D.H. Lawrence's "struggle for verbal consciousness": From Women in love to Psychoanalysis and the unconscious and Fantasia of the unconscious

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D. H. LAWRENCE'S "STRUGGLE FOR VERBAL CONSCIOUSNESS":
FROM WOMEN IN LOVE TO PSYCHOANALYSIS AND THE UNCONSCIOUS
AND FANTASIA OF THE UNCONSCIOUS

A Thesis
Presented to the
Faculty of
California State University,
San Bernardino

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts
in
English Composition

by
Yvonne Martha Weatherby
June 1994
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Abstract

Throughout his fiction and nonfiction writings, particularly in his narrative texts, D. H. Lawrence was preoccupied with the human dilemma of realizing intimacy with another while preserving individuality. Late in his career, Lawrence developed these explorations into a theory of the unconscious and union in two essays—Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious and Fantasia of the Unconscious—claiming that the theory first evolved undeliberately from his fiction and then was developed in the essays.

Traditionally, Lawrencian criticism has offered limited examination of the essays, considering them as the primary site of Lawrence's psychology theory and using them only to explicate the fiction. Conversely, some contemporary studies have isolated the essays, examining only their rhetorical style and structure without considering how the essays relate to the fiction. Reversing and expanding both views, as well as disputing Lawrence's separation of the essays from his fiction, this study instead shows that (1) the novel Women in Love was the narrative text in which Lawrence began consciously and deliberately to develop his psychology theory of the unconscious and union and (2) Lawrence's tentative articulation of theory in the novel developed into a more assertive and strategically developed rhetoric of persuasion in the two essays.
Remembering my husband David,
his love, support, enthusiasm
his belief in my work
these never die
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Introduction

D. H. Lawrence was a prolific writer whose works span many genres, explore almost every conceivable topic, and continue to generate an abundance of wide-ranging critical responses. However, in spite of the profusion of inquiry into both his narrative and expository texts, a survey of Lawrence scholarship and criticism quickly reveals that commentators have devoted their time and attention primarily to Lawrence's fiction. They offer, usually, only a limited examination of his nonfiction, exploiting it generally for the purpose of explicating the fiction. The nonfiction, for most critics, becomes a window into Lawrence's narratives. A case in point are Lawrence's two psychology essays, *Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious* and *Fantasia of the Unconscious*:

[Critics] have been happy enough to pillage both psychology books for resounding summaries of Lawrence's 'beliefs' but, considering how much has now been written on him, they have provided comparatively little appraisal of their character or worth and not much discussion of their relation to his other writings. (Ellis 69)

The purpose of my study is twofold. First, I will reverse this traditional approach by using Lawrence's fiction to inform his nonfiction; specifically, I will show that Lawrence's novel *Women in Love* was the text in which he began to work out his psychology theories that later
appeared in the two psychology essays. Second, I will dispute Lawrence's own claim, made in his foreword to *Fantasia*, that his psychology theories evolved unconsciously from his fiction.

Lawrence called the novel form "the one bright book of life" and "art speech," the only true speech. He believed that it was the task of the artist to develop this truth through fiction, and that the sole purpose of the novel was to convey morality and effect change in its readers, not by preaching, but by leading readers through a narrative experience that would enlighten them. However, as Lawrence's narrative texts grew, so too did the didactic assertions within his fiction, and by mid career, his theories became more directly stated in his tales. A case in point is his novel *Women in Love*, which explores the conflicting goals of preserving individuality—which he called "spontaneous being" or the fully realized "unconscious"—while maintaining an ideal intimate relationship with another—which he called "union," "star-equilibrium," or "polarity."

Some four to five years after completing *Women in Love*, Lawrence presented his theory of the unconscious and union in fully developed expository form in his two psychology essays, *Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious* and *Fantasia of the Unconscious*. Here too Lawrence's bias for the novel surfaces in his foreword to *Fantasia* where he explains that
his theories are inferred from the novel.

This pseudo-philosophy of mine - 'pollyanalytics', as one of my respected critics might say - is deduced from the novels and poems, not the reverse. The novels and poems come unwatched out of one's pen. And then the absolute need which one has for some sort of satisfactory mental attitude towards oneself and things in general makes one try to abstract some definite conclusions from one's experiences as a writer and as a man. The novels and poems are pure passionate experience. These 'pollyanalytics' are inferences made afterwards, from the experience.

And finally, it seems to me that even art is utterly dependent on philosophy: or if you prefer it, on a metaphysic. The metaphysic or philosophy may not be anywhere very accurately stated and may be quite unconscious, in the artist, yet it is a metaphysic that governs men at the time, and is by all men more or less comprehended, and lived. . . . Then it is unfolded into life and art. (Fantasia, "Foreword" 15)

Given Lawrence's "deducing" and "inferring," the implication is that no direct claim has been made in his fiction--hints maybe, or, to be very Lawrencian, knowledge is gained from the whole experience of life in the novel. Further, if the experience of the novel has come "unwatched out of [Lawrence's] pen," the expectation is that he makes no direct claims as novelist, as author of Women in Love, and that his philosophy was quite unconsciously developed as he was writing this novel. By heeding Lawrence's admonition to trust the "tale" and not the "teller," and by examining Women in Love's structure, its narration, and its dialogue, this study will reveal many examples in which Lawrence was consciously and deliberately articulating his theory of the "unconscious" and "union" in this novel. Also analysis will
show *Women in Love* to be an earlier stage of Lawrence's conceptualization process: throughout the novel's text are examples of Lawrence's theory in embryonic form. Finally the study will show the two psychology essays to be formal expository statements fleshed out after, and probably as a result of, the novel, which through its queries and answers becomes, in addition to a compelling fiction, the preliminary draft of Lawrence's psychology theory. Ultimately both this novel and the psychology essays are laden with Lawrence's gospel of the unconscious and union.
Background

Throughout his writing career, Lawrence was preoccupied with the struggle between men and women attempting to establish an intimate relationship but, at the same time, struggling to preserve their individuality. In his novels and short stories, Lawrence continually explored and recorded the quest for an ideal relationship, resulting mostly in failed relationships and occasionally in those unions whose success is left open to debate. Even to the beginning reader of Lawrence, his preoccupation with the struggle in human relationships is very evident and compelling, particularly in his earlier writings where Lawrence's powerful imagery allows readers to feel the experience along with those characters engaged in the quest for this ideal state.

By mid career, however, the voice of the author began to intrude into his narratives, striving to find a solution to the human dilemma of avoiding isolation while preserving individuality. Through both his characters and his narrators, Lawrence began to talk out his ideas about why relationships failed and how they could succeed. He was experimenting, exploring, and establishing his theory of individuality and union. This significant turning point for Lawrence takes place in his mid-career novel Women in Love (WIL hereafter). In this novel, relationships are not just
experienced; they are discussed over and over again by the narrator and by the characters. Most telling is Lawrence's own recognition of his need to debate these issues in his fiction. In his Foreword to WIL, which was written in 1919, two years after the completion of the novel, but published separately from both the English and the American publications of the novel, he explains:

This novel pretends only to be a record of the writer's own desires, aspirations, struggles; in a word, a record of the profoundest experiences in the self. Any man of real individuality tries to know and to understand what is happening, even in himself, as he goes along. This struggle for verbal consciousness should not be left out in art. It is a very great part of life. It is not superimposition of a theory. It is the passionate struggle into conscious being. (Phoenix II 275-276, emphasis added)

Although the foreword was written some two years after the novel, allowing Lawrence time to consider what he had done and to identify his "struggle for verbal consciousness," he was, nevertheless, aware of a change in his writing much earlier on. In a letter to Edward Garnett dated 12 December 1913, Lawrence discusses his new novel-in-progress The Sisters (which later was split to become The Rainbow and WIL), "It is very different from Sons and Lovers: written in another language almost.... I shan't write in the same manner as Sons and Lovers again, I think—in that hard, violent style full of sensation and presentation" (Sagar 46, Lawrence's emphasis). Then in May of 1916 after beginning WIL, Lawrence referred to it as "a
stranger to me even as I write it" and "a sequel to The Rainbow though quite unlike it" (Sagar 71). In that same month, he seemed to be reiterating what he was to express later in his 1919 Foreword to WIL: "I have got a long way with my novel. . . . At present my real world is the world of my inner soul, which reflects on to the novel I write" (Sagar 71).

Besides Lawrence's own observations of the changes that were occurring in his writing from Sons and Lovers to The Rainbow and ultimately to WIL, the texts themselves offer substantial illustrations of these changes, particularly WIL which reveals a more self-conscious author and deliberate theorizer speaking through the narrator and the characters.

Lawrence also developed a new plot structure for WIL. Never before WIL, nor after, did Lawrence juxtapose two couples and their ensuing relationships as he did in this novel. Throughout, the reader is made aware of significant differences between the couples, Ursula Brangwen/Rupert Birkin and Gudrun Brangwen/Gerald Critch. One couple—Ursula and Rupert—represents the potentially ideal relationship, while the other couple represents a failed relationship. Some critics argue that this interpretation of Lawrence's couples as polar opposites is too simplistic a notion and that WIL is too complex to be reduced to good couple versus bad couple. Indeed WIL is complex in its structure, its characterization, and its ideas;
nevertheless, the novel does focus on the two couples and its plot does trace the evolution of the two relationships. Furthermore, by novel's end, one couple is clearly lost: Gerald is dead and Gudrun remains directionless. At the same time, however, while the success of Ursula and Rupert's relationship has been argued, many critics consider the novel's ending too open to be a pronouncement of a successful union.

In spite of this lack of resolution for Ursula and Birkin, the possibility of realizing Lawrence's ideal union is embodied in their discussions, although lacking in their experience. More important than the outcome of each couple's relationship is consideration of what Lawrence did with the two couples in the novel. By using opposing couples in this way for the first time, Lawrence was exploring the causes of success and failure in relationships in an attempt to develop a theory of ideal union. He was moving a step beyond observing and recording relationships as experience in the way that he had already done in *Sons and Lovers* and *The Rainbow*. In WIL, he was beginning to speculate and to theorize about how to achieve the ideal relationship and how to avoid the destructive one, but he did not resolve these issues by novel's end. This absence of resolution is important. WIL as text is engaged in exploration and speculation, not resolution. Lawrence did not realize his ideal union through Ursula and Birkin in his
fiction; he could only express it as theory through their
dialogue, through his narrator, and ultimately, in his later
psychology essays.

Talk is the essence of WIL. Beyond the couples' actual
experiences—what they did and how they did it—most
significant is their dialogue—especially the dialogue
between Ursula and Birkin as they struggle to define the
ideal union that they are both seeking. For Lawrence,
Ursula and Birkin's dialogue becomes the primary site of his
exploration, his "struggle for verbal consciousness."
Lawrence had never done this before. Never had his couples
self-consciously and intellectually sought an ideal
relationship, nor had a couple ever before engaged in
deliberate discussion of what it is they seek in their
union.

Both Sons and Lovers' and The Rainbow's couples
struggle with relationships, but they do not talk about it
in the same way (in fact they hardly talk about it amongst
themselves) nor is their goal the same. In both of these
novels the protagonists, Paul Morel in Sons and Lovers and
Ursula Brangwen in The Rainbow, seek a rite of passage, and
the relationships that they experience along the way end up
contributing to their coming of age. As a result, whatever
discussions they do engage in regarding the relationships
come afterwards and seem to be more reflective, showing a
growing awareness of who they are and who they are becoming.
Ursula and Rupert, on the other hand, talk throughout WIL about their desires, and these discussions precede both consummation and marriage. The dialogues from the earlier novels pale in comparison to the garrulous conversations in which WIL's couples engage, particularly Ursula and Rupert.
Chapter One

From Love Talk to Theory

The "Do you love me?" dialogue is a staple in Lawrence's narratives, particularly in WIL, and for most readers this dialogue would not be considered an uncommon prelude to an intimate encounter, or following it for that matter. However, Lawrence uses it for much more than narrative unfolding. The love dialogue between Birkin and Ursula becomes a forum for Lawrence's evolving theory of ideal union, a place where he works his ideas out through the couple's questioning of one another and their debating the issue of love. And as they talk, Birkin and Ursula conceptualize together. Gudrun and Gerald's love dialogues, on the other hand, are far less garrulous than Birkin and Ursula's and far less theoretical as well. Gerald and Gudrun usually have their talks after a physical encounter, while Ursula and Birkin discuss love long before they have had any kind of physical relationship.

Such stark differences between the couples can be misleading and can tempt readers to judge these couples as either successes or failures. While there is no doubt that Gerald and Gudrun's relationship fails in the novel, Ursula and Birkin's is open to debate, and critics have continually argued the success of Ursula and Birkin's relationship. One can make a case for either view. However, the purpose of my
study is not to judge the success or failure of the relationships themselves, but rather to demonstrate that Lawrence was working out his theory through these couples and their dialogue. Ultimately his novel culminates in paradox rather than resolution.

My analysis is not directed to the novel as a resolved entity in itself, but as one stage in Lawrence's development of a theory that finally found its expression in the essays. Although Gudrun and Gerald's relationship is more clearly a failure than Ursula and Birkin's relationship, the latter couple's relationship does not lead to the ideal theory of union that Lawrence articulates in the essays. However, their dialogues do mark the initial steps leading to this ideal theory.

By the time Ursula and Birkin have their first discussion in "An Island" chapter, it is clear that they have more than a casual interest in one another, but there have been no physical demonstrations of affection between them. Their opening exchange is indicative of a search for something more, a desire to find meaning in their lives. Birkin's initial response to Ursula's inquiry about his health demonstrates this search: "one is ill because one doesn't live properly--can't. It's failure to live that makes one ill, and humiliates one." Ursula responds immediately with a question, "But do you fail to live?" A few lines later Birkin explains, "But it infuriates me that
I can't get right, at the really growing part of me... I don't know what really to do. One must do something somewhere," to which Ursula retorts, "Why should you always be doing?... It is so plebian. I think it is much better to be really patient, and to do nothing but just be oneself, like a walking flower" (125, Lawrence's emphases).

This early exchange sets the pattern for Ursula's role as interlocutor in these dialogues, which some critics claim is Lawrence's way of interrogating his novel and its message. Jackson and Jackson define this role played by Lawrence's female characters as "a counterpoint, a corrective view"(34), and Cowan calls it "a practical and realistic view that functions as a corrective" (171-172). However, Ursula's role is not only to balance Birkin; she too is searching: "Ursula often wondered what else she waited for... Sometimes she had periods of tight horror, when it seemed to her that her life would pass away, and be gone, without having been more than this" (52).

From these personal concerns the dialogue quickly turns to the topic of love, but it is the global implications of love with which Birkin is concerned: "And they say that love is the greatest thing... the foul liars... the millions of people who repeat every minute that love is the greatest, and charity is the greatest--and see what they are doing all the time" (126-127). Ursula, the spokesperson for love, counters: "But... that doesn't alter the fact that
love is the greatest, does it? What they do doesn't alter the truth of what they say, does it?" (127, Lawrence's emphasis). Ursula's tag questions form another pattern in her dialogues with Birkin. "Frequently Ursula will provide a succinct rejoinder to his verbal outburst, a teasing and deflating remark by her which reveals his characteristic wordiness and imprecision" (Balbert 88). As she counters with her view, she is inviting him to continue the dialectic and to explain himself further.

The discussion continues taking only two pages for Ursula to steer it to a more immediate level: "But ... you believe in individual love even if you don't believe in loving humanity-?" (129). Birkin's response is not so strange; he believes that love is just an emotion, not the end-all and be-all of human relationships. Neither is Ursula's an unusual view; she believes that the emotion of love is the essential bond in a relationship. To this point the discussion is a credible exchange between two thoughtful people with opposite views, but it is neither esoteric nor didactic. Birkin is looking for new direction; he wants something more, but just what, he's not sure.

"One must throw everything away, everything—let everything go, to get the one last thing one wants," he said.
"What thing?" she asked in challenge.
"I don't know—freedom together," he said.
She had wanted him to say 'love.' (132)

Birkin's "I don't know" is explored throughout the
novel as he and Ursula talk, attempting to develop a notion of love, of relationships, of individual personal development. Birkin's "freedom together" is the core of Lawrence's ideal union, later to be called "star equilibrium" by Birkin in the novel and finally by Lawrence in the essays. Ursula's view of personal engagement through love is contrary not only to Birkin's "freedom together," but also to Lawrence's theory of impersonal union in the essays, especially as it is expressed in Fantasia: "[Every] individual creature shall come to its own particular and individual fullness of being... through a living dynamic relation to other creatures... not the relation of love (182, Lawrence's emphasis).

Contrasting the some ten pages that comprise Ursula and Birkin's first love discussion in "An Island" chapter is Gerald and Gudrun's first love talk of less than a page, which is far more concrete and immediate. Following Gudrun's frenzied dancing and taunting of the bulls, she defies Gerald's attempt to stop her. They argue; she strikes him on the face. "You have struck the first blow," he exclaims. "And I shall strike the last," she retorts (171). Following this terse exchange and Gudrun's pleas that Gerald not be angry, the first mention of love between them occurs, rather a sudden juxtaposition to such a brutal dialogue: "I'm not angry with you. I'm in love with you" (171).
This open declaration of love is the first mention of
the word between these two; there have been no lengthy
abstract discussions like Ursula and Birkin's preceding
Gerald's statement. Not only has Gerald and Gudrun's first
physical encounter been a violent one, but it has also
served, ironically, as an introduction to Gerald's
declaration of love. Even more telling is Gudrun's
facetious reply (or is it disbelief?): "That's one way of
putting it." Next he checks with her, "It's all right,
then, is it?" and she acknowledges with "Yes, it's all
right" (172). Their first love talk extends four brief
lines—hardly a discussion, and a far cry from the breadth
of inquiry that marks Birkin and Ursula's first verbal
encounter on love.

On the one hand, through Birkin and Ursula's dialogue,
Lawrence demonstrates a search for some kind of truth
through love, for some kind of salvation through love—a way
to succeed in the quest for an ideal relationship. On the
other hand, through Gerald and Gudrun's limited dialogue,
Lawrence is demonstrating failure to achieve this kind of a
perfected relationship by their lack of inquiry, by their
moving ahead without thinking, without examining each other,
without conceptualizing, without debating.

In Lawrence's extremes there is paradox. Ursula and
Birkin work so hard to formulate a theory that their mental
efforts inhibit physical and emotional union for quite some
time. While Gudrun and Gerald forge directly into physical union, they act without giving any thought to what it is they are doing with each other. One couple is too submerged in theorizing their potential union; the other literally doesn't know what they're doing.

Furthermore, the paradox is extended in the essays where Lawrence bids readers to abandon the mental realm by submitting to their preverbal unconscious and to impersonal union, yet, he appeals to the reader's intellect, giving verbal directives on how to achieve this ideal state. In his fiction these two opposing psychological states are irreconcilable. Instead, each of WIL's couples represents only one side of Lawrence's theoretical view—either Gudrun and Gerald's primal approach or Ursula and Birkin's mental analyzing—but neither can embody his theory in full nor can they find balance between these two extremes, a balance necessary to achieving Lawrence's ideal union.

Although these initial love dialogues reveal much about how each of the two couples approaches their relationship, it is in the "Mino" chapter that Birkin and Ursula's dialogue begins to formulate Lawrence's theory of human relationships. The "Death and Love" chapter, conversely, via Gudrun and Gerald's "Do you love me?" dialogue, serves as the counterpart to the "Mino" chapter showing this couple's impending demise. Each couple's encounter follows different patterns. For Ursula and Birkin "Mino" begins
with dialogue and ends with embrace. For Gudrun and Gerald
"Death and Love" begins with an embrace, followed by
dialogue and ultimately by consummation. Each couple's
immediate need is different. One must talk and talk before
acting; the other must do without talk. "The two relations,
Gerald-Gudrun and Birkin-Ursula, intertwine throughout the
book but represent wholly opposed experiences. If the
latter is a dream of becoming, the former dramatizes coming
apart" (Moynahan 67). Moynahan's "dream of becoming"
signifies potential—not resolution—a potential theory that
Lawrence gives shape to in the essays, but never fully
realizes in WIL.

By the second page of the "Mino" chapter after some
preliminary small talk, Birkin gets right to the point: "if
we are going to know each other, we must pledge ourselves
forever. If we are going to make a relationship, even of
friendship, there must be something final and infallible
about it," and in response to Ursula's lack of response, he
continues: "I can't say it is love I have to offer—and it
isn't love I want. It is something much more impersonal and
harder,—and rarer" (145). From this point a lengthy verbal
interaction ensues: a series of questions by Ursula and
assertions by Birkin.

'You mean you don't love me?' [Ursula]
[narration omitted]
'Yes, if you like to put it like that.—Though
perhaps that isn't true. I don't know. At any rate,
I don't feel the emotion of love for you---no, and I
don't want to. Because it gives out in the last
issues.' [Birkin]

'Love gives out in the last issues?' [Ursula; narration omitted]

'Yes, it does. At the very last, one is alone, beyond the influence of love. There is a real impersonal me, that is beyond love, beyond any emotional relationship. So it is with you. But we want to delude ourselves that love is the root. It isn't. It is only the branches. The root is beyond love, a naked kind of isolation, an isolated me, that does not meet and mingle, and never can.' [Birkin]

[narration omitted]

'And you mean you can't love?' [Ursula; narration omitted]

'Yes if you like—I have loved. But there is no love there.' [Birkin]

[narration omitted]

'But how do you know—if you have never really loved?' [Ursula]

'It is true, what I say: there is a beyond, in you, in me, which is further than love, beyond the scope, as stars are beyond the scope of vision, some of them.' [Birkin]

'Then there is no love.' [Ursula]

'Ultimately, no, there is something else. But, ultimately, there is no love.' [Birkin]

[narration omitted]

'Then let me go home—what am I doing here?' [Ursula]

'There is the door . . . You are a free agent.' [Birkin]

[narration omitted]

'If there is no love, what is there?' [Ursula; narration omitted]

'Something.' [Birkin; narration omitted]

'What?' [Ursula]

[narration omitted]

'There is,' he said, in a voice of pure abstraction, 'a final me which is stark and impersonal and beyond responsibility. So there is a final you. And it is there I would want to meet you—not in the emotional, loving plane—but there beyond, where there is no speech and no terms of agreement. There we are two stark, unknown beings, two utterly strange creatures, I would want to approach you, and you me. —And there could be no obligation, because there is no standard for action there, because no understanding has been reaped from that plane. It is quite inhuman,—so there can be no calling to book, in any form whatsoever—because one is outside the pale of all that is accepted, and nothing known applies. One can only follow the
impulse, taking that which lies in front, and responsible for nothing, asked for nothing, giving nothing, only each taking according to the primal desire.' (145-146, Lawrence's emphases)

There is nothing in this exchange to startle readers. Birkin is insisting on a particular kind of relationship, although he is not completely clear on how to achieve this, while Ursula wants Birkin simply to declare his love to her. Indeed Birkin's assertions are rather lofty and impersonal as a prelude to intimacy, and it is unclear to the reader as well as to Birkin what exactly it is that he wants.

"Something," his one-word response to Ursula's questioning about what should replace love, and his long speech that follows both demonstrate his attempt to articulate his vision. Although this early recital has not yet reached the theoretical stage that the psychology essays will later take, it exemplifies Lawrence's "struggle for verbal consciousness" in the novel, and it serves as a prelude to Lawrence's discussion of love found in Fantasia:

It is time to drop the word love, and more than time to drop the ideal of love. Every frenzied individual is told to find fulfilment in love. So he tries. Whereas, there is no fulfilment in love. Half of our fulfilment comes through love, through strong, sensual love. But the central fulfilment for a man [or a woman] is that [each] possesses his own soul in strength within him, deep and alone. The deep, rich aloneness, reached and perfected through love and the passing beyond any further quest of love. (123, Lawrence's emphasis)

Love is a spontaneous thing, coming out of the spontaneous effectual soul. As a deliberate principle it is an unmitigated evil. (79)

[Every] individual creature shall come to its own
particular and individual fullness of being. . . . through a living dynamic relation to other creatures. . . . not the relation of love. (182, Lawrence's emphasis)

Lawrence's discourse in the essays is further developed than Birkin's words to Ursula. Birkin does not want to lose himself in a love relationship in his encounter with Ursula, and it is this fear that underlies his argument. In the essays, however, Lawrence clearly identifies the dangers of this kind of encompassing love and adamantly denounces its practice. Lawrence's ideas begin to take shape through these verbal explorations that Birkin takes with Ursula.

The following stage of Ursula and Birkin's lengthy dialogue reveals a pattern of equivocation by Birkin as Ursula insists on his declaration of love and an explanation for his position of non-love. Like Lawrence, Birkin's rhetoric is strong and affirmative when he is asserting without interruption his beliefs, but he is not so comfortable when called upon to explain his claims or to enter into a dialogue. The following rhetorical hedging resembles a rhetorical pattern in parts of Fantasia where Lawrence is called to defend his first treatise, Psychoanalysis (discussed in ch. 3 below, pp. 76-77 and endnote 13).

'But it is because you love me, that you want me?' [Ursula]
'No it isn't. It is because I believe in you--if I do believe in you.' [Birkin]
'Aren't you sure?' [Ursula]
[narration omitted]
'Yes, I must believe in you, or else I shouldn't
be here saying this,' he replied. 'But that is all
the proof I have. I don't feel any very strong
belief at this particular moment.' (147, Lawrence's
emphasis)

Birkin's "if I do believe in you" and his "I must
believe in you" reveal his discomfort when Ursula insists
that he prove himself to her. He is comfortable when
discussing his ideas as general theory, but not so
comfortable when asked to apply these views specifically to
himself and to their relationship. Birkin's fear of
personal and emotional connection with another often limits
him to the solitariness of his own thoughts, thoughts which,
according to Miko, serve paradoxically as "both doctrinal
revelation" and "a mask for his own inadequacy" (247-248).
The defensive posture, the hedging, and the biting voice
that sometimes emerge in Birkin's responses to Ursula's
challenges parallel Lawrence's rhetorical responses in
*Fantasia* to critics' indictment of *Psychoanalysis*, his first
essay. Both Birkin and Lawrence struggle to find words that
fit the idealism they espouse, and they both hide behind
words to cover their discomfort and uncertainty.

Next when asked by Ursula, "But don't you think me
good-looking?", he evades answering her question directly by
claiming, "I don't feel that you're good looking." He is
playing with words: She wishes to know if he perceives her
to be physically attractive, and he hedges by changing
Ursula's "think" to "feel." And when she pushes him by
asking "Not even attractive?", he still cannot give a straightforward answer, but instead responds with a tirade on the topic of physical attraction: "Don't you see that it's not a question of visual appreciation in the least? . . . I don't want to see you. I've seen plenty of women, I'm sick and weary of seeing them. I want a woman I don't see" (147, Lawrence's emphasis). In such examples, Birkin's words create "an irony that even approaches humor" (Miko 248): Birkin begins by questioning Ursula's ability to understand, "Don't you see," and ends with an indictment against himself, "I don't see." A few lines later he continues:

I want to find you, where you don't know your own existence, the you that your common self denies utterly. But I don't want your good looks, and I don't want your womanly feelings, and I don't want your thoughts nor opinions nor your ideas—they are all bagatelles to me. (147)

Birkin's hedging, his self-righteousness, and most of all, his long-winded rhetoric become tiresome to Ursula: "I think you are very silly. I think you want to tell me you love me, and you go all this way round to do it" (148). However, Ursula's interrogation of Birkin does not always function as the "corrective view" that Jackson and Jackson and other critics have claimed. Sometimes she is manipulating and pushing Birkin towards her view of love. Indeed Widmer's speculation that Birkin's "wilful arguing of the doctrine" develops into what he calls an "adversarial
eroticism" (137) between these two is particularly noteworthy here. Throughout the novel talk predominates, and these dialogue scenes are especially indicative of Lawrence's "struggle for verbal consciousness" operating in and through this couple, especially through Birkin. "In Women in Love the stage is often left to Birkin to 'try to know and understand' this 'passionate struggle', [sic] and his accompanying 'struggle for verbal consciousness' is necessarily ... often contradictory, evasive, and inexact" (Balbert 88).

Other characters besides Ursula criticize Birkin for his verbose, didactic posturing with such epithets as "word bag" and "preacher." Both Birkin's evasion and his inflated rhetoric parallel the Lawrence voice that we hear in his psychology works, particularly in Fanatasia when Lawrence is defending his first essay, Psychoanalysis, against the critics. Lawrence was aware of his own problem of garrulousness and alluded to it repeatedly: In a letter to Edward Garnett (18 February 1913), Lawrence expresses his dismay, "I wish, I were not so profuse - or prolix," and earlier he writes, "[Trim] and garnish my stuff I cannot - it must go" (Sagar 32 & 35). Perhaps Lawrence is parodying his own verbosity through Birkin and others.

In spite of his overblown rhetoric and his defensiveness, Birkin's "I want to find you, where you don't know your own existence, the you that your common self
denies utterly" (see above p. 23) is most significant as it provides the kernel for Lawrence's preverbal pristine unconscious later defined in the psychology essays. In *Psychoanalysis*, Lawrence develops Birkin's idea to the full:

We have actually to go back to our own unconscious. But not to the unconscious which is the inverted reflection of our ideal consciousness [a mental construct]. We must discover, if we can, the true unconscious, where our life bubbles up in us, prior to any mentality. . . . innocent of any mental alteration, this is the unconscious. It is pristine, not in any way ideal. It is the spontaneous origin from which it behooves us to live. It is not a shadow cast from the mind. It is the spontaneous life-motive in every organism. (212)

And in *Fantasia*, Lawrence continues to explore the implications of his unconscious theory as it pertains to relationships:

It is the death of all life to force a pure idea into practice. Life must be lived from the deep, self-responsible spontaneous centres of every individual, in a vital, non-ideal circuit of dynamic relation between individuals. The passions or desires which are thought-born are deadly. (85, Lawrence's emphasis)

Although Birkin's explanation to Ursula is not as informed as Lawrence's, he begins his exploration of the unconscious and union when he rejects Ursula's "good looks," her "womanly feelings," her "thoughts," opinions," "ideas"—what Lawrence calls "egoism" or mental consciousness in the essays. And Birkin embraces Lawrence's "pristine unconscious" as the pathway to union with Ursula. Yet, at the same time, he denies Ursula the very selfhood that Lawrence's "pristine unconscious" promises, when he rejects
her thoughts, opinions, ideas, feelings. Both Birkin's limited articulation of these concepts and the contradiction inherent in his responses to Ursula exemplify Lawrence's "struggle for verbal consciousness" in the novel. Indeed there is irony and paradox in the couple's exchange when considering it in the light of Lawrence's theory of preserving one's "pristine unconscious" in "a vital non-ideal circuit of dynamic relation between individuals" (Fantasia 85).

In concluding this dialogue, Birkin is able finally to get to the point and tell Ursula what he wishes their relationship to be: "What I want is a strange conjunction with you . . . not meeting and mingling;--you are quite right:--but an equilibrium, a pure balance of two single beings:--as the stars balance each other" (148, emphasis added). This is the first direct statement in the novel that approximates Lawrence's theory of union as it was to be expressed later in the two psychology essays. In *Psychoanalysis* Lawrence explains:

> For the end, the goal, is the perfecting of each single individuality, unique in itself - which cannot take place without a perfected harmony between the beloved, a harmony which depends on the at-last clarified singleness of each being, a singleness equilibrizd, polarized in one by the counter-posing singleness of the other. The one process, of unison, cannot go on without the other process, of purified severance. (222, emphasis added)

Ultimately the star-equilibrium concept is the crux of
Birkin's vision and Lawrence's own theory of the unconscious and union as expressed in *Psychoanalysis* and *Fantasia*. By the end of this dialogue, Birkin clearly and succinctly summarizes this theory: "[It] is the law of creation. One is committed. One must commit oneself to a conjunction with the other--forever. But it is not selfless--it is a maintaining of the self in mystic balance and integrity--like a star balanced with another star" (152). And in his psychology essays, Lawrence elaborates on Birkin's "maintaining of the self in mystic balance and integrity":

There is as well the continuing widening gap. A wonderful rich communion, and at the same time a continually increasing cleavage. If only we could realize that all through life these are the two synchronizing activities of love, of creativity. (*Psychoanalysis* 221-222)

There are two ways of love, two ways of activity in independence. And there needs some sort of equilibrium between the two modes. (*Fantasia* 46)

[The] whole circuit is established between two individuals . . . neither is a free thing-unto-itself . . . the very fact of established polarity between the two maintains that correspondence between the individual entity and the external universe which is the clue to all growth and development. (*Psychoanalysis* 227)

By this point in the dialogue, even a novice or casual reader of Lawrence would begin to find Birkin's pronouncements esoteric and intrusive to the novel's world of everyday experience. Even though some readers would not necessarily make the connection to his essays, they would fully recognize the novel's vacillation from theory to
experience:

What Lawrence's characters think and say about themselves and their fate remains . . . the very stuff of narrative, not of exposition. Nevertheless, an examination of the language in which their observations are phrased will at once reveal, their remarks are at the same time calculated theoretical and formal statements. (Friedman 44)

His characters, specifically in this case, Rupert Birkin, cannot resist the temptation to preach and to move beyond experience. Clearly Birkin is wearing two hats: he is the man pursuing Ursula as well as the spokesman advocating Lawrence's theories. "[He] is the Lawrence-figure, that is to say, the author embodied in his own work, but objectively embodied and integral to the work and not a mere mouthpiece" (Spilka 121).

This is certainly not the case with Gerald, or with Gerald and Gudrun as a couple. They are not interested in lofty, probing discussions about what it is that they are doing; they are not interested in examining themselves as individuals or as a couple in the way that Ursula and Birkin are driven to do. Their rather brief dialogue—one page in "Death and Love" versus Ursula and Birkin's several pages in "Mino"—reflects their lack of awareness.

To Gudrun's "Are you happier?", Gerald responds, "Much better. . . and I was rather far gone [from his father's death]." Ursula continues, "I'm so glad if I help you," and Gerald, "Yes. . . There's nobody else could do it, if you wouldn't." One more brief comment by Gudrun, and then the
key question, "But how much do you care for me?" Gerald retorts "How much!...I don't know either - but everything," and Ursula, "But I can't believe it" (329, Lawrence's emphases). There is no common ground here for discussion; they are unable to find a mutual issue like Ursula and Birkin's love on which to debate. The word "love" does not enter this discussion. Gerald's further reply conveys their preoccupation with the here and now, with the concrete needs that make up this relationship.

Why don't you believe it?--It's true. It is true, as we stand at this moment...I care for nothing on earth, or in heaven, outside this spot where we are. And it isn't my own presence I care about, it is all yours. I'd sell my soul a hundred times--but I couldn't bear not to have you here. I couldn't bear to be alone. My brain would burst. It is true. (330)

Gerald's dependence and Ursula's skepticism are again displayed in their next dialogue in this same chapter when Gerald sneaks into her bedroom seeking relief from his pain. In less than two pages, Gudrun asks the same question four times: "Why have you come?"; "And what do you want of me"; "What do you want of me?"; "But why did you come to me?" Gerald, in response to her, explains: "I wanted to"; "I came--because I must"; and finally, "Because--it has to be so.--If there weren't you in the world, then I shouldn't be in the world, either" (343, Lawrence's emphasis). Following this exchange, the relationship is consummated. No more words are exchanged other than Gudrun's repeated insistence
that Gerald "must go" (347) before her family rises in the morning. Their departure consists of an abrupt "Good-bye then" from Gerald; a reciprocal "Good-bye" from Gudrun; and the narrator's accompanying description, "He kissed her, dutifully, and turned away" (348-349).

Gerald and Gudrun's dialogues do not reflect the conceptual exchange that Ursula and Birkin's dialogues do. Instead of exchange, Gerald and Gudrun are "in opposition" (WIL 177 & 329) as they speak. Gudrun's skepticism cancels any hope of union between them, and Gerald's need for Gudrun to fill his inner void cancels any possibility for their realizing the individuality that "star equilibrium" promises. The dependence that Gerald expresses in these dialogues is extended into their ensuing consummation where his needs not only consume Gudrun but also reflect his lack of selfhood. They cannot function as "two single beings" in "a strange conjunction" (WIL 148). Instead they experience a fusion that denies selfhood, as their ensuing consummation corroborates the problems that their dialogues have shown (to be discussed in the next chapter below).

Not only has the word "love" not been used by Gerald and Gudrun in "Death and Love" where they consummate the relationship, but the topic of love is not broached by them until the novel's end in "Snowed Up" long after the relationship has been consummated. By then, the tone is cynical and the dialogue destructive. Gudrun opens the
discussion abruptly with a question and Gerald returns with another question—a pattern that continues.

'How much do you love me?' [Gudrun]

[ narration omitted]

'How much do you think I do?' he asked.
'I don't know,' she replied.
'But what is your opinion?' he asked.

[ narration omitted]

'Very little indeed,' she said...
'Why don't I love you?' he asked...
'I don't know why you don't—I've been good to you. You were in a fearful state when you came to me.'

[ narration omitted]

'When was I in a fearful state?' he asked.
'When you first came to me. I had to take pity on you.—But it was never love.'

[ narration omitted]

'Why must you repeat it so often, that there is no love?' he said...

(442, Lawrence's emphasis)

After this initial fencing, Gudrun gets down to the business of whether Gerald actually loves her. Four times in a very brief space of text (not quite a third of a page) she repeats the question: "Well you don't think you love, do you?" (note the missing "me"); "You don't think you can love me, do you?"; "You know you never have loved me, don't you?"; "You know all right that you have never loved me. Have you, do you think?" (442, Lawrence's emphases). Once Gerald evades the question by debating the semantics of love, but twice he gives her a solemn, one-word pronouncement of "No" (442). The next question erases hope: "And you never will love me... Will you?" Again Gerald says "No" (442, Lawrence's emphasis).

From accusation and despair, Gudrun moves to her pleas
of "Say you love me . . . Say you will love me for ever --won't you--won't you?" and "Won't you say you'll love me always? . . . Say it, even if it isn't true--say it Gerald, do" (443). After Gerald concedes with "I will love you always," Gudrun retaliates with "Fancy your actually having said it" and "Try to love me a little more, and to want me a little less" (443).

The single most important dialogue between them ironically repeats the many arguments over love that precede Birkin and Ursula's marriage. For Gerald and Gudrun, however, it is a retrospective look back at what has been wanting, a dialogue held too late and almost forced out of its two victims. . . . . . . . it is the ultimate failure of verbal consciousness, where language is simply a deliberate act of will, an act of aggression . . . (Ragussis 215)

Furthermore it illustrates the kind of love relationship that Lawrence warns about in Fantasia:

We think that love and benevolence will cure anything. Whereas [they] are our poison, poison to the giver, and still more poison to the receiver. Poison only because there is practically no spontaneous love left in the world. It is all will, the fatal love-will. . . . only deadly, exaggerated volition. (80, Lawrence's emphasis)

Ursula and Birkin, in spite of their theorizing and conceptualizing in dialogue, have similar needs; Ursula wants a declaration of love from Birkin, while he seeks union with her. By the end of "Mino," Birkin finally breaks down, becomes vulnerable, acquiesces to Ursula, and abandons his theoretical ideals. Whether he believes in love or not is beside the point; he longs for her, for union, for
consummation. Their closing dialogue shows him wearing down, and after all the chatter, they finally embrace.

She put her arms around his neck. He enfolded her, and kissed her subtly, murmuring in a subtle voice of love, and irony, and submission:
'Yes,—my love, yes,—my love. Let love be enough then.—I love you then—I love you. I'm bored by all the rest.'
'Yes,' she murmured, nestling very sweet and close to him. (154)

Both Gudrun and Ursula have coaxed and cajoled their lovers, but only Ursula has been successful in winning the desired admission of love from her partner. However, by giving in to Ursula, Birkin's words and actions betray his ideal of impersonal union. In spite of this momentary compromise, Birkin continues to intellectualize the process with his "But I want it to be something else" and his "Because we can go one better" (154). Birkin never gives up his verbal quest for the ideal union, and throughout the novel he strives to define this ideal, but his actions here do not meet his ideal of star equilibrium nor do they meet the ideal union that Lawrence defines in the essays.

Thus it seems that if words are incapable of effecting that 'strange conjunction' that Birkin wants, still some part of him that relies on words must assert itself before that other part, which is capable of passion, can come into being. In this sense, the thinking speaking self liberates the passionate self. (Bonds 108)

Whether Birkin's passionate self has been liberated here is certainly questionable, although he does momentarily experience this passionate liberation in "Excurse" when he
and Ursula finally consummate their relationship (to be discussed below in the next chapter). More significant, however, is Bonds's point that for Birkin talk is the prerequisite to passion and union. He cannot avoid this stage on his quest for an ideal union. Finally Lawrence completes Birkin's verbal task by composing the theoretical formulations of Psychoanalysis and Fantasia.

Indeed the notion that one couple's relationship is successful and the other is failed is simplistic. Nevertheless, Lawrence uses the Ursula/Birkin dialogues and the Gerald/Gudrun dialogues to illustrate opposing views of relationships as a means of exploring the concept of an ideal union. "[His] theories . . . are purged and qualified by the pull and thrust of human interchange—and this is Lawrence's way of threshing out important problems" (Spilka 6).

The primary obstacle to Lawrence's achieving resolution in the novel is, of course, the classic conflict between theory and practice, between the absoluteness of the ideal versus the limitations of real life experience. Schneider succinctly captures Lawrence's conflict: Lawrence, "the religious artist wants a heroic soul," but Lawrence, "the psychologist [the realist], aware of inner weakness, indecision, and continual vacillation, can find little in life to correspond to his vision" (193). Although readers of the novel may be left dissatisfied with Ursula and
Birkin's relationship, their dialogues, when considered in
the light of the essays, become revealing and informing, as
they offer readers a view of an earlier stage of Lawrence's
theory of the unconscious and union. And what most enriches
the thoughts and dialogues of WIL is their exploratory
nature: Lawrence had not yet reached the conclusive stand
he was to take in Psychoanalysis and Fantasia, nor had he
reached the absolutist position of his later novels. As
Lawrence himself points out in his Foreword to WIL, he was
engaged in a "struggle for verbal consciousness."
Chapter Two

The Narrator as Theorist

Narration includes both editorial commentary and plot development, and it is not unusual that the narrator of WIL used both aspects of narration in the novel. Neither authors nor their narrators are immune to their own points of view, nor should writers be expected to separate themselves from their theories when they are writing. Besides using Rupert Birkin's character and the love dialogues to convey his view of relationships in WIL, Lawrence also used WIL's narrator as a spokesperson to convey his theory of individual development through union. In this novel, the narrator's editorial commentary, for the most part, is not disturbing. Most of the time, the narrator summarizes characters' inner states and the condition of the developing relationships in ways that enhance the tale and one's reading of it.

However, at other times, the narrator's voice intrudes upon the narrative experience and becomes blatantly didactic. At these times, the narrator's rhetoric is lofty and esoteric, and the jargon obtrudes. Although in such cases readers who are unfamiliar with the psychology works would not recognize that the jargon and theory being expressed by WIL's narrator parallel views expressed in the nonfiction texts, the sudden shift in tone and voice is
nevertheless obvious. The narrator's rhetoric becomes most stilted when Lawrence's psychology theories are being expressed more consciously and directly within the novel. At these times Lawrence's "struggle for verbal consciousness" is most acute.

Sometimes the narrator vacillates from moderate narrative commentary to sudden didactic statements within a short block of text, in some cases even within the confines of a single paragraph. More often, though, Lawrence juxtaposes paragraphs, sharpening the contrast between these two aspects of narration. Two chapters, "Sunday Evening" and "Man to Man," offer some striking examples of such narrative juxtaposition, the former dealing with Ursula's responses and the latter with Birkin's. "Sunday Evening"'s opening paragraphs offer a description of Ursula that is perfectly acceptable within the context of the unfolding plot.

As the day wore on, the life-blood seemed to ebb away from Ursula, and within the emptiness a heavy despair gathered. Her passion seemed to bleed to death, and there was nothing. She sat suspended in a state of complete nullity, harder to bear than death. 'Unless something happens,' she said to herself, in the perfect lucidity of final suffering, 'I shall die. I am at the end of my line of life.'

She sat crushed and obliterated in a darkness that was the border of death. She realised how all her life she had been drawing nearer and nearer to this brink, where there was no beyond, from which one had to leap like Sappho into the unknown. The knowledge of the imminence of death was like a drug. Darkly, without thinking at all, she knew that she was near to death. She had travelled all her life along the line of fulfilment [sic], and it was nearly concluded. She knew all she had to know, she had
experienced all she had to experience, she was fulfilled in a kind of bitter ripeness, there remained only to fall from the tree into death. And one must fulfil [sic] one's development to the end, must carry the adventure to its conclusion. And the next step was over the border into death. So it was then! There was a certain peace in the knowledge.

After all, when one was fulfilled, one was happiest in falling into death, as a bitter fruit plunges in its ripeness downwards. Death is a great consummation, a consummating experience. It is a development from life. That we know, while we are yet living. What then need we think for further? One can never see beyond the consummation. It is enough that death is a great and conclusive experience. Why should we ask what comes after the experience, when the experience is still unknown to us? Let us die, since the great experience is the one that follows now upon all the rest, death, which is the next great crisis in front of which we have arrived. If we wait, if we balk the issue, we do but hang about the gates in undignified uneasiness. There it is, in front of us, as in front of Sappho, the illimitable space. Thereinto goes the journey. Have we not the courage to go on with our journey, must we cry 'I daren't.'? On ahead we will go, into death, and whatever death may mean. If a man can see the next step to be taken, why should he fear the next but one? Why ask about the next but one? Of the next step we are certain. It is the step into death. (191-192)

Other than the narrator's overly dramatic references to death and the shift from the personal "she" to the impersonal "one" toward the end of the third paragraph, the information regarding Ursula's despair in the first three paragraphs serves reasonably as narrative explication. However, the paragraph that follows moves beyond Ursula and becomes the narrator's dissertation on death as the ultimate consummation. This distinct pronominal shift in the fourth paragraph from "one" to "we" creates significant changes in rhetorical tone. Clearly the narrator has stepped to the
The movement in paragraph three from the statement "she was fulfilled in a kind of bitter ripeness, there remained only to fall from the tree into death" to the following "And one must fulfil one's development to the end" appears as a reasonable shift by the narrator from reporting to reflecting. This movement is neither too abrupt in tone nor too didactic in its assertion. But by the fourth paragraph, the voice of the narrator has altered dramatically from reflection—"when one was fulfilled one was happiest in falling into death"—to pronouncement—"Death is a great consummation... That we know" (191). The strong assertive voice that rises from these pages in the novel where the instructive first person "we" is used is reminiscent of the same powerful voice of conviction that Lawrence uses when making his pronouncements of theory in *Psychoanalysis*'s text (to be discussed below in ch. 3).

Besides the rhetorical shift from the first three paragraphs to the fourth, the narrator's presentation of death itself takes a considerable turn from the concrete—Ursula's personal desolation in the first three paragraphs—to the abstract—death as "a great... consummating experience" in paragraph four. That there is a void in Ursula's life is clear at this point in the novel. She has neither come into her own "spontaneous being" nor realized an equilibriated union with another. The real topic here is
life, not death. It is a definition by negation; the absence of life within brings death. In the novel, Lawrence first must study those who suffer this inner death before he can expound in the psychology texts on how to live life. And by the time of the essays, Lawrence is not discussing death. Instead, he talks of life, a life that "must be lived from the deep, self-responsible spontaneous centres of every individual, in a vital, non-ideal circuit of dynamic relation between individuals" (Fantasia 85).

The hopeful view of death—death as renewal or rebirth—in paragraph four plays a different role: the narrator is talking about death of the ego, about death to the self, and in this way anticipating Ursula and Birkin's consummation in the "Excurse" chapter where for a moment they surrender ego and will to the "great consummating experience." Although life, not death is the predominant topic of the psychology essays, Lawrence first had to explore the actual experience of death within his characters before he could postulate his theory of life in the essays—his theory of the unconscious and union. And Ursula and Birkin become the seekers long before the essays are ever formulated.

Also noteworthy are Ursula's directly quoted thoughts and the narrator's references to her, intermittently dispersed throughout these narrative pronouncements. Examples of such narration are found in paragraphs that follow those that have been quoted: "Her thoughts drifted
into unconsciousness, she sat as if asleep" and "In a kind of spiritual trance, she yielded, she gave way" (192). Whether this is Lawrence's way of keeping readers wed to the story, or whether he wants readers to believe that everything in these passages represents Ursula's point of view and not the narrator's--that the narrator is simply conveying it all--can never be known. What can be concluded with certainty, however, when examining such examples from the novel, is that the narrator often intruded with strong didactic pronouncements, some of which reiterate the theories expressed in the psychology books.

Whether such excerpts represent Ursula's thoughts or the narrator's, it is nevertheless clear that Ursula, like Birkin, is searching for something more. Yet her search is not so ambitious as Birkin's nor are her answers so definitive, except that when it comes specifically to her relationship with Birkin, love is the prime requisite for her. Birkin, on the other hand, presents a more elaborate theory of relationships, and always the conditions for union move far beyond love itself. Birkin's views resemble those of Lawrence in the psychology essays, and often the narrator offers extended discussion of these views on Birkin's behalf.

"Man to Man," the chapter that follows Ursula's "Sunday Evening," not only repeats the pattern of "Sunday Evening" with its shifts from narrative development to didactic
pronouncements, but "Man to Man" also reveals the narrator's reiteration of the relationship themes found in the *Syclerbb* works. This chapter opens quite like "Sunday Evening," only this time Birkin's ennui is being described. As Ursula's responses open "Sunday Evening," so too do Birkin's open "Man to Man," with a brief description of Birkin in paragraph one and a lengthy critique of traditional marriage in paragraph two.

He lay sick and unmoved, in pure opposition to everything. He knew how near to breaking was the vessel that held his life. He knew also how strong and durable it was. And he did not care. Better a thousand times take one's chance with death, than accept a life one did not want. But best of all to *persist and persist and persist* for ever, till one were satisfied in life. (emphasis added)

He knew that Ursula was referred back to him. He knew his life rested with her. But he would rather not live than accept the love she proffered. The old way of love seemed a dreadful bondage, a sort of conscription. . . . (199)

"Man to Man"'s first paragraph directly parallels "Sunday Evening"'s first paragraph: both describe the breakdown in each character; both are in line with the narrative movement; and both consider death as an alternative. However, there is one exception: Birkin must "persist"; he cannot give in. It is Birkin's task to find the ideal relationship, to formulate a theory, and ultimately to realize his--and Lawrence's--"struggle for verbal consciousness." He continues his quest in the next paragraph with a lengthy critique of traditional marriage and love (not fully cited above). From Birkin's original
attack on marriage in the second paragraph of "Man to Man," the text continues to vacillate between criticism and solution.

On the whole, he hated sex, it was such a limitation. It was sex that turned a man into a broken half of a couple, the woman into the other broken half. And he wanted to be single in himself, the woman single in her self. He wanted sex to revert to the level of other appetites, to be regarded as a functional process, not as a fulfilment. He believed in sex marriage. But beyond this, he wanted a further conjunction, where man had being and woman had being, two pure beings, each constituting the freedom of the other, balancing each other like two poles of one force, like two angels, or two demons.

He wanted so much to be free, not under the compulsion of any need for unification, or tortured by unsatisfied desire. Desire and aspiration should find their object without all this torture, as now, in a world of plenty of water, simple thirst is inconsiderable, satisfied almost unconsciously. And he wanted to be with Ursula as free as with himself, single and clear and cool, yet balanced, polarised with her. The merging, the clutching, the mingling of love was become madly abhorrent to him. (199-200)

The first of these paragraphs succinctly summarizes Lawrence's theory of individual development via the unconscious and via union with another, specifically in its last sentence, "But beyond, he wanted further conjunction, where man had being and woman had being, pure beings, each constituting the freedom of the other. . . ." Its language is simple and its syntax direct. The phrases "balancing each other like two poles of one force" and "single and clear and cool, yet balanced, polarised" echo Birkin's theory of equilibrium in "Mino" and anticipate Lawrence's in Psychoanalysis and Fantasia.
The narrator is reiterating Lawrence's theories, but more significantly the narrator does so through Birkin's thoughts, and it is Birkin's fear of merging and Birkin's desire to preserve individuality for himself and for Ursula that is the main concern in these two paragraphs. In *Psychoanalysis* Lawrence extends Birkin's concerns by elaborating on the dangers of fusion and the necessity of preserving individuality in relationships. However, Lawrence had to first bring these ideas to "verbal consciousness" through Birkin and the narrator before he could articulate his theory in *Psychoanalysis*:

A soul cannot come into its own through that love alone which is unison. If it stress the one mode, the sympathetic mode, beyond a certain point, it breaks its own integrity, and corruption sets in in the living organism. On both planes of love, upper and lower, the two modes must act complementary to one another, the sympathetic and the separtist.

The goal of life is the coming to perfection of each single individual. This cannot take place without the tremendous interchange of love from all the four great poles of the first, basic field of consciousness. There must be the twofold passionate flux of sympathetic love. And there must be the twofold passional circuit of separatist realization, the lower, vital *self-realization* and the upper, intense realization of the other. . . . (240-241, Lawrence's emphasis)

In the two "Man to Man" paragraphs previously cited, unlike the "Sunday Evening" section on death, the narrator's voice is not as stilted, the discussion is not as lofty, nor is the jargon as foreign to the reader's ear. Also, these paragraphs are more readily acceptable as Birkin's thoughts than is the narration acceptable as Ursula's thoughts in
"Sunday Evening" because Birkin habitually carries on verbally in this way. Nevertheless, these issues are not only Birkin's issues; they anticipate the psychology books. Yet in spite of the more down-to-earth tone and language in these first two pages of "Man to Man," the narrator cannot resist the temptation to elevate his rhetoric, closing this beginning reflection with two verbose paragraphs.

And why? Why should we consider ourselves, men and women, as broken fragments of one whole. It is not true. We are not broken fragments of one whole. Rather we are the singling away into purity and clear being, of things that were mixed. Rather the sex is that which remains in us of the mixed, the unresolved. And passion is the further separating of this mixture, that which is manly being taken into the being of the man, that which is womanly passing to the woman, till the two are clear and whole as angels, the admixture of sex in the highest sense surpassed, leaving two single beings constellated together like two stars.

In the old age, before sex was, we were mixed, each one a mixture. The process of singling into individuality resulted in the great polarisation of sex. The womanly drew to one side, the manly to the other. But the separation was imperfect even then. And so our world-cycle passes. There is now to come the new day, when we are beings each of us, fulfilled in difference. The man is pure man, the woman pure woman, they are perfectly polarised. But there is no longer any of the horrible merging, mingling self-abnegation of love. There is only the pure duality of polarisation, each one free from any contamination of the other. In each, the individual is primal, sex is subordinate, but perfectly polarised. Each has a single, separate being, with its own laws. The man has pure freedom, the woman hers. Each acknowledges the perfection of the polarised sex-circuit. Each admits the different nature in the other. (200-201)

The first person "we" has emerged again in conjunction with the voice of didacticism. Lawrence's readers are being instructed in these two paragraphs, not so much by Birkin as
by the narrator. Although the ideas are Birkin's, the tone and the voice are more authoritative. The "pure duality of polarisation," also referred to as star equilibrium by Birkin in "Mino," is continually reiterated here in contrast to the "merging, the clutching, the mingling of love" which Birkin thinks a page earlier is "madly abhorrent to him." This idea is central to Lawrence's theory of the unconscious and union as it is expressed in Psychoanalysis and Fantasia. Lawrence tells "us" readers in Fantasia that "[we] either love too much, or impose our will too much, are too spiritual or too sensual," and he admonishes "us" readers "to learn to live from the centre of our own own responsibility only, and let other people do the same" (47).

In keeping with Birkin's concern for preserving the individual--"pure" manhood and "pure" womanhood--in relationships, Lawrence extends the discussion in Fantasia:

But even in its profoundest, and most elemental movements, the soul is still individual. . . . And though we have a potential dynamic sexual connection, we men, with almost every woman, yet the great outstanding fact of the individuality even of the blood makes us need a corresponding individuality in the woman we are to embrace. (174 & 175)

H. M. Daleski succinctly captures the union that Lawrence, Birkin, and the narrator have been wrestling with verbally:

"The relationship is envisaged as a meeting on equal terms of two people who have themselves achieved full individuality and transcend their duality in the balance that is attained between them" (107).
Overall, this three-page discussion can be accepted as Birkin's as it reflects the issues he has been grappling with in his dialogues with Ursula. At the same time, the discussion can be accepted as Lawrence's because it anticipates the ideas later expressed in the essays. Nevertheless this entire section of the novel is expressed directly in the narrative voice and not in Birkin's. And in an effort to preserve narrative credibility and flow, the narrator closes this section with a reminder that these are Birkin's thoughts we have been privy to just before Gerald's arrival—"So Birkin meditated whilst he was ill. . . . and things came to him clear and sure" (201). In contrast, when concluding the "Sunday Evening" meditations just before Birkin arrives to see Ursula, the narrator does not directly assign these meditations to Ursula: "Ursula sat quite still and quite forgotten. . . . gone into the ultimate darkness of her own soul" (194).

As a meditative chapter, "Man to Man" offers yet another vivid example of how WIL serves as an explorative beginning to the psychology theories expressed in the essays. The union that both Lawrence (in the psychology essays) and Birkin (in the novel) are seeking must be eternal and impersonal, but not controlling—"The merging, the clutching, the mingling of love" which is "madly abhorrent" to Birkin (200). Such a union must represent a balance between the "sympathetic" and
"separatist" modes that Lawrence contrasts in *Psychoanalysis* (cited above, p. 44). Ultimately, it is in the two consummation chapters, "Excurse" and "Death and Love," that the narrator illustrates, through Ursula/Birkin and Gerald/Gudrun, the contrasts between an impersonal union and a smothering union.

The narrator's judgment of each couple's relationship is revealed early in these chapters in descriptions of each partner, and later, in descriptions of their consummation. In "Excurse," Birkin and Ursula are described as reborn creatures whereas in "Death and Love" Gerald and Gudrun are described as doomed creatures. Birkin "was as if born out of the cramp of a womb" (311), "as if he had just come awake, like a thing that is born, like a bird when it comes out of an egg, into a new universe" (312), and Ursula "was beautiful as a new marvellous flower opened" (313), "an essential new being . . . quite free . . . in complete ease, her complete self" (314). Spilka's observation that Lawrence saw sex "as a religious communion, an inclusive expression of the force of life itself, which nourishes and renews the true self, the second ego, the individual soul of each of the lovers" (216) is evident in the narrator's description of Ursula and Birkin. It is important to note again that Lawrence searches for his ideal union through Ursula and Birkin, and that although they do not meet his ideal by novel's end, they do momentarily experience his
"religious communion" in the "Excurse" chapter. Lawrence further stresses his vision of an ideal union by the contrasting fatal union between Gerald and Gudrun.

The promise of new life in "Excurse" starkly opposes the fatal descriptions of Gerald and Gudrun in "Death and Love," the following chapter. Gudrun "felt as if she were caught at last by fate, imprisoned in some horrible and fatal trap," (325), and only three pages later, we are told that "She died a little death" (329); "She sipped the poison" (329). As for Gerald, "A dangerous resolve formed in his heart. . . . He would not go back tonight till he had come to her, if it cost him his life. He staked his all on his throw" (339).

Along with the juxtaposition of chapter pairs, Lawrence uses parallel structural patterns within these chapters to illustrate the contrast between the two couples. Besides the initial character descriptions in "Excurse" and "Death and Love," two intimate encounters are experienced by each couple in each chapter. By chapter's end each couple realizes full consummation in the second encounter. Ursula and Birkin's first physical intimacies occur at the Southwell inn, with their consummation under the night sky in the open, natural setting of Sherwood Forest; conversely, Gerald and Gudrun begin their embraces under a bridge while walking home and consummate their relationship in the stifling, secretive confines of Gudrun's bedroom.
The first paragraph that describes Ursula and Birkin's coming together in the parlor of the inn identifies a transition for them from continuous discussion to a non-verbal, felt experience.

He stood on the hearth-rug looking at her, at her face that was upturned exactly like a flower, a fresh, luminous flower, glinting faintly golden with the dew of the first light. And he was smiling faintly as if there were no speech in the world, save the silent delight of flowers in each other. Smilingly they delighted in each other's presence, pure presence, not to be thought of, even known. (312-313)

Not only have Ursula and Birkin moved beyond their "struggle for verbal consciousness," they have entered a new realm, the realm of the unconscious, where knowledge exists at a level beyond mental consciousness—where reality need not be articulated. This becomes the essence of the unconscious as it is defined in the first essay, *Psychoanalysis*.

By the unconscious we wish to indicate that essential unique nature of every individual creature, which is, by its very nature, unanalysable, undefinable, inconceivable. It cannot be conceived, it can only be experienced. (214)

From the unconscious to the body centers, which are also defined in the psychology essays, the novel moves on to describe their physical meeting.

She traced with her hands the line of his loins and thighs, at the back, and a living fire ran through her, from him, darkly. It was a dark flood of electric passion she released from him, drew into herself. She had established a rich new circuit, a new current of passional electric energy, between the two of them, released from the darkest poles of the body and established in perfect circuit. It was a
dark fire of electricity that rushed from him to her, and flooded them both with rich peace, satisfaction. [brief dialogue omitted]

She closed her hands over the full, rounded body of his loins, as he stooped over her, she seemed to touch the quick of the mystery of darkness that was bodily him. She seemed to faint beneath, and he seemed to faint, stooping over her. It was a perfect passing away for both of them, and at the same time the most intolerable accession into being, the marvellous fulness of immediate gratification, overwhelming, outflooding from the Source of the deepest life-force, the darkest, deepest, strangest life-source of the human body, at the back and base of the loins.

... She had thought there was no source deeper than the phallic source. And now, behold, from the smitten rock of the man's body, from the strange marvellous flanks and thighs, deeper, further in mystery than the phallic source, came the floods of ineffable darkness and ineffable riches. (313-314)

The significance in these paragraphs is not the sensuality of Birkin's loins as Ursula connects with him, but her discovery of "the deepest life-force...of the human body, at the back and base of the loins" and the "rich new circuit" that has been established between them, according to the narrator, a "perfect circuit" (314). All that Lawrence may appear to be doing here is glorifying and elevating Ursula and Birkin's union; however, he is doing much more. "His interest in sexual relations is most fundamentally an interest in extending their meaning, not a mere fascination with their intensity" (Miko, Intro. 10). And for Lawrence in the novel, Birkin and Ursula become a means of exploring the possibility for ideal union, the ideal union that he defines more explicitly in the essays.

In these paragraphs from "Excurse," Lawrence begins to
experiment with the concept of body centers as critical connections between two people; then from a biological perspective in the psychology essays, Lawrence begins his necessary effort to establish scientific credibility for this theory of "equilibrium." The following excerpt from *Fantasia* defines the four primary body centers, according to Lawrence, our "first field of dynamic consciousness":

The solar plexus and the lumbar ganglion, great nerve-centres below the diaphragm, act as the dynamic origin of all consciousness in man, and are immediately polarized by the other two nerve-centres, the cardiac plexus and the thoracic ganglion above the diaphragm. At these four poles the whole flow, both within the individual and from without him of dynamic consciousness and dynamic creative relationship is centered.8 (103)

None of the preceding citations that describe Ursula and Birkin's first meeting discuss directly the unconscious or the body centers, yet the descriptions of the couple's experience reveal Lawrence's early examination of these concepts unfolding first in WIL before they are discussed in the essays.

Far more concrete and far less mysterious is Gerald and Gudrun's initial physical encounter in "Death and Love."

So, under the bridge, they came to a standstill, and he lifted her upon his breast. His body vibrated taut and powerful as he closed upon her and crushed her, breathless and dazed and destroyed, crushed her upon his breast. Ah, it was terrible, and perfect. Under this bridge, the colliers pressed their lovers to their breast. And now, under the bridge, the master of them all pressed her to himself! And how much more powerful and terrible was his embrace than theirs, how much more concentrated and supreme his love was, than theirs, in the same sort! She felt
she would swoon, die, under the vibrating, inhuman tension of his arms and his body—she would pass away. Then the unthinkable high vibration slackened and became more undulating, he slackened and drew her with him to stand with his back to the wall.

She was almost unconscious. So the colliers' lovers would stand with their backs to the walls, holding their sweethearts and kissing them as she was being kissed. —Ah, but would their kisses be fine and powerful as the kisses of the firm-mouthed master? Even the keen, short-cut moustache—the colliers would not have that. (330-331)

The language is more violent and overpowering here, and there is no indication of connection, of a "rich new circuit." In this excerpt Gerald's power—his "taut and powerful" body (330), "the firm-mouthed master" (331)—and his conquest over Gudrun are detailed. And Gudrun is enamored of Gerald's external status, "the master of them all" (330). Lawrence defines their relationship in Fantasia: "It is all will, the fatal love-will. . . . There is now only deadly, exaggerated volition. . . . We want to put all life under compulsion" (80-81, Lawrence's emphasis).

There is no balance, no equilibrium between these two. There isn't even the "horrible mingling" and "merging" that Birkin has condemned. Instead, Gudrun is overtaken, is consumed by Gerald.

His arms were fast round her, he seemed to be gathering her into himself, her warmth, her softness, her adorable weight, drinking in the suffusion of her physical being, avidly. He lifted her, and seemed to pour her into himself, like wine into a cup. (331)

Unlike the violent interaction and the isolation of Gerald and Gudrun's embrace, unlike their "balance . . . in
ideal union between Birkin and Ursula that is reminiscent of Birkin's quest in "Mino" for a relationship with Ursula like "two single equal stars balanced in conjunction" (151).

Also, this description by the narrator anticipates the consummation that is to take place between Ursula and Birkin a page later.

She sat in a fullness and a pure potency that was like apathy, mindless and immobile. She was next to him, and hung in a pure rest, as a star is hung, balanced unthinkably. —Still there remained a dark lambency of anticipation. She would touch him. With perfect fine finger-tips of reality she would touch the reality in him, the suave, pure, untranslateable reality of his loins of darkness. To touch, mindlessly in darkness, to come in pure touching upon the living reality of him, his suave, perfect loins and thighs of darkness, this was her sustaining anticipation.

And he, too, waited in the magical steadfastness of suspense, for her to take this knowledge of him as he had taken it of her. He knew her darkly, with the fulness of dark knowledge. Now she would know him, and he too would be liberated. He would be night-free, like an Egyptian, steadfast in perfectly suspended equilibrium, pure mystic nodality of physical being. They would give each other this star-equilibrium which alone is freedom. (319)

This passage reveals glimpses of Lawrence's early musings on the profound unconscious form of knowledge that he was to define later in Psychoanalysis:

We know it by direct experience. All the best part of knowledge is inconceivable. . . . Knowledge is always a matter of whole experience . . . and never a matter of mental conception merely. This is indeed the point of all full knowledge: that it is contained mainly within the unconscious, its mental or conscious reference being only a sort of extract or shadow. (215)
However, in the preceding excerpt from "Excurse," Lawrence, through the narrator's use of the anticipatory modal "would," must first review the criteria for ideal union before he can describe the actual consummation between Ursula and Birkin, let alone before he can talk about unconscious knowledge in the essays. Such preliminaries are unnecessary for Gerald and Gudrun's consummation in "Death and Love" because Lawrence is not attempting to describe an unknown ideal union. Instead Lawrence describes the reality of destructive union. "Their 'love' is a perverse sexuality, a form of ontological masturbation in which the partner is nothing more than an instrument for the perfection of the Self. . . . That requires a kind of annihilation of the Self or of the Other" (Adamowski 354-355). Gerald has a need which he fills at Gudrun's expense.

He had come for vindication. She let him hold her in his arms, clasp her close against him. He found in her an infinite relief: Into her he poured all his pent-up darkness and corrosive death, and he was whole again. . . . And she, subject, received him as a vessel filled with his bitter potion of death. She had no power at this crisis to resist. The terrible frictional violence of death filled her, and she received it in an ecstasy of subjection, in throes of acute, violent sensation. (344)

Gerald's need to be "whole again" and to find "an infinite relief" (344) dominates the union, erasing the possibility of "star equilibrium" with Gudrun. Of great significance is the narrator's choice of verbs to describe Gerald's participation in this consummation—"he poured,"
"he plunged," "he buried," "he cleaved," and the adjectives that describe Gerald's response to Gudrun—"dissolving and sinking to rest," "healed," "whole again," "made whole," "palpitating with new life" (344-345). The only verb applied to Gudrun in these two pages is "received"; she has become no more than a passive recipient of Gerald's anguish. "But Gudrun lay wide awake, destroyed into perfect [mental] consciousness" (not to be confused with Lawrence's ideal unconscious), while Gerald enjoyed "the sleep of complete exhaustion and restoration" (345). Neither Gerald nor Gudrun has experienced Lawrence's pristine unconscious state through their union. Instead, Gerald has escaped reality, while Gudrun remains imprisoned in full mental consciousness.

Conversely, after their actual consummation in "Excurse," both Birkin and Ursula "slept the chilly night through . . . a night of unbroken sleep" (320). Also the consummation itself is less aggressive than Gerald and Gudrun's. "Touch" is the primary verb used to describe both Ursula's and Birkin's participation in this union, and it is through "touch" that "knowledge" of the other is gained.

[He] gathered her to him. . . . his fingers upon her unrevealed nudity . . . never to be seen with the eye, or known with the mind, only known as a palpable revelation of living otherness.

[She] touched, she received the maximums [sic] of unspeakable communication in touch . . . the reality of that which can never be known . . . never be transmuted into mind content. . . . For she was to him what he was to her, the immemorial magnificence of mystic, palpable, real otherness.
Moreover, the knowledge of touch being described by the narrator aligns perfectly with Lawrence's subsequent definition of knowledge in the essays:

The aim is not mental consciousness. We want effectual human beings, not conscious ones. The final aim is not to know, but to be. (Fantasia 68) The vast bulk of consciousness is non-cerebral. It is the sap of our life, of all life. (Psychoanalysis 217)

Ursula and Birkin have moved beyond the intense verbal exchanges of earlier chapters to another realm, the realm of touch. So touch for Ursula and Birkin becomes a matter of "whole experience," (Psychoanalysis 215) a "non-cerebral" (Psychoanalysis 217) way to know one another more fully. "Lawrence's thematic use of his psycho-biological theory of the unconscious may be seen in his treatment of touch . . . that it activates unconscious instinctual motives, not rationally conceived ideas, into consciousness, thus making both self-confrontation and encounter with the other possible" (Cowan 27). By the time the psychology essays are written, Lawrence has figured out the significance of "knowledge of the other," and he postulates that by learning through union with another who we are not, we can come to realize our own individuality:

Thus the first plane of the upper consciousness - the outgoing, the sheer and unspeakable bliss of the sense of union, communion, at-oneness with the beloved - and then the complementary objective realization of the beloved, the realization of that which is apart, different. This realization is like riches to the objective consciousness. It is, as it
were, the adding of another self to the own self.
(Psychoanalysis 239-240)

In this way, through union and knowledge of "another," individuals can more fully become themselves, not through merging or isolation, but through "star equilibrium"—that ideal "polarity" between two people. Lawrence's "knowledge of the other" reflects the later post-structural notion of difference: "Although it would be an overstatement to say that Lawrence is a precursor of post-structuralism, he was the first English writer to forward the notion of utter, uncontained difference" (Jewinski 7).

In addition to Ursula and Birkin's newfound "knowledge" of one another gained through "touch," the other significant feature of their consummation is the "mindlessness," the "unspeakable communication" that characterizes their union. This state of "mindlessness" aligns with Lawrence's idea of the unconscious—that deeper level where, he believed, "truth" and fullness of experience could be found. "Lawrence's knowledge of this first place of experience permeates his writing. He returns again and again to a mode of knowing in which consciousness of another cannot be grasped in 'cognitive' diacritical terms" (Schwartz 217).

In Fantasia Lawrence further defines the value of this mindlessness or unconscious state as it relates to consummation: "The mystery must remain in its dark secrecy, and its dark, powerful dynamism. The reality of sex lies in
the great dynamic convulsions in the soul. And as such it should be realized, a great creative-conclusive seizure upon the soul" (113-114).

In "Excurse," the narrator is celebrating Ursula and Birkin's total abandonment of the mental and their mutual participation with one another at the unconscious, non-verbal level. Birkin's "fingers upon her unrevealed nudity were the fingers of silence upon silence," and Ursula "touched, she received the maximums [sic] of unspeakable communication in touch, dark, subtle, positively silent" (320). It has taken them two-thirds of the novel and much talking to get to this point. "For she was to him what he was to her, the immemorial magnificence of mystic, palpable, real otherness" (320). Birkin and Ursula's consummation may be a non-verbal experience, but it is the narrator's verbal expression of their consummation that epitomizes Lawrence's ideal theory of the unconscious and union with the other. Ragussis points out that this "state beyond language is, paradoxically, wed to language" (198), as the narrator's voice must often rise above the actual narrative experience, especially over Birkin and Ursula's silence. "But," as Bell indicates, "wordlessness is not an option in fiction; not, at least, for the author" (167), nor for the narrator.

In Ursula and Birkin's consummation readers can find the seed of Lawrence's pristine unconscious and ideal union coming to fruition through the narrator's words. However,
their union, only a momentary experience of less than a page, is not indicative of the Ursula/Birkin relationship throughout the novel, and certainly not in keeping with their relationship by novel's end. Nevertheless, Ursula and Birkin were the primary site of Lawrence's exploration in preparation of the theories he eventually outlined in the essays. Although by contrast Gerald and Gudrun's is the failed relationship, Ursula and Birkin can only represent the potential for Lawrence's ideal union in the novel.

Through Birkin and Ursula's consummation, WIL's narrator explores what an ideal union might be, but neither Lawrence nor his narrator resolve these theoretical issues in the novel. While resolution was not the outcome for Lawrence in WIL, exploration was his primary rhetorical preoccupation. "The result is a kind of novel of discovery, didactic but experimental, prophetic but obedient to the dictates of experience" (Spilka 6). Frequently in WIL Lawrence is assisted by "a narrative voice which so heightens the implications of the ostensible action that in some ways the narrative voice is more primary than the action it describes" (Bell 213). WIL's narrator had to intrude frequently upon the narrative experience itself, thereby assisting Lawrence in his "struggle for verbal consciousness" within the novel. Lawrence would finally achieve full theoretical expression only in the psychology texts.
Chapter Three
Theory Formulated in the Essays

Thus far in examining Lawrence's *Women in Love* as a prelude to his two psychology essays, my analysis has considered the exploratory and sometimes didactic role that dialogue and narration played in the development of Lawrence's significant themes of the unconscious and union. Also noteworthy are the claims that Lawrence himself made about each work and the relationship between his fiction and his nonfiction, between WIL and the essays.

In his *Foreword to WIL*, Lawrence explains that his novel is a record of his "own desires, aspirations, struggles," and that his "struggle for verbal consciousness" is "not superimposition of a theory" but his own "passionate struggle into conscious being" (Phoenix II 275-276, emphasis added). Certainly Lawrence's claim that he has not superimposed his theory upon his art is arguable, but his "struggle for verbal consciousness" is not disputable. The novel's text clearly reveals this struggle through dialogue, particularly through the character of Rupert Birkin.

Overall Rupert and Ursula's many conversations reflect both Rupert's and Lawrence's earnest effort to articulate a theory of individual development through union. As well, the narrator's didactic intrusions reflect early formulations of Lawrence's theories. Nevertheless, Lawrence
does not fully articulate his theories until he writes the two psychology essays.

Some four to five years after WIL, when Lawrence wrote the essays, he explained his effort to articulate his theories in his foreword to Fantasia:

This pseudo-philosophy of mine - 'pollyanalytics', as one of my respected critics might say - is deduced from the novels and poems, not the reverse. The novels and poems come unwatched out of one's pen. And then the absolute need which one has for some sort of satisfactory mental attitude towards oneself and things in general makes one try to abstract some definite conclusions from one's experiences as a writer and as a man. The novels and poems are pure passionate experience. These 'pollyanalytics' are inferences made afterwards, from the experience. (15)

The purpose of this study—to show that Lawrence began to develop his psychology theories in his fiction—aligns with Lawrence's first claim that he deduced the theories from the novel. However, his second claim that the novel came "unwatched out of [his] pen" is certainly contradicted by the preceding examination of both dialogue and narration in WIL. Although Lawrence's "struggle for verbal consciousness" in WIL can be seen in not fully articulated theories, nevertheless, his effort to develop these theories through the novel was indeed conscious and deliberate.

In the paragraph that follows the one previously cited from Fantasia's foreword, Lawrence makes even more claims about his unconscious intention when writing fiction:

And finally, it seems to me that even art is utterly dependent on philosophy: or if you prefer it, on a metaphysic. The metaphysic or philosophy may not be

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where very accurately stated and may be quite unconscious, in the artist, yet it is a metaphysic that governs men at the time, and is by all men more or less comprehended, and lived... Then it is unfolded into life and art. (15)

Lawrence's claims here can be considered at best ingenuous or paradoxical, at worst contradictory. On the one hand he claims that his metaphysic governs him as he writes, yet on the other, he suggests that he "may be" unconsciously developing his metaphysic as he writes. More to the point, Lawrence's romantic notion of unconscious metaphysical emanation is overruled by WIL's text and its many examples of early theoretical development through narration and dialogue. The parallels between the psychology essays' theory of the unconscious and union and WIL's preliminary articulation of these theories, as well as the jargon found in both, reveal a deliberate, conscious effort by Lawrence, the novelist, to develop his "metaphysic or philosophy" in WIL. The polemic intention is not unconscious, nor is the argument unconsciously "stated" in the novel.

Lawrence's insistence that the artist's intention is subserved to some higher form of truth was not new to him when he wrote Fantasia. In the earliest version of Studies in Classical American Literature (SCAL hereafter), completed shortly after he had finished writing WIL but before the essays, Lawrence defined the artist's dual role: "first, the didactic import given by the author from his own moral
consciousness, and then the profound symbolic import which proceeds from his unconscious or subconscious soul" (The
Symbolic Meaning 19). In SCAL's final version, written at the same time he was writing the psychology essays, Lawrence is even more emphatic: "The essential function of art is moral. . . . But a passionate, implicit morality, not didactic. A morality which changes the blood, rather than the mind. Changes the blood first. The mind follows later, in the wake" (SCAL 180).

Finally and most telling, Lawrence explains in his foreword to Fantasia his need to translate "art speech" into nonfiction: "We've got to . . . find what the heart really believes in after all: and what the heart really wants . . . And then we've got to put it down in terms of belief and of knowledge" (16). Here what the "heart really wants" reiterates Lawrence's claims of (1) the theory that comes unwatched from the writer's pen, (2) the artist's unconscious metaphysic, and (3) the passionate morality that changes the blood. And Lawrence's imperative "to put it down" explains his desire to articulate his theory—to translate his initial novelistic explorations in WIL into theoretical expression in the psychology essays. Further, through his desire "to put it down in terms of belief and of knowledge," Lawrence extends art's "essential function" of morality to his non-fiction texts.

Despite his preference for the novel as the arbiter of
"truth," Lawrence still chose to argue his theories in essay form. *Psychoanalysis* thus represents his first formal statement on the unconscious and union after experimenting with these theories in *WIL*. *Psychoanalysis* is not a dense text, nor is it difficult to follow. Reading this essay gives the reader a reasonable, if not clear, understanding of Lawrence's theory of the unconscious, the necessity of coming into "spontaneous being" through realization of the unconscious and through union with another, "two synchronizing activities" (*Psychoanalysis* 221).

Although Lawrence had talked about "blood consciousness" in *SCAL* and had experimented extensively with relationships in his narratives, he had never committed to writing a formal theoretical (what he might call "metaphysical" or "philosophical") statement on the unconscious and union until he wrote *Psychoanalysis*. It is early in this essay that Lawrence's first formal definition of the unconscious appears:

We have actually to go back to our own unconscious. But not the unconscious which is the inverted reflection of our ideal consciousness. We must discover, if we can, the true unconscious, where our life bubbles up in us, prior to any mentality. The first bubbling life in us, prior to any mentality. The first bubbling life in us, which is innocent of any mental alteration, this is the unconscious. It is pristine, not in any way ideal. It is the spontaneous origin from which it behoves [sic] us to live. (212)

Throughout *WIL*, Birkin is never able to formulate a formal definition like Lawrence's, indeed expressing his
inability to do so in conversation with Ursula, first in the "An Island" chapter when they have their initial discussion on love:

'One must throw everything away, everything--let everything go, to get the one last thing one wants,' he said.
'What thing?' she asked in challenge.
'I don't know--freedom together,' he said.

(132)

In the "Mino" chapter--the love-dialogue chapter--Birkin continues to express his uncertainty about what he is seeking, and in this dialogue glimmers of Lawrence's unconscious theory surface as Birkin stresses his concern with preserving his own and Ursula's individuality:

'. . . I don't know. At any rate, I don't feel the emotion of love for you--no, and I don't want to. Because it gives out in the last issues.' [Birkin]
'Love gives out in the last issues?' [Ursula; narration omitted]
'Yes, it does. At the very last, one is alone, beyond the influence of love. There is a real impersonal me, that is beyond love, beyond any emotional relationship. So it is with you. But we want to delude ourselves that love is the root. . . .' [Birkin] (145)

The narrator echoes Birkin's concerns with preserving the unconscious self later in the "Man to Man" chapter through Birkin's narrated musings: "And he wanted to be single in himself, the woman single in herself. . . . he wanted a further conjunction, where man had being and woman had being, two pure beings, each constituting the freedom of the other . . ." (199).

Although Lawrence continually discusses the unconscious
throughout *Psychoanalysis*, his next formal statement on the unconscious appears only three pages after the previously cited definition:

> We know [the unconscious] by direct experience. All the best part of knowledge is inconceivable. . . . Knowledge is always a matter of whole experience . . . and never a matter of mental conception merely. This is indeed the point of all full knowledge: that it is contained mainly within the unconscious, its mental or conscious reference being only a sort of extract or shadow. (215)

In WIL Birkin and the narrator are beginning to conceptualize Lawrence's preverbal, non-mental unconscious. Birkin, in the "An Island" chapter, after hedging Ursula's question, "But don't you think me good-looking?", roughly summarizes Lawrence's non-mental unconscious in his response to her query:

> I want to find you, where you don't know your own existence, the you that your common self denies utterly. But I don't want your good looks, and I don't want your womanly feelings, and I don't want your thoughts nor opinions nor your ideas—they are all bagatelles to me. (147)

Birkin is striving to find this unconscious state both in himself and in Ursula, and in the "Excurse" chapter the quest is finally realized. But in "Excurse" the narrator's utterances reify Lawrence's non-mental unconscious through descriptions of Ursula and Birkin's impending consummation—through an experience defined by its mindlessness and the knowledge of touch:

> She sat in a fulness and a pure potency that was like apathy, mindless and immobile. . . . she would touch the reality in him, the suave, pure, untranslateable reality. . . . To touch, mindlessly in darkness, to
come in pure touching upon the living reality of him
... And he, too. ... He knew her darkly, with the
fullness of dark knowledge. ... (319)

These examples clearly prefigure as well as reinforce
Lawrence's claim in *Psychoanalysis* that "[we] know [the
unconscious] by direct experience. All the best part of
knowledge is inconceivable" (215).

Even though the WIL dialogues and narration do not
present a formal definition of the unconscious, as do the
essays, nevertheless WIL does begin to formulate Lawrence's
conception of the unconscious as Birkin and Ursula quest for
an ideal relationship. Lawrence extends their quest by
defining the ideal union in his essays.

For the end, the goal is the perfecting of each
single individuality, unique in itself - which cannot
take place without a perfected harmony between the
beloved, a harmony which depends on the at-last-
clarified singleness of each being, a singleness
equilibrizased, polarized in one by the counter-posing
singleness of the other. *Psychoanalysis* (222,
emphasis added)

Birkin's discussion of union in the "Mino" chapter
closely paraphrases Lawrence's ideal union of equilibrium
expressed in the preceding excerpt from *Psychoanalysis*.
Although not verbatim, Birkin captures the essay's
significant idea of "singleness equilibrizased, polarized" in
union when he tells Ursula:

What I want is a strange conjunction with you
... not meeting and mingling;--you are quite
right:--but an equilibrizum, a pure balance of two
single beings:--as the stars balance each other.
(148, emphasis added)
Later in "Mino" Birkin again explains:

[It] is the law of creation. One is committed. One must commit oneself to a conjunction with the other--forever. But it is not selfless--it is a maintaining of the self in mystic balance and integrity--like a star balanced with another star. (152)

Lawrence's simultaneous "singleness" and "conjunction" agrees with Lacan's theory "that all notions of selfhood must be seen with two facts in mind: inevitable inequality (difference) and unavoidable singleness (utter oneness)" (Jewinski 9).

Albeit a suspended moment in the novel, Ursula and Birkin do fulfill their ideal union in "Excurse," expressed through the narrator's deliberate delivery of their consummation. First, the narrator anticipates their soon-to-be consummation as a union of equilibrium. Although not so definitive as Birkin's explanation or Lawrence's, nonetheless the narrator is experimenting with this idea in anticipation of their consummation and of the essays, in an effort to define an ideal union through Ursula and Birkin.

He knew her darkly, with the fulness of dark knowledge. Now she would know him, and he too would be liberated. He would be ... steadfast in perfectly suspended equilibrium, pure mystic nodality of physical being. They would give each other this star-equilibrium which alone is freedom. (319)

Even before "Excurse" the narrator discusses equilibrium in a didactic passage represented as Birkin's meditations, but it is clearly the narrator who is strongly asserting these ideas about a sexual union that "[leaves]
two single beings, constellated together like two stars," that is "the perfection of the polarised sex-circuit" (201). It is also the narrator who warns against "the horrible merging, mingling self-abnegation of love" (201). (See ch. 2 above, pp. 43 & 45.)

Lawrence's fiction had always been preoccupied with relationships, but in WIL Lawrence's search for the ideal relationship becomes more deliberate than in his previous narratives. By the time he wrote WIL, Lawrence was examining two opposing relationships. The opposing couples, however, were simply a means for Lawrence to explore the theory he was to express more comprehensively in the essays, but the couples are not a definitive representation of success or failure in the novel. In an effort to identify the criteria of a successful union, Lawrence was examining a failed relationship through Gerald/Gudrun and a potentially ideal one through Ursula/Birkin.

Through the narrator in "Excurse," Lawrence begins to define his ideal of the unconscious and union with another, manifesting the beginnings of his theory in Birkin and Ursula's actual consummation. Birkin and Ursula do not sustain this ideal beyond "Excurse"'s end, but embodied in their momentary union is Lawrence's ideal union. Of less significance to this study is Lawrence's inability to find resolution in the novel. More significant is the way he used the two couples to explore his ideal theory articulated.
later in his essays—an ideal not fully achieved by
characters in the novel, but only manifested temporarily in
Ursula and Birkin's consummation as expressed through the
narrator's voice.

[He] gathered her to him. . . . his fingers upon
her unrevealed nudity . . . never to be seen with the
eye, or known with the mind, only known as a palpable
revelation of living otherness.

[She] touched, she received the maximums [sic]
of unspeakable communication in touch . . . the
reality of that which can never be known . . . never
be transmuted into mind content. . . . For she was
to him what he was to her, the immemorial
magnificence of mystic, palpable, real otherness.

(320)

Of further significance are the parallels in language
between WIL and the essays. The diction used in both
Birkin's and the narrator's discussions of union, such as
"equilibrium," "polarized-circuit," and "singleness,"
certainly affirms Lawrence's deliberate development of these
ideas in the novel. Clearly Lawrence had begun developing
his ideas of the unconscious and union in WIL.

By the time Lawrence wrote his second essay, Fantasia,
a few months after completing Psychoanalysis, he began to
explore the implications of his theory of the unconscious
and union with another. In this second essay, he discusses
the differences between the ideal union and those unions
that fail, in much the same way he compares Ursula and
Birkin to Gerald and Gudrun in WIL. Lawrence develops the
contrast particularly in his examination of sexual
consummation. The following excerpts from Fantasia sound
like a replay of the opposing consummations portrayed in the "Excurse" and "Death and Love" chapters:

In the act of coition . . . the two individuals . . . clash into oneness. A great flash of interchange occurs, like an electrical spark or like lightning out of the densely surcharged clouds. . . . and then the tension passes.

The two individuals are separate again. . . . The air is as it were new, fresh, tingling with newness. So is the blood of man and woman after successful coition. After a false coition like prostitution, there is not newness but a certain disintegration.

And again in the last chapter of Fantasia the metaphor is reiterated:

But the main thing, as in the thunder-storm, is the absolute renewal of the atmosphere in this case, the blood . . . . And in this renewal lies the great magic of sex. . . . And the only possible means of relief and renewal is in pure passional interchange . . . . . . . Sex passion as a goal itself always leads to tragedy. . . . a slow humiliation and sterility. (187-188)

These descriptions resemble the narrator's references to each couple after consummation (see ch. 2 above, pp. 48-49, 55-56). Birkin and Ursula are described as reborn creatures. Birkin "was as if born out of the cramp of a womb" (311), "as if he had just come awake, like a thing that is born . . . into a new universe" (312). And Ursula "was beautiful as a new marvellous flower opened" (313), "an essential new being . . . quite free . . . in complete ease, her complete self" (314). At chapter's end, Birkin and
Ursula "slept the chilly night through under the hood of the
car, a night of unbroken sleep" (320).

Conversely, Gerald and Gudrun are described in fatal
terms after their consummation. Gudrun "felt as if she were
captured at last by fate, imprisoned in some horrible and
fatal trap" (325); "She died a little death" (329); "She
sipped the poison" (329). As for Gerald, "A dangerous
resolve formed in his heart. . . . He would not go back to-
night till he had come to her, if it cost him his life. He
staked his all on his throw" (339). Unlike Ursula and
Gerald's "night of unbroken sleep," Gerald slept "the sleep
of complete exhaustion," while "Gudrun lay wide awake,
destroyed into perfect consciousness. She lay wide awake,
destroyed into perfect consciousness" (345).

The narrator's description of Gerald and Gudrun
certainly reflects Lawrence's argument in the preceding
Fantasia excerpt that "a false coition" brings
disintegration and that "[sex] passion as a goal itself"
leads to "humiliation and sterility." This destructive
outcome is reiterated further in other parts of Fantasia:
"The passions or desires which are thought born are deadly"
(85); "It is all will, the fatal love-will . . . only
deadly exaggerated volition" (80, Lawrence's emphasis). For
Ursula and Birkin, the narrator recites a litany of positive
descriptions in "Excurse" that reinforce Fantasia's refrains
of renewal: "new, fresh, tingling with newness," "changed
and renewed, refreshed, almost re-created."

In addition to examining parallels between WIL and the essays—how WIL's narration and dialogue reflect Lawrence's earlier conceptual stages of his unconscious and union theory—it is also important to examine the rhetorical parallels between Lawrence's fiction and non-fiction as well as between the two essays.

*Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious,* written a few months before *Fantasia of the Unconscious,* is a more straightforward expository statement than the later *Fantasia.* In *Psychoanalysis,* Lawrence's goal is to expose what he considers the evils of Freudian psychoanalysis and its oedipal argument. He also wants to replace these Freudian tenets with his own theory of the unconscious. As in his fiction, his goal is moral: to reveal "the moral dilemma of psychoanalysis" and to help "us" readers "recover our moral footing" via his gospel of the unconscious and union\(^{10}\) (*Psychoanalysis* 205 & 209). His text is diagnostic and prescriptive—he analyzes the problems and proposes the solutions—and he assumes an assertive didactic posture, much as Birkin does when he proclaims his ideas and much as WIL's narrator does when he makes didactic pronouncements.

Nevertheless, after the poor reception that *Psychoanalysis* received, Lawrence found it necessary to expand his original treatise and to elaborate extensively his ideas on the unconscious, quadrupling its length in his
second essay, Fantasia. Fantasia then becomes a pseudo-scientific tract in which Lawrence systematizes his theories and attempts to create a science of body centers (lightly discussed in the first essay) as a means of connection between the individual and the external universe, in particular between the individual and others. More important, in Psychoanalysis Lawrence simply "has the answers," whereas in Fantasia he moves beyond his basic theory of the unconscious by exploring the implications of his theory for life's many relationships—education, child rearing, marriage, gender roles, cosmology, sleep and dreams—all to further illustrate and make more convincing his theory of human development.

In spite of his efforts, Lawrence tells nothing new about unconscious development and union in this second essay. Most of Fantasia's additions are simply expansions of the theory already established in Psychoanalysis, expansions that do not add significant new information to the core of Lawrence's theory, and expansions that sometimes become digressions. However, reading Fantasia reveals more than merely an expansion of Psychoanalysis. A rhetorical examination of these two essays reveals striking differences between them, differences that further clarify Lawrence's role as author of the psychology essays and of WIL.

The significant difference between the two essays is
found not so much in their content as in their style and structure. Lawrence does not say different things in both essays; he says the same things differently in each. It is not the "what" of these essays, but the "how" that affects the reader. Lawrence creates a significantly different persona in Fantasia than in Psychoanalysis. By Fantasia, the writer's voice and the tone of the text have altered considerably. According to Evelyn J. Hinz in her article on the psychology essays, the differences in style and structure are so significant that "not only must Fantasia be viewed as a new statement rather than as a re-statement but also that it must be viewed as a different kind of work from Psychoanalysis" (252, Hinz's emphasis). She describes the change from the first essay to the second as a movement from "an empirical" to "a poetic methodology," from "an analytic" to "an archetypal approach to the unconscious" (252).

Another assessment of the two essays can be found in D. H. Lawrence's Non-fiction. David Ellis agrees that "[it] is important not to lump the two psychology books together: they do have a different character," yet he claims "the link with the earlier [essay] is nevertheless maintained. In matters other than scope, Fantasia is much less of a departure than it tends at first to seem" (83-84). He further explains that after the unfavorable reception received by the first essay, Psychoanalysis, Lawrence wrote in a different style and voice in the second essay,
**Fantasia:** "Patronizing yet defensive." This change in persona evolved as a result of Lawrence's "unease about his readership" (72).

In this second essay Lawrence is much more verbose, yet unsure of himself much like Birkin "the word-bag" of *WIL*. Lawrence's persona shifts from the authoritative spokesperson in *Psychoanalysis* to the more defensive, self-conscious speaker in *Fantasia*. Indeed a tentativeness plagues this text. This is the most significant characteristic of the second essay. Often when making an assertion, Lawrence will qualify his statement, undercut it, and when he does this, he appears to be second guessing himself. At these times Lawrence's response is much like Birkin's when Ursula pushes him to prove himself further in their dialogues (see above, pp. 21-23). By contrast in *Psychoanalysis*, where Lawrence completes the explorations that he began in *WIL*, he unhesitatingly develops a comprehensive statement of his theory of the unconscious and union. There is no questioning of or experimenting with ideas in this essay as Lawrence had done in the novel. Both the unconscious and union with the other are defined and articulated in a straightforward, declarative fashion. First Lawrence speaks in the third person to elaborate, explain, and educate readers regarding his theories. Then Lawrence uses the first person "we" to instruct the reader, as well as to suggest an affinity with the reader. This
strategy is reminiscent of WIL's narrator who assumes the same posture when speaking in the first person plural, specifically in the "Man to Man" and "Sunday Evening" chapters (see above, pp. 38-39, 45-46).

Also important is the tone. Embodied in Psychoanalysis is the voice of a confident advocate who is convinced of the value of realizing one's "pristine unconscious" through "union with another." Lawrence is at home with his ideas, convinced of their worth, and eager to pass them on to a world he, like Birkin and the narrator of WIL, finds weary of isolation and mechanization.

Lawrence has already arrived at his conclusions by the time he writes Psychoanalysis and is ready to declare them without hesitation or questioning. He is making direct affirmative statements, statements in which his "we" does far more than presume alliance with his readers. By virtue of his lack of hesitancy, he presumes consensus from his readers.

Psychoanalysis has sprung many surprises on us, performed more than one volte-face before our indignant eyes. No sooner had we got used to the psychiatric quack who vehemently demonstrated the serpent of sex coiled round the root of all our actions, no sooner had we begun to feel honestly uneasy about our lurking complexes, than lo and behold the psychoanalytic gentleman reappeared on the stage with a theory of pure psychology. (201)

The essay's opening immediately asserts an a priori argument assuming a community of believers. Lawrence creates this illusion at once, integrating his "we's" and his "our's"
with his third person indictment against psychoanalysis as though he were truly partaking in a dialogue with others who share similar beliefs. But Lawrence is the only one speaking, and there is no dialogue occurring between Lawrence and any other.

Four paragraphs later in this first chapter, "Psychoanalysis vs Morality," Lawrence forcefully states his case with no hesitation:

First and foremost the issue is a moral issue. It is not here a matter of reform, new moral values. It is the life or death of all morality. The leaders among the psychoanalysts know what they have in hand. Probably most of their followers are ignorant, and therefore pseudo-innocent. But it all amounts to the same thing. Psychoanalysis is out, under a therapeutic disguise, to do away entirely with the moral faculty in man. Let us fling the challenge and then we can take sides in all fairness. (202)

Out of the eight sentences in the preceding citation, seven are third person statements outlining the sorry state of psychoanalysis; these seven are then highlighted by the paragraph's closing sentence, a challenge addressed to the reader in the first person plural voice. First Lawrence cleverly states his case in the third person as if it were simple fact, then personally engages readers to act on this indisputed fact with his first person plural voice in the last sentence. This same pattern can be seen interacting among the opening paragraphs of the essay as well: Lawrence's effective blend of his third person voice that instructs authoritatively with his first person plural voice
that presumes allegiance from his readership.

Further illustration of this pattern is exemplified in a six paragraph sequence beginning with the paragraph cited above. The second paragraph that follows also opens in the third person: "The psychoanalytic leaders know what they are about," and the paragraph continues with more third person indictments against psychoanalysis, also asserted as established fact. Lawrence then feigns a receptive audience by closing the paragraph with: "[We] hear the dull rumble of the incipient avalanche" and "We are in for a debacle" (202). These two third person paragraphs each close with a "we" statement that presumes a connection between reader and writer. A paragraph then follows that builds on this connection by drawing the reader into the good fight through its abundant use of the first person plural voice:

But at least let us know what we are in for. If we are to rear a serpent against ourselves, let us at least refuse to nurse it in our temples or to call it the cock of Aesculapius. It is time the white garb of the therapeutic cant was stripped of the psychoanalyst. And now that we feel the strange crackling convulsion in our moral foundations, let us at least look at the house which we are bringing down over our heads so blithely. (202)

Standing alone the third paragraph serves to reinforce the claims made in the two preceding third person paragraphs by pulling the reader into the argument in the same way that the individual closing "we" statements of each preceding paragraph have created consensus for each paragraph's individual argument.
The fourth paragraph again pulls the reader to Lawrence's view by its opening first person plural announcement: "Long ago we watched in frightened anticipation when Freud set out" (202). Having designed an artificial audience of participants through his deceptive "we watched [Freud]," Lawrence then embarks on a rambling two-paragraph myth about Freud, all in third person statements presented as truth. The final sixth paragraph, following Lawrence's third person narrative on Freud, reinforces the "we watched" theme in its opening sentence: "With dilated hearts we watched Freud..." (202-203).

Lawrence has purposely sequenced his pronouns both within the individual paragraphs as well as in the overall arrangement of the six paragraphs collectively. From informing readers through seemingly established third person statements of fact, Lawrence builds his argument by feigning a dialogue between himself and readers, first through direct address in the first person plural voice, and finally, through his forceful use of "we" statements that have the rhetorical power to draw readers into moral certitude with him.

Lawrence's narrator uses this same strategy of intermingling pronouns in the "Man to Man" and "Sunday Evening" WIL chapters (see above, pp. 37-39, 45-46). In each chapter, the narrator first presents Birkin's and Ursula's views respectively in third person statements that
within the context of the narrative can be accepted by the reader as the character's thoughts—as established fact. From there the narrator launches into the persuasive "we" voice presenting a philosophy that belongs to the narrator, not to the characters. Here too the rhetorically effective first person plural voice serves to create a pseudo-connection between the reader and the text. The narrator assumes a solitary didactic posture like Lawrence's in Psychoanalysis, but there is no real audience as there is in Fantasia where Lawrence is responding to critics' assessment of Psychoanalysis (to be discussed later in this chapter) or as there is in WIL where Birkin must respond to Ursula.

The interacting of these two voices continues throughout Psychoanalysis. Again in his "we" voice, Lawrence immediately rouses the reader at the beginning of Chapter Two to find a new way, one better than Freudian psychoanalysis has offered: "It is obvious we cannot recover our moral footing until we can in some way determine the true nature of the unconscious" (209, emphasis added). Having established his imaginary community of moral consentors in Chapter One, Lawrence is now setting up his readers, getting them ready to accept his definition of the unconscious, which will be another third person recitation. Lawrence's definition of the unconscious serves as a base from which his theory of union springs and, ultimately, the union of Ursula and Birkin in WIL.
The word unconscious itself is a mere definition by negation and has no positive meaning. Freud no doubt prefers it for this reason. He rejects subconscious and preconscious, because both [terms] would imply a sort of nascent consciousness, the shadowy consciousness which precedes mental realization. (209, Lawrence's emphases)

By this point, only eight lines into the second chapter of his essay, Lawrence has set the stage for his definition of the unconscious—the task at hand for chapter two and the essence of the essay.

In the following three pages, he further sets the stage by showing that Freud's unconscious is mentally derived, thus "[the] incest motive is a logical deduction of human reason" (210). After only three pages, and mostly through a deceptively simple rhetorical technique, Lawrence has established a captive audience, if not one ready to accept his theory of the unconscious. He accomplishes this mainly through the use of pronouns and by pronoun placement: on the one hand by strong third person assertions and on the other by insistent first person plural statements, always directly addressing his readers while presenting his case. And finally he states his case for the unconscious in full:

... We have actually to go back to our own unconscious. But not to the unconscious which is the inverted reflection of our ideal consciousness. We must discover, if we can, the true unconscious, where our life bubbles up in us, prior to any mentality. The first bubbling life in us, which is innocent of any mental alteration, this is the unconscious. It is pristine, not in any way ideal. It is the spontaneous origin from which it behoves us to live. (212) [intervening paragraph omitted]

... And where life begins the unconscious also
begins. But mark, the first naked unicellular organism is an individual. It is a specific individual, not a mathematical unit, like a unit of force. (212-213)

Where the individual begins, life begins. The two are inseparable, life and individuality. And also, where the individual begins, the unconscious, which is the specific life-motive, also begins . . . (213, Lawrence's emphasis)

[two intervening paragraphs omitted]

... By the unconscious we wish to indicate that essential unique nature of every individual creature, which is, by its very nature, unanalysable, undefinable, inconceivable. It cannot be conceived, it can only be experienced in every single instance. And being inconceivable, we will call it the unconscious. As a matter of fact, soul would be a better word. By the unconscious we do mean soul. But the word soul has been vitiated by the idealistic use, until nowadays it means only that which a man conceives himself to be. And that which a man conceives himself to be is something far different from his true unconscious. So we must relinquish the idea [ideal] word soul. (214-215, Lawrence's emphasis)

In three pages packed with continuous definition and discussion of the necessity of returning to the unconscious as the source of life, Lawrence has invited readers to regain a Utopian state that will carry them through all of life's experiences. Presumably, his audience is to be captured by the rhetoric and swept up in the romantic notion of returning to their very own selves, the true source of life and knowledge. If Lawrence were simply using the instructive third person, readers could not be drawn in personally to his argument: his "we's" bid "us" to enter his world of ideas, to accept his salvation of the unconscious, or at least to ponder it as a possibility in "our" lives. Lawrence's rhetorical strategies are surely
seductive, and, at the least, can tempt "us" into accepting his "pristine unconscious," or rather, "our" "pristine unconscious."

By the time he writes the last chapter of the essay, he can indulge himself, and "us," finally in a full third-person pronouncement that summarizes his theory of the unconscious.

Thus it would seem that the term unconscious is only another word for life. But life is a general force, whereas the unconscious is essentially single and unique in each individual organism; it is the active, self-evolving soul bringing forth its own incarnation and self-manifestation. Which incarnation and self-manifestation seems to be the whole goal of the unconscious soul: the whole goal of life. Thus it is that the unconscious brings forth not only consciousness, but tissue and organs also. (242)

Also by Chapter Five's end (immediately preceding the above citation), Lawrence's full third person pronouncements sum up his theory of union--body centers and all.

Thus the first plane of the upper consciousness - the out-going, the sheer and unspeakable bliss of the sense of union, communion, at-oneness with the beloved - and then the complementary objective realization of the beloved, the realization of that which is apart, different. This realization is like riches to the objective consciousness. It is, as it were, the adding of another self to the own self, through the mode of apprehension . . .

[two intervening paragraphs omitted]

The goal of life is the coming to perfection of each single individual. This cannot take place without the tremendous interchange of love from all the four great poles of the first, basic field of consciousness. There must be the twofold passionate flux of sympathetic love, subjective-abdominal and objective-devotional, both. And there must be the twofold passional circuit of separatist realization, the lower, vital self-realization, and the upper, intense realization of the other, a realization which includes a recognition of abysmal otherness . . .
It is important to note in the preceding essay citations that once Lawrence engages in an extended recitation of his theories, he leaves the "we" address behind as he forges into his earnest avowal of life, of his theory.

Lawrence has created a specious audience in *Psychoanalysis*, a specious "we." Like the narrator in WIL, Lawrence is a solitary speaker in the first essay. In *Psychoanalysis*—unlike the novel's dialogue where characters, particularly Ursula and Birkin, are forced to interact with one another and unlike *Fantasia* where Lawrence is responding to the critics of *Psychoanalysis*—there is no such "other" with whom Lawrence is engaging. In *Psychoanalysis* Lawrence is proclaiming his beliefs independently and creating an imaginary community of believers into which he deceptively pulls the reader through his use of "we."

Although he follows a similar strategy in WIL's narration, the narrator's ideal claims can be more readily questioned by the action of the novel, the real experience of life. But in non-fiction, in *Psychoanalysis* specifically, there is only theory, no experience. Here Lawrence could finally outline his ideal theory without interruption. At the same time Lawrence could make readers a part of his "we" discussion, thus creating an illusion of participation in a dialogue that does not in fact exist in
this text. By the time Lawrence writes Fantasia, there is "another" to whom he responds, the critics of Psychoanalysis.

More defensive and self-conscious in his posture, Lawrence seems to be struggling to prove himself in the second essay, to justify his theory, a position he did not assume in the first essay. In the process, he sounds discomfited, and his uneasiness is reflected in the rhetoric of Fantasia. In this second essay, a different voice can be heard and a different tone experienced--one that is cynical, even mocking. When forced to confront his claims, to justify them for an unsympathetic audience, something interesting happens to Lawrence. Uncomfortable, perhaps, with his own seriousness and his own intensity, he does not mock only those readers who cannot understand his theory, but he mocks himself as well. In spite of his self-conscious, defensive posture that can dislodge the reader, Lawrence still makes his pronouns work for him in this second essay, including his new "I" voice that enters the text.

The most radical change that occurs from Psychoanalysis to Fantasia is Lawrence's overt use of the first person singular and his blatant, often facetious, apostrophes. Although he occasionally departs from "we" to "I" in Psychoanalysis, one has to search extensively for the pronominal shift from the inclusive "we" to the exclusive
"I" in his first essay. But by *Fantasia*, the "I" screams from the pages, betraying a hyper self-conscious speaker in Lawrence.

In spite of the first person singular intrusions, Lawrence still retains both his plural first person "we" and his instructive third person from the first essay, but at times they lose some of their persuasive power as they are diluted by his personal entrance into the dialogue. Later in the essay they become secondary to his new, inflated "I am I" persuasive strategy.

Nevertheless, the shift of "we" to "I" from *Psychoanalysis* to *Fantasia* is significant. Lawrence's first person singular voice in this second essay serves a deliberate rhetorical function. Not only does Lawrence's "I" stand out in the second essay, but it is present immediately to the reader in *Fantasia*’s Foreword. Here Lawrence engages in direct dialogue with his readership and direct confrontation with his critics. He begins his second essay:

> The present book is a continuation from *Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious*. The generality of readers had better just leave it alone. The generality of critics likewise. I really don't want to convince anybody. It is quite in opposition to my whole nature. I don't intend my books for the generality of readers. I count it a mistake of our mistaken democracy that every man who can read print is allowed to believe that he can read all that is printed. I count it a misfortune that serious books are exposed in the public market, like slaves exposed naked for sale. But there we are, since we live in an age of mistaken democracy, we must go through with it.
I warn the generality of readers, that this present book will seem to them only a rather more revolting mass of wordy nonsense than the last. I would warn the generality of critics to throw it in the waste paper basket without more ado.

As for the limited few, in whom one must perforce find an answerer, I may as well say straight off that I stick to the solar plexus. That statement alone, I hope, will thin their numbers considerably.

Finally, to the remnants of a remainder, in order to apologize for the sudden lurch into cosmology, or cosmogony, in this book, I wish to say that the whole thing hangs inevitably together. I am not a scientist. I am an amateur of amateurs. As one of my critics said, you either believe or you don't. (11)

Of the seventeen sentences that comprise the first four paragraphs of Lawrence's Foreword, over half bear "I" as their subject. Defensive, even facetious, Lawrence's voice is forcibly asserted in this opening statement, and his "I" is pronounced. It is clear that Lawrence is speaking, and not a distanced representation of Lawrence.

In these opening paragraphs, Lawrence creates an exclusive audience for himself through his "I" voice and through direct address. Lawrence dismisses immediately "the generality of readers" and "the generality of critics" in his first sentences. Through these opening statements, in his use of the first person singular, as a speaker in a dialogue with others, Lawrence becomes visible—something he did not do in the first essay.

By virtue of his "I" statements that reject the majority of readers as his audience, Lawrence is cleverly creating another imaginary audience for this essay. He is
defining an exclusive, elitist audience—the chosen few readers who are capable of understanding his message. To make membership in this select group seem real, Lawrence reverts back to the inclusionary "we" of Psychoanalysis in the closing sentence of this essay's first paragraph, enticing readers not only into membership but also into agreement. The second paragraph reinforces the opening paragraph's first sentences by reiterating his exclusion of the majority, again through his direct address to the "generality" of readers and critics.

In Fantasia's two opening paragraphs, Lawrence's "I" works in the same way that his third person did in the first essay—to establish an a priori argument, in this case, the existence of incapable readers. Both his direct address and his "we's" then draw readers in, who, if they are to consider themselves part of the chosen readership, must therefore agree with Lawrence's premise. Again through pronoun use and placement Lawrence can draw readers into his audience and ultimately into agreement with his argument. But in Fantasia Lawrence's "I's" make him the visible speaker who takes responsibility for the assertions, whereas in Psychoanalysis Lawrence hides behind his "we" assertions.

Although Lawrence becomes visible through his "I" voice in this second essay, he also uses the first person singular as a manipulative, rhetorical strategy that allows him not only to win connection and consensus from the "few," but to
give his defense credibility against the critics who rejected the first essay. Thus Lawrence's response at once excludes and includes. Fantasia's third and fourth paragraphs' direct addresses, "the limited few" and "the remnants of a remainder," function like the "we" of Psychoanalysis. They establish connection between reader and writer before Lawrence launches into his belief system (several paragraphs) as a prelude to the essay itself. Having drawn readers into his circle, he can now present his views as established fact. As in the first essay, here Lawrence's pronoun selection and direct addresses are strategically placed within and among paragraphs in persuasive progression in an attempt to win his readers' consensus.

In spite of the profusion of "I" throughout this "Foreword," Lawrence engages readers in the closing peroration to his Foreword, abruptly shifting to a predominant first person plural voice, then closing with the third person and his solipsistic "I" in the very last paragraph.

... Our vision, our belief, our metaphysic is wearing woefully thin, and the art is wearing absolutely threadbare. We have no future; neither for our hopes nor our aims nor our art. It has all gone grey and opaque.

We've got to rip the old veil of a vision across, and find what the heart really believes in after all: and what the heart really wants, for the next future. And we've got to put it down in terms of belief and of knowledge. And then go forward again, to the fulfilment [sic] in life and art.

Rip the veil of the old vision across, and walk
through the rent. And if I try to do this - well, why not? If I try to write down what I see - why not? If a publisher likes to print a book - all right. And if anybody wants to read it, let him. But why anybody should read one single word if he doesn't want to, I don't see. Unless of course he is a critic who needs to scribble a dollar's worth of words, no matter how. (15-16)

Lawrence effectively uses the possessive third person, plural in the first paragraph to create further consensus from his established audience. Not only does he summarize his moral mission as an artist, but he makes his mission a shared cause: "our vision," "our belief," "our metaphysic," "our hopes," "our aims," "our art." In the first paragraph, Lawrence has designed a mutual cause that prepares the reader for his call-to-arms, "we've got to," of the second paragraph. Additionally, in this closing sequence to the Foreword, Lawrence first establishes himself as a credible speaker by making his moral concerns the reader's in order to at once justify his facetious response to the critics in the closing paragraph and to win consensus for the essay that follows. In this example, Lawrence has cleverly used his "we's" and "our's" to create an audience who will be receptive to the second essay.

Ellis's explanation of the Foreword's origin is most telling:

These hostile preliminaries become more understandable when one discovers that they were once not preliminary at all but the continuation of 'An Answer to Some Critics' (Lawrence's initial sub-title for his 'Foreword'), the first, major part of which Seltzer declined to publish. In September 1921 he had sent Lawrence a score of reviews of
Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious, to which the original opening of Fantasia is a relatively detailed response. (72)

Hinz explains Lawrence's negative response to his readership in another way:

[The] negative appeal to a few fit readers can be viewed as something more than a peevish reaction to the critical fate of Psychoanalysis. (258)

But his argument is not that the majority cannot read, i.e., are insensitive, but that the average man should not read: the first is the typical defensive complaint of the misunderstood writer, but the second is a statement of principle. . .one of the central themes of Fantasia. (258)

Considering Ellis's explanation of the critical background that evoked such "hostile preliminaries" makes Lawrence's design in creating a new audience all the more noteworthy. In spite of his facetious tone and his blatant presence in the dialogue of the Foreword, Lawrence was still clever enough to evoke a sympathetic audience through what Hinz defines as "a statement of principle." By arguing "that the average man should not read," Lawrence invites readers to join the elitist audience of capable readers and he wins a constituency for himself in an effort to bridge the chasm left by critics. In this way Lawrence can engage himself more readily with his newly established, receptive audience rather than directly addressing the critics' concerns, thereby giving himself more latitude to expound and justify his theory in the second essay.

In his article "D. H. Lawrence and the Fantasias of Consciousness," John B. Vickery considers Lawrence's
approach to his readership through a study of persuasion and engagement:

The nervy dissonance of this sort of language is clearly designed to galvanise the reader not only into a state of alert attention and active involvement but also into a process of individual thoughtfulness rather than the customary thinking based on habit and learned conceptual responses. At first sight, it appears to be the antithesis of the rhetoric of persuasion, but on closer inspection it does carry its own kind of persuasiveness. (172)

This "nervy dissonance" characterizes not only the foreword, but all of Fantasia, and Vickery's observation applies more to the essay as a whole (especially the "I am I" section to be discussed later) than to the Foreword specifically. Yet Lawrence does create "alert attention," "active involvement," and "individual thoughtfulness" in the Foreword by making readers a part of his "we," his unique circle, thereby distinguishing his audience from the "generality of readers" and the "generality of critics" that his "I" shuns. The foreword thus serves as a rhetorical prototype for the entire essay with its vacillation from "we" to "I," its intermittent defensive, mocking tone, and its sometimes biting direct-address.

Finally in Chapter Three Lawrence's use of "I" takes on a magnitude beyond the "I" of the preceding thirty-three pages--one that is sure to engage readers and one that buttresses his theory of the unconscious presented in his first essay.

At this point in Fantasia, readers can join Ursula by
saying, "[And] you go all this way round to [tell me]" (148), because it is here, after all of Lawrence's lengthy preliminaries, that the core of his theory of the unconscious is expressed, but in a way far different from the previous essay. Here Lawrence engages the first person singular in a sobering and persuasive style to capture "our" attention, as he eloquently pleads his case for the existence of the pre-mental unconscious state within each of "us."

The solar plexus, the greatest and most important centre of our dynamic consciousness, is a sympathetic centre. At this main centre of our first mind we know as we can never mentally know. Primarily we know, each man, each living creature knows, profoundly and satisfactorily and without question, that I am I. This root of all knowledge and being is established in the solar plexus; it is dynamic, pre-mental knowledge, such as cannot be transferred into thought. Do not ask me to transfer the pre-mental dynamic knowledge into thought. It cannot be done. The knowledge that I am I can never be thought: only known. (34, Lawrence's emphasis)

In spite of his third person syntax dealing with the solar plexus and fusion, Lawrence personalizes the unconscious with his "I am I" statements and his "we" and "our," more intimately involving the audience much as he has done in the Foreword's closing. Through this inclusionary tactic Lawrence not only creates agreement with his audience, but he also diminishes the voices of Psychoanalysis' critics by bringing his new audience to the fore.

His strategy in the second essay makes his newly
created audience more prominent, thus engaging readers more
directly and more persuasively than in the first essay.
Although his definition of the unconscious in *Psychoanalysis*
also incorporates the first person plural with third person
explanations, there is more distance between Lawrence and
the reader (see above, pp. 83-84). *Psychoanalysis'*
invitation to the reader to "know" the unconscious does not
hold the same certainty for the reader as *Fantasia*'
declaration does: "We must discover, if we can, the true
unconscious, where our life bubbles up in us, prior to any
mentality" (*Psychoanalysis* 212). Here the reader is given
urgency, but not hope. By *Fantasia* Lawrence includes the
reader with himself in his intimate "knowing" of the
unconscious: "Primarily we know, each man, each living
creature knows, profoundly and satisfactorily and without
question that I am I" (34, Lawrence's emphasis).

Not only does Lawrence include the reader in his
community of the ideal unconscious through his affirmative
"we know" in *Fantasia* versus his "[we] must discover, if we
can" in *Psychoanalysis*, but he ensures inclusion for his
readers through his "I am I" definition. Here his "I" takes
on a cosmic magnitude (Hinz 264), leaving behind Lawrence's
awkward and conspicuous "I" of the Foreword. Yet Lawrence
is still able to define in third person assertions his
criteria for the ideal unconscious--that it originates at
the solar plexus, that it is premental, and most important,
that it "can never be thought: only known." In just one paragraph Lawrence has accomplished a dual feat for Fantasia by making his definition of the unconscious believable both to and for the reader—all through effective use of his inclusionary "we" and introduction of his "I am I" proclamation.

The four paragraphs that follow further define the unconscious and its relationship to the primary body centers—the solar plexus and the lumbar ganglion—completely in third person syntax (with one exception), closing with repetitions of the engaging "I am I" in the fourth paragraph. By initially creating consensus in his first paragraph (cited above), Lawrence has created receptivity to his third person definition of the unconscious in the four paragraphs that follow. Again not only is pronoun choice key, but pronoun sequencing as well.

However, Lawrence has done far more than create consensus in his very first paragraph, he has created union, a union reminiscent of WIL's star equilibrium. Lawrence's "we's" at once create union between him and his readers, while his "I am I" creates "the other" by signifying the individual reader, separate from Lawrence the writer and separate from his audience of other individual readers. By the time Lawrence finishes his first paragraph defining the unconscious, he has already implied his theory of union with the other through his "we's" and "I am I," thus creating
affinity with readers as well as credibility for the second part of his theory in the sixth paragraph of this series. And as he moves from establishing the solar plexus as the source of "our" own unconscious selves, "our" own individuality in the first paragraph, he then establishes "our" connection with others, the second part of his theory, union with the other in the sixth paragraph.

But at the lumbar ganglion, which is the centre of separate identity, the knowledge is of a different mode, though the term is the same. At the lumbar ganglion I know that I am I, in distinction from a whole universe, which is not as I am. This is the first tremendous flash of knowledge of singleness and separate identity. I am I, not because I am at one with all the universe, but because I am other than all the universe. It is my distinction from all the rest of things which makes me myself. Because I am set utterly apart and distinguished from all that is the rest of the universe, therefore I am I. And this root of our knowledge in separateness lies rooted all the time in the lumbar ganglion. It is the second term of our dynamic psychic existence. (35-36)

Although the sixth paragraph does not define union directly or describe it in the experiential terms of consummation that WIL does, nevertheless the narrator's words in "Excurse" come to mind—the narrator's "palpable revelation of living otherness" that Birkin and Ursula discover in their union (320). And some four pages later by the end of Fantasia's Chapter Three, Lawrence summarizes his theory as it relates to the sympathetic and voluntary centers of the body, and as it relates to this theory of union: "Between the dark, glowing first term of knowledge at the solar plexus - I am I, all is one in me; and the
first term of volitional knowledge: *I am myself, and these others are not as I am - there is a world of difference*" (40, Lawrence's emphasis).

In this "I am I" portion of Fantasia Ellis's argument, that Lawrence uses the first person singular to demonstrate "his belief in the importance of an instinctive noncerebral relation with the outside world," becomes credible, but certainly not in the preceding pages where his "I" is of an altogether different character, "making the reader more aware of Lawrence as an individual and a writer" (75).

There is indeed a stark contrast between the first thirty-three pages of this essay and the ensuing third chapter, evidenced by the intermittent use of "I" and "we" throughout third person syntax in the first two chapters versus insertion of the persuasive "I am I" in the third chapter. Pronoun usage and order take on even more significance here as they operate not only within and among paragraphs, but also as they operate within and among chapters. Lawrence's solipsistic application of the first person singular in the first two chapters opposes a more powerful and persuasive 'I' in Lawrence's third chapter--what Hinz calls "the cosmic 'I'" (264). In this chapter Lawrence boldly proclaims "I am I" as a universal call to all of "us" readers to affirm "our" own individuality, "our" own unconscious, "our" own "spontaneous being."

The end of Chapter Three provides powerful closure for
his theory and for this second essay, unlike his actual
closing chapter some 150 pages later which leaves the reader
suspended and unresolved. Essentially Lawrence's essay is
complete after these first 41 pages, and everything else
that follows becomes anti-climactic, adding nothing new to
his theory. To explore these expansions and digressions
following Chapter Three, which make up the bulk of
Lawrence's second text, is too ambitious a project for the
confines of this study, nor would such an exploration add
anything of consequence to the argument presented here.

While Lawrence has uttered nothing new in Fantasia, he
has certainly argued for the case he presented in
Psychoanalysis, albeit sometimes a disconcerting argument.
In spite of these limitations, Lawrence has cleverly pled
his case for realization of the unconscious through union by
implementation of his rhetorically persuasive "I" in the
second essay. Equally important, the beginnings of these
arguments can been traced to WIL where Birkin and the
narrator begin Lawrence's exploration of the unconscious and
union theory.

Although Lawrence was able to realize the "struggle for
verbal consciousness" that he had begun in WIL through his
formal statement of theory in Psychoanalysis and Fantasia,
rhetorical examination of the essays shows that Lawrence was
engaged in another kind of "struggle for verbal
consciousness" in these nonfiction texts. This second
struggle is one of creating audience and consensus.

First in *Psychoanalysis* Lawrence expounds his theories but remains invisible to his audience. By avoiding the first person singular voice, Lawrence never enters into direct dialogue with his audience, and by making authoritative third person assertions, he maintains this distance. Further his deceptive use of "we" in the first essay does not create authentic union with his readers, but creates instead a pseudo union and a pseudo consensus.

Birkin behaves in a similar fashion in his dialogues with Ursula. He expounds his theories as established fact, more interested in gaining her agreement than in considering her views. Although she probes him throughout their discussions, an authentic exchange does not occur between them, as Birkin continually presses his view and maintains his separateness from Ursula.

Lawrence behaves similarly in *Psychoanalysis* where he expounds his theories in third person assertions apart from his audience. Like Birkin, Lawrence is convinced of the validity of his theories, seeking only consensus rather than genuine dialogue. However, Lawrence does create an imaginary union between himself and his readers and, ultimately, a feigned consensus through his rhetorically deceptive use of "we" in the first essay.

In his second essay Lawrence comes closer to achieving authentic union with an audience as well as the possibility
of genuine consensus. He achieves this by entering into a dialogue with his readers through his first person singular voice and his "I am I" assertions that carry the rhetorical potential of uniting his readers with him and to his theory. Although Lawrence is more conspicuous in his defensive, mocking tone in response to critics, his first person singular engagement in Fantasia makes him a visible speaker who can be reckoned with, thus creating more authentic union than in Psychoanalysis where Lawrence never becomes a live voice with whom an audience can engage, but remains invisible and distant. This didactic, distancing stance often taken by Lawrence has given credence to the charge by many that he wrote and thought from a solipsistic point of view.

Not directed to the essays specifically, but to Lawrence as a nonfiction writer in general, Ellis and Mills cite commentaries by Lawrence's contemporaries reflecting this widely held position. Jessie Chambers made the charge that "[as] an artist, when he is dealing with the immediate and concrete, he is superb, but when he assays to be a thinker I find him superficial and unconvincing, and quite soon boring" (2, Chambers quoted in Ellis and Mills).

"[And] Rebecca West's pronouncement . . . that what he wrote was true 'only of the universe within his own soul'" reflects the "alleged solipsism" often countered against Lawrence (3, West quoted in Ellis and Mills). Most biting
is T. S. Eliot's commonly quoted, smug indictment that Lawrence had "an incapacity for what we ordinarily call thinking" (3, Eliot quoted in Ellis and Mills). In contrast, F. R. Leavis has hailed Lawrence as a writer and as a thinker in what he himself identifies as "a long battle to win recognition for Lawrence, and to kill the currency of the grosser misconceptions and prejudices." (Novelist, intro., ix).

Whether reviewing Lawrence's fiction or nonfiction, the multitude of commentaries bear a common thread: they are responding to Lawrence's ideas. And these ideas have evoked opposing responses: "His detractors have accused him of stupid emotionalism, obsession with sex, anti-intellectualism; his supporters say he was truer to feeling than reason can be, treated sex as a religious activity, denied the mind its right to inhibit" (Miko 3). Critics have responded to Lawrence's thoughts as either the mark of a madman or the mark of a sheer genius, even a demigod. F.R. Leavis has been the prototype for proponents of Lawrencian thought, while T. S. Eliot has exemplified the opposition. However, at either extreme and in between, most critical response has evaluated Lawrence's views in and of themselves rather than the ways in which he expresses them. In addition such critical responses have privileged his fiction over his nonfiction, only considering the latter as a means of understanding the ideas that develop in his
narratives. Ellis's commentaries cited in the introduction to this study are worth considering again:

[ Critics ] have been happy enough to pillage both psychology books for resounding summaries of Lawrence's 'beliefs' but, considering how much has now been written on him, they have provided comparatively little appraisal of their character or worth and not much discussion of their relation to his other writings. (Ellis 69)

By moving beyond this limited view of Lawrence's psychology essays, first by tracing the rhetorical development of their ideas from WIL to the essays themselves, thus establishing WIL as the primary site of origin for the essays' ideas, and then by tracing the rhetorical development within the essays themselves, as well as the rhetorical progression that occurs from Psychoanalysis to Fantasia, this study has examined the rhetorical implications of the essays' strategical pronoun selection and placement.

Ultimately, when examining these essays, to seize the ideas expressed by Lawrence and to wrestle with them as his rhetoric tempts readers to do is not enough. Only by examining Lawrence's rhetoric and by moving beyond the ideas themselves to an examination of their varying modes of presentation, can we discover how his rhetoric evokes such powerful and opposing responses from critics.
Chapter Four

Artist - Thinker - Theorist

The purpose of this study has been twofold: (1) to reverse the prevailing critical use of Lawrence's nonfiction texts, specifically the psychology essays, as windows which permit us to see into his fiction and (2) to dispute Lawrence's claim in Fantasia's foreword that his theory of the unconscious and union evolved undeliberately and separately from his fiction. Clearly WIL's dialogues, narrative explication, structure, and diction show that Lawrence was consciously and purposefully developing his psychology theory in the novel. The novel does indeed represent Lawrence's "struggle for verbal consciousness." Examination of WIL's narration and dialogue has shown the beginnings of a struggle in this novel that was to be fully articulated later in Psychoanalysis and Fantasia. Lawrence's theories did not simply come "unwatched out of [his] pen"; they were not simply "inferences made afterwards, from the experience," from his fiction\(^\text{17}\) (Fantasia 15).

Lawrence had developed his idea that an artist's philosophy comes "unwatched out of [his] pen" long before writing his foreword to Fantasia. In Studies in Classical American Literature (both in the first version, written while he was writing WIL, and in the final version,
completed at the same time he was completing the psychology essays), Lawrence articulated his vision of authentic art:

But art-speech . . . is . . . the greatest universal language . . . Art-speech is also a language of pure symbols. But whereas the authorized symbol stands always for a thought or an idea, some mental concept, the art-symbol or art-term stands for a pure experience, emotional and passional, spiritual and perceptual, all at once. . . . Art-speech is a use of symbols which are pulsations on the blood . . . (The Symbolic Meaning 18-19, early version, Lawrence's emphasis)

The essential function of art is moral. . . . But a passionate, implicit morality, not didactic. A morality which changes the blood, rather than the mind. Changes the blood first. The mind follows later, in the wake. (SCAL 180, later version)

The artist usually sets out – or used to – to point a moral and adorn a tale. The tale, however, points the other way, as a rule. Two blankly opposing morals, the artist's and the tale's. Never trust the artist. Trust the tale. The proper function of a critic is to save the tale from the artist who created it. (SCAL 8, later version, emphasis added)

Lawrence's claim for a morality that changes the blood first and the mind later represents his vision of art both for the artist as well as for the critic-reader. First, Lawrence believed that the morality of the novel would be expressed through the artist, in spite of the artist's didactic intentions. He believed that "art speech"– the only medium of truth– never came from the artist, but from the tale. Further, he believed that "art speech" had the capacity to change the blood, not simply the mind, of the reader, again in spite of the artist's didactic intentions.
However, by following Lawrence's admonition to "never trust the artist" but to "[trust] the tale," this examination of WIL has shown that Lawrence's theories did not come "unwatched out of [his] pen" while he was writing the novel, nor were his theories simply "inferences made afterwards" in the essays. Instead it is now clear that Lawrence's theories were consciously articulated conceptions that began to take form in WIL some time before the essays were written. Lawrence's "mind" did not follow "later, in the wake": Lawrence was actively and consciously developing his theory while writing the novel. This study has been an effort "to save the [theory] from the [tale]" rather than an effort "to save the tale from the artist."

Any survey of Lawrence's writing, both his fiction and nonfiction texts, clearly attests to Lawrence's preoccupation with individual development through relationships--with the human dilemma of realizing intimacy with another while at the same time preserving one's individuality. From his earliest writings, Lawrence explores this conflict between the self and others. But now it can be argued that it is not until WIL and the psychology essays that he begins specifically and consciously to examine this dilemma in theoretical terms.

Before WIL Lawrence does explore relationships in his narratives, but never before WIL does he so specifically examine the reasons for failed relationships, nor does he
attempt to propose a formula for a successful relationship. In earlier narratives, Lawrence explores the problems of relationships and the internal struggles of his characters through narration and dialogue. However, these earlier characters do not discuss their relationships amongst themselves in an effort to define an ideal relationship as Ursula and Birkin do, nor do the earlier narrators articulate Lawrence's theory of the unconscious and union as WIL's narrator does. In Lawrence's earlier tales, enough is offered via narration and dialogue to aid readers in concluding why a particular relationship has failed, but there are no claims made for a relationship based on Lawrence's notion of "star-equilibrium." Nothing in the earlier fiction begins to resemble a theory of the unconscious and union as Lawrence theorizes in WIL or in Psychoanalysis and Fantasia.

By the time he writes WIL, Lawrence has moved beyond a novel of experience into a novel of exploration, wherein he begins to formulate his ideas about individual development via union with another. In WIL he offers a thoughtful examination of relationships through his opposing couples: Gerald and Gudrun's union represents the failure of an all-consuming fusion that destroys individuality, whereas Ursula and Birkin's union suggests a possible solution to the dilemma--"star-equilibrium"--the maintaining of "pure singleness" through union with the other. This purposeful
study of Gerald and Gurdrun's failed relationship and Ursula and Birkin's potentially successful relationship represents Lawrence's first attempt to theorize in his fiction.

Not only in his narratives did Lawrence explore the conflict between individual development and relationships. Lawrence was preoccupied with this paradox throughout his writings, and these ideas began to emerge in his earlier nonfiction texts, prior to WIL and prior to Psychoanalysis and Fantasia. Particularly noteworthy is Studies in Classical American Literature in which Lawrence did more than just assert his theory of art and review significant American artists. In the earliest version of this study, written at the same time he was writing WIL, kernels of Lawrence's theory of the unconscious and union appear, kernels that were to be more fully expressed later in WIL and elucidated even further in the psychology essays.

Amin Arnold points out that, in addition to critiquing American literature, Lawrence also attempted "to jot down reflections about his solar-plexus-theories" (The Symbolic Meaning 5-6). Lawrence began sketching out the unconscious and union in the earliest version of SCAL: "Our knowing is always secondary and subsequent to our being. . . ." (Symbolic 26); "Our ultimate attainment is in 'being'"--"pure reality lies . . . in the mystery of the perfect unique self" (Symbolic 49, Lawrence's emphasis); "Love is the mysterious force" that can lead to either "creative
conjunction" or "frictional disruption" (Symbolic 118); and in "The Two Principles" (an essay that never appeared in SCAL's final 1923 version), such terms as "duality," "polarity," "blood consciousness," "otherness," "sympathetic" and "voluntary" appear (Symbolic 186-189).

Arnold explains Lawrence's approach in these early versions:

Lawrence had originally planned to write purely literary essays which he would be able to use as lectures in America. But, as always with Lawrence, he had to write about the problems which occupied him most at the moment. And what really was on his mind in 1917-1918 was his "philosophy". [sic] (Symbolic 4-5)

These early musings emerge intermittently only in relationship to a particular artist or a particular work that Lawrence is reviewing. They are not central to Lawrence's discussion as they are in WIL and the psychology essays. This contrast between SCAL, WIL and finally the essays shows Lawrence's more deliberate and concerted effort to shape his ideas into a theoretical framework through the articulation of Birkin and the narrator in WIL and eventually through his own voice in Psychoanalysis and Fantasia.

In addition to reviewing Lawrence's own texts for this study, a survey of the critical canon has shown a preference for considering Lawrence's fiction as the core of Lawrence's ideas. The nonfiction texts, especially the psychology essays, are generally given secondary status and mentioned only in passing to explicate the meaning and significance of
his narratives.

On the other hand, critics such as Hinz, Ellis and Mills, and Vickery have considered the essays as artistic expressions in and of themselves—especially as expressions of Lawrence's art of persuasion. However, in these studies the essays are isolated. These critics take a narrow approach to Lawrence's rhetorical style and structure by not considering how the essays relate to the fiction. Other studies, such as Diane Bonds' and Daniel Schneider's, consider the essays from a particular point of view: Bonds in her linguistic evaluation of the texts and Schneider in his consideration of Lawrence's own psychology theories in terms of the thinkers who influenced them.

Besides reversing the order usually taken by critics, thus showing that Lawrence's WIL was a prelude to *Psychoanalysis* and *Fantasia*, this study has been an attempt to create a marriage between earlier critics who used the essays only as "a tissue of ideas" (Bonds 3) for the novels and those later critics who viewed the essays more specifically as a separate prose genre, one in which the linguistic signs of Lawrencian thought operate solely as a means of rhetorical persuasion. While such studies have value in and of themselves for particular aspects of Lawrencian rhetoric, Lawrence's writing and his thoughts as a whole are more complex than any one study can reveal. By considering the theories of unconscious and union as well as
their rhetorical expression, both in his fiction and his nonfiction, the reader/critic can understand more clearly the developing theory from one genre to the other and see more clearly Lawrence's evolving dialogue within himself as well as with his audience. It is never enough to explore simply what Lawrence had to say, in order to agree or disagree with him. It is instead part of the critical task to examine how what-is-being-said has been said. Lawrence was acutely conscious of how he presented his ideas—his rhetoric, his voice, his tone, his style—and reader/critics fail to acknowledge his craft as a writer if they do not examine and appreciate how he presented his thoughts in print.19

The essays' poor contemporay reception and the limited attention that subsequent scholars have given them (considering them only as aids to comment on Lawrence's fiction) reflect the prevailing preference for fiction as the superior form of discourse. This condescending attitude may also reveal these readers' uneasiness with Lawrence's multiple voices in the essays, his often sarcastic attitude towards his audience, and his esoteric, almost mythological presentation of his ideas. Paradoxically, these are the very components that make the essays worth studying. To limit critical attention and give priority to the fiction not only overlooks the richness of rhetorical play in these nonfiction pieces, but moreover, overlooks their beginnings
in the novel. The psychology essays are not afterthoughts to the novels; they have evolved through time from their beginnings in the fiction. *Women in Love* is the site where Lawrence began consciously to formulate his theory of the unconscious and union. In *Women in Love* Lawrence began his "struggle for verbal consciousness" that would finally be realized fully in *Psychoanalysis* and *Fantasia*. 
Notes

1 I have used the Cambridge UP edition of *Women in Love* for all quotations and have not altered, nor noted, the alternate British spelling.

2 This is but one example in which Gerald and Gudrun's dialogue foreshadows Gerald's impending doom and their failed relationship as well as contrasting Ursula and Birkin's dialogue--another way the reader can see how the opposing couples illustrate and build Lawrence's theory. Also see the "Water-Party" Chapter, p. 177 and the "Snow Chapter, p. 408.

3 "The deadly action-reaction syndrome seems a characteristic of Birkin's linguistic attempt to taboo the word 'love' and start from scratch with a new concept and word to replace it. . . . Language seems like . . . a cul-de-sac out of which Birkin cannot escape in naming how he wants to be beyond love, love remains the central principle" (Ragussis 178).

4 To reinforce Birkin's initial statement of theory and to extend the dialogue between Ursula and Birkin, Lawrence uses the encounter between Birkin's Mino and a female stray as a metaphor for Birkin and Ursula's relationship and Lawrence's theory of human relationships.

5 The notion of conjunction and opposition are expressed in WIL, first by Birkin's "two single equal stars balanced in conjunction" (151) and then by the narrator's description of Gerald and Gudrun: "He seemed to balance her perfectly in opposition to himself" (329) and "their being balanced in separation, in the boat" (177). Birkin's "in conjunction" implies a union, whereas the narrator's "in opposition" implies alienation, not equilibrium.

6 It is important to note that in "Man to Man" (as well as elsewhere in the novel) Birkin also strives to define an intimate relationship between man and man, specifically between himself and Gerald Critch. However a full discussion of Birkin's quest is not germane to this study except to point out that the same criteria hold whether Birkin (or Lawrence) is discussing a relationship between male and female or between male and male. (Also see prologue to WIL, Phoenix II.)

7 There is some irony at play here in Lawrence's sexual rhetoric. In an effort to elevate the sexual encounter to a spiritual plane, Lawrence uses phrases--"comes out," a "flower opened," "died a little death," "come to her," and
"his throw"—that do double duty as orgastic references.

8 In Fantasia's ch. 3 and Psychoanalysis' ch. 4, Lawrence extends his discussion of the body centers and their roles through the mother and infant relationship, our primary introduction into the world of relationships.

9 "When he makes love to Gudrun, however he does not achieve connection with her. He uses her for his 'relief' and becomes like a child 'soothed and restored'... For [Gudrun] has not given herself up, and she can only envy and feel jealous hatred for Gerald, given peace in childlike unconsciousness" (Schneider 184-185).

10 In WIL's "Class-Room" Chapter, Birkin makes this same contrast between the authentic unconscious (Lawrence's) and Freud's mentally derived unconscious (considered to be artificial by Lawrence): "There's the whole difference in the world... between the actual sensual being, and the vicious mental-deliberate profligacy our lot goes in for... You've got to learn not-to-be, before you can come into being" (WIL 94).

11 Within the essay itself Lawrence alludes perhaps defensively to his own digressions, i.e., pp. 46 & 102.

12 The point made by both Hinz and Mills regarding the chronology of the essays is significant and worth noting. The placement of Fantasia before Psychoanalysis in one book may be misleading to readers, since Psychoanalysis was written before Fantasia. To note their difference, the essays need to be read and considered in the order that Lawrence actually wrote them.

13 Both essays are filled with examples of this hedging, i.e. Fantasia, p. 20: In spite of his strong claim that the unconscious begins at the moment of fusion, Lawrence claims not to know where he comes from, repeatedly claiming ignorance of his origin; and in Psychoanalysis, p. 212, after claiming that the "true unconscious" is the "spontaneous life motive," Lawrence says that "life is inconceivable"—it can't be defined.

14 Less obtrusive in Psychoanalysis is the distancing indefinite pronoun "one" that WIL's narrator sometimes intermingles with his "we" assertions. The indefinite "one" is more conducive to non-fiction discourse than in WIL where the "one" creates a distancing by the narrator and a didactic tone that does not flow with the narrative experience.

15 Ellis also explains that Lawrence borrowed phrases
from the reviews, parroting them in his "Foreword": "a revolting mass of wordy nonsense" and "pollyanalytics," for example (72 & 85).

Lawrence's own awareness of his esoteric ideas is reflected in the "Pompadour" Chapter of WIL when Birkin's letters are mimicked and ridiculed by others: "[Those] phrases are too absurdly wonderful. . . . they're nearly as good as Jesus" (383) and "He is a megalomaniac . . . it is a form of religious mania. He thinks he is the savior of man" (384).

"His fiction provided him, he said, with the living data, the passional experience, from which his 'subjective science' was deduced. But if he deduced his laws of psychology from life, 'life' as it appears in his fiction is seen always through the lens of these laws" (Schneider, preface, p. x).

i.e., see The Study of Thomas Hardy and "The Crown" written and completed during 1914-1915.

"[There] is an attitude of intellectual superiority involved in presuming that Lawrence's interests and ideas can be understood apart from his so-called 'eccentric habits of language'" (Bonds 4).
Works Cited


Other Works Consulted


