that the purpose of presenting the above theories was not to imply that one was more applicable than another in explaining

what took place during the brainwashing process in Korea. The purpose was to show that no matter what school of thought came in to play regarding these theoretical aspects of brainwashing, one key factor clearly stood out—the breakdown of group cohesion.

The effectiveness of Chinese brainwashing will be discussed in the following chapter.
V. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE BRAINWASHING PROCESS

Approximately one month after the first group of Americans landed in Korea, an article entitled "The PLA Policy For War Prisoners" was published in People's China, a Communist magazine. The article dealt with the success that the Chinese Communist's experienced in the "anti-Japanese Wars" as well as during the revolution in winning over their enemies, mainly because of their treatment of prisoners. This policy included lenient treatment, separation of officers from enlisted, lectures and discussions about China, and "accusation meetings," where the prisoners discussed the suffering they experienced under their governments. The Chinese objectives were "to win them [POWs] over, re-educate them, and gradually remould their ideology and behavior." Even if they could not be re-educated in such a short time, two or three months was sufficient "to make them politically neutral. Such persons were no longer willing to risk their lives for a lost cause."175

The importance of Chiu Kang's article is two-fold: first, many writers on the subject of brainwashing have

175 Chiu Kang, "The PLA Policy For War Prisoners," People's China, 1 August, 1950, pp. 8-9.
stated that ideological remoulding was the Chinese objective of brainwashing. \(^{176}\) (This was also admitted by the Chinese in this same article prior to their entrance into the Korean War.) Second, their success was measured by the degree of ideological change and/or neutralization in the prisoner's behavior.

The extent of ideological change which took place in Korea, according to Edgar Schein, "is difficult to evaluate because of the...hazards in measuring ideological change, and because of the impossibility of determining the latent effects of the indoctrination." \(^{177}\) It seems, however, that twenty-one American prisoners capitulated to the brainwashing techniques of their captors. Virginia Pasley has suggested that this number would have been much larger had it not been for a twist of fate. She contends that approximately one hundred days prior to the armistice


being signed, the Chinese returned (in Operation Little Switch) 149 prisoners to United Nation's control. They consisted of the sick and wounded, as well as "progressives" who were planted to spread Communist propaganda in the United States. Sixty days after they were returned, the Chinese learned that almost fifteen thousand Chinese prisoners of the United Nations refused to return home. This came as a shock to the Chinese, who felt that in response they had to have some American prisoners refuse repatriation. They therefore had only forty days to "develop a token force to keep back and had to pick those whom their methods would soften up most quickly." The group they had to pick from was depleted from their most advanced progressives, due to their sending them off prematurely. If the Chinese had the foresight to hold off sending back to the States the progressives during Operation Little Switch, it is probable that they would have kept them in China. Edgar Schein believes that the main reason these twenty-one refused repatriation was not due to a change in ideology, but from fear of the charges that would be brought against them for misconduct upon

178 See Appendix 6 for Korean War Chronology.

179 Palsey, 21 Stayed, p. 228.
their return to the United States. It would therefore follow that the methods used "to soften" the twenty-one who stayed highlighted this fact.

In view of the fact that only twenty-one Americans stayed with the Chinese compared to the 14,704 Chinese who stayed with the United Nations forces, Schein believes that "In terms of overt criteria of conversion or ideological change, one can only conclude that, considering the effort devoted to it, the Chinese program was a failure." This conclusion is widely accepted by many other writers on this topic as well. It was,


The main reason the 14,704 Chinese prisoners decided to stay with the West was due to successful indoctrination by the United States, and not due to fear of charges being brought against them. The success of U.S. indoctrination centered on kind treatment of their Chinese (and North Korean) prisoners. The main difference between brainwashing and indoctrination is that brainwashing uses violence and aggressiveness as its basis, while indoctrination uses kind treatment; see White, The Captives Of Korea, pp. 111-117.

As of 1978, "fewer than ten" have failed to return; see Scheflin, The Mind Manipulators, p. 89.


Biderman, March To Calumny, pp. 74-75; Scheflin, The Mind Manipulators, p. 89; Segal, "Initial
as in Biderman's words, "a resounding flop."\textsuperscript{185}

Since the Chinese were, for the most part, not as effective as they would have liked their brainwashing of American POWs to be in terms of ideological conversion, it would seem that American concern over brainwashing would end. The reason it did not, however, was due to some interesting incidents which took place in the POW camps. The general public (with the help of the media), claimed that these incidents were the result of successful brainwashing. The most significant charges were that one out of every three prisoners collaborated, with one out of every seven collaborating seriously. Moreover, not one prisoner escaped from a permanent camp and the death rate among prisoners was higher than any war in our nation's history.\textsuperscript{186}

After repatriation, the U.S. Army conducted extensive studies on the returnees which centered around psychiatric evaluations and counterintelligence.\textsuperscript{187}

Subsequently, individuals were placed into three catagories

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\textsuperscript{185}\textsuperscript{185}Biderman, \textit{March To Calumny}, pp. 74-75.

\textsuperscript{186}\textsuperscript{186}Kinkead, \textit{In Every War But One}, pp. 16-17; U.S. Congress, House, \textit{Communist Psychological Warfare (Brainwashing)}, p. 15.

\textsuperscript{187}\textsuperscript{187}Kinkead, \textit{In Every War But One}, pp. 40-41.
according to their conduct while captives: participators (also known as pro's and progressives), resisters, or middle men (also known as neutrals).

Participators—Fifteen per cent of the men fell in this category. These were men recommended for court martial or dishonorable discharge...plus those who would have fallen in either category had they not already been discharged from the military service.

Resisters—Five per cent of the men fell in this category. These were returnees who were recommended for decoration as a result of their meritorious behavior in captivity, plus those who committed at least two distinct acts of resistance in internment and against whom there was no derogatory information.

Middle Men—Eighty per cent of the men fell in this category. These were men...whom the Army had compiled little or no derogatory information, or conflicting information.188

The two groups who were of most concern to the Army because of collaboration were the "participators" and the "middle men."

As stated earlier, collaboration on the part of the prisoners was reportedly widespread. Most charges were based on acts such as filling out phoney Red Cross forms or signing peace petitions. A smaller number of individuals, referred to as participators, "engaged in persistent collaboration which included writing, signing, and soliciting signatures for peace petitions, delivering

188 Segal, "Correlates Of Collaboration And Resistance Behavior Among U.S. Army POWs In Korea," p. 32.
anti-United Nations lectures to other POWs, aiding in the preparation and distribution of communist (sic) propaganda, encouraging fellow POWs to collaborate, informing on other POWs, and generally aiding the Chinese in their indoctrination program."\(^{189}\) The above quote is similar to the definition of collaboration found in The Random House Dictionary Of The English Language, which is, "to cooperate, esp. willingly, with an enemy of one's country."\(^{190}\) Based on this definition, it is interesting to note that out of the 3,973 Army POWs repatriated, 425 were initially considered for court-martial, but only forty-seven were officially slated for court-martial. Of these forty-seven, fourteen were brought to trial but only ten were found guilty.\(^{191}/^{192}\) Additionally, it should be pointed out that another group of 210 POWs were discharged prior to their being charged for their actions in the camps. Consequently, they were out of the Army's jurisdiction, but not out of the jurisdiction of the Department of Justice.


\(^{191}\)See Appendix 4, Table 3 for comparisons between the services regarding collaboration.

\(^{192}\)Biderman, March To Calumny, p. 36.
After studying the matter for several years however, the Department of Justice decided to take no action against these men. The reason for this is two-fold: first, the subject was not very popular with the public since they perceived the enlisted man as getting stiffer sentences than those received by the officers during the Army trials. And second, many years had passed since their repatriation, and much time, money, and effort would be wasted trying to locate all the people involved in these cases. Moreover, it was also likely that much relevant information would have been forgotten. Thus, even if the trials did take place, few, if any, would have been convicted. Officially, based on legal criteria, "only 10 of 4,000 have been proven guilty of 'collaboration.'" Such a low number should not have caused such great alarm.

Julius Segal, in addressing the neutralization of the "middle men," has stated that although they did not collaborate, they did not resist the Chinese either. What took place was that when confronted with the stresses of

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193 Kinkead, March To Calumny, p. 75.
194 Ibid, p. 68.
195 Ibid, p. 75.
196 Biderman, March To Calumny, p. 37.
prison camp life, they withdrew from the situation. In so doing, they were not a threat to the Chinese, and were easy to control. In addition, they showed the Communists that they did not care enough about America and/or their duty as soldiers to continue the war while prisoners. Such behavior, Segal believes, was a victory for the Communists (as they themselves so claimed), and further stated it was "an indictment of the American's own indoctrination of its men."

Historically, it would be safe to state that in all wars, some POWs collaborated with their enemy. For example, it was found that during the Civil War, approximately 3,170 Union soldiers went over to the Confederate side, and about 5,450 Confederates went over to the Union's side. There were instances not only of collaboration with the enemy, but also of what might be referred to as "traitorous actions." In one case, a whole company of "reconstructed" Confederate soldiers was sent to man a


Union outpost so that those soldiers could be sent to fight the South on an important front. During World War II, the policy was that after giving name, rank, and serial number, the soldier was to "maintain silence." Yet in testimony to the Department of Justice in 1949, Hanns Scharff, referred to as the "Luftwaffe's Master Interrogator," claimed that in his years as an interrogator at AusWerstelle West, Oberursel, Germany, he interviewed over five hundred downed airmen. From these interrogations, he reported that he obtained the precise information he wanted from "all but a handful." Although his techniques were somewhat different than the brainwashing that took place in Korea, the facts still remain:


201 Ibid, p. 59.


204 Hanns Scharff mainly relied on friendliness, with his main approaches being the "walking conference" and the "deception" techniques (see Appendix 5). I would also submit that a "consciousness of kind" was working in his favor also, as he was Anglo and spoke perfect English, with no accent. See Toliver, The Interrogator: The Story Of Hanns Scharff, Luftwaffe's Master Interrogator, pp. 82-113.
American POWs in the examples cited above, gave information to the enemy.

Therefore, since collaboration and misconduct by prisoners has always occurred in war, what took place in Korea should not be cause for undue concern. What should be of more concern is that ninety-five percent of the prisoners were neutralized by the Chinese brainwashing techniques.205 This result was largely due to the breakdown of the group. Had the prisoners banded together, they would have made a formidable force behind the wire (as were the Turks). Since they did not do this, it enabled the development of participators and middle men who failed in their duties as soldiers and Americans.

Another factor which caused considerable criticism was the fact that not one prisoner escaped from a permanent Korean prisoner of war camp. Had the facts been fully known, the public would have realized that any escape would have had to overcome many serious obstacles in order to make his way back to friendly lines.

Earlier in this paper, it was stated that it would have been easy for a prisoner to escape from his captors in

205 The ninety-five percent includes not only the middle men, but the participators as well. The reason for including the participators in this percentage is that in order to collaborate, they first had to be successfully neutralized.
the permanent camp since he was usually not guarded or securely confined. The first steps then, in order to escape, would be to avoid having the Chinese know of one's plan through an informer, and to overcome the fear of being recaptured by the North Koreans, whose treatment of American prisoners was found to be brutal. Assuming that these obstacles were overcome, the next problem would be the great distance one would have to travel to reach friendly lines. This distance could be anywhere from two hundred to three hundred miles (the journey most likely would be on foot), by one who probably was in a severely weakened physical condition. The journey, moreover, would consist of travel through narrow valleys, which was characteristic of the terrain, and crawling with Chinese or North Korean soldiers. Perhaps the greatest problem one would have to overcome was the disguising of one's features. It

206 See pp. 32-33.


208 Biderman has stated that, "The situation was quite different from that of previous wars in that the only routes home in Korea were the seas or the fighting line... There was no neutral shipping tied up in the ports of North Korea; in fact, there were no ports left to speak of, so that even this difficult but time-honored opening for escape was closed to the Korean POW's."; see Biderman, March To Calumny, p. 87.
would be extremely hard to disguise oneself as an Oriental, especially if a Negro. And lastly, if by some stroke of luck the front lines were reached, the POW would still have to execute the very dangerous passage through the lines. With the daily changing of passwords, it is impossible for a POW to know the proper countersign to a challenge, and would risk being shot by his own forces. 209

Albert Biderman has compared the above circumstances to those of the German soldiers who were prisoners in the United States during World War II. There were 435,788 German POWs interned in the United States at this time, and only twenty eight escaped. These were not considered successful escapes however, since none of them could get out of the country. After the cessation of hostilities, all were found living in the United States under assumed names. The only reason these escapes were successful was because they could pass as Americans with little difficulty. 210 Relating this to the predicament of the prisoners in Korea who found themselves in an obviously different environment, the American POWs had little, if any hope for escape.

In his discussion on the deaths of American


210 Ibid, pp. 89-90.
prisoners Eugene Kinkead found that 2,320 of the 7,190 POWs held in captivity died in Korea. This was described as "a higher prisoner death rate than that of any of our previous wars." Oddly enough, contrary to past wars where the captor's barbaric treatment of prisoners was given as the reason for prisoner deaths, in Korea, the fault was put on the prisoners. Biderman, in reaction to this has stated: "The logic of regarding the victim rather than the perpetrator of the submarginal conditions in Korea as 'primarily responsible' for the high death rate...is like saying that the mugging victim is responsible for the injuries and losses he suffers because he does not have the strength or training in judo to fight off his attacker." Thus, although the press and some writers fault the POWs for the high number of deaths, the truth of the matter is that the conditions they were forced to endure caused most of the deaths.

In response to the accusation that the high death rate should be a matter of concern, Biderman noted that in Korea, most of the POWs who died, did so during the first year of the war. He then compared the death rates

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211 Kinkead, In Every War But One, p. 17.

212 Biderman, March To Calumny, p. 92.

213 See Appendix 4 for Tables.
during the first year of imprisonment of American POWs in Korea with the first year of imprisonment of American POWs in World War II. His data shows that the death rates were high for both groups. In Korea, thirty-eight percent of the POWs died during the first year of the war, whereas in World War II, sixty percent (1,492 out of 2,200 U.S. prisoners) died in six weeks at Camp O'Donnel in the Philippines while captives of the Japanese.\(^{214}\)

In view of the above statistics, the seemingly high death rate for Korea was not different than the death rates of prisoners held by the Japanese. The Korean death rates can be seen as a consequence of brainwashing, but it should not be attributed to the effectiveness of the process, since the Chinese were not out to kill the prisoners; they merely wished to change their thinking about the war and Communism.

Dr. Harold G. Wolff, who researched the subject of brainwashing for the Central Intelligence Agency, summed up the Korean POW experience as follows: "The behavior of American prisoners of war...was in general not very different from that of other armies and places, but was obviously made to appear much worse by the enemy's propaganda devices and our own initial ineptitude in countering

\(^{214}\)Biderman, March To Calumny, p. 102.
enemy propaganda. By failing to counter this propaganda, a brainwashing scare was used as a scapegoat to rationalize what took place in the Korean prisoner of war camps. Since brainwashing was something new and mysterious to the West, it was used to label anything that could not be easily explained. This eventually led to the formation of a committee in 1955 by the Secretary of Defense to investigate what went on in the POW camps. The responsibility of this committee was to establish specific guidelines for POWs (and for soldiers in general) to abide by in future wars.

On July 29th, 1955, the above mentioned committee published its findings and recommendations. They concluded that, "Although all services had regulations, the U.S. Armed Forces have never had a clearly defined code of conduct applicable to American prisoners after capture. There are piece-meal legal restrictions and regulations but no comprehensive codification." Consequently, the World War II policy of "name, rank, and service number" was carried into the Korean War. The official consensus

\[\text{215 Scheflin, The Mind Manipulators, p. 89.}\]
\[\text{216 U.S., Secretary Of Defense, POW: The Fight Continues After The Battle, pp. v-vii, 6.}\]
\[\text{217 Modifications of this code took place during the Korean War. The Army's modification was that a prisoner}\]
of the committee was that only a "minority" of the POWs were guilty of misconduct in Korea. However, the members felt that a code of conduct would be helpful to POWs in the future. In addition to the code, "each member of the Armed Forces liable to capture must be provided with specific training designed to equip him better to cope with all enemy efforts against him. He will be fully instructed as to his behavior and obligations in combat and in the event of capture." On August 17, 1955, Executive Order 10631, A Code Of Conduct For Members Of The Armed Forces Of The United States, was signed by President Dwight D. Eisenhower. In this writer's opinion, two important guidelines resulting from the brainwashing of U.S. Army prisoners in Korea are contained in this code: first, maintain group cohesion, and second, do not give up the fight once captured. The promulgation of this executive order officially closed all matters pertaining to the

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did not have to stop at "name, rank, and service number" as long as military information was not given. (No overwhelming evidence of violations of this code was found in this writer's research.) See Biderman, *March To Calumny*, pp. 232-233.


Korean prisoner of war ordeal, and also focused on the future conduct of all U.S. servicemen during wartime. The rules regulating one's conduct are listed below:

**CODE OF CONDUCT**

The Articles

1. I am an American fighting man. I serve in the forces which guard my country and our way of life. I am prepared to give my life in their defense.

2. I will never surrender of my own free will. If in command, I will never surrender my men while they still have the means to resist.

3. If I am captured I will continue to resist by all means available. I will make every effort to escape and aid others to escape. I will accept neither parole nor special favors from the enemy.

4. If I become a prisoner of war, I will keep faith with my fellow prisoners. I will give no information nor take part in any action which might be harmful to my comrades. If I am senior, I will take command. If not, I will obey the lawful orders of those appointed over me and will back them up in every way.

5. When questioned, should I become a prisoner of war, I am bound to give only name, rank, service number and date of birth. I will evade answering further questions to the utmost of my ability. I will make no oral or written statements disloyal to my country and its allies or harmful to their cause.

6. I will never forget that I am an American fighting man, responsible for my actions, and dedicated to the principles which made my country free. I will trust in my God and in the United States Of America.

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VI. CONCLUSION

When Mao Tse-Tung became the Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party in 1949, he re-emphasized that the breakdown of the group was essential in order for the Communists to gain control of the masses. This theory was put into actual practice during the Civil War in China between the Chinese Communists and Chiang K'ai-shek's Nationalists and during the Korean War against the American Army personnel captured by the Chinese Communists.

The U.S. Army went to war in Korea in response to the June 25, 1950 invasion of South Korea by North Korea. The American soldiers were mentally unprepared for the conflict because they were mostly untrained soldiers of a peace-time era thrown into battle with little, if any, information about their foe or reasons why the U.S. was fighting in Korea. Consequently, with the entrance of China into the war, those soldiers captured by the Chinese were susceptible to brainwashing. Furthermore, they were not forewarned of China's techniques of brainwashing and what they entailed. It was not until the repatriation of the POW's that the brainwashing process received widespread attention.

The key factor in the Chinese's success in brainwashing Army prisoners lay in their ability to break down
the group's cohesion. Various interpretations and examples of their methods were presented. All were shown to have merit and all emphasized the breakdown of group cohesion as the key factor in brainwashing.

It was shown that the American POWs fared no worse in Korea than American POW's of past wars. Furthermore, the brainwashing scare that followed the repatriation of the prisoners was intensified by the false perception the public had of a mysterious oriental process which the prisoners were thought to have been subjected to.

The Chinese's success in terms of ideological conversion was extremely limited, since only twenty-one Americans stayed with their captors. It was suggested that these men probably remained in China because they believed that charges would be brought against them for misconduct when they returned. In terms of social control, it was concluded that the Communists were quite effective since ninety-five percent of the American POWs were successfully neutralized and did not continue to fight once behind the wire. It is this writer's opinion that the Chinese brainwashing program came to an end not only because the prisoner lists were exchanged (as Dixon claimed), but also because they could see the results of their program. Even though there were few (if any) conversions, the enormous success in controlling the prisoners made the brainwashing program worth the Chinese's effort. With almost total
social control, there was no need to expend any more effort. Thus the program came to an end.

In Edgar Schein's summary of the brainwashing process used by the Chinese in Korea, he stated that there was an "attempt to use a combination of...techniques and apply them simultaneously in order to gain complete control over significant portions of the physical and social environment of a group of people." The Communists gained control of the prisoner population by destroying their group cohesion. In response to their predicament, the POWs became passive and inactive.

The outcome of the Korean POW experience, particularly in light of the inaction by the majority of the prisoners, prompted an investigative committee to be formed by the Secretary of Defense. It recommended a Code of Conduct to be used as a guide for all members of the Armed Forces. The code stipulates how soldiers must behave if they become prisoners. Had this code been written and adopted earlier, it could have alleviated many of the problems which occurred in Korea. The most important statements in the code which pertain to group cohesion were: (1) "I will continue to resist by all means available;" (2) "I will accept neither parole nor special favors

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from the enemy;" (3) "I will keep faith in my fellow prisoners and give no information nor take part in any action which might be harmful to my comrades;" (4) "If I am senior, I will take command. If not I will obey the lawful orders of those appointed over me and will back them up in every way;" and (5) "I will make no oral or written statement disloyal to my country." The code also stressed the reason why the soldier should resist the enemy: "I will never forget that I am an American fighting man, responsible for my actions, and dedicated to the principles which made my country free. I will trust in my God and in the United States of America." The soldier is therefore compelled to follow the code in order to help preserve the group's solidarity and our country's values.

In conclusion, future U.S. Army POW's captured by Communist forces will probably be treated in the same manner as the Korean War POWs. The first step to counter this treatment was taken when the Code Of Conduct was implemented. The second step is taking place today. The U.S. Army is testing the "Regimental Concept," in which soldiers will spend their entire Army career with the same regiment. In as early as 1959, it was submitted that such

a program would be needed to develop and maintain group cohesion in the U.S. Army. The rationale is that it "will enable a soldier to identify more strongly with those men immediately around him, and, as a result, greatly increase his loyalty to them. The unit should thus be more effective in combat, and, if any of its members are captured, they should, through this group solidarity, be more able—as were the Turks and Marines—to resist pressure in a prison camp." In the final analysis, brainwashing would not be effective if one's bond to his group is strong.

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223 Kinkead, *In Every War But One*, pp. 202-203.
APPENDIX 1 (Propaganda Leaflets Used By The Chinese And Americans In The Korean War)

The following are actual Korean Era leaflets which were professionally reproduced for this thesis. The originals were of newspaper quality and yellowed with age. Source: Charles J. Nilsson, (LTC, Ret), Assistant G-3, 2nd Infantry Division, Korea, 1950-1951.
Leaflet Given As Safe Conduct Pass For 2nd Infantry
Division Men Capture By The Chinese And Released

Side 1

What Is She Thinking NOW?

FOUND ON
THE BODY
OF A DEAD
AMERICAN
SOLDIER

EVERYONE HAS
SOMEONE
TO LIVE
FOR

STOP FIGHTING FOR DUPONT AND MORGAN

SAFE CONDUCT PASS
(tear out)
Say
投 Tow Shong 降
(surrender)
Tow rhyme with show, Shong rhyme with long.
Safety and good treatment of bearer are guaranteed
The Chinese People's Volunteer Forces

THEN WHAT?
You'll go to the rear to safety
and get home in the end. Turn
over see what your buddies say.
I appeal to you as a p.o.w.

My fellow Officers and Men of the U.S. Army!
I am a U.S. pow of the people's Army and have been treated with the utmost care. We have no reason to fight these peoples as they are trying to unify the country as one nation. Korean people want to have peace so the only way for them to have it is for all foreign troops to withdraw from the Korean soil. As soon as the troops withdraw from the Korean soil all the P.O.W.s can go back to their sweet home.

Please Fellow! Give up your guns! And surrender to the people's army or withdraw from Korea so you may go to your families and wives.

pvt Charles R. Kirtler
Co G 38 Inf Regt.
2nd Inf Div
DO TRY TO FIND A NEW WAY TO RESTORATION TO LIFE FROM THE DARKEST GATE OF DEATH

Dear friends!

You are deceived and taken to the battle field of aggression of Korea and driven step by step to the gate of your death by the U.S. imperialists. Behold!

The Korean People's Army, continuing irresistible march towards South like an angry sea, have already closed every avenue of your escape. Even the Chunna-Posoko and Chunna-Namdo are completely liberated. Therefore, now there are remained only Taizan and such death's door cities as PuSan and ChunHai the liberations of which are only a question of time.

On the mountains, the partisans are waiting for you. And in the fields also the peoples of Korea are watching for you.

S please you could escape to the end!

The high waves running rough of the Korean Straits will watch your retreat.

Wherever you may try to escape you can never find out even a single avenue of escape, because nobody and nothing will try to welcome you. Therefore the only way to be alive is to surrender to the Korean People's Army. If surrender, you will be able to live here in peace receiving warm protection and go back your sweet home to see your own dear, dear mother and wife.

Don't become worn at the gate of death. Do surrender as soon as possible not hesitating.
American Leaflet Disseminated in North Korea—Psychological Warfare and Other Actions Resulted In Over 23,000 Communist POW's Refusing Repatriation At The Cessation Of Hostilities

SAFE CONDUCT PASS

SOLDIERS OF THE UN FORCES:
This certificate guarantees good treatment to any enemy soldier desiring to cease fighting. Take this man to your nearest officer and treat him as an honorable prisoner of war.

Douglas MacArthur
General of the Army
Commander-in-Chief
American Leaflet Disseminated In North Korea

[Image of a cartoon with Chinese text]

[Text in Chinese]

中国士兵们上了中共领袖们的当。中国士兵们为俄国打仗而俄国士兵们却留在俄国。

中国士兵们被追到冰雪遍地的朝鲜送死！但是那些有勇气跑到联合国军这远来的中国士兵却可以在自由的世界里来享受自由！
APPENDIX 2 (Brainwashing: Related Terms)

Advertising
Brain-changing
Brain-warfare
Coercive Persuasion
Corticovisceral Psychiatry
Dialectical Persuasion
Education
Ideological Reform
Ideological Remoulding
Indoctrination
Mass Hypnotism
Mental Douche
Menticide

Mind Reform and Re-education
Narcohypnosis
Persuasion
Public Relations
Psychological Artillery
Psychological Mass Coercion
Psychological Mass Control
Psycho-surgery
Self-criticism
Self-cultivation
Socialization
Soul-surgery
Though Reform
APPENDIX 3 (Map Showing Position Of Temporary And Permanent POW Camps And The Position Of United Nations Forces At Various Stages In The Korean War)

Source: Biderman, March To Calumny, pp. 96, 202.
APPENDIX 4 (Statistics Applicable To The Korean POW Experience)

Table 1 (Numbers Who Died And Numbers Who Survived Among U.S. Army Personnel Known Captured In Each Period Of The Korean War)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period Captured</th>
<th>Number Captured</th>
<th>Number Died</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jun-Oct 1950</td>
<td>1,037</td>
<td>575</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 1950-Feb 1951</td>
<td>4,139</td>
<td>1,896</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar-Jun 1951</td>
<td>975</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul 1951-Apr 1952</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1952-Mar 1953</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr-Jul 1953</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2 (Fate Of U.S. Army Personnel Captured In Korea)

Survivors:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Repatriated</td>
<td>3,326</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Escaped, evaded, or released at the front</td>
<td>647</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refused repatriation</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL SURVIVORS</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,993</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Died In Enemy Territory:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Died in authenticated atrocities</td>
<td>1,036</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Died in POW camps</td>
<td>2,634</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing; evidence indicated captured, but presumed dead</td>
<td>244*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refused repatriation, dead in enemy territory</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL KNOWN OR PRESumed DEAD</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,915</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TOTAL KNOWN OR BELIEVED TO HAVE BEEN IN ENEMY HAND** 7,908

*This total does not include the 2,237 men who were listed as missing in action at the end of 1953. Moreover, no information exists to indicate that any of these men were captured.
Table 3 (Number And Percent Of Repatriated Prisoners Of War Of Each Service Suspected Of Misconduct Who Required Further Investigation)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Total Repatriated</th>
<th>Number &quot;Required Further Investigation&quot;</th>
<th>Percent &quot;Required Further Investigation&quot;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>3,973</td>
<td>426</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Corps</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALL SERVICES</td>
<td>4,428</td>
<td>565</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Biderman, March To Calumny, Table 1-p. 111; Table 2-p. 94; Table 3-p. 30.
APPENDIX 5 (Communist Techniques Of Interrogation Used In Korea)

1. DECEPTION—A common practice of the Communists was to request the prisoner to prepare a TOE (Table Of Organization And Equipment) of his military organization as it stood at the time of his capture. If he gave false information the interrogator would produce the correct answer from the United States field manual. The prisoner was then given a long lecture on lying and warned that further falsification would not be tolerated. The enemy asked the same question again and had the prisoner give the correct answer. He was then told that the enemy had all the correct answers and that he was asked such questions simply to test his honesty. If the prisoner fell into this trap, he was open for further interrogations and deceptions. On the TOE question and many others the enemy did have the correct answers; however, he did not have the correct answers to all the questions he asked—if he had he would not have needed to interrogate any prisoners. The Communists continued by representing the whole interrogation operation as purely routine, indicating that the prisoner's role in it was of no real importance. In truth, no enemy will spend time on a useless interrogation, for he has more fruitful uses for his personnel.

Another deception device the Communists favored was having prisoners write essays on subjects which, on the surface, appeared to have no military or propaganda significance: American banking methods, industrial finance and management, journalism, bridge building, and the like. The captors would show prisoners publications bearing on these subjects and give the impression that they already had the information and merely wanted to get the prisoner's views. Some of these essays and statements were read over the Communist radio in the enemy propaganda attempt to convince the world that the prisoners were against "American aggression;" others were used to blackmail the prisoners into further acts of collaboration—the prisoners who had prepared them were told that they would be exposed to their fellow prisoners or to the American "authorities" as collaborators. This, of course, was despite the fact that prisoners were induced to write essays and confessions partly by the promise that all statements and confessions would simply be filed away, with signatures deleted, for future educational use.
2. HARASSMENT—Persistent and annoying harassment was an effective technique of interrogation, especially when the prisoners were not aware that the harassment was, in fact, a technique. A prisoner would be called to the interrogation room at odd hours of the day or night. He would be awakened from his sleep, or summoned during a meal. Sometimes he would be dismissed only to be recalled a short time later. Many prisoners became exasperated and came to believe that if they simply talked or answered the questions they were asked, the Communists would let them alone. In fact, it never happened that way—no prisoner who ever gave any information was let alone. After giving an answer the prisoner would be pressured to explain it and give details. Bit by bit he was led deeper into collaboration.

3. REPETITION—Although repetition is, in a sense, harassment, the Communists considered it an independent technique in its own right and used it as such. Going over questions again and over their answers was wearing and boring to the prisoner; but the interrogator would be sympathetic, understanding, and tolerant. By going over questions many times, the Communists were able to discover whether the prisoner really had the sought-after information. This technique often broke down stubbornness—prisoners gave in and answered questions simply to escape the exasperatingly patient questioning.

4. THE "201 FILE"—The Communists prepared files on each prisoner and kept them up to date for reference when he was summoned for interrogation. The prisoner was shown a folder with his name and service number written in English and Chinese, and told that the Communists knew all about him, about his background, his family and all other important aspects of his life. The results of the initial interrogation at the collecting point, the many forms he had completed, and the pieces of blank paper with his signatures were all part of the file. In addition, the file contained information taken from letters he had received and from those he had written, many of which the Communists had never mailed, and it was often enlarged by the addition of blank sheets of paper. Faced with this material and hearing the claims that the enemy had much more information about him, the prisoner was likely to wilt and give the enemy additional information.

This is an old technique which has been used by many agencies throughout the world. To resist it, the prisoner must retain his confidence and recognize the trick that his captors are attempting to put over on him. The enemy relies heavily on a prisoner's not knowing what is
happening to him in a detached situation such as capture. The prisoner need only remember that if the enemy were certain of all this information he would not be under interrogation. The captor's prime goal is to get the prisoner to talk in the knowledge that once started he won't be able to stop. To thwart the attempt the prisoner must keep his wits about him and his mouth shut.

5. WALKING CONFERENCE--It was common for an enemy interrogator to approach a prisoner and invite him to go for a walk outside the prison compound. To the prisoner this request seemed harmless enough, and a walk was a welcome relief from the monotony of the camp routine. During this walk the interrogator usually engaged the prisoner in informal and personal conversation. The prisoner forgot or did not fully realize that interrogators are chosen--by the Communists as well as by the American Army--chiefly for their ability to elicit information. Most prisoners found this technique difficult to resist.

6. THE "MUTT AND JEFF" APPROACH--A technique so old that it is universally recognized by its nickname, the "Mutt and Jeff" approach, which uses two interrogators. The first acts ferocious and soon becomes enraged with the prisoner, even to the point of slapping or kicking him. If the prisoner is frightened into divulging information at this point, the enemy has gained his goal with unexpected ease. If not, another interrogator enters the room, often acting as if he is superior in rank to the first. This second man appears to become angry with his assistant and may even strike him. Banishing him from the room--often with threats of demotion or other punishment--the newly arrived interrogator apologizes to the prisoner. He says that his assistant's behavior was crude, unsoldierly and suited only to prisoners who are not intelligent. This implies a bond between the POW and his questioner--they are both intelligent, certainly more so than the crude assistant. Now the interrogator is free to turn on the friendly approach, and the prisoner--often unaware of the trick--lowers his defenses and starts to talk.

7. BIOGRAPHICAL ESSAYS--A Communist technique related to the essays and to the 201 file was to urge the prisoners to write long, comprehensive biographies. These were to include practically every aspect of their lives up to the time of their capture, and they proved a most profitable means of gathering a vast amount of information. Through this device the Communists obtained information even their most skilled interrogators could not have gotten. As a rule the initial biography the prisoner prepared was returned repeatedly for additional details; each time the
prisoner added a little more information in the hope that it would satisfy his captor. Of course, so long as he continued to supply information the Communists persisted in their demands for more.

From the enemy's viewpoint these biographies were very helpful. First, they enabled the Communists to categorize the prisoner, permitting them to tailor their indoctrination approach to him. Furthermore, the captive often gave information about other prisoners, rendering these others vulnerable to the designs of the captors. The enemy studied these documents very carefully, and often called the prisoners back for clarification or amplification of the biographies. Some prisoners wrote as many as 500 pages of material about themselves, their hobbies, and occupations and everything else they could think of. And each time the prisoner "clarified" some point, he gave more information to the enemy. One American wrote a total of nine personal biographies. The "clarifications" the enemy requested eventually included comments favorable to the enemy and to his system, Communism, enabling him to bring a great deal of pressure to bear on the author.

8. THREATS--Prisoners who prepared or signed personal biographies or petitions made themselves targets for coercive threats, for all such documents contained something derogatory about our government or our army. When the prisoner who had prepared such a document refused to give more information, he was told that the documents he had prepared or signed would be forwarded to the American "authorities" for future legal action against him. Although the enemy never did take such action against an American prisoner, most prisoners felt that the possibility did exist. Such threats caused many American prisoners to comply with endless requests for additional information. Many other prisoners held out against such threats and were not harmed.

Other implied threats worked to the enemy's advantage. By the time the prisoners arrived at the permanent prison camps they had heard a great number of atrocity stories and experienced the hostile atmosphere of capture. The Communists tried to make the POW believe that anyone who resisted was sent away to be shot or worked to death. Many prisoners interviewed upon their repatriation from North Korea gave reports of resisters they were certain had been killed. Investigation showed that the "dead men" had merely been transferred to another camp, while the other prisoners concluded from their disappearance that they had been "eliminated."
9. **SELF-INDUCED FEAR**—In some instances American prisoners were so terrified by their own imaginings of what would happen to them during interrogation that their captors didn't even need to question them. These men had frightened themselves to the point that they poured out all information they had the minute they were asked to speak. Others, nearly as frightened, held out until the Communists said that "it would be better" for the POW if he talked. In their frightened state, these wretched men thought this statement was a threat of all kinds of torture and unknown, mysterious tragedies—so they gave in.

17 Jan. 51  China gives "outrageous and unacceptable" reply to U.S. cease-fire proposal.
20 Jan. 51  Chinese set up first permanent POW camp near Pyoktong.
22 Jan. 51  India submits peace proposal to UN.
25 Jan. 51  Allies regain offensive; Asian-Arab group submits Korean peace proposal.
1 Feb. 51   UN General Assembly labels Communist China the aggressor.
12-18 Feb. 51 Communist counter-offensive.
Mar. 51     Chinese brainwashing program begins.
15 Mar. 51  Allies retake Seoul.
31 Mar. 51  UN crosses 38th parallel again.
11 Apr. 51  Truman removes MacArthur.
Jun. 51     Soviet Ambassador to the UN suggests truce talks should begin in order to end hostilities.
14 June 51  UN takes P'yongyang.
8 July 51   Truce talks begin.
5 Aug. 51   UN quits truce talks in protest against propaganda violations.
11 Aug. 51  Truce talks are resumed.
23 Aug. 51  Communists break off truce talks; charging air attacks on Kaesong.
25 Oct. 51  Truce talks resume.
27 Nov. 51  Agreement in truce talks on location of cease-fire line.
12 Jan. 52  Mig 15's (Russian aircraft) attack U.S. planes for first time.
Mar. 52    Brainwashing halts.
4 Mar. 52 Secretary of State Acheson denies U.S. used or is using BW on prisoners of war.

28 Apr. 52 UN submits proposals on voluntary repatriation of POW's to end truce deadlock.

4 Sep. 52 Truce talks in sixth week of deadlock.

8 Oct. 52 Communists reject UN truce proposals; negotiations postponed indefinitely.

2 Dec. 52 President-Elect Eisenhower goes to Korea.

15 Dec. 52 Communists charges U.S. continues brain-washing POW's.

28 Mar. 53 Red China yields on POW repatriation; accepts neutral custodian for prisoners unwilling to go home.

20 Apr. 53 Operation Little Switch—149 sick and wounded prisoners returned.

20 June 53 Communists discover that over 23,000 prisoners of the UN will refuse repatriation; 14,704 are Chinese.

27 July 53 Armistice is signed at Panmunjon.

3 Aug. 53 Operation Big Switch begins.

6 Sep. 53 Operation Big Switch is completed--3,629 American prisoners repatriated.

25 Jan. 54 Final deadline for choosing to go home passes for POW's declining repatriation.


Source: Biderman, March To Calumny, pp. 283-285, plus dates presented in this thesis.